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Abstract 
The adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
2007 has shifted the attention oflndigenous rights scholars from norm elaboration to norm 
implementation. Yet, the influence of the United Nations Human Rights Council ' s special 
procedures in actualising Indigenous rights norm implementation remains under-researched. I 
investigate how the non-coercive and resource-poor special procedures regulate - or influence -
state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. I depart from the existing international law corpus 
by drawing on regulatory literature. Contrary to rationalist theories, I find that the apparently 
weak international mechanism of the special procedures regulates state behaviour towards 
Indigenous peoples imperfectly but appreciably. However, I argue that ritualism is states' 
dominant response: states outwardly agree with the special procedures ' recommendations while 
inwardly developing techniques to avoid them. I conclude that the special procedures 
mechanism is capable of exerting enhanced influence over state behaviour towards Indigenous 
peoples and propose strategies to that end. The findings are based on case studies regarding the 
special procedures ' influence in Aotearoa New Zealand and the Republic of Guatemala. 
The special procedures mechanism enjoys a broad mandate to advance the realisation of 
international Indigenous rights norms. In fulfilling this mandate the special procedures experts 
leverage a mixed dialogic tool-set; principally engaging techniques of shaming, in addition to 
dialogue-building and capacity-building. The experts ' influence on state behaviour towards 
Indigenous peoples is perceptible in Aotearoa New Zealand and the Republic of Guatemala. But 
each state engages in ritualism both to disguise its inward resistance to recommendations 
regarding 'hard' rights to self-determination and land and its failure to fully commit to 
recommendations concerning the 'soft' cultural right to education. A complex collection of 
factors explain the experts' imperfect influence: key actors are not engaged, the core principles 
underlying states' responses to the experts ' recommendations are not contested and important 
regulatory mechanisms are under-exploited. The analysis indicates that, by harnessing dialogic 
'webs of influence' , comparatively weak actors like the special procedures can influence 
powerful actors, such as states. It also reveals that, to counter states ' rights ritualism, the special 
procedures should simultaneously shame and praise states, fostering continuous improvement in 
observing Indigenous rights. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
A Addressing the Indigenous Rights 'Implementation Gap ' 
Indigenous peoples' rights now form part of the lexicon of international human rights 
law. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), adopted 
by the General Assembly (GA) in 2007, is the most comprehensive articulation of their 
contours. 1 Its adoption has shifted the attention of Indigenous rights scholars from the 
elaboration of international Indigenous peoples' rights norms to their implementation. 2 
Intensified efforts at implementation are vital. In the last four decades Indigenous peoples have 
secured remarkable standard-setting and institution-building achievements on the international 
stage. Along with the UNDRIP, Indigenous peoples' rights have been affirmed in the 
jurisprudence of the bodies that monitor compliance with the core United Nations (UN) human 
rights treaties, amongst others, and a collection of UN mechanisms have been established with 
an exclusive focus on advancing the position of Indigenous peoples and their rights.3 But, in 
their home states, many of the world's estimated 370 million Indigenous peoples remain at the 
margins of power and overrepresented in negative socio-economic indicators.4 This disconnect 
has been described as the Indigenous rights 'implementation gap' .5 
The gap between the international commitment to norms and their domestic 
implementation is not unique to Indigenous peoples' rights. Empirical studies confirm that 
1 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples GA Res 61 /295, UN GAOR, 61 st sess, 107th plen 
mtg, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2010) (' UNDRIP'). The referencing style used in this 
dissertation complies with the Australian Guide to Legal Citation: Third Edition. In this text I capitalise the word 
'Indigenous' to show that it is being used as a proper noun, to reference a unique people or collection of peoples, 
rather than as an adjective to describe a 'thing' that originates in a place. 
2 See, eg, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 'Making the Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples Work: The Challenge 
Ahead' in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing, 2011) 14 7, 150-51; Irene Bellier and Martin Preaud, 'Emerging Issues in 
Indigenous Rights: Transformative Effects of the Recognition oflndigenous Peoples' (2011) 16(3) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 474,474; Luis Rodrfguez-Pifiero, "'Where Appropriate" : Monitoring/Implementing of 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights under the Declaration' in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the 
Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affairs: IWGIA, 2009) 314,314,329. 
3 See generally S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2 ed, 2004); 
Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 2002); Jeremie Gilbert, 
Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors (Transnational Publishers, 2006); 
Alexandra Xanthaki , 'Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments' 
(2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 27; Sarah Pritchard (ed), Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations 
and Human Rights (The Federation Press, 1998); Siegfried Wiessner, 'Rights and Status oflndigenous Peoples: A 
Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis' (1999) 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal 57; Robert A 
Williams, 'Encounters on the Frontiers oflnternational Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms oflndigenous 
Peoples' Survival in the World' (1990) Duke Law Journal 660; Russel L Barsh, 'Current Developments: Indigenous 
Peoples: An Emerging Object oflnternational Law' (1986) 80 The American Journal of International Law 369; Hurst 
Hannum, 'New Developments in Indigenous Rights' (1988) 28 Virginia Journal of International Law 649. 
4 See, eg Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, State of the World's 
Indigenous Peoples (United Nations Secretariat, 2009). 
5 Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights ('CHR' ), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/78 (16 February 2006) [14] ('Stavenhagen Annual Report 2006'). 
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states do not consistently comply with their international obligations, especially in the field of 
human rights.6 The motivations behind state compliance with international norms - understood 
expansively as standards of behaviour - have been the subject of increased focus amongst 
international law, international relations and, more latterly, sociology scholars. 7 These scholars 
have distinguished two broad approaches to understanding state conformity to international 
norms: rationalism and constructivism. In essence, rationalists argue that states, as rational 
actors, will only comply with international norms that are in their national interests. 8 There are 
different variations ofrationalist explanations. One of its most prominent strands argues that 
state compliance is dictated by economic or military coercion, or the norm' s accordance with 
the state ' s rational self-interest, with ' self-interest' understood restrictively as advancement of 
the state' s economic and military power.9 Such positions struggle to explain those instances 
where states comply with international norms absent coercion or furtherance of this narrow self-
interest. In particular, human rights norms often entail the relinquishment of economic or 
military power by states and even binding human rights treaties lack the spectre of institutional 
coercive enforcement. In contrast, constructivist approaches argue that norms help to constitute 
state identities and that these identities then shape political action. 1° Constructivists 
acknowledge that state interests and power disparities matter, but do not view them alone as 
determinative of state behaviour. 11 There are different variations of constructivist explanations. 
But they are united in their tendency to emphasise the important role of the interaction of 
various actors, including resource-poor non-state actors, in influencing states ' norm 
1. 12 comp iance. 
Inspired by the possibilities opened up by a constructivist approach to norm 
compliance, I explore how the international human rights system regulates - or influences -
state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. I do so in order to understand whether the 
international human rights system may be leveraged to secure improved domestic 
implementation of international Indigenous peoples ' rights norms. I focus on the influence of 
one mechanism within the international human rights system: the UN Human Rights Council 's 
6 See, eg, Oona A Hathaway, 'Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?' (200 1-2002) 11 1 Yale Law Journal 
1935; Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing/or Human Rights: 
International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2009). 
7 For comment on the definition of 'norms' see Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J Toope, 'Constructivism and International 
Law' in Jeffrey L Dun off and Mark A Pollack ( eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and 
International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge Uni vers ity Press, 20 12) 119, 11 9. 
8 I explore these two approaches in more depth in Chapter II. For now, regarding ratio nal ist approaches see, eg, Jack 
L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005). 9 See, eg, ib id 3-6; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories' in Rildiger Wolfrum (ed), Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 20 11 ) [2]-[3]. 
10 See generally Brunnee and Toope, above n 7, 12 1, 129; John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang 
Together? eo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Chall enge' (1998) 52(4) International Organization 855, 
869-70. 
11 Slaughter, above n 9, [21]. 
12 See, eg, Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Cornell University Press, 1998); Haro ld Hongj u Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 
106 Yale Law Journal 2599. 
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(HRC) special procedures (special procedures). 13 The special procedures are independent 
experts charged by the UN with monitoring and promoting human rights either on a thematic or 
a country basis. First established in the late 1960s, they commonly fulfil their role by 
conducting country missions to investigate human rights issues; through a communications 
process that involves receiving information on allegations of human rights violations and 
requesting state governments to clarify the facts; promoting best practice through technical 
advisory assistance and dialogue; and preparing thematic reports on topical rights issues. 14 In 
their country reports and the advice they offer in the course of providing technical advisory 
assistance they can issue recommendations to specific state governments to promote the 
realisation of international Indigenous peoples' rights norms. But they do not have the mandated 
power to economically or militarily coerce state compliance with their proposals: their 
propositions are recommendatory only and they receive sparse institutional funding. 15 
The special procedures are an apt mechanism to study in an effort to investigate how the 
international human rights system regulates state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. They 
have global reach unshackled by the requirement that the state under study has ratified a 
particular human rights treaty. 16 They are unusual in that the experts receive their mandates 
from the UN and operate under its banner, with some support from the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). But the experts function in their personal capacity, 
without a UN salary, giving them a level of flexibility uncommon in the international system. 17 
The special procedures have an express mandate regarding Indigenous peoples' rights. Their 
parent body has called on all thematic mandate-holders to pay particular attention to the 
situation of Indigenous peoples within the framework of their mandates. 18 And, in 2001 , the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples) was established to 
investigate and report on Indigenous peoples' rights. 19 This mandate continues. It was held first 
by the sociologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen and, since 2008, by the legal scholar James Anaya. The 
13 In this research I refer to those individuals who hold or held special procedures mandates variously as ' experts ' and 
'mandate-holders' as well as by their specific titles, such as 'Special Rapporteur' and 'Working Group' member. I 
discuss the experts' different titles in Chapter III. 
14 See, eg, Surya P Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs' (2011) 
33 Human Rights Quarterly 201, 213-16. I discuss these working methods in Chapter IV. 
15 See, eg, Ted Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of 
Human Rights Norms' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 206, 209-10, 224-25. 
16 See, eg, Miko Lempinen, Challenges Facing the System a/Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights (Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 2001) 1. 
17 See, eg, Joanna Naples-Mitchell, 'Perspectives of UN Special Rapporteurs on their Role: Inherent Tensions and 
Unique Contributions to Human Rights' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 232, 232-34. 
18 International Year of the World's Indigenous People, 1993, CHR Res 1993/30, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1993/30 (5 
March 1993) para 2 ('CHR Res 1993/30' ). 
19 Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001/57 (24 April 2001) ('CHR 
Res 2001/57'). The mandate was renewed in 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2013 (with the title of the mandate changed in 
2010), see Chapter III. In this dissertation, except for citation purposes, I use the abbreviated titles set out in the 
Abbreviations when referring to the individual mandates of the special procedures experts . Given the length of many 
of the mandates' titles, only the title of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples is definedin the 
body of this dissertation. 
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mechanism has also been praised for its efficacy in the realisation of human rights. Former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the special procedures as the 'crown jewel' of the UN 
human rights machinery, and Amnesty International has called them ' a critical element in the 
implementation of international human rights standards' .20 Yet, there is a dearth of empirical 
academic research critically analysing the influence of the special procedures on state 
behaviour, especially in relation to Indigenous peoples. 
B Research Context 
A growing body of literature examines the special procedures. The earliest scholarship 
examines the historical development of the initial mandates, including concerning Chile, 
enforced disappearances, torture and arbitrary detention. 21 Several larger works on the 
international system outline the core features of the mechanism, including edited texts by Philip 
Alston, Janusz Symonides and Julie Mertus. 22 A collection of articles and book chapters 
2° Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, 'Secretary-General Urges Human Rights Activists to 'Fill Leadership 
Vacuum', Hold World Leaders to Account, in Address to International Day Event', (Media Release, UN Doc 
SG/SM/10788, 8 December 2006); Amnesty International , Organization of the Work of the Session: Written 
Statement Submitted by Amnesty International, a Non-Governmental Organization in Special Consultative Status, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/NGO/250 (27 March 2006) 2. 
21 Marc Bossuyt, 'The Development of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights' (1985) 6 Human Rights Law Journal 179; Toine van Dongen, 'In Laatste Instantie: Verdwijningen en de Verenigde 
Naties' (1986) 40 Internationale Spectator 468; Menno T Kamminga, 'The Thematic Procedures of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights' (1987) 34 Netherlands International Law Review 299; Sir Nigel S Rodley, 'United 
Nations Action Procedures Against "Disappearances," Summary or Arbitrary Executions, and Torture' (1986) 8 
Human Rights Quarterly 700; David Weissbrodt, 'The Three "Theme" Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights' (1986) 80(3) The American Journal of International Law 685 ; David Weissbrodt, 'Country-Related 
and Thematic Developments at the 1988 Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights' (1988) 10( 4) Human 
Rights Quarterly 544; Reed Brody, 'The United Nations Creates a Working Group on Arbitrary Detention' (1991) 
85( 4) The American Journal of International Law 709; Jose Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, 'Les Procedures Publiques 
Speciales de la Commission des Droits de !'Homme des Nations Unies' (1991 -III) 28 Receuil des Cours 182; Joan 
Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Allison L Jernow, 'Ad Hoc and Extra-Conventional Means for Human 
Rights Monitoring' (1995-1996) 28 Journal of International Law and Politics 785; Beate Rudolf, 'The Thematic 
Rapporteurs and Working Groups of the United Nations Commiss ion on Human Rights' in J A Frowein and R 
Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) 289; Manfred 
Nowak, 'Country-Oriented Human Rights Protection by the UN Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-
Commission' (1991 ) 22 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 39; Reed Brody, Penny Parker and David 
Weissbrodt, 'Major Developments in 1990 at the UN Commission on Human Rights' (1990) 12(4) Human Rights Quarterly 559. 
22 Philip Alston ( ed), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford University Press, 1992); 
Tom Farer and Feli ce Gaer, 'The UN and Human Rights: At the End of the Beginning' in Adam Roberts and Bened ict 
Kingsbury (eds), United Nations, Divided World (Clarendon Press, 1993) 240; Janusz Symon ides ( ed), Human 
Rights: International Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement (Ashgate, 2003); Theo van Boven, 'United Nations 
Strategies to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination; A Sobering but not Hopeless Balance-Sheet' in Monique 
Castermans-Holleman, Fried van Hoof and Jacqueline Smith ( eds), The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Centwy: 
Human Rights, International Organisations and Foreign Policy. Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr (Kluwer Law 
International , 2003) 25 1; Julie A Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for a New Era (Routledge, 
2 ed, 2009); Manfred Nowak (ed), Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (Martinus Nij hoff, 2003); 
Sir Nigel S Radley, 'The Evolution of United Nations' Charter-based Machinery for the Protection of Human Rights' 
in Frances Butler (ed), Human Rights Protection: Methods and Effectiveness (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 187; 
Louis Joinet, 'The UN Special Rapporteurs' in Li nos-Alexandre Sicilianos ( ed), The Prevention of Human Rights 
Violations (Ant N Sakkoulas Publishers; Martin us Nij hoff Publishers, 200 I) 91; Olivier De Schutter, In ternational 
Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentmy (Cambridge University Press, 20 1 O); David Weissbrodt and 
Connie de la Vega, International Human Rights Law: An Introduction (Uni versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); 
David Weissbrodt, Joan Fitzpatrick and Frank Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process 
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examine the mechanism's different aspects. A few focus on particular country mandates, 
including Surya Subedi, Hilary Charlesworth and Michael Kirby's separate analyses of the 
mandate of the expert on Cambodia.23 Some scholars focus on singular thematic mandates, such 
as the experts on torture, internally displaced persons or freedom ofreligion.24 Others focus on 
the special procedures' role in promoting particular rights, such as migrants' rights, 
environmental rights or economic, social and cultural rights. 25 A sizeable number devote 
attention to the role of the experts in the context of conflicts, including Joan Fitzpatrick, Alston, 
Jason Morgan-Foster, William Abresch and Michael O'Flaherty.26 Several also look at 
particular issues relating to the mandates.27 For example, Sir Nigel Rodley analyses the 
relationship between the special procedures and the human rights treaty bodies, 28 while Alston, 
(Anderson Publishing Co, 3 ed, 2001); Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions: Between Remedy and 
Ritual (Polity, 2007); Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman (eds), International Human Rights in 
Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford University Press, 3 ed, 2008); Felipe Gomez Isa and Koen de Feyter (eds), 
International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges (University ofDeusto, 2006). 
23 Surya P Subedi, 'The UN Human Rights Mandate in Cambodia: The Challenge of a Country in Transition and the 
Experience of the Special Rapporteur for the Country' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 249; 
Hilary Charlesworth, 'Kirby Lecture in International Law - Swimming to Cambodia: Justice and Ritual in Human 
Rights After Conflict' (2010) 29 The Australian Year Book of International Law I ; Michael Kirby, 'UN Special 
Procedures - Reflections on the Office of the UN Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia' (2010) 11 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 491. 
24 Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, 'Special Rapporteurs as Law Makers: The Developments and Evolution of the 
Normative Framework for Protecting and Assisting Internally Displaced Persons' (2011) 15(2) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 286; Jared M Genser and Margaret K Winterkorn-Meikle, 'The Intersection of Politics and 
International Law: The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in Theory and in Practice' (2008) 39 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 687; Amrita Mukherjee, 'The Fact-Finding Missions of the Special Rapporteur 
on Torture' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 265; Michael Wiener, 'The Mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief - Institutional, Procedural and Substantive Legal Issues' (2007) 
2(2) Religion and Human Rights 3; Gabriela Rodriguez, 'The Role of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants' (2000) 38(6) International Migration 73. 
25 Taryn Lesser, 'The Role of United Nations Special Procedures in Protecting the Human Rights of Migrants' (2010) 
28(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 139; Caroline Oommen, 'Claiming Environmental Rights: Some Possibilities Offered 
by the United Nations' Human Rights Mechanisms' (1998) 11 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 
l ; Christophe Golay, Claire Mahon and Joana Cismas, 'The Impact of the UN Special Procedures on the 
Development and Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (2011) 15(2) International Journal of 
Human Rights 299; Christophe Golay, Irene Biglino and Ivona Truscan, 'The Contribution of the UN Special 
Procedures to the Human Rights and Development Dialogue' (2012) 9(17) Sur - International Journal on Human 
Rights 15. 
26 Joan Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States of 
Emergency (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Claire Breen, 'Revitalising the United Nations Human Rights 
Special Procedures Mechanisms as a Means of Achieving and Maintaining International Peace and Security' (2008) 
12 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 177; Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster and William Abresch, 'The 
Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in relation to Armed Conflicts: 
Extrajudicial Executions in the 'War on Terror" (2008) 19(1) The European Journal of International Law 183 ; 
Bertrand Ramcharan, 'The Special Rapporteurs and Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights and Human Security' in Bertrand Ramcharan (ed), Human Rights and Human Security (Kluwer Law 
International, 2002) 81; Michael O'Flaherty, 'Future Protection of Human Rights in Post-Conflict Societies: The Role 
of the United Nations' (2003) 3(1) Human Rights Law Review 53; Hurst Hannum, 'Human Rights in Conflict 
Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and 
Peacebuilding' (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 1. 
27 See, eg, Rhona KM Smith, 'The Possibilities of an Independent Special Rapp01ieur Scheme' (2011) 15(2) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 172; Surya P Subedi et al, 'The Role of the Special Rapporteurs of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council in the Development and Promotion oflnternational Human Rights Norms' (2011) 
15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 155; Lyal S Sunga, 'How can UN human rights special procedures 
sharpen ICC fact-finding?' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 187; Markus Schmidt, 'Follow 
Up Activities by UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures Mechanisms of the Human Rights Council 
- Recent Developments' in Gudmundur Alfredsson et al (eds), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: 
Essays in Honour of Jakob Th Moller (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2 ed, 2009) 25. 
28 Sir Nigel Rodley, 'UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights -
Complementarity or Competition' (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 882; Sir Nigel Rodley, 'The United Nations 
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Sir Nigel Radley and Elvira Dominguez Redondo consider the responsibilities that attach to the 
experts.29 A generous selection of scholars explore the impact of the disbandment of the 
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) - the special procedures' former parent body - and its 
replacement with the HRC on the mechanism,30 as well as the impact of the HRC's institutional 
reviews.3 1 An assortment of mandate-holders have provided personal reflections on their time 
holding mandates, including John Gerard Ruggie (as the expert on transnational corporations), 
Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (as the expert on Burundi and then Myanmar) and Katarina Tomasevski 
(as the expert on education). 32 Olivier de Frouville, Patrick Flood, Beate Rudolf, Miko 
Human Rights Council, its Special Procedures and its Relationship with Treaty Bodies : Complementarity or 
Competition?' in Kevin Boyle (ed), New Institutions for Human Rights Protection (Oxford University Press, 2009) 
49. 
29 Philip Alston, 'Hobbling the Monitors: Should UN Human Rights Monitors be Accountable?' (2011) 52(2) 
Harvard International Law Journal 561; Sir Nigel S Rodley, 'On the Responsibility of Special Rapporteurs' (2011) 
15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 319; Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, 'UN Public Special Procedures 
under Damocles' Sword - Two Particular Innovations: Mechanisms for the Appointment of Mandate-Holders and the 
Adoption ofa Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-Holders of the Human Rights Council' (2008) 29(1) 
Human Rights Law Journal 32. 
30 Philip Alston, 'Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New Human Rights 
Council' (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 185; Claire Callejon, 'Developments at the Human Rights 
Council in 2007: A Reflection of its Ambivalence' (2008) 8(2) Human Rights Law Review 323; Nazila Ghanea, 'From 
UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council : One Step Forwards or Two Steps Sideways' 
(2006) 55(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 695; Jeroen Gutter, 'Special Procedures and the Human 
Rights Council: Achievements and Challenges Ahead' (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 93; Francoise J 
Hampson, 'An Overview of the Reform of the UN Human Rights Machinery' (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 7; 
Hurst Hannum, 'Reforming the Special Procedures and Mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights' (2007) 
7(1) Human Rights Law Review 73; Oliver Hoehne, 'Special Procedures and the New Human Rights Council - A 
Need for Strategic Positioning' (2007) 4(1) Essex Human Rights Review 48; Paul Gordon Lauren, "'To Preserve and 
Build on its Achievements and to Redress its Shortcomings": The Journey from the Commission on Human Rights to 
the Human Rights Council' (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 307; Ibrahim Salama, 'Institutional Re-engineering for 
Effective Human Rights Monitoring: Proposals for the Unfinished Business under the ''New" Human Rights Council' 
in Gudmundur Alfredsson et al (eds), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of 
Jakob Th Moller (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2 ed, 2009) 185; Patrizia Scannella and Peter Splinter, 'The United 
Nations Human Rights Council: A Promise to be Fulfilled' (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 41; Katherine 
Short, 'From Commission to Council: Has the United Nations Succeeded in Creating a Credible Human Rights 
Body?' (2008) 9 Sur - Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos 146; Helen Upton, 'The Human Rights Council: 
First Impressions and Future Challenges' (2007) 7(1) Human Rights Law Review 29; Lyal S Sunga, 'What Effect if 
Any Will the UN Human Rights Council Have on Special Procedures?' in Gudmundur Alfredsson et al (eds), 
International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th Moller (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2 ed, 2009) 169; Elvira Dominguez Redondo, 'Rethinking the Legal Foundations of Control in 
International Human Rights Law - The Case of Special Procedures' (2011) 29(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 261. 
31 Ingrid Nifosi-Sutton, 'The System of the UN Special Procedures: Some Proposals for Change' in M Cherif 
Bassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery (Intersentia, 2011) 
3 89-417; Tania Baldwin-Pask and Patrizia Scannell a, 'The Unfinished Business of a Special Procedures System' in M 
CherifBassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machine1y (lntersentia, 
2011) 419; David Weissbrodt, 'United Nations Charter-Based Procedures for Addressing Human Rights Violations: 
Historical Practice, Reform, and Future Implications' in Geoff Gi lbert, Franc,:oise Hampson and Clara Sandoval (eds), 
The Delivery of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Professor Sir Nigel Radley (Routledge, 2011) 13 ; Patrick Flood, 
'The UN Human Rights Counc il : What Would Eleanor Roosevelt Say?: The UN Human Rights Council : ls its 
Mandate Wei I-Designed?' (2009) 15(2) ILSA Journal International and Comparative Law 4 71; Rhona Smith, 'From 
'Crown Jewel ' to 'Frankenstein 's Monster' : Reviewing, Rationalising and Improving the Role of the UN Special 
Procedures' (2011) 17(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 33; Bertrand G Ramcharan, The UN Human Rights 
Council (Routledge, 20 11 ); Subedi et al, above n 27 ; Lyal S Sunga, 'Introduction to the "Lund Statement to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council on the Human Rights Special Procedures"' (2007) 76 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 281. 
32 John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (W W Norton & Company, 
Inc, 20 13); Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 'Musings of a UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights' (2003) 9 Global 
Governance 7; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 'Being a Special Rapporteur: A Delicate Balancing Act' (2011) 15(2) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 162; Katarina Tomasevski, 'Has the Right to Education a Future Within the 
United Nations? A Behind-the-Scenes Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998-2004' 
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Lempinen, Ingrid Nifosi, Dominguez Redondo, J eroen Gutter and Bertrand Ramcharan offer 
book-length accounts of the historical evolution, legal foundations and contemporary 
organisation of the special procedures mechanism. 33 These accounts provide important context 
on the mechanism. 
The literature offers much general comment on the special procedures' role in 
actualising the implementation of international human rights norms, mostly positive. But there 
is little sophisticated assessment of this influence. For example, David Weissbrodt argues that 
'the thematic special procedures directly affect the policy and practices of governments' ,34 
O'Flaherty that 'examples can be cited of their activities having a favorable impact in state 
practice' ,35 and Subedi that the experts 'significantly impact the enjoyment of human rights' .36 
Authors such as Weissbrodt and Subedi are well positioned to make an assessment, having held 
special procedures mandates. However, other former mandate-holders are more circumspect 
about the mechanism's impact. For example, Pinheiro has remarked that '[a]fter issuing 
recommendations for 13 years, I became increasingly tired of this exercise that had become a 
(2005) 5(2) Human Rights Law Review 205; Subedi, 'The UN Human Rights Mandate in Cambodia: The Challenge 
of a Country in Transition and the Experience of the Special Rapporteur for the Country' above n 23 ; Jean Ziegler et 
al, The Fight for the Right to Food: Lessons Learned (Pal grave Macmillan, 2011 ); Kirby, above n 23; Manfred 
Nowak, 'Monitoring Disappearances - The Difficult Path from Clarifying Cases to Effectively Preventing Future 
Ones' (1996) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 348; Theo van Boven, 'Urgent Appeals on Behalf of Torture 
Victims' in Luigi Condorelli et al (ed), Libertes, Justice, Tolerance: Melanges en Hommage au Doyen Gerard 
Cohen-Jonathan, Volume II (Bruylant, 2004) 1651; Paul Hunt and Rajat Khosla, 'Holding Pharmaceutical Companies 
to Account: A UN Special Rapporteur's Mission to GlaxoSmithKline' in Geoff Gilbert, Francoise Hampson and Clara 
Sandoval (eds), The Delivery of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Professor Sir Nigel Radley (Routledge, 2011) 
39; Alston, Morgan-Foster and Abresch, above n 26. For additional contributions that contain personal reflections, or 
projections, by mandate-holders see Natassia Rozario, 'A Conversation with Anand Grover, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health' (2011) 5(1) Health Law and Policy Brief 57; Naples-Mitchell, 'Perspectives of UN 
Special Rapporteurs on their Role: Inherent Tensions and Unique Contributions to Human Rights', above n 17; 
Joanna Naples-Mitchell, Defining Rights in Real Time: The UN Special Procedures' Contribution to the International 
Human Rights System (Senior Thesis, Harvard College, 2010); Paul Hunt, 'The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Health: Key Objectives, Themes, and Interventions' (2003) 7(1) Health and Human Rights l. 
33 Olivier de Frouville, Les Procedures Thematiques: Une Contribution Effi Cace des Nations Unies a la Protection 
des Droits de I 'Homme (Editions A Pedone, 1996); Patrick J Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights 
Institutions (Praeger Publishers, 1998); Lempinen, above n 16; Ingrid Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field 
of Human Rights (Intersentia, 2005); Beate Rudolf, Die Thematischen Berichterstatter und Arbeitsgruppen der UN-
Menschenrechtskommission: Ihr Beitrag zur Fortentwicklung des Internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes (Springer, 
2000);·Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, Los Procedimientos Publicos Especiales de la Comision de Derechos Humanos 
de Naciones Unidas (Ti rant lo Blanch, 2005); Jeroen Gutter, Thematic Procedures of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights and International Law: In Search of a Sense of Community (Intersentia, 2006); Bertrand G 
Ramcharan, The Protection Roles of UN Human Rights Special Procedures (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009). I 
owe an intellectual debt to Naples-Mitchell whose canvas of the core literature on the special procedures inspired 
several of the categorisations used in this paragraph. Naples-Mitchell, Defining Rights in Real Time: The UN Special 
Procedures ' Contribution to the International Human Rights System, above n 32. 
34 Weissbrodt, 'United Nations Charter-Based Procedures for Addressing Human Rights Violations: Historical 
Practice, Reform, and Future Implications', above n 31, 33. 
35 Michael O'Flaherty, 'Future Protection of Human Rights in Post-Conflict Societies: The Role of the United Nations' 
(2003) 3(1) Human Rights Law Review 53, 68. 
36 Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs' , above n 14, 223. See 
also, eg, Bertrand G Ramcharan, The Protection Role of National Human Rights Institutions (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009) 123-24; Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 25, 311 ; Kirby, above n 23, 493; Gutter, Thematic 
Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and International Law: In Search of a Sense of 
Community, above n 33, 349-50; Ramcharan, 'The Special Rapporteurs and Special Procedures of the United.Nations 
Commission on Human Rights and Human Security', above n 26, 81. 
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sort ofritual or repeated mantra with hardly any consequence. ' 37 Greater attention is devoted to 
the issue of impact in several of the book-length works. Flood, whose 1998 text focuses on the 
experts on enforced disappearances, religious intolerance, Chile and Iran argues 'that these 
mechanisms constitute an increasingly influential deterrent to human rights abuse by states. '38 
Nifosi, writing in 2005 regarding the first country procedures as well as the mandates on 
enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary detention, the Congo, and 
the former Yugoslavia, concludes that the experts' impact on the improvement of domestic 
human rights situations is 'significant' .39 She cites developments in Bhutan and Chile as 
examples.40 Gutter's 2006 contribution examining the work of the mandates on enforced 
disappearances, torture and arbitrary detention is more pessimistic, describing their effect as 
'extremely modest';41 although his concern is more on state cooperation with the experts, which 
is a related but distinct question. The overriding impression is of a mechanism capable of 
bringing about human rights improvements. Yet, none of these scholars engage with the 
theoretical literature on norm implementation; where examples of influence are given, none 
explicitly outline how the causal link between the experts' efforts and the claimed rights 
improvement was drawn; and many are reliant on UN documents as the source of the 
improvements cited.42 
The most rigorous and comprehensive empirical work on the special procedures' 
influence on states' domestic human rights behaviour is a 20 IO study by the Brookings 
Institution led by Ted Piccone. Its findings are published in both report and book form through 
the Brookings Institution,43 and in abridged form in The International Journal of Human 
Rights.44 The study analysed the influence of two of the special procedures' working methods 
37 Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 'Being a Special Rapporteur: A Delicate Balancing Act', above n 32, 169. See also 
Kamminga, above n 21, 317-19; Charlesworth, above n 23, 9, 12-4. 
38 Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions, above n 33, 130. 
39 Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above n 33, 152. 
40 Ibid 141-43 . Lempinen shares a similarly positive view of the special procedures' work but he emphasises their 
role as an awareness-raising tool so judges them against this function only. Lempinen, above n 16, 1, 11, 119, 285-86. 41 Gutter, Thematic Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and International Law: In 
Search of a Sense of Community, above n 33, 350. One journal article also considers the issue of impact in some 
depth but it is narrow in focus, examining only the Working Group on arbitrary detention, and it is not a 
comprehensive study: it looks at just four cases where the Working Group is argued to have contributed to securing 
the release of individuals from detention. Genser and Winterkom-Meikle, above n 24, 716-39. 
42 See, eg, Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above n 33, 137 n 64. Flood's analysis is 
distinguishable from the other literature in that it is based on focused case studies, where the competing influence of 
domestic and other factors are given some consideration. Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions, 
above n 33, 49-115. Jared Genser and Margaret Winterkom-Meikle provide the best elaboration of the connection 
between the special procedures' efforts and the claimed rights improvement, and draw on sources beyond UN 
documents in support of their analysis. But, as noted above, their focus is narrow and is not presented as a 
comprehensive study. Genser and Winterkom-Meikle, above n 24, 716-39. 
43 Ted Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights (The Brookings Institution, 20 IO); Theodore J Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts 
Promote Human Rights (Brookings Institution Press, 2012). The book builds on the report' s findings to explore in 
more depth the factors that impact the influence of the mechanism. 
44 Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights 
No,ms', above n 15. Piccone also comments, briefly, on the study's findings in Ted Piccone, 'Why Are Special 
Human Rights Procedures So Special' in A Global Agenda: Issues Before the United Nations 2011-2012 (The United 
Nations Association of the USA, 2011) 59. 
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on a selection of states: the recommendations made by the experts following their country 
missions and their communications. The team's field visits to five states and extensive 
interviews (more than 200, including with nearly 30 current and former special procedures 
mandate-holders) distinguish the study from the other literature commenting on the experts' 
influence.45 The study concluded that 'the special procedures mechanism represents one of the 
most effective tools of the international human rights system' playing 'a direct, positive but 
uneven role in influencing government behaviour. ' 46 The team found that '[i]n general, states 
have made modest but important progress toward implementing the recommendations a special 
procedure makes after a country visit', gathering 'numerous examples of positive steps taken by 
governments after the issue was raised during an SP's [special procedures'] country visit.' 47 But 
communications, although having 'some limited impact on influencing state behaviour ... in 
general are ineffective. ' 48 Again, the theoretical literature on norm implementation is not 
discussed; the causal link between the experts' efforts and the claimed rights improvement is 
rarely set out; and, despite the field visits and interviews, there is still an overreliance on UN 
documents as the source of the improvements cited.49 Further, examples of the mechanism's 
impact are drawn from across the mandates and the globe, even beyond those states to which the 
team conduced field visits, opening the study up to accusations that it 'cherry picks' examples 
of the mechanism's impact. Limitations such as these prompted Alston to observe, in 2011, that 
'[i]t is ... difficult. .. to understand why virtually no scholarly evaluation studies of the impact of 
reporting by Special Procedures mandate-holders have been undertaken.' 50 He went on, 'all that 
are available are anecdotal accounts of instances in which government policies have been 
reversed, individuals released, and prosecutions undertaken, subsequent to reporting by Special 
Procedures mandate-holders.' 51 
45 The team conducted field visits to Spain, Morocco, the United Kingdom, Indonesia and Colombia where they 
examined state responses to special procedures' country recommendations issued between 2003 and 2010; including, 
in Colombia, by the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples. The study did not include interviews with either 
Stavenhagen or Anaya. The team also assessed government replies to 19 thematic mandate-holders' communications 
between 2004 and 2008, including by the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, representing 'over 5000 
communications sent to over 140 countries.' I discuss the report's specific findings regarding Indigenous peoples 
below. Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, 
above n 43, 4, 78; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of 
Human Rights Norms', above n 15, 207-08. 
46 Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights 
Norms', above n 15, 206. 
47 Ibid 214-15. 
48 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 43, ix. 
49 See, eg, ibid 16-7, 26-7, 31, appendix E 61-8; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts 
Promote Human Rights, above n 43, appendix D 159-60, 162-63; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special 
Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 15, 208, 214-15. Piccone's team's 
methodology for assessing the influence of the experts' communications is outlined in some depth but it is based on 
the experts' communication reports rather than independent research and its focus is on the content of the replies 
received as opposed to action on the rights issues raised. Piccone's methodology has been praised by other 
commentators. Ryan Kaminski and A Edward Elmendorf, 'Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts 
Promote Human Rights - Book Review' (2013) Yale Journal of International Affairs 121, 122-23. 




The lacuna in the literature widens where the rights of Indigenous peoples are 
concerned. Literature on the special procedures infrequently mentions Indigenous peoples. 
Where it does it is generally to acknowledge, in passing, the application of a specific rights 
issue to Indigenous peoples, as Subedi has done in respect of Cambodia, or to briefly outline the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, as Ramcharan has done. 52 Similarly, 
much of the literature on Indigenous peoples' rights under international law devotes only 
cursory attention to the work of the special procedures in relation to Indigenous peoples. Many 
identify that the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has a role in promoting Indigenous 
peoples' rights but as a side note, including Anaya's seminal Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law.53 Few identify a role for special procedures mandate-holders other than the 
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples in promoting Indigenous rights, Anaya's substantial 
contributions included. 54 Luis Rodriguez-Pinero Royo and Julian Burger are notable exceptions, 
although both focus on the role of thematic special procedures experts only.55 A small number 
of scholars discuss the overlaps in the mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples and the other Indigenous-exclusive UN bodies; Claire Charters' unpublished doctoral 
thesis is the most extensive examination.56 
52 Subedi, 'The UN Human Rights Mandate in Cambodia: The Challenge of a Country in Transition and the 
Experience of the Special Rapporteur for the Country', above n 23, 252, 257-58; Ramcharan, above n 36, 10, 170-71. 
53 See, eg, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 3, 223-24; S James Anaya, International Human 
Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen Publishers, 2009) 107-14; James Anaya, 'Indigenous Law and Its Contribution 
to Global Pluralism' (2007) 1 Indigenous Law Journal 3, 1 O; Xanthaki, above n 3, 28; Stephen Allen and Alexandra 
Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing, 2011) 49-
50, 53-4, 57, 136-37, 307-08; JeffCorntassel, 'Partnership in Action? Indigenous Political Mobilization and Co -
optation during the First UN Indigenous Decade (1995 -2004)' (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 137, 159-60; Irene 
Bellier, 'The Declaration of the Rights oflndigenous Peoples and the World Indigenous Movement' (2005) 14 
Griffith Law Review 227, 228; Rhiannon Morgan, Transforming Law and Institution: Indigenous Peoples, the United 
Nations and Human Rights (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011) 29-30; Wilton Littlechild, 'When Indigenous Peoples 
Win, the Whole World Wins: Address to the UN Human Rights Council on the 60th Anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights' in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 372, 373-74; Naomi Kipuri, 'The 
UN Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples in the African Context' in Claire Charters and Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 252, 267. 
54 Anaya identifies that the establishment of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples adds 'to 
the commission's system of extraconventional, thematic mechanisms which includes special rapporteurs and working 
groups on matters such as torture, religious intolerance, and forced disappearances.' But he does not explore the 
relevance of these mandates to Indigenous peoples. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 3,223. 
A similar statement is made in Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, above n 53, 107. 
55 Julian Burger, 'Making the Declaration Work for Human Rights in the UN System' in Claire Charters and Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen ( eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 304, 305 , 307-08; Rodriguez-Pinero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing of 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Under the Declaration', above n 2, 330-34; Luis Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, 'Los 
Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! del Relator Especial' in Mikel Berraondo et al (eds), 
Los Derechos de Los Pueblos Indigenas en el Sistma Internacional de Naciones Unidas (lnstituto Promocion Esudios 
Sociales, 2010) 109, 124-26. See also Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and Erlyn Ruth Alcantara, Engaging the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous People: Opportunities and Challenges (Tebtebba Foundation, 2004) 21-2; Garth 
Nettheim, 'The UN Charter-Based Human Rights System: An Overview' in Sarah Pritchard (ed), Indigenous Peoples, 
the United Nations and Human Rights (Zed Books Ltd and The Federation Press, 1998) 32, 37-9. 
56 Claire Cha1iers, The Legitimacy of Indigenous Peoples' Norms Under International Law (PhD Thesis, University 
of Cambridge, 2011) 63-5 , 67-8 , 75-80, 88-91; Rodriguez-Pinero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing 
oflndigenous Peoples' Rights under the Declaration', above n 2, 334; Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos 
Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! del Relator Especial', above n 55, 127-28; Alberto Saldamando, 'The 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Human Rights' (2002) 5(1) Indigenous Affairs 32, 33-4. 
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The role of the special procedures regarding Indigenous peoples is the complete focus 
of only a handful of, mostly non-academic, published works. All bar one focus on the mandate 
of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, specifically Stavenhagen's time in the role. 
Alberto Saldamando, Maureen Tong and David Bray offer short articles introducing the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, emphasising the creation of the 
mandate, its potential use in Africa and Stavenhagen's contribution to the global Indigenous 
rights process, respectively.57 Three publications devote lengthier, but principally descriptive, 
attention to the mechanism. In 2004 Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and Erlyn Ruth Alcantara published 
a guide for Indigenous peoples seeking to maximise the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples' country missions as well as an information tool on Stavenhagen's 2002 mission to the 
Philippines.58 Three years later Jennifer Preston et al reported the findings of a 2006 
International Expert Seminar on best practices for implementation of the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples' recommendations (Expert Seminar),59 convened to feed into a report by the 
Special Rapporteur on implementation to the HRC (Study on Best Practices). 60 In 2010 
Rodriguez-Pifiero Royo provided an overview of the mandate and Stavenhagen's activities, as 
well as highlighting some examples of other thematic special procedures mandate-holders' 
attention to Indigenous rights concerns. 61 
No scholarly assessment of the influence of the special procedures mechanism in 
actualising the implementation of international Indigenous peoples ' rights norms exists; 62 
although its efficacy is resoundingly praised. Some comment positively on the mechanism's 
influence but do not explore the issue further. 63 Others provide examples in support of the claim. 
Bray identified Stavenhagen's contribution to 'the advancement and implementation' of the 
global Indigenous rights process, proposing that his eleven country reports 'appear to have had 
the greatest impact'. 64 He cited three examples of Stavenhagen' s influence from Guatemala, the 
Philippines and Chile, including the establishment of a forum to monitor implementation of the 
57 Saldamando, above n 56; Maureen Tong, 'The UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Rights oflndigenous People: Benefits for Indigenous People in Africa' (2002) 5(1) Indigenous Affairs 
36; David Barton Bray, 'Rodolfo Stavenhagen: The UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples' (2011) 113(3) 
American Anthropologist 502, 502. Some magazine articles also focus on particular experts ' country missions. See, 
eg, Tom Bennion and Darrin Cassidy, 'Special Rapporteur's Report Taken for a Spin' (2006) 70 Mana 40; Moana 
Jackson, 'The United Nations and the Foreshore' (2006) 68 Mana 18. 
58 Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 55. 
59 Jennifer Preston et al, The UN Special Rapporteur: Indigenous Peoples Rights: Experiences and Challenges 
(IWGIA, 2007). 
60 Human Rights Council (' HRC' ) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Study Regarding Best Practices Carried out to 
Implement the Recommendations Contained in the Annual Reports of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc 
A/HRC/4/32/Add.4 (26 February 2007) [42]-[76] ('Study on Best Practices'). 
61 Rodriguez-Piliero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: EI Pape! de! Relator Especial', 
above n 55, 118, 124-26. He identified Anaya as the successor to the mandate but focused on Stavenhagen's work. 
62 A journal article based on Chapter V of this dissertation was accepted for publication on 23 August 2013: Fleur 
Adcock, 'The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples and New Zealand: A Study in Compliance 
Ritualism' (2013) forthcoming New Zealand Yearbook of International Law. 
63 See, eg, Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 55, 37. 
64 Bray, above n 57, 502-03 . 
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mandate 's recommendations in Guatemala. 65 Rodriguez-Pinero Royo argued that '[t]he 
activities carried out by Stavenhagen during his seven years as Special Rapporteur made an 
undeniable contribution to the protection and promotion of indigenous rights'. 66 He saw 
Stavenhagen's thematic reports as having an indirect effect in opening up dialogue and debate. 
But he viewed the communications and country reports as having 'real impact', citing three 
examples of the communications' influence in Chile, Laos and Tanzania, including the 
cancellation of a project to build a game park in the traditional territory of the Hadza in 
Tanzania.67 He referenced the Study on Best Practices in support of the country reports' 
influence.68 Preston et al noted difficulties in assessing the domestic impact of Stavenhagen's 
thematic reports and communications, positing that his country visits and reports had a more 
direct impact at the national level.69 In addition to the country reports' dialogue-fostering, 
educative and advocacy roles, Preston et al reported five instances where the Special 
Rapporteur ' s country recommendations were implemented in Guatemala, the Philippines, 
Canada, South Africa and Chile, including the Chilean President's 2006 commitment not to use 
an anti-terrorist law against Indigenous activists .70 Piccone's report identified three examples of 
the influence of special procedures' country recommendations on Indigenous peoples, two from 
Stavenhagen concerning Guatemala and Mexico and one from the expert on violence against 
women regarding Canada.71 The latter example involved the Canadian Government signing a 
contribution agreement with an Indigenous rights organisation to run a programme geared at 
addressing violence against Indigenous women. 72 A fourth example was included in the book 
version of Piccone's findings, concerning the influence of the expert on housing in Mexico.73 
UN documents offer examples of the mechanism's influence on Indigenous peoples' rights too, 
including Stavenhagen's Study on Best Practices,74 the experts' annual and country reports,75 
and the OHCHR's reports and bulletins. 76 The message in the literature is clear: here is a 
65 Ibid 503. 
66 Rodriguez-Piliero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos lndigenas: El Pape! del Relator Especial', 
above n 55, 117; Rodriguez-Pinero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples' Rights 
under the Declaration', above n 2, 330-31. 
67 Rodriguez-Piliero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos lndigenas: El Pape! del Relator Especial', 
above n 55, 121-24. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Preston et al, above n 59, 20, 39, 51. 
70 Ibid 39 (see also 31, 35-7, 40, 42, 52). 
71 Piccone, Catalysts/or Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 43, appendix E 63, 66. 
72 Ibid appendix E 63. 
73 Piccone, Catalysts/or Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 43, appendix 
D 155. 
74 Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4 , [42]-[76]. 
75 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Extractive 
Industries Operating Within or Near Indigenous Territories, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35 (11 July 2011) [71] ('Anaya 
Annual Report 201 J '); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya: The Situation of Maori People in New Zealand, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35/Add.4 (31 May 2011) [66] ('Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand'). 
76 See, eg, HRC Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17 (13 December 2012) [12] ; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ('OHCHR'), United Nations Special 
Procedures Facts and Figures 2010 (2011) 13. 
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mechanism capable of delivering real improvements in the recognition of Indigenous peoples' 
rights, especially through the experts' country missions and reports. Yet, it is Stavenhagen's 
own assessment of the mechanism's efficacy that is the most discouraging; in 2007 he described 
'the general record of implementation of the Special Rapporteur's recommendations' as 
'gloomy' .77 
The assessment of the mechanism's impact on the realisation of Indigenous peoples' 
rights is thin in important respects. The examples of direct rights improvements are drawn from 
two sources: the Expert Seminar and the special procedures' reports.78 For example, Bray relies 
on Preston et el, who in turn rely on the Expert Seminar, and both Rodriguez-Pinero Royo and 
Piccone rely on Stavenhagen's reports.79 Relying on the experts' self-assessment of their impact 
is problematic. As Alston has pointed out, ' [e]valuation is ideally undertaken by objective and 
impartial external experts.' 80 This is because 'insiders, for their part, generally do not have the 
incentive or the necessary degree of detachment to enable them to undertake a compelling 
evaluation of the work with which they have been engaged. '81 The Expert Seminar circumvents 
this concern to a degree, having brought together a group of experts to consider the mandate's 
efficacy. Yet, as Alston also argues, 'the real test lies in the strength of the methodology used, 
of the research undertaken, and of the degree of persuasiveness of the conclusions reached when 
measured against all available evidence.' 82 As with the bulk of the literature regarding the 
mechanism's impact generally, the causal link between the experts' work and the rights moves 
are not articulated (nor is any theory of compliance engaged), including in the Study on Best 
Practices that the Expert Seminar fed into.83 Some of the examples reveal flaws in the research 
process too. For instance, Preston et al's Chilean example of the influence of Stavenhagen's 
country recommendation actually concerns a communication Stavenhagen sent. Although still a 
possible example of the mechanism's influence, the mislabelling undermines their assessment 
77 Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, 2, [84]. 
78 There is one exception: the example of the expert on housing' s influence in helping to convince the Mexican 
Government to delay completion of the La Parota Dam Project (which would displace Indigenous peoples, amongst 
others) that is included in Piccone's book version of his findings but not in his report. Its sources are even more 
tenuous. It relies on the fact that NGOs have cited the expert's findings and recommendations in their campaigns; an 
unattributed reflection from the expert that NGOs viewed his work as influential; and a statement by the Mexican 
permanent representative to the UN in Geneva that the work of the expert was 'effective' , for which Piccone provides 
as authority a document that does not show such a statement having been made. Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How 
the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 43 , appendix D 155 . 
79 The examples provided of direct action on the experts' recommendations reduce to these two sources. Indirect 
examples of impact emanate from a broader pool of sources, see, eg, Rodriguez-Pifiero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos 
Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! de! Relator Especial', above n 55, 120. Rodriguez-Pinero Royo also 
draws on his experience as OHCHR assistant to the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples in assessing the impact 
of Stavenhagen' s communications. 
80 Philip Alston introducing Christian Salazar Volkmann, 'Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Work: The Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Reduction ofExtrajudicial Executions in 
Colombia' (2012) 4(3) Journal of Human Rights Practice 396, 396. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 In the Study on Best Practices Stavenhagen himself recognised that there were 'methodological limitations related 
to the difficulty of establishing clear relations of causality between the Special Rapporteur's recommendations and 
policy and practical changes that have actually taken place.' Study on Best Practices , UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/ Add.4, 
[l O]. 
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that it is the country reports, rather than communications, that have the most direct impact. 
Further, Piccone's example of the impact of the expert on violence against women relies, as its 
source, on Stavenhagen's Study on Best Practices, which ties the move to Stavenhagen's own 
efforts: the expert on violence against women has not conducted a country mission to Canada. 84 
The analysis is also incomplete. The predominant focus is on Stavenhagen's time in the role, 
little attention is directed at the impact of Anaya's work or that of other special procedures 
mandates. And the literature centres on the influence of the experts' country reports, with some 
comment on their communications and thematic reports, ignoring entirely the capacity-building 
work they engage in. The field is ripe for an independent, robust, empirical analysis of the 
mechanism's influence regarding Indigenous peoples' rights. 
C Aims, Questions and Scope 
This research aims to help fill the space in the existing literature. It seeks to benefit 
scholarship regarding Indigenous peoples' rights under international law, the special procedures 
and also the implementation of international norms. Above all, it hopes to inform practical 
strategies to help close the yawning Indigenous rights implementation gap and improve the 
daily lived experiences oflndigenous peoples. 
I investigate the question: how does the international human rights system, through the 
special procedures, regulate state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples? To do so I pose, and 
then seek to address, a collection of subsidiary questions. What does the theoretical literature 
tell us about how states respond to different normative orders - such as international Indigenous 
rights norms - and the mechanisms that promote them? Is it possible for apparently weak actors 
such as the special procedures to influence that behaviour? If so, how could they do so? What is 
the nature of the special procedures' role regarding Indigenous peoples? Do they have a role in 
advancing the realisation of international Indigenous rights norms? If so, what tools are at the 
special procedures ' disposal to influence states to realise those norms? Have the special 
procedures actually influenced states to realise those norms? What factors explain the special 
procedures ' influence? Can an understanding of those factors inform strategies to improve the 
regulatory impact of the mechanism and, thus, secure improved domestic implementation of 
international Indigenous peoples' rights norms? And, what, if anything, do the answers to these 
questions tell us about the larger inquiry concerning how the international human rights system 
regulates state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples? 
84 Ibid [ 43]. Piccone also mistakenly identifies Danfred Titus as having held the role of Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples since March 2012 . Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN 's Independent Experts Promote 
Human Rights, above n 43, appendix B 142. Anaya' s term in the role does not end until 20 14. Danfred Titus became 
a member of the UN HRC's Expert Mechanism on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples (EMRIP) in 2012. 
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My thesis is that the international human rights system, through the special procedures 
mechanism, regulates state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples imperfectly but appreciably. 
Contrary to rationalist theories, there are instances where states have acted upon the special 
procedures' recommendations regarding Indigenous peoples' rights. However, ritualism is 
states' dominant response to the experts. 'Ritualism' is a concept used in the regulatory 
literature to denote behaviour where an actor abandons the regulatory objectives of a normative 
order but confonns to the institutionalised means for achieving those objectives. 85 It is an 
insidious behavioural response as it can be mistaken for norm conformity: there is outward 
agreement but inward resistance. I use the idea to argue that states predominantly outwardly 
agree with the special procedures experts' recommendations regarding Indigenous peoples, 
while inwardly developing techniques to avoid the international Indigenous rights norms that 
underlie those recommendations. I argue that states do so in order to deflect deeper scrutiny of 
their Indigenous rights records. Yet, I see a role for the special procedures mechanism in 
exerting enhanced regulatory power over state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples and I 
propose several strategies to that end. 
States and their behaviour have been chosen as the focus of this research as states 
remain one of the actors - in addition to Indigenous peoples and, increasingly, transnational 
corporations - with the most power to effect change in the lives of Indigenous peoples. States 
are also the primary duty bearers under international human rights law. 86 I use the term 'state' to 
refer to nation-states, the political entities that exercise formal authority over defined territories. 
States are complex actors, defined by the people, parties, processes and conventions that make 
them up.87 Understanding the influence of the special procedures on state behaviour thus 
requires analysing the responses of different state actors over time. However, the prime focus 
here is on the behaviour of the executive and legislative arms of government, given the 
sweeping powers they tend to exercise in relation to Indigenous peoples and their lead role in 
dictating state action. 88 
I adopt Jose Martinez Coho's widely cited definition oflndigenous peoples for the 
purposes of this research. According to Martinez Coho's 1987 Study on the Problem of 
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, Indigenous peoples are those who 'having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on 
85 Robert K Merton, 'Social Structure and Anomie' (1938) 3(5) American Sociological Review 672; Robert K Merton, 
Social Theory and Social Structure (The Free Press, Enlarged ed, 1968); John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai and Valerie 
Braithwaite, Regulating Aged Care (Edward Elgar, 2007); Charlesworth, above n 23 . 86 See, eg, Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 22, 1086. For comment on the problems this raises for the 
recognition oflndigenous peoples' rights in the context of the increasing power of transnational corporations see, eg, 
Morgan, above n 53, 156-58. 
87 Rachel Brewster, 'Unpacking the State's Reputation' (2009) 50(2) Harvard International Law Journal 231 , 249, 
256. 
88 See, eg, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 3, 190-94. 
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those territories, or parts of them. ' 89 And who 'form at present non-dominant sectors of society' 
that 'are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. ' 90 The term 
continues to be debated. 91 I flag some of its complexities below and again in Chapters III and 
VII. 
I adopt an open view of what constitutes international Indigenous peoples' rights norms. 
I treat the UNDRJP as a source of international Indigenous peoples rights norms . I do so despite 
the fact that, from a positivist point of view, as a declaration of the GA, it is 'soft' law and does 
not carry the binding force of a treaty. At the same time, aspects of the UNDRIP are already 
reflected in the jurisprudence of the human rights treaty bodies and customary international law 
and are thus 'hard' and binding.92 However, on the constructivist theoretical position I adopt, 
whether a norm is a 'legal norm' rather than a social norm or 'hard' or 'soft' law is not 
determinative of the influence that the norm will have. 93 
The analysis proceeds on the assumption that states should act in accordance with the 
special procedures experts' recommendations. This is open to debate. Some ( customarily states 
that have been criticised) argue that individuals who are typically outsiders and who spend only 
a short time in a state, if they spend any time at all, should not have any say over how a country 
addresses its Indigenous rights situation. There is a degree of merit in such arguments: these are 
important issues with long and complex histories that often require the delicate balance of valid 
competing interests. At the same time, the mandate-holders are appointed based upon their 
human rights expertise. As outside experts they may discern trends and behaviours not observed 
by domestic actors. Yet, the recommendations that the experts make are a product of domestic 
input too, including from the variety of national actors that the experts engage with during their 
89 Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights, Jose Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur, Study of 
the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations - Volume 5: Conclusions, Proposals and 
Recommendations, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (March 1987) [379] . 
90 Ibid. 
91 See, eg, Mark Bennett, 'lndigeneity as Self-Determination' (2005) 4( I) Indigenous Law Journal 71; Benedict 
Kingsbury, '"Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy' (1998) 
92(3) American Journal of International Law 414; Jeremy Waldron, 'Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy' 
(2003) l New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 55. 
92 See, eg, International Law Association, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 75th conference, Sofia, Bulgaria, Res 
5/2012, para 2 (August 2012); International Law Association Committee on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, Sofia 
Conference Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Final Report (2012); S James Anaya and Siegfried Wiessner, 'OP-ED: The 
UN Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment' (2007) Jurist 
<http: //j uri st. law. pitt.edu/forumy/2007 /l 0/un-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous. php>; Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 21, Right of Eve,yone to Take Part in Cultural Life (art 15, para 1 
(a) , of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc E/C. l 2/GC/21 (21 December 
2009) [7]; Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee), General Comment No 11 , Indigenous Children 
and their Rights under the Convention, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/11 (12 February 2009); Calv Attorney-General Claims 
Nos 171 /2007, 172/2007, 18 October 2007 (Supreme Court of Belize). 
93 See, eg, Dinah Shelton, 'Commentary and Conclusions' in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commitment and Compliance: The 
Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, 2004) 449, 449, 458. For 
comment on legal positivists and legal pluralists' views on what constitute legal norms see Brunnee and Toope, 
above n 7, 119. See also Paul Schiff Berman, 'A Pluralist Approach to International Law' (2007) 32 Yale Journal of 
International Law 302. 
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country missions and technical advisory work. Although the mandate-holders' suggestions are 
recommendations only, as the recommendations of an expert UN mechanism established under 
the authority of the UN Charter the recommendations carry the force of that organisation.94 For 
example, Flood argues that ' [ v ]alidly established Charter-based human rights mechanisms and 
procedures are legally binding on all member states' .95 The states that are a party to the UN 
Charter are thus expected and encouraged to take steps to implement the special procedures 
experts' recommendations.96 Further, the normative framework that informs the mandates of the 
special procedures experts is drawn from a range of international human rights sources to which 
many states are bound or have expressed their support. As holders of UN human rights 
mandates the special procedures experts are an authoritative voice on the application of these 
international norms in domestic contexts. 
The influence of the special procedures mechanism as a whole is assessed, rather than 
focusing solely on the influence of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples as the existing literature has largely done. The independent nature of the mandates, and 
their corresponding diversity, renders study of them as a group challenging. But the approach 
acknowledges that Indigenous peoples are affected by all of the human rights issues covered by 
the thematic special procedures mandates and by many of the country-specific mandates as well. 
However, as the only special procedures mechanism with an exclusive mandate to address the 
human rights of Indigenous peoples, the influence of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples is a core focus. The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples is also of especial 
interest in a study on the mechanism's influence as it is one of the mandates to have directed the 
most pronounced attention to follow-up of its work.97 
The special procedures are analysed from their first inception up until the close of the 
24th regular session of the HRC in September 2013, a period of over 40 years. The analysis is 
pertinent as two decades have passed since the CHR called on thematic special procedures 
mandate-holders to pay particular attention to Indigenous peoples within the framework of their 
mandates. Also, more than a decade has elapsed since the establishment of the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples. This is a period of time over which some influence 
could be expected to be seen. 
94 United Nations Charter, signed 26 June 1945, TS 993 (entered into force 24 October 1945). See Chapter III, Part 
B. 
95 Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions, above n 33, 91-92. 
96 See, eg, Human Rights and Special Procedures, CHR Res 2004/76, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2004/76 (21 April 2004) 
para 3 ('CHR Res 2004/76'). · 
97 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 43, 20; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 43, 33; 
Rodriguez-Pifiero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! de! Relator Especial', 
above n 55, 121. 
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D Methodology 
The research departs from the existing international law corpus on the special 
procedures mechanism by expressly engaging with the theoretical debate over state compliance 
with international norms. It adopts a loosely constructivist theoretical framework. It adds to the 
existing debate on state compliance with international norms by drawing on the body of 
regulatory scholarship concerning norm compliance, a resource largely untapped by 
international law scholars.98 In doing so, it leans heavily on the theoretical work of John 
Braithwaite and Peter Drahos regarding the globalisation of norms. In particular, it draws on 
their theorising regarding the role of apparently weak non-state actors in the globalisation 
process.99 Although legal scholarship, by rendering law and its agents an object of inquiry this 
research is also sociological in nature. It is informed by my positioning as an Indigenous 
woman, who is both Maori and English, from a working class background, trained in common 
law legal practice. While my closeness to the rights issues raised inevitably complicates my 
discussion, it also has the potential to reveal insights not otherwise observable from a greater 
distance. 
The blended research methodology used is a mixture of case study analysis, critical 
document analysis, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. In order to explore 
the mechanism's influence on state behaviour in depth, two states have been used as case 
studies for comparative critical analysis: Aotearoa New Zealand (New Zealand) and Guatemala 
(officially, the Republic of Guatemala). Examining the mechanism's influence on two states' 
behaviour towards Indigenous peoples has enabled patterns and understandings that may have 
remained hidden in a single state case study to be borne out. The deep analysis undertaken has 
also avoided the pitfalls of a generalised study that selects examples of the mechanism's 
influence from across the globe. Of course, only tentative insights can be drawn from such a 
small pool of case studies. A larger case study set, or world-level study, would have provided an 
opportunity to identify with more certainty themes and patterns in the mechanism's influence 
but is beyond the scope of this project. However, the two case studies examined provide a basis 
from which to start to begin to understand the influence of the special procedures mechanism on 
state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples . 
I focus on the influence of special procedures' recommendations that have been directed 
at the governments of New Zealand and Guatemala. This means centring attention on the 
special procedures' reports on their country missions and the advice they give in the course of 
98 Char lesworth is one international law scholar who has drawn on regulatory scholarshi p, see, eg, Charlesworth, 
above n 23 . Eve Dari an-Smith and Coli n Scott argue that ' [a] particular strength ofa regulatory approach to rights 
might be a more direct foc us on implementation of and compliance wi th ri ghts regimes.' Eve Darian-Smith and Coli n 
Scott, 'Regulation and Human Rights in Socio-Legal Scholarship' (2009) 31(3) Law & Policy 27 1, 273 . 
99 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge Uni versity Press, 2000). 
18 
offering technical advisory assistance, both of which contain country-specific recommendations. 
The existing, methodologically light, literature suggests that the special procedures' country 
visits and reports have had the most impact, inviting interrogation. The same body of work 
ignores the impact of the experts' technical advisory assistance, inviting attention. I do not 
assess the influence of the special procedures' communications as these do not contain 
recommendations, although they typically request information from the state on the rights issue 
with which they are concerned. I do track state responses to (rather than the influence of) each 
special procedures communication that concerns Indigenous peoples in New Zealand. There are 
too many special procedures communications concerning Indigenous peoples in Guatemala to 
examine all of them in detail. Instead, in that state I explore their content and the Government's 
responses to them in general terms. I also devote particular attention to examining the influence 
of a special country report by Anaya on Guatemala, which was sparked by a communication he 
sent. Given that I am concerned with the domestic impact of the special procedures' work I have 
not focused on the impact of the experts' recommendations to the international community at 
large in their thematic reports. I focus on recommendations directed at New Zealand and 
Guatemala in order to avoid the criticism that they were not an intended subject of the generally 
framed recommendation or the possibility that they were unaware of the recommendation's 
existence at all. In framing the study in this way, I do not discount the important influence that 
these texts may have: such an investigation is simply beyond the ambit of this undertaking. 
Nor is this research concerned with the more diffuse and harder to quantify indirect 
influence that the experts have on state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples in their work. 
The experts conceivably influence state behaviour by empowering Indigenous peoples and civil 
society in their advocacy through public recognition and independent legitimation of their 
struggles, their ability to influence the discourse surrounding rights issues (including 
encouraging states to understand issues from a human rights perspective) and preventing the 
state's descent into even greater rights abuses. 100 In such scenarios the experts' impact on state 
behaviour towards Indigenous peoples may only be visible in the very long term, if visible at 
all. 101 As Alston has remarked in relation to country missions, 'it is essential to see a country 
visit by a special rapporteur in its overall perspective and not to assess it exclusively in terms of 
measures overtly taken in response to his or her recommendations.' 102 But, I share Alston's 
view that 'it remains the case that a consistent pattern of neglect of the relevant 
100 Regarding the indirect impact of the special procedures experts' work generally see Alston, 'Reconceiving the UN 
Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New Human Rights Council', above n 30, 220; Nifosi, The UN 
Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above n 33, 138-41; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special 
Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 15, 212; Subedi, 'Protection of 
Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 14, 224-25; Golay, Mahon and Cismas, 
above n 25,311; Kirby, above n 23 , 505. Regarding the indirect impact of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples' work see Preston et al, above n 59, 35-6, 42. 
101 See, eg, Subedi, 'The UN Human Rights Mandate in Cambodia: The Challenge of a Country in Transition and the 
Experience of the Special Rapporteur for the Country', above n 23, 258. 
102 Alston, 'Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New Human Rights Council', 
above n 30, 220. 
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recommendations should ring alarm bells among those who are concerned with ensuring that the 
international human rights regime is capable of making a positive difference. ' 103 Thus, this 
study focuses on implementation of the experts' recommendations and advice conscious of the 
myriad other meaningful ways in which the experts' may regulate behaviour. I leave a study of 
those additional dimensions to other scholars. 
Guatemala and New Zealand provide an interesting, and seldom explored, comparison. 
Guatemala, the most populous Central American state, was colonised by the Spanish from the 
1500s; is officially a democratic constitutional republic based on a civil law legal system; has a 
majority - predominantly Mayan - Indigenous peoples ' population, comprised of more than 
twenty different linguistic groups; and is a lower middle income developing country that has 
been marred by a protracted internal conflict and continuing instability. 104 In contrast, the small 
Pacific Island nation of New Zealand has inherited a common law legal system from its British 
colonisers who arrived mainly in the 1800s; possesses a comparatively low (15 per cent) Maori 
Indigenous peoples population essentially united linguistically; and is a stable, developed, 
liberal democracy.105 Yet, New Zealand and Guatemala are both states that we might expect to 
fare well in the implementation of special procedures' recommendations and advice regarding 
Indigenous peoples. New Zealand has a strong human rights reputation. It has long been 
identified as a source of good practice regarding Indigenous peoples' rights, despite the fact that 
internationally it demonstrated strong opposition towards the UNDRIP at crucial points.106 In 
contrast, Guatemala does not have a strong domestic human rights reputation. However, it has a 
strong reputation for advocating Indigenous peoples' rights on the international stage. 
Historically, it has cosponsored the thematic resolution on Indigenous peoples before the HRC 
and previously the CHR. 107 And it was a prominent advocate of the UNDRIP.108 Further, it has 
been recurrently identified in the literature as a state where the special procedures mechanism 
has had an impact on state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. 109 
103 Ibid 221. 
104 See Chapter VI, Part B. In this dissertation I use the terms 'developed', 'developing' , 'global North' and 'global 
South' to capture the striking power and wealth disparities between those from wealthy, developed, nations: the 
global North, and those from poorer, developing, nations: the global South. I acknowledge that these terms are 
problematic, including because they carry heavily loaded notions of ' progress' and they gloss over the striking 
discrepancies in wealth within nations. But I engage them as a device for discussing aspects of these disparities. For a 
sim ilar approach see, eg, Eve Darian-Smith, Laws and Societies in Global Contexts: Contemporary Approaches 
(Cambridge University Press, 20 13) 6 n 3. 
105 See Chapter V, Part B. 
106 See, eg, Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.4, [67]. See also Chapter V. 
107 See, eg, Rodrfguez-Pi.fiero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples' Rights under 
the Declaration' , above n 2, 315; OHCHR, 'Council Extends Mandates on Slavery, Peaceful Assembly, Health, 
Arbitrary Detention, Indigenous Peop les and Mercenaries' (Media Release, 26 September 2013) 
<http: //www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/P ages/D isplayN ews.aspx?N ewsID= 13 790&LangID=E>; Indigenous 
Peoples' Center fo r Documentation Research and Information ( doCip ), Human Rights Council 
<http://www.docip.org/Human-Rights-Council.64 .0.html>. 
108 Megan Davis, 'Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples' (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of In ternational Law 439, 458 n 88; Anaya Special Report on 
Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.3 , appendix [65]. 
109 Bray, above n 57, 503 ; Preston et al, above n 59, 39; Piccone, Catalysts fo r Rights: The Unique Contribution of 
the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above n 43 , appendix E 66. 
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Guatemala and New Zealand have received the attention of multiple special procedures 
experts. The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has visited both case study states more 
than once. Guatemala has received three country missions from the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples. Stavenhagen visited in 2002, which was his first country mission as Special 
Rapporteur, and again in 2006. 110 Anaya carried out a special country mission in 2010.11 1 He 
also provided technical advisory assistance to the state in 2011. 112 In fact, Guatemala is one of 
the states most studied by the special procedures mechanism as a whole. By late 2013 it had 
received 21 country missions from 13 different thematic special procedures mandates ranging 
from the experts on torture to food, many of which touched on Indigenous rights concerns. Two 
further country missions from thematic mandates are planned for the end of 2013, including 
from one mandate that has not visited the state before. 113 Guatemala was also the subject of 
successive special procedures country mandates between 1983 and 1997, resulting in numerous 
country visits, reports and recommendations some of which reference Indigenous peoples. 114 
Guatemala is of particular interest given the OHCHR's Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights in Latin America, with Special Focus on Guatemala and Mexico project, which 
supported the follow-up of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' recommendations in 
both Guatemala and Mexico over several years. 115 In contrast, New Zealand has received only 
two country missions from the special procedures, both from the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples. New Zealand received a country mission from Stavenhagen in 2005 and 
one from Anaya in 2010. 116 In addition to these country missions, both states have been the 
subject of communications by various thematic special procedures experts, a number of which 
concern Indigenous peoples and their rights. 117 
11° CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2001/57: Mission to 
Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2 (24 February 2003) ('Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala'). Note that 
Stavenhagen did not produce a separate country report on his follow-up mission to Guatemala. Instead his brief 
comments on the mission are contained in his Study on Best Practices: Study on Best Practices, UN Doc 
A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [58]-[64]. 
11 1 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3. 
112 Ibid [8] -[10]. 
113 In addition to the three country missions by the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, Guatemala has 
received country missions from the experts on health, food, the independence of judges, education, migrants, human 
rights defenders, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, racism, violence against women, the sale of 
children, and torture, see Chapter VI. The 2013 planned visits are by the experts on peaceful assembly and torture. 
For comment on the frequency of special procedures experts' visits to Guatemala see Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: 
The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above n 43, 10-1. 
114 The Guatemalan country mandates were held by Viscount Mark Colville of Culross from 1983-1987; Hector Gros 
Espiell from 1987-1990; Christian Tomuschat from 1990-1993 ; and Monica Pinto from 1993-1997, see Chapter VI, 
Part C. 
115 Study on Best Practices , UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/ Add.4, [21 ], [22] , [24] -[26] ; Rodriguez-Pifiero Royo, 'Los 
Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! de! Relator Especial', above n 55 , 122. 116 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3 (13 March 
2006) ('Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand'); Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35/Add.4. 
11 7 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: 
Communications Sent, Replies Received and Observations, 2012-2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41/Add.4 (2 September 
2013) [ 121 ]-[ 124] (' Anaya Communications Report 2013 '); HRC, Communications Report of Special Procedures, 
21 
As the review of the literature above revealed, any attempt to assess the influence of the 
special procedures is challenging. Even where moves have been made by a government to act 
on rights issues that form the subject of special procedures ' recommendations, assessing 
whether those actions have been taken in response to the mandate-holders or other actors or 
considerations is difficult. Governments infrequently acknowledge the motivations for their 
actions so assessing the special procedures ' influence requires imputing motivations. 118 Often a 
complex combination of actors and factors will be responsible. 11 9 The circular manner in which 
special procedures ' recommendations are formulated contributes to this difficulty. Domestic 
actors inform special procedures mandate-holders of key issues and sometimes formulate 
proposed recommendations, which can then be directly reflected in the mandate-holders' reports 
and, ultimately, be taken up by the same domestic actors to support their push for resolution of 
the issue. Despite these difficulties, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding the 
mechanism's influence in New Zealand and Guatemala. In notable contrast to the existing 
literature, my analysis expressly explores the basis for any assessment that it was the work of a 
special procedures mandate-holder that prompted the state's behavioural change. My analysis 
goes beyond a reliance on the reflections of special procedures mandate-holders and UN 
documents, although both are drawn on as sources. I systematically examine the context in 
which the special procedures experts ' recommendations were made; official government 
statements made in response to the experts and their recommendations; other government 
statements both public and, where available, private that reference the experts and their 
recommendations; domestic governmental policy, legislative and budgetary actions that accord, 
or fail to accord, with the experts ' recommendations; the timing of any moves by the 
government in-line with the experts' recommendations; the actions of other actors, whether 
domestic, regional or international, regarding the norms the subject of the experts' 
recommendations; and the perceptions oflndigenous rights advocates of the influence of the 
experts and their recommendations. I invite the reader to judge the connection between the 
governments ' behaviour and the experts ' recommendations based on the evidence shared. 
Critical document analysis was the primary method of data collection. A range of 
official UN documents were examined, including the country, special, communication, thematic 
and other reports of the special procedures mandate-holders; reports and resolutions of the 
CHR, HRC and the GA; reports and statements of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(HCHR) and her office, the OHCHR; reports and decisions of other international bodies, 
including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII) , the Expert Mechanism on the 
UN Doc A/HRC/22/67 (20 February 2013) 11 , 78, 121 (' Joint Communications Report Februa,y 2013 '). For more 
examples see Chapter V, Part C and Chapter VI, Part C. 
118 Alsto n, 'Hobbling the Mon itors: Should UN Human Rights Monitors be Accountab le?', above n 29, 574; Alston, 
'Reconceiving the UN Human Ri ghts Regi me: Challenges Confro nting the New UN Human Rights Council' , above n 
30, 220 ; Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions, above n 33 , 49-50 . 
119 See, eg, Subedi, 'The UN Human Rights Mandate in Cambodia: The Challenge of a Country in Transi tion and the 
Experience of the Special Rapporteur for the Country', above n 23, 258 . 
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Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), the former Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(WGIP), the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, the HRC's Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR) Working Group, and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (ILO Committee of Experts); as well 
as UN media releases, in particular those of the special procedures experts and the OHCHR. 
Relevant international case law informs the analysis where appropriate. At the domestic level I 
reviewed publically available government statements, media releases and Parliamentary 
debates; executive and local government policies, domestic statutes, regulations and case law; 
internal governmental information, advice and correspondence between officials released to me 
through requests under the Official Information Act 1982 (NZ); and domestic media coverage of 
the work of the special procedures. I complemented this analysis with a review of information 
collected by domestic, regional and transnational Indigenous peoples' organisations (IPOs) and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Other secondary sources, including key texts, journal 
articles, monographs and additional documents concerning Indigenous peoples and their rights 
under international law, the special procedures, and theories of how to influence state behaviour, 
have been used to locate the primary sources in context and theory. Documents in Spanish, and 
English documents requiring translation into Spanish, were translated either by a qualified 
translator or the author. 
The research also involved 18 semi-structured interviews with key actors conducted 
between 2010 and 2011. The interviews were carried out with the approval of the Australian 
National University's Human Research Ethics Committee. I adopted a form of ' snowball ' 
methodology, asking interviewees and other contacts to suggest further potential interviewees. I 
interviewed both the former and current Special Rapporteurs on Indigenous peoples, 
Stavenhagen and Anaya; a former OHCHR-Geneva bureaucrat who worked on Indigenous 
rights; a member of the OHCHR's Guatemalan country office; a member of New Zealand's 
Parliament whose political party held ministerial posts outside of cabinet in the government at 
the time; Guatemalan Government officials working in departments concerned with Indigenous 
rights; representatives of both New Zealand and Guatemala's national human rights institutions 
(NHRI); 120 Indigenous peoples from Guatemala and New Zealand involved in Indigenous rights 
advocacy, including Indigenous leaders, academics, lawyers and local activists; and other non- · 
Indigenous individuals also involved in Indigenous rights advocacy. Many, although not all , of 
the interviewees had some exposure to the work of the special procedures mandate-holders, 
whether through meeting with them during their country missions or in other fora, contributing 
information to their studies, or leveraging their reports in their own work. I have endeavoured to 
address the absence of interviews with more members of the executive and legislature -
potentially key sources of the motivations of government behaviour - by carefully reviewing 
120 Both New Zealand and Guatemala's national human rights institutions (NHRis) have been accredited with 'A 
status ' by the International Coordinating Committee ofNational Human Rights Institutions. 
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statements by these actors regarding Indigenous peoples' rights and the work of the special 
procedures, made within and outside of the legislative chambers, in both states. 121 To protect the 
interviewees, interviewees ' names and specific positions are withheld, except in the case of 
Stavenhagen and Anaya, who both consented to the attributions made to them. In 2013, after 
having spent more than an additional two years in the role, Anaya updated some of his 
reflections from the original interview in writing. 
I embraced a flexible interview style. Conducting semi-structured interviews allowed 
participants to speak to the issues of most importance to them. This was particularly appropriate 
for navigating discussion with Indigenous interview participants around sensitive issues, such as 
the more egregious examples of Indigenous rights violations. The length of the interviews 
ranged in time from half an hour to three hours. All of the interviews bar five were conducted in 
the cities where the participants were based, in Wellington and Christchurch in New Zealand; 
Guatemala City, Quetzaltenango and Antigua in Guatemala; and Panama City in Panama. Four 
of the interviews were conducted by telephone and one using Skype as it was not possible to 
coordinate a face-to-face interview given the schedule of the interviewee. The interviews with 
Guatemalan participants were conducted with the aid of a qualified interpreter familiar with 
Indigenous rights issues, except where the interviewee was fluent in English. 122 
These sources were supplemented with participant observation. I observed the 
interactions of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, and both formal and infonnal 
discussions concerning the special procedures' work regarding Indigenous peoples, during the 
annual sessions, side events and global Indigenous caucus meetings held as part of the annual 
meetings of the EMRIP in Geneva, Switzerland, in 2010, 2011 and 2012 and of the PFII in New 
York, the United States of America (United States), in 2011. 
During the research I remained attentive to the need to privilege Indigenous peoples ' 
voices . In this effort I was inspired by Indigenous critical scholars, including Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith, Lester-Irabinna Rigney and Robert Williams, as well as post-colonial theorists. 123 I use 
the plural ' voices ' intentionally. There is no unitary 'Indigenous' voice. 124 To presume so would 
121 A number of members of the legislature in New Zealand and Guatemala were invited to participate in an 
interview, given that these government actors are key sources of the motivations of government behaviour. But only 
one agreed to be interviewed. While the research may have benefited from more interviews with these actors it cannot 
be assumed that they would have been will ing to speak frankly regarding their and their political part ies' motivations. 
122 Where quotes fro m the interviews conducted in Spanish appear in thi s dissertation I have retained fideli ty to the 
translation made by the interpreter even if thi s does not present as grammaticall y sound Engli sh. I have adopted the 
same approach with the translations by the UN interpreters of UN sess ions. 
123 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonising Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (Zed Books, 1999); 
Norman K Denzin, Yvonna S Linco ln and Linda Tuhiwai Sm ith (eds), Handbook of Critical and Indigenous 
Methodologies (Sage, 2008); Robert A Wi !I iams, 'Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice' ( 1996 -1997) 95 
Michigan Law Review 74 1; Lester-Irabinna Rigney, 'Internationali sation of an Indigenous Anti-Co lonial Cultural 
Criti que of Research Methodologies: A Guide to Indigenist Research Methodology and its Principles' (l 999) 14(2) 
Reprinted in WICAZO SA revie1,v: Journal of Native American Studies 109; Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
(Grove Press, 1963); Edward Said, Orientialism (Pantheon Books, 1978); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Can the 
Subaltern Speak?' in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the l nte1pretation of Culture 
(Macmi ll an, 1988) 24; Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Penguin , 1972). 
124 See, eg, Smith, above n 123 , 6-7 . 
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be to deny the diversity of opinion between and within these collectives; even individuals have 
shifting positions and identities depending on the context. 125 Like Kimberle Crenshaw I also 
acknowledge that constructions like ethnicity, gender, class and disability intersect such that 
Indigenous peoples and persons experience oppression differently. 126 However, as Gayatri 
Spivak argues, a degree of strategic essentialising is unavoidable in the production of critical 
analyses, 127 as this is. Thus, although I use terms including ' Indigenous peoples', 'Maori' and 
'Maya' throughout this text, I remain conscious of the fact that these essentialisms do not 
represent reality. In an effort to privilege a diversity of Indigenous voices in my research I 
sought out Indigenous interviewees from a range of backgrounds, men and women, young and 
old, parliamentarians to grassroots activists. This was important to understand how different 
Indigenous peoples perceive and engage with the special procedures mechanism. 
I recognise that some Indigenous peoples will dismiss my endeavour to explore the 
leverage of a 'master's tool ' to 'dismantle the master's house' . The 'masters tools ' are the 
structures and processes of the dominant group that have acted to keep non-dominant groups in 
a position of disadvantage. The term derives from a quote by Audre Lorde ' [ fJ or the master's 
tools will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his 
own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change. ' 128 It captures the idea 
that relying on measures that are designed and implemented by the same structure that created 
the need for the intervention in the first instance will only bring counterfeit gains. 129 The special 
procedures mechanism is a master's tool because it derives from, and operates within, an 
international legal framework that both reflects and constitutes colonial power interests. 130 I 
have enduring respect for those who have the foresight and tenacity to develop their own 
Indigenous-centred tools for their liberation. This is critical. But given the scope of the task I 
see value in examining the efficacy of existing mechanisms; especially those to which all UN 
member states have outwardly committed and that use a discourse - human rights - familiar to 
125 See, eg, Samia Bano, "Standpoint', 'Difference' and Feminist Research' in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), 
Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing, 2005) 91, 92-3; Floya Anthias, 'Where do I belong?: 
Narrating Collective Identity and Translocational Positionality' (2002) 2 Ethnicities 491. 
126 See, eg, Kimberle Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color' (199 1) 43 (6) Stanford Law Review 1241. 
127 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Post-Colonial Critique: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues (Routledge, 1990) 45. 
As Nicholas Buchanan and Darian-Smith point out, law plays an important role in 'essentializing cultural difference'. 
Nicholas Buchanan and Eve Darian-Smith, 'Introduction: Law and the Problematics of Indigenous Authenticities' 
(2011) 36(1 ) Law & Sociallnquiry 115, 121. 
128 Audre Larde, Sister Outsider (The Crossing Press Feminist Series, 1984) 112 (emphasis in original). 
129 For example, Taiaiake Alfred argues that 'Indigenous leaders engaging themselves and their communities in 
arguments framed within a liberal paradigm have not been able to protect the integrity of their nations. "Aboriginal 
rights" and ' 'tribal sovereignty" are in fact the benefits accrued by indigenous peoples who have agreed to abandon 
autonomy to enter the state's legal and political framework."' Taiaiake Alfred, 'From Sovereignty to Freedom: 
Towards an Indigenous Political Discourse' (2001) 3(1) Indigenous Affairs 22, 26. 
130 Regarding international law's implication in imperialism see, eg, Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and 
the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Makau Mutua, 'Savages, Victims, and Saviors: 
the Metaphor of Human Rights' (2001) 42(1) Harvard International Law Journal 201; Dale Turner, 'Vision: Towards 
an Understanding of Aboriginal Sovereignty' in Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman (eds), Canadian Political 
Philosophy: Contemporary Reflections (Oxford University Press, 2001) 318; Paul Keal, European Conquest and the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society (Cambridge University Press, 2003); 
Makere Stewart-Harawira, The New Imperial Order: Indigenous Responses to Globalization (Zed Books 2005). 
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the state actors with whose behaviour I am concerned. 131 In taking this approach I also honour 
the choices of the many Indigenous peoples who have engaged with the international human 
rights system, including the special procedures mechanism, in order to emancipate their peoples 
and others in similar situations around the globe. 
E Thesis Structure 
My thesis that the special procedures regulate state behaviour towards Indigenous 
peoples in a muted but palpable way unfolds over seven chapters. In the next chapter I explore 
the theoretical literature concerning how powerful actors such as states are regulated. The 
chapter argues that even absent coercive enforcement powers and abundant resources the special 
procedures have the ability to weave webs of influence that conduce state conformity to the 
international Indigenous rights norms they push. It unpicks the different possible behavioural 
responses to normative orders: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion. 132 
Particular attention is given to the response of ritualism, given evidence of its existence in state 
responses to international human rights norms.133 It then considers whether apparently weak 
actors, such as the special procedures, can influence these responses . A generally constructivist 
view of how the regulation of states occurs is adopted in order to argue that they can. The 
mechanics of how the special procedures could do so is outlined. It is based on Braithwaite and 
Drahos ' 'webs of influence' understanding of regulation. This understanding posits that 
regulation occurs as a result of actors pushing contesting principles using different regulatory 
mechanisms.134 I use this approach to identify some potential strategies for flipping states out of 
non-conforming behaviour, including ritualism. 
Chapter III examines the special procedures' role regarding Indigenous peoples. It 
identifies the mechanism's considerable mandate to advance the realisation of international 
Indigenous rights norms. It briefly outlines what the special procedures mechanism is in order to 
contextualise the discussion on its Indigenous mandate. The analysis reveals the ad hoc and 
piecemeal development of the mechanism. It then traces the development of the mechanism 's 
mandate regarding Indigenous peoples over time focusing on three key moments : the creation of 
the first special procedures mandate; the issue of the resolution by the CHR recommending that 
all thematic special procedures mandate-holders pay particular attention to the situation of 
131 Ignatieff describes human rights as 'the linguafranca of global moral thought '. Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights 
as Politics and Idolatry (P rinceton University Press, 200 1) 53. On the use of human ri ghts di scourse by Indigenous 
peoples see, for example, Robert Wi ll iams who argues that ' [t]he discourse of international human rights has enabled 
indigenous peoples to understand and express their oppress ion in terms that are meaningful to them and their 
oppressors.' Wi lliams, 'Encounters on the Fronti ers oflnternational Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of 
Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World' , above n 3, 701. 
132 Merton, 'Social Structure and Anomie', above n 85; Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, above n 85. 
133 The idea of using Merton's theory of behavioural responses to normative order to analyse state behaviour in 
respect of international human rights norms is drawn from Hilary Charl esworth, see Charlesworth, above n 23, 11-4. 
134 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 99, 7, 9. 
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Indigenous peoples; and the creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples. It examines the relationship between the special procedures ' mandate regarding 
Indigenous peoples and the mandates of the constellation of other international mechanisms that 
also promote the realisation of international Indigenous rights norms, devoting especial 
attention to the synergies and tensions between the Special Rapporteur and the other 
Indigenous-exclusive bodies: the former WGIP, the PFII and the EMRIP. 
Chapter IV assesses the the key regulatory mechanisms engaged by the special 
procedures to advance their mandate regarding Indigenous peoples. It argues that the special 
procedures draw on a mixed toolset of dialogic mechanisms to fulfil their mandate to advance 
the realisation of international Indigenous rights norms. It briefly examines why it is that the 
special procedures principally rely on dialogic mechanisms, identifying that the special 
procedures experts have recommendatory powers only and no coercive power to compel state 
cooperation with their work. It then analyses the specific types of regulatory mechanisms 
engaged by the special procedures. It argues that shaming is the central mechanism used by the 
experts with what I term ' dialogue-building' and capacity-building the two other core 
mechanisms leveraged. Shaming is engaged primarily through the special procedures country 
reporting, communications process, special reports on specific cases and media releases. 
Dialogue-building underlies each of these working methods too, along with the experts ' efforts 
to improve knowledge amongst states and others regarding the content of international 
Indigenous rights norms through thematic studies and formal and informal dialogues. Capacity-
building is employed in the experts ' technical advisory assistance work. In addition, this chapter 
explores the institutional support the special procedures receive in leveraging these regulatory 
mechanisms. It argues that while the institutional support provided by the UN is insubstantial 
some mandate-holders, especially the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, have deftly 
emolled the support of institutions outside of the UN in an effort to improve the quality and 
reach of their work. 
Chapters V and VI analyse the influence of the special procedures on state behaviour 
towards Indigenous peoples through a detailed analysis of their influence in the two case study 
states: New Zealand and Guatemala. In each state the principal behavioural responses of the 
governments are explored using three exemplar recommendations concerning the 'hard' 
international Indigenous rights to self-determination and land and the ' soft ' cultural right to 
education. 'Hard' rights pose a more obvious challenge to existing power and wealth structures 
than ' soft ' rights, although the autonomous dimensions of soft rights can also be very 
challenging to states. 135 The right to self-determination is the cornerstone of Indigenous peoples' 
135 Sheryl Lightfoot also embraces the 'hard '/'soft:' distinction regarding Indigenous peoples ' rights norms, see Sheryl 
Lightfoot, 'Emerging International Indigenous Rights Norms and 'Over-Compliance' in New Zealand and Canada' 
(2010) 62(1) Political Science 84, 96, 103-04. 
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claims. 136 It is a malleable concept, often associated with secession (the attainment of 
independent statehood) or the exercise of' external' self-determination. 137 But it represents a 
spectrum of norms, including 'internal' self-determination rights to self-government and 
participation in decision-making; rights that are affirmed in the UNDRIP and in the 
determinations of the UN human rights treaty bodies.138 The recommendations I examine 
regarding the right to self-determination concern constitutional recognition of Indigenous 
peoples' rights, including to self-determination, and Indigenous peoples' right to participate in 
decision-making that affects them. Land rights are also foundational to Indigenous peoples' 
claims. 139 Indigenous peoples' rights to their lands and resources are affirmed in various 
sources, including the UNDRIP, the ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries of 1989 (ILO Convention 169), which is the main international treaty 
regarding the rights oflndigenous peoples, and the decisions of the International Court of 
Justice, regional human rights bodies and the UN human rights treaty bodies. 140 The land rights 
recommendations I examine concern title over lands and the impact of extractive industries. 
Education is the primary vehicle for sustaining Indigenous peoples' languages and knowledge 
and is, thus, intrinsically linked to the maintenance of Indigenous peoples' cultures. Indigenous 
peoples' right to maintain and develop their cultural identities is recognised in instruments 
including the UNDRIP. 141 The recommendations regarding education I examine involve 
136 UNDRIP art 3. See, eg, Michael Dodson quoted in Craig Scott, 'Indigenous Self-Determination and 
Decolonization of the International Imagination: A Plea' (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 814, 814; Anaya, 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 3, 7, 97. 
137 See, eg, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 3, 7; Chris Tenant, 'Indigenous Peoples, 
International Institutions, and the International Legal Literature from 1945-1993' (1994) 16 Human Rghts Quarterly 
1, 29. For general discussion regarding the right to self-determination see, eg, Antonio Cassese, 'The Self-
Determination of Peoples' in Louis Henkin ( ed), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Columbia University Press, 1981) 92; J Crawford, 'The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its 
Development and Future' in Philip Alston (ed), Peoples' Rights (Oxford University Press, 2001) 7. 
138 See, eg, UNDRIP arts 4, 5, 18, 19, 23; Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 3, 150-56, 229-
32. Article 46(1) of the UNDRIP limits the recognition ofindigenous peoples' rights to self-determination to its 
internal dimensions, except where the legal justifications for secession are made out, see, eg, Megan Davis, 
'Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights ofindigenous Peoples' 
(2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 439, 460-61 . For discussion regarding Indigenous peoples' rights 
to self-government and to participate in decision-making see, eg, Mauro Barelli, 'Free, Prior and Informed Consent in 
the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights ofindigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead' 
(2012) 16(1 ) The International Journal of Human Rights l; Steven Wheatley, 'Indigenous Peoples and the Right of 
Political Autonomy in an Age of Global Legal Pluralism' (2009) 12 Law and Anthropology: Current Legal Issues 
351. 
139 See, eg, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 3, 141 ; Bel lier and Preaud, above n 2, 480-81 . 
140 See, eg, UNDRIP arts 25-30, 32; International Labour Organization's (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, opened for signature 27 June 1989, ILO Convention No 169, 71 ILO 
Official Bull 59 (entered into force 5 September 1991) art 14(1) ('!LO Convention 169'); Western Sahara (Advisory 
Opinion) 1975 ICJ Rep 12; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (Merits) IACHR Series C No 79, 
31 August 200 1; Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on 
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya ACHPR 276/2003, 4 February 2010; Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee), 'General Recommendation on the Rights ofindigenous Peoples, Adopted 
by the Committee, at its 1235th Meeting, on 18 August 1997' in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination annex V, A/52/18 (1997) [5] . See generally Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 
aboven3, 141-48,229-31. 
14 1 See, eg, UNDRIP arts 13-15, 21. See generally Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 3, 131-
41 ; Bel li er and Preaud, above n 2, 478, 480-81. 
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Indigenous peoples' right to an education tailored to their cultural needs, including one that is in 
their language. 
Chapter V assesses the influence of the special procedures mechanism on New 
Zealand's behaviour towards Maori. It begins with some contextual background on the 
Indigenous rights situation in New Zealand. It reveals a stable democratic state but one with a 
history of violating the rights of Maori that reverberates into the present day. It examines the 
nature of the special procedures' engagement with New Zealand regarding its Indigenous rights 
situation. It finds that there has been a focused engagement in which the special procedures ' 
tools of shaming, and to some degree dialogue-building, have been leveraged. It analyses the 
New Zealand Government's official response to the special procedures' attentions. The 
Government moved from rejection to a degree of outward commitment to the special 
procedures' country assessments of the human rights situation of Maori. It then assesses to what 
extent this rejection and then apparent commitment translated into action to implement the 
special procedures' recommendations. It finds that the New Zealand Government has 
implemented few of the special procedures' recommendations in their totality. Ritualism is the 
Government's dominant behavioural response. New Zealand disguises its inward resistance to 
special procedures' recommendations regarding hard rights to constitutional protection and land 
with outward acceptance of those recommendations. It partially commits to recommendations 
concerning the soft right to education. But then leverages this fractional commitment to deflect 
attention both from its fuller implementation of that soft right and its resistance to the hard 
rights. The analysis shows that the special procedures experts' role in bringing about some of 
the small moves in line with the mandate's recommendations is tangible, although slight. 
Chapter VI examines the influence of the special procedures mechanism on 
Guatemala's behaviour towards the Indigenous peoples of Guatemala. It also begins with an 
introduction to the Indigenous rights situation in Guatemala, painting a picture of a troubled 
state facing a critical juncture. It analyses the nature of the special procedures ' engagement with 
Guatemala regarding its Indigenous peoples. The analysis discloses a long history of sustained 
special procedures' attention in which each of the mechanism' s dialogic regulatory tools has 
been engaged. It explores the Guatemalan Government' s official response to the special 
procedures' attentions. In contrast to the New Zealand Government's early posture, it finds that 
the Guatemalan Government's official public stance towards the special procedures' Indigenous 
rights recommendations has been largely positive. Also in contrast to New Zealand, where the 
experts' influence was more peripheral, there are two noteworthy examples of the mechanism 
having a direct influence in Guatemala. But ultimately these responses are best characterised as 
ritualistic. Again, ritualism is apparent in the Government' s implementation of aspects of the 
soft right to education the subject of the special procedures' recommendations. This limited 
commitment operates to deflect attention from the Government's failure to more fully 
29 
implement that soft norm. It also deflects attention from the Government's inward resistance to 
the hard rights to Indigenous participation in decision-making and land that are reflected in the 
experts' recommendations, which the Government outwardly commits to. 
Chapter VII considers the factors that explain the special procedures' influence in New 
Zealand and Guatemala and how an understanding of those factors might inform strategies to 
improve the regulatory impact of the mechanism more generally. It employs Braithwaite and 
Drahos' 'webs of influence' analysis to unravel the regulatory webs at play in both states. It 
analyses the key actors, principles and mechanisms relevant to the special procedures' 
regulation of state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples in New Zealand and Guatemala. It 
argues that a complex array of factors explains the special procedures' imperfect influence in 
these two states. Key actors are not engaged, the core principles leveraged by the state are not 
contested and important regulatory mechanisms are not exploited to their full potential. In the 
process of making this assessment it offers some suggestions for the mechanism's improved 
influence that are of broader import than just the two states under study. 
Chapter VIII, the final chapter, sets out the overarching conclusions and reflections on 
the thesis. It argues that the special procedures regulate state behaviour towards Indigenous 
peoples perceptibly but incompletely. There are instances where the governments of New 
Zealand and Guatemala have acted upon the special procedures' recommendations regarding 
Indigenous peoples. However, ritualism is both states' prevailing response. It then uses an 
understanding of the strategies for improving the influence of the special procedures outlined in 
Chapter VII to advocate for the improved leverage of the international human rights system to 
address the Indigenous rights implementation gap. Crucially, it supports a shift in the 
international human rights system's predominant focus on shaming states for non-compliant 
behaviour to models that simultaneously shame and praise states, fostering continuous 
improvement in observing Indigenous rights. 
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II WEBS OF INFLUENCE: THEORISING 
REGULATORY POTENTIAL 
A Introduction 
Investigating how the special procedures regulate state behaviour towards Indigenous 
peoples requires first understanding how powerful actors such as states are regulated. In this 
chapter I draw heavily on the rich body of regulatory literature to theorise how that occurs. I 
argue that, even though the special procedures do not have the ability to coercively enforce their 
recommendations or enjoy access to generous economic resources, they can weave webs of 
influence that help to bring about state conformity to international Indigenous rights norms. I 
develop this argument in three steps. First, I explore how states respond to normative orders and 
the authorities that push them. I argue that states can respond in varying ways, including ways 
designed to disguise their inward rejection of the goals of the relevant norms. I follow John 
Braithwaite, Toni Makkai, Valerie Braithwaite and Charlesworth in adapting Robert Merton ' s 
theory of individuals ' behavioural responses to normative orders - conformity, innovation, 
ritualism, retreatism and rebellion - to distinguish state responses to norms. 1 I focus especially 
on ritualism, which Charlesworth has identified in state responses to international human rights 
regulation.2 Secondly, I consider whether 'weak' actors, like the special procedures experts, 
have the ability to effect changes in these responses . I embrace a largely constructivist 
theoretical stance to argue that they do. Thirdly, I examine the logistics of how it is that such 
actors can make these shifts happen. To this end, I embrace Braithwaite and Drahos ' 'webs of 
influence ' conceptualisation of how regulation happens. It conceives ofregulation as occurring 
through contests of principles between many actors leveraging different mechanisms, rather 
than simply at the whim of states with the power to coerce and reward. Based on this 
understanding I argue that the special procedures, like other apparently weak actors, have the 
potential to weave dialogic webs of influence to significant effect. The chapter addresses each 
of the steps of my argument in tum. 
1 Robert K Merton, 'Social Structure and Anomie' (1 938) 3(5) American Sociological Review 672; Robert K Merton, 
Social The01y and Social Structure (The Free Press, Enlarged ed, 1968); John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai and Valerie 
Braithwaite, Regulating Aged Care (Edward Elgar, 2007) 6-7, 130-39, 219-88; Hilary Charlesworth, 'Kirby Lecture 
in International Law - Swimming to Cambodia: Justice and Ritual in Human Rights After Conflict' (20 10) 29 The 
Australian Year Book of International Law 1, 11-4. I note that Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite use Robert 
Merton' s theory to distinguish organisational, rather than state, responses to norms. 
2 Charlesworth, above n 1, 12. 
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B State Responses to Normative Orders and Authorities 
1 The Mertonian Paradigm of Behavioural Adaptations 
States can respond to normative orders and the authorities that push them in varying 
ways. Merton's paradigm of individuals' behavioural adaptions to normative orders is an 
instructive starting point in understanding states' responses to norms. The focus of Merton's 
paradigm is non-conformity. He theorises that non-conformity or deviance from normative 
systems is 'a symptom of dissociation between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially 
structured avenues for realizing these aspirations. ' 3 In the course of making his argument, 
Merton identifies five logically possible behavioural adaptations. The first is conformity, where 
the individual accepts both the cultural goals and the institutionalised means of achieving them. 
In his view, conformity is the most common behavioural adaptation. The second is innovation, 
where the individual accepts the cultural goals but finds alternative means to achieve them. 4 
Although in colloquial terms 'innovation' has positive connotations, Merton uses the term to 
refer to behaviours of crime and delinquency. Ritualism is the third behavioural adaptation. 
Ritualism, according to Merton, occurs where the individual abandons the cultural goals but 
'almost compulsively' abides by the institutionalised norms. 5 Merton points out that this 
adaptation has not often been viewed as deviant, given that the overt behaviour of the individual 
aligns with institutionalised nonns. 6 The fourth adaptation is retreatism. Retreatism is identified 
by Merton as the least common behavioural adaptation. It occurs where the individual 
substantially abandons both the cultural goals and the institutionalised means for achieving 
those goals.7 The fifth, and last, is rebellion, which occurs where the individual rejects and 
substitutes new goals and standards for the cultural goals and the institutionalised means for 
meeting those goals.8 Merton cautions that individuals' responses may shift in relation to the 
same normative order (and, of course, between them); the adaptations do not categorise the 
totality of individuals' personalities. 9 
Each of Merton's behavioural adaptations is, with some refinement, possible in states' 
responses to the international Indigenous rights nonns pushed by the special procedures. In this 
context, the cultural goals are the goals of international Indigenous rights norms, such as for all 
Indigenous peoples to enjoy the right to self-determination or to be free from non-discrimination 
and so forth. The socially structured avenues for realising those goals are the accepted means for 
their realisation, such as the enactment of laws and policies affirming and providing for 
3 Merton, Social Theo1y and Social Structure, above n 1, 188. 
4 Ibid 230-31. 
5 Ibid 238. 
6 Ibid 238, 241. 
7 Ibid 241-42. 
8 Ibid 245. 
9 Merton, 'Social Structure and Anomie', above n 1, 676. 
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Indigenous peoples ' rights to self-determination and non-discrimination. Some states will 
conform, accepting the goals of the norms and the means of achieving them. This acceptance, or 
commitment, is the most durable form of regulation as the state will self-regulate compliance to 
the normative order. 10 Unlike the context in which Merton writes, the rights situation of 
Indigenous peoples suggests that conformity is not the most common behavioural adaptation to 
international Indigenous rights norms. A few states will innovate, accepting the goals of the 
norms but finding other ways to achieve those goals . States will retreat, abandoning the goals of 
the norms and the accepted means for achieving those goals. States will also rebel, rejecting and 
substituting new goals and means for meeting those new goals. Given the poor state of 
Indigenous rights implementation, at first blush retreatism and rebellion are states ' expected 
behavioural responses. Yet, the near universal state endorsement of the UNDRIP and evidence 
of states' domestic steps to legislate for the norms it affirms reveals an apparent disassociation 
between states ' abidance with the socially structured avenues for realising those goals 
(international and domestic law and policy) and the goals themselves. This suggests that 
ritualism is a common state response to international Indigenous rights norms: states abandon 
the goals of the norms but comply with the accepted means of achieving them. The case studies, 
discussed in Chapters V and VI, bear this out. 
2 Compliance Ritualism 
Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite have adapted and developed Merton' s concept of 
ritualism in the course of a sustained comparative study of regulation. They analyse the 
regulation of nursing home facilities in the United States, England and Australia over three 
decades. They found examples of each of Merton' s behavioural adaptations in the responses of 
nursing home operators to their regulation. But they identified ritualism as the most prevalent 
response. 11 In fact, they identified it as ' the most daunting challenge of regulatory capitalism' .12 
They argue that in order to avoid confrontation with regulators, nursing home operators often 
agreed to the language and techniques of regulation, such as by changing policies, but without 
committing to the goal behind those policies. They found that operators were usually successful 
in this strategy because the regulators did not have sophisticated mechanisms to follow-up and 
monitor the operators ' compliance and because the new policies were capable of perfunctory 
1
° Charlesworth, above n 1, 11. 
11 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 1, viii. 
12 Ibid 7. 
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observation. 13 Given the difficulties in assessing commitment to regulatory goals, regulators 
often equated formal compliance with the rules with commitment. 14 
Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite go on to theorise the contemporary prevalence of 
ritualism in regulation. They refine Merton 's definition of ritualism, defining it as 'acceptance 
of institutionalised means for securing regulatory goals, while losing all focus on achieving the 
goals or outcomes themselves. ' 15 They argue that it can take many forms, often 
simultaneously. 16 For example, rule ritualism, where a rule is produced instead of a solution to 
the problem; documentation ritualism, where the documentation is right but the actions towards 
fulfilment of the regulatory goals are wrong; legal ritualism, where the letter rather than the 
spirit of the law is followed; and, participatory ritualism, where procedures are followed that 
purport to improve participation but instead alienate the intended participants. 17 These are 
responses of the regulated, what Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite term 'compliance 
ritualism'. 18 Regulators can also engage in ritualism. Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite refer 
to this as 'regulatory ritualism' .19 
It is a leap to go from an understanding of individuals' behavioural adaptations to 
ascribing behaviours to states. As Chapter I identified, states are complex. They are 
conglomerates of individuals and organisations, each of whom may respond with a different 
behaviour to any single authority or norm. In fact, each individual or organisation within a state 
may respond with multiple behaviours to a single authority or norm over a course of time. Yet, 
it is conceivable that a state representative ( a government minister or head of a diplomatic 
mission in Geneva say) or a state institution could be attributed a dominant behavioural 
adaptation at a point in time. Certainly, the large body of international law and international 
relations literature that considers state compliance with international norms has no difficulty in 
imputing prevailing behaviours to states.20 
13 This sentence is paraphrased from Charlesworth's discussion of Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwa ite's findin gs . 
Charlesworth, above n 1, 12; Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 1, 13 l. 
14 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 1, 131-33; Carol A Heimer and J Lynn Gazley, 'Performing 
Regulation: Transcending Regulatory Ritualism in HIV Clinics' (2012) 46(4) Law & Society Review 853, 880. 15 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 1, 7. 
16 Ibid 220-59. 
17 Ib id 221. 
18 Ibid 264, 302 . 
19 Ibid 302. Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite argue that ' [r]egulatory ritualism induces gaming, defiance and 
di sengagement that in turn produce compliance ritualism.' Gaming, defi ance and di sengagement are motivational 
postures, which signal actors' atti tudes abo ut how they wish to pos ition themselves in relation to an authority. The 
idea of motivational postures was developed by Valerie Braithwaite in itially on the basis of the nursing home data 
co ll ected by Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite and later in relat ion to tax compliance, see Valerie Braithwaite, 
Defiance in Taxation and Governance: Resisting and Dismissing Authority in a Democracy (Edward Elgar, 2009). 20 As John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth and Aderito Soares acknowledge, ' [o]fcourse, states are larger, more 
complex organisations than nursing homes'. But they see some of the principles born of Braithwaite, Makkai and 
Braithwaite's research as applicab le to state behaviour. John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth and Aderito Soares, 
Networked Governance of Freedom and Tyranny: Peace in Timor-Leste (ANU £Press, 20 12) 34. 
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3 Human Rights Ritualism 
Charlesworth is one scholar who has specifically embraced the ascription of ritualism as 
a behavioural response to states. She does so in the process of examining the international 
community' s role in the protection of human rights in the context of international peace-
building efforts. A large part of her focus is on how the international community has engaged in 
the protection of human rights in Cambodia, with especial emphasis on Kirby's time as the 
special procedures expert on Cambodia. She draws on Merton, Braithwaite, Makkai and 
Braithwaite to argue that in 'the field of human rights, rights ritualism is a more common 
response than an outright rejection of human rights standards and institutions', including in 
Cambodia.2 1 She argues: 
Rights ritualism can be understood as a way of embracing the language of human rights 
precisely to deflect real human rights scrutiny and to avoid accountability for human rights 
abuses . Countries are often willing to accept human rights treaty commitments to earn 
international approval, but they resist the changes that the treaty obligations require. 22 
For example, she points out that, despite signing up to several core international human rights 
treaties, Cambodia has failed to implement these international human rights commitments into 
domestic law.23 As the case studies in Chapters V and VI will show, enacting domestic 
legislation that reflects international human rights commitments can itself be a form ofrights 
ritualism where the policies, processes and resources to give effect to those commitments are 
lacking. Charlesworth argues that the practice of rights ritualism has been ' tacitly endorsed' by 
the international community 'perhaps as the path of least resistance in a political system that is 
inhospitable to human rights claims. ' 24 Nor is the tactic restricted to states from the global 
South. Charlesworth suggests that Australia also engages in rights ritualism. 25 Yet, states 
display other behaviours too. Charlesworth acknowledges that Cambodia has edged closer to 
disengaging behaviours at times, resisting human rights when it is the subject of strong 
criticism.26 But she posits that it is rights ritualism that has enabled Cambodia to successfully 
avoid deep international human rights scrutiny. 27 The rights ritualism that Charlesworth focuses 
on is compliance ritualism: the ritualism engaged in by states. However, in pointing to the 
international community's tacit endorsement of the practice, she alludes to the regulatory 
ritualism engaged in by the international authorities advancing human rights norms. As with 
21 Charlesworth, above n 1, 12-4. 
22 Ibid 12-3. 




27 Ibid 14. 
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Charlesworth, it is 'compliance ritualism' that I am alive to uncovering in the case studies of 
state responses to the special procedures in Chapters V and VI. Following Charlesworth, I refer 
to this phenomenon simply as 'ritualism' or 'rights ritualism'. 
Other legal scholars have recognised the prevalence of human rights ritualism among 
states, although they use different terminology. For example, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks 
use the term 'decoupling' to describe three different categories of behaviours, the second of 
which aligns with rights ritualism.28 Goodman and Jinks' second category of decoupling occurs 
where there is a decoupling between public conformity to a social convention and private 
acceptance and practice.29 They argue that this is common within international society.30 In the 
human rights context, they give the example that 'states ratify international human rights 
treaties and enact liberal, rights-based constitutions, but these formal changes often do not alter 
substantially their commitment to human rights standards in day-to-day governance.' 31 In their 
view, states act this way because they perceive their domestic practices 'to be relatively 
insulated from global scrutiny. ' 32 They identify that '[i]n the human rights context, this is 
particularly troubling, given the familiar problem of the seemingly "shallow" or disingenuous 
embrace of international human rights law by many states. ' 33 
The language of ritual and its synonyms is prevalent in Indigenous scholars and 
advocates' reflections on states' domestic protection of international Indigenous peoples' rights 
too. Ana Pinto observes that the UN's first International Decade of the World's Indigenous 
People 'has been a good ritual but has not produced the results it could have' .34 Tauli-Corpuz 
reflects that the response of most states domestically to international Indigenous rights norms 
'has been ceremonial, not actual' .35 Further, Jeff Corntassel makes a distinction between the 
recognition of 'paper rights' and the 'actual realization' of Indigenous peoples' rights. 36 'Ritual' 
is a word long associated with Indigenous peoples given its frequent use in the countless 
anthropological studies oflndigenous peoples' social, legal and political systems. Examining 
states' ritualism turns the gaze back from the 'rituals' oflndigenous peoples to those of the 
colonial powers. 
28 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 'Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law' (2008) 
19(4) The European Journal of International Law 725, 729-31. 
29 Ibid 73 1. 
30 Ibid 727, 729; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 'International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical , 
and Normative Challenges' (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 983, 994; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 'How to 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law' (2004) 54(3) Duke Law Journal 621, 649. 31 Goodman and Jinks, 'International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical , and Normative Challenges', 
above n 30, 994 ( citations omitted). 
32 Ibid 994. 
33 Goodman and Jinks, 'Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law', above n 28, 727 . 34 Ana Pinto in Ellen Lutz, 'S tories From Home: Indigenous Issues Ignored in India' (2004) 28(3) Cultural Survival 
quoted in Jeff Comtassel, 'Partnership in Action? Indigenous Political Mobilization and Co-optation during the First 
UN Indigenous Decade (1995-2004)' (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 137, 162. 
35 Victoria Tau Ii-Corpuz in Cultural Survival, Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous People Renews 
Hope (7 January 2005) <http ://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/karin-oman/second-intemational-decade-worlds-
indigenous-people-renews-hope> quoted in Comtassel, above n 34, 162. 
36 Comtassel , above n 34, 162. 
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Merton's behavioural adaptations provide a useful language with which to label state 
responses to international Indigenous rights norms and the work of the special procedures 
mandate-holders in pushing them. Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, Charlesworth and 
Goodman and Jinks' analyses also highlight the need to remain alert to Indigenous rights 
ritualism. Their scholarship underscores the importance of carefully inspecting below the 
surface of states' formal rights practices. However, being able to label state responses is only 
the first step. Where states are not conforming to international Indigenous rights norms the next 
vital step is identifying whether it is possible for apparently weak actors, such as the special 
procedures, to influence states to do so. 
C The Influence of 'Weak' Actors: Rationalism versus Constructivism 
l Rationalism and Indigenous Rights Conformity 
Two conventional approaches to understanding state conformity to international norms 
were introduced in Chapter I: rationalism and constructivism. These approaches offer differing 
perspectives on the ability of apparently weak actors to wield influence over states.37 In the 
broadest brush strokes, rationalist accounts are concerned with interests. Rationalist scholars 
take the position that states, as rational actors, will only comply with international norms that 
are in their national interests.38 The general category ofrationalist accounts includes three main 
approaches: realist,39 institutionalist,40 and liberal.41 Realists emphasise the lack of a centralised 
law-making authority within an uncertain and anarchic international system. 42 They see unitary 
nation states as the only international actors that matter, understanding each state as a rational 
actor with survival as its primary goal. On these accounts state power is central. The goal of 
survival requires that states maintain sufficient power - understood principally as economic and 
37 See generally Oona A Hathaway and Harold Hongju Koh (eds), The Foundations of International Law and Politics 
(Foundation Press, 2005). 
38 Rationalist scholars include Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, 'Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International 
Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective' (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies 115; Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A 
Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005); Andrew T Guzman, How International 
Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press, 2008); Robert O Keohane, 'International Relations 
and International Law: Two Optics' (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 487; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics' (1997) 51 ( 4) International Organization 513; Hans 
J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (McGraw-Hill, 6 ed, 1993); Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, 'A Liberal Theory of International Law' (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 
240. 
39 See, eg, Morgenthau, above n 38. 
40 See, eg, Keohane, 'International Relations and International Law: Two Optics', above n 38; Jack Donnelly, Realism 
and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Robe1i O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984); Jack Donnelly, 'International Human 
Rights : a Regime Analysis' (1986) 40 International Organization 599. 
41 See, eg, Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe' 
(2000) 54 International Organization 217; Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Politics', above n 38; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States' (1995) 6(4) 
European Journal of International Law 503. 
42 Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories' in Rudiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) [l], [4]. 
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military assets - to ward off threats of foreign invasion or occupation. Thus, on realist accounts, 
states can only be bound by coercion (generally, of the military or economic variety) or consent, 
which will be withheld if it does not accord with the (narrowly defined) rational self-interest of 
the state. It concludes that it is those states with the greatest military and economic clout that are 
decisive globally.43 As a result, realists do not view international norms as influencing state 
behaviour. In Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope's words, '[r]ealist approaches tend to devalue 
the role of norms in international society, leaving little space for the operation oflaw.' 44 Norm 
compliance is simply a reflection of state power and interests: states obey norms when it is in 
their interests and ignore them when it is not (with any compliance counter to states' interests 
understood as a consequence of coercion).45 Accordingly, realists reject the idea that individuals 
without direct coercive enforcement powers and significant economic resources could wield 
influence over states.46 Hans Morgenthau's scholarship typifies such approaches.47 
Institutionalists modify the realist position slightly. Like realists, institutionalists view 
the international system as anarchic and uncertain and states as self-interested rational actors 
geared towards survival through increasing their military and economic power.48 But they 
identify an important role for international institutions. According to institutionalists, states 
design international institutions ' to prevent opportunistic behavior from hindering collectively 
optimal outcomes'. 49 Such ' institutions do not reconfigure state interests and preferences, but 
they might, under certain conditions, constrain strategic choices by prescribing and stabilizing 
mutual expectations about state behavior. ' 50 Institutions can do so in several ways: through 
extending the time horizons relevant to the interactions, increasing the relevance of reputation 
and punishment; improving information regarding states' behaviour; and increasing efficiency 
in agreeing a collective course of action. 51 Reputations are relevant instrumentally only: states 
are concerned about their reputations as a way 'of securing gains to the state by entering into 
more cooperative agreements' not for honour or prestige. 52 Institutionalists use microeconomic 
43 Ibid [2]-[4]; Oona A Hathaway, 'Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?' (2001-2002) 111 Yale Law 
Journal 1935, 1944-47. See generally Morgenthau, above n 38; Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years ' Crisis 1919-
1939 (Harper & Row, 1964); Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw Hill , 1979). 44 Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law' in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A 
Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 119, 120. 
45 Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories', above n 42, [7]; Paul Schiff Berman, 'A Pluralist Approach 
to International Law' (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International Law 302. 323; Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human 
Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2009) 114. 
46 Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Soares, above n 20, ix. 
47 Morgenthau, above n 38. 
48 Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories', above n 42, [8]. 
49 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 'Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty' (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 
1749, 1751. 
50 Ibid 175 1. See also Hathaway, above n 43 , 1947-52. See generally Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy, above n 40. 
51 Slaughter, 'International Relations , Principal Theories', above n 42, [10]-[1 2]. 
52 Rachel Brewster, 'Unpacking the State's Reputation' (2009) 50(2) Harvard International Law Journal 231, 236. 
See also Guzman, above n 38, 35. 
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and game theories to explain why states may pursue cooperation.53 Robert Keohane's work is an 
example of institutionalist scholarship. 54 
Liberalism is a more distinct branch of rationalism. Its central defining thesis is that 
states' individual national characteristics are relevant to their compliance with international 
norms.55 It understands states as comprised of various component parts, each of which may have 
different interests. One branch of liberalism argues that state behaviour in the international 
system is a product of the arrangement of the preferences of the individuals and private groups 
who dominate domestic society. These actors' preferences can include, for example, ideological 
beliefs rather than simply the acquisition of economic and military power.56 In this way it 
contrasts with realist and institutionalist accounts. Another branch focuses on the explanatory 
power of status as a liberal democratic state, arguing that liberal democracies are more 
compliant with international law than non-democracies. 57 Andrew Moravcsik has adopted a 
liberal theoretical stance. 58 
Yet, rationalist accounts struggle to explain the dynamics behind the pockets of state 
compliance with international Indigenous rights norms that do exist. Following the realist ' s 
logic, there is no tenable reason why a rational self-interested state would comply with 
international Indigenous rights norms. There is no centralised enforcement body with the power 
to coerce state compliance with international Indigenous rights norms. Even the weakest nation 
states have more economic and military power than the Indigenous peoples within their borders. 
As Sheryl Lightfoot explains, 'if states view concessions to indigenous groups as a zero-sum 
game, then a state would stand only to lose power and capacity by making any domestic 
changes that would recognize indigenous rights within the state.' 59 Institutionalists ' refinement 
of the realist position cannot explain such compliance either. In the area of Indigenous peoples' 
rights, neither the idea of reciprocity nor reference to a cooperation or coordination game alone 
plausibly explains state compliance. States generally do not require the cooperation of other 
states to realise their own domestic rights recognition so an argument for reciprocal compliance 
cannot be made in the same way it could for trade agreements, for instance. Reciprocity only 
persuasively comes into play where there is an agreement to exchange economic aid for 
53 Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories', above n 42, [8]-[9]. See generally Keohane, After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, above n 40. 
54 See, eg, Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, above n 40; 
Keohane, 'International Relations and International Law: Two Optics', above n 38. 55 Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories', above n 42, [14] . See also Hathaway, above n 43 , 1952-55; 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States', above n 41, 507-08 . 56 Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories', above n 42, [16]-[l 7] . See generally Moravcsik, 'Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory oflnternational Politics', above n 38; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International 
Law in a World of Liberal States', above n 41. 
57 Sheryl Lightfoot, 'Indigenous Rights in International Politics: The Case of "Overcompliant" Liberal States' (2008) 
33 Alternatives 83, 89. See generally Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory oflnternational 
Politics', above n 38; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States', above n 41. 58 See, eg, Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory oflnternational Politics', above n 38. 59 Lightfoot, above n 57, 89. 
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improved domestic rights recognition, for example. 60 Nor would the possibility of acquiring a 
bad reputation for failing to comply with international Indigenous rights norms explain a 
rational self-interested state's compliance. It is difficult for other states to detect and verify 
Indigenous rights violations. Even if they could, there is little instrumental value in having such 
a reputation;61 George Downs and Michael Jones find that 'reputation promotes compliance 
with international law most in trade and security and least in environmental regulation and 
human rights . ' 62 Liberal understandings fall short too. For example, while Lightfoot argues that 
a higher number of liberal democracies do in fact comply with international Indigenous rights 
norms than non-democracies, she also identifies that liberal theories struggle to explain the 
Indigenous rights non-compliance of liberal states such as the United States and the compliance 
of what she categorises as comparatively illiberal states such as Taiwan. Nor do they explain 
state recognition of Indigenous peoples' collective rights, given the liberal view that human 
rights attach to individuals only.63 
2 Constructivism and Indigenous Rights Conformity 
(a) Constructivism 's Defining Features 
Constructivist approaches offer some answers to the failings of rationalist accounts . At 
heart, constructivism is concerned with the socially constructed nature of identities and 
meanings and the role and evolution of norms.64 In marked contrast to rationalist accounts, 
constructivists argue that norms (along with ideas, culture and knowledge) help to constitute 
state identities and that these identities then shape political action. The argument is not that 
norms have a direct causal effect, rather that they shape behaviour by constraining, enabling and 
constituting states in their choices: 65 
Norms are ... seen to shape states' interests in an international system defined as a social system, 
in which states organize their conduct not solely according to material interests or the traditional 
tenets of sovereignty, but because they value the security and legitimacy of a particular identity. 
In this way, norms are seen, by their constitutive aspects for states' identities, to be relevant 
during the process by which states define their interests and organize their behaviour, while 
60 See, eg, Goodman and Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law', above 
n 30, 628-29 ; Simmons, above n 45, 123. 
61 Simmons, above n 45, 124-25 . 
62 George W Downs and Michael A Jones, 'Reputation, Compliance, and International Law' (2002) 3 1 Journal of 
Legal Studies S95 , Sl 12. See also Simmons, above n 45, 124. 
63 Lightfoot, above n 57, 89-90. 
64 Brunnee and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', above n 44, I 2 I ; Slaughter, 'International Relations, 
Principal Theories', above n 42, [1 9] -[23]; Lightfoot, above n 57, 90; Hathaway, above n 43, 1955-62 . See generally 
John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Nee-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist 
Challenge' (I 998) 52( 4) International Organization 855 . 
65 Brunnee and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', above n 44, I 24; Ruggie, above n 64, 869. 
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principled ideas and norms, in particular, are understood to mitigate states' self-interested 
behaviour and to act as a powerful constraint on the established norms of state sovereignty 
(Robinson 2003, 165-166).66 
Constructivists do acknowledge that state interests and power disparities matter.67 However, 
they 'stress that varying identities and beliefs belie the simplistic notions of rationality under 
which States pursue simply survival, power, or wealth. ' 68 Constructivists have differing 
perspectives on precisely how norms influence state behaviour, variously giving primacy to the 
explanatory power of factors such as acculturation,69 persuasion,70 socialisation,7' legitimacy,72 
and intemalisation.73 But the best view is that these perspectives operate together to explain why 
states obey international norms.74 
Constructivists emphasise the important role of non-state actors in states' norm 
compliance, which also distinguishes them from most rationalist accounts. Constructivist 
scholars have highlighted the role of non-state actors as 'norm entrepreneurs'. 75 Norm 
entrepreneurs influence states through non-coercive mechanisms like persuasion, which can 
help to change state beliefs and interests.76 They can include actors such as NGOs who do not 
have significant economic or military assets; actors ignored by realists. Transnational advocacy 
networks are identified as having an important role in the socialisation of norms, including by 
66 Rhiannon Morgan, Transforming Law and Institution: Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights 
(Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011) 51. 
67 Brunnee and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', above n 44, 121 ; Slaughter, 'International Relations, 
Principal Theories', above n 42, [21]. 
68 Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories', above n 42, [21]. 
69 See, eg, Goodman and Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law', above 
n 30; Goodman and Jinks, 'International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative 
Challenges', above n 30; Goodman and Jinks, 'Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law', 
above n 28. 
70 See, eg, Thomas Risse, 'International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behaviour in the 
Human Rights Area' (1999) 27(4) Politics and Society 529; Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in 
World Politics' (2000) 54(1) International Organization 1. 
71 See, eg, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change' (1998) 52(4) 
International Organization 887; Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn 
Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
72 See, eg, Jutta Brunnee and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional 
Account (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Thomas M Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International System' (1988) 82 
The American Journal of International Law 705; Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 
(Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford 
University Press, 1995); Thomas M Franck, 'The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International 
Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium' (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 88. 
73 See, eg, Harold Hongju Koh, 'Transnational Legal Process: The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture' (1996) 75 Nebraska 
Law Review 181; Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 
2599; Harold Hongju Koh, 'How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?' (1998) 74 Indiana Law Journal 
1397; Harold Hongju Koh, 'The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home' (1998) 35 Houston Law 
Review 623 . 
74 See, eg, Risse, 'International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behaviour in the Human 
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75 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International 
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Thomas Risse and Sikkink. 77 This is because transnational advocacy networks have the ability 
to focus international attention on norm violations, which in tum leads to pressure on the target 
countries 'simultaneously "from above" and "from below'". 78 Both domestic and transnational 
actors may engage in 'moral consciousness-raising', such as by mobilising shame to publicise 
norm-violations in order to embarrass states into compliance.79 In addition, constructivists have 
identified 'the role of international institutions as actors in their own right.' 80 Institutionalists 
tend to view 'institutions largely as the passive tools of States', whereas constructivists identify 
that the bureaucracies of international institutions sometimes pursue interests contrary to 'the 
wishes of the States that created them' .81 
(b) Process-based Micro Analyses of Norm Compliance 
Constructivist approaches are process based, emphasising the role of interactions in 
bringing about norm compliance. In order to catalogue the multiple interests, normative 
assertions and effects that impact the influence of norms constructivist approaches require 
'process-based micro analyses'. 82 Examples of process-based analyses by international law 
scholars in the constructivist vein include Abram and Antonia Chayes' 'managerial' account of 
compliance with international law that emphasises how 'an iterative process of discourse' 
between the parties to international treaties, treaty organisations and the public acts to pressure 
states into compliance with international treaties; 83 Harold Hongju Koh's 'transnational legal 
process' theory that sees the multi-stage process of interaction, interpretation and internalisation 
of international norms as key to explaining why states obey international law;84 and Goodman 
and Jinks' state socialisation approach, which argues that states derive their elemental features 
'from worldwide models constructed and propagated through global cultural and associational 
77 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Socialization oflnternational Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction' in Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 1. 
78 Ibid 5 (citations omitted). See also Keck and Sikkink, above n 71. 
79 Morgan, above n 66, 52 . See also Keck and Sikkink, above n 71, 23. 
80 Slaughter, 'International Relations, Principal Theories', above n 42, [23]. 
81 Ibid [23]. Regarding the latter approach see generally Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: 
International Organizations in Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004). 
82 In advocating a pluralist approach to international law Paul Schiff Berman argues that '[s]uch analyses will 
necessarily go beyond both the simplified models of rational choice realists and the triumphalism that can afflict 
international law proponents , who have sometimes simply assumed that international law affects state behavior 
without the essential process-based micro analyses. ' Berman, above n 45, 327. 
83 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The Nei11 Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulato,y 
Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1995). For comment on this approach, including its rationalist dimensions, 
see Brunnee and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', above n 44, 130-31. 
84 Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?', above n 73, 2646. See also Koh, 'Transnational Legal Process: 
The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture', above n 73; Koh, 'How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?', above n 73; 
Koh, 'The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home', above n 73. For critical comment on Koh's 
approach see, eg, Brunnee and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', above n 44, 131-32. Later scholars, 
especially Gregory Shaffer, have further developed Koh's theory see, eg, Gregory Shaffer, 'The Dimensions and 
Determinants of State Change' in Gregory Shaffer ( ed), Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 23. 
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processes' that then 'define and legitimate purposes of state action' as well as shaping 'the 
organizational structure and policy choices of states'. 85 
(c) A Generally Constructivist Approach 
Constructivist approaches offer a hopeful view of state compliance with international 
Indigenous rights norms. When state behaviour is understood as a product of state identities, 
which in tum are constituted in part by norms, international Indigenous rights norms and the 
non-coercive and resource-poor mechanisms and actors that push them have the potential to 
exercise notable power. 86 Moreover, a constructivist approach enables the discussion to rise 
above a fixation with the legal status of these norms. This is a factor of some import in the 
present context given the UNDRIP's orthodox status as 'soft' law. As Brunnee and Toope point 
out, ' constructivism is a poor fit for those who see the legal status of a norm as exclusively 
connected to its provenance from a formal source. ' 87 On constructivist approaches social 
interaction and social practices are central to how international norms are made and obeyed, not 
whether they emanate from a UN treaty or custom or elsewhere. 88 
I embrace a roughly constructivist view of how the regulation of states occurs to argue 
that apparently weak actors, such as the special procedures, can influence states to conform to 
international Indigenous rights norms. But I retain some rationalist leanings. I acknowledge that 
interests and power play a role in shaping state behaviour.89 However, I do not see them as the 
end of the story: norms, and actors that lack significant economic and military resources, also 
matter. I am not alone in such a composite formulation; Brunnee and Toope observe that 
'[m]any international lawyers appear to have both rationalist and constructivist intuitions.' 90 
Embracing a constructivist approach requires that I address the mechanics of how it is that 
international human rights norms and apparently weak actors like the special procedures experts 
85 Goodman and Jinks, 'Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty', above n 49, 1752. See also Goodman and 
Jinks, 'Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law', above n 28; Goodman and Jinks, 'How 
to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law', above n 30; Goodman and Jinks, 
'International Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges', above n 30, 983 . As 
Brunnee and Toope identify, this approach has parallels with the work of Finnemore and Sikkink and others who are 
also concerned with socialisation and internalisation. Brunnee and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', 
above n 44, 133. See Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', above n 71. 86 See, eg, Morgan, above n 66, 145. 
87 Brunnee and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', above n 44, 129. For pluralists such as Robert Cover 
state 'lawmaking' is no more legitimate or authoritative than that of any other normative community. Berman, above 
n 45, 307. 
88 Brunnee and Toope, 'Constructivism and International Law', above n 44, 129. 
89 In taking this approach I am mindful ofBrunnee and Toope's caution that constructivists must 'tackle head-on the 
internal critique of critical theorists and the external critique ofrealists that constructivism may privilege agency and 
neglect the constraints of power relationships.' Ibid 139. 
90 Ibid 129. Other scholars in a constructivist vein similarly acknowledge a role for coercion, see, eg, Goodman and 
Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law', above n 30, 623 ; Koh, 'The 1998 
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home', above n 73 , 633-34. On the advantages of avoiding firmly 
locating oneself in the either the rationalist or constructivist camp see, eg, Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'A 
New Generation ofIR-IL Scholarship' in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 33 . 
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can wield power; that is, I must outline my process-based micro analysis of influence. In doing 
so, I once again return to the regulatory literature. 
D How 'Weak ' Actors Influence States 
l 'Webs of Influence ' 
I adopt an understanding of regulation as a product of complex webs of influence. On 
this view, regulation occurs through contests of principles between actors leveraging different 
mechanisms. 91 I posit that non-coercive and resource-poor actors, such as the special 
procedures, have the ability to strategically weave dialogic webs to influence state behaviour. In 
taking this approach I draw heavily on the theoretical work of Braithwaite and Drahos,92 
although I remain informed by international law and international relations scholarship. 
Braithwaite and Drahos theorise regulation as a product of webs of influence in the course of 
exploring the globalisation of business regulation. They develop their theoretical offerings from 
in-depth bottom-up empirical analyses of thirteen business domains, ranging from corporations 
and securities to the environment and transport. However, their theorising is of wider import: 
global business regulation is simply a sub-set of the broader movement of the globalisation of 
norms, standards, principles and rules and their enforcement. In subsequent works John 
Braithwaite alone, and with Makkai, Valerie Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Aderito Soares, has 
also supported the application of several of the work's key theoretical conclusions outside of the 
business domain, including in the regulation of international human rights law.93 But their 
application in the human rights context is not explored in depth. 
Braithwaite and Drahos do not offer a guidebook for individual regulatory power. 
Regulation is too dialectical, non-linear and messy for that. 94 Rather, they put forward processes 
and mechanisms that may be effectively harnessed by comparatively weak actors in order to 
exert influence.95 I draw from Braithwaite and Drahos' regulatory theory, although it emanates 
from a different context, because such an offering is largely missing from the existing body of 
literature concerned with influencing states. While existing scholarship in a constructivist vein 
theorises on the mechanics of influencing states ' human rights behaviour it is yet to elaborate 
with specificity the strategies and mechanisms that may be engaged by non-state actors to 
influence state behaviour or to empirically test those theories. For example, Goodman and Jinks 
are unable to identify exactly how ' states respond to cultural forces ', noting that the issue is 'an 
91 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2000) 7, 9. 
92 Ibid . 
93 See, eg, Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 1, 10-1 , 303, 305, 322-23; John Bra ithwaite, Restorative 
Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford Uni vers ity Press, 2002) 201-2; Braithwaite, Charl esworth and Soares, 
above n 20, 41 , 196. 
94 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 9 1, 23-4. 
95 Ibid 550-629. 
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important one that requires rigorous empirical testing' .96 Koh similarly leaves unanswered how 
human rights activists are to go about provoking the interactions, interpretations and 
internalisations central to this theory. 97 Further, other models such as Risse, Ropp and Sikkink's 
'spiral model' and Finnemore and Sikkink's concept of a 'norm cascade' theorise the phases of 
international human rights norm socialisation but do not focus on the techniques to instigate 
movement through those phases.98 
2 The Foundational Concepts: Actors, Principles and Mechanisms 
(a) Actors 
Actors, principles and mechanisms are the conceptual foundations for my 'webs of 
influence' understanding ofregulation. I follow Braithwaite and Drahos in arguing that within 
each regulatory domain there are diverse actors seeking 'victory at different sites' .99 These 
actors include states; organisations of states, such as treaty secretariats; business organisations; 
corporations; NGOs; mass publics, which are sizeable 'audiences of citizens who ... express 
together a common concern about a regulatory question'; 100 and, epistemic communities of 
actors, which are ' loose collections of knowledge-based experts who share certain attitudes and 
values and substantive knowledge, as well as ways of thinking about how to use that 
knowledge' .101 Although Braithwaite and Drahos do not identify individuals as a recurrent actor 
in their case studies, they recognise that in some cases they are able to exert genuine influence 
over global regulation, including when they act as entrepreneurs of models of ways of acting. 102 
As identified above, other scholars in a constructivist mould engage some of these conceptual 
categorisations - such as the idea of norm entrepreneurs - in the context of considering state 
compliance with international human rights norms. 103 
Consistent with constructivist thought, each of these actors regulates and is regulated. 
This means that states are just one type of actor that can effectively exert influence. Braithwaite 
and Drahos find that 'no one actor appears as master of the world', 104 although they find that 
96 Goodman and Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law', above n 30, 
654. 
97 See, eg, Koh, 'The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home', above n 73. As noted above at n 84, 
Shaffer builds on Koh's theory. 
98 Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', above n 71; Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink, above n 71. 
99 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 91, 23. 
100 Ibid 24. 
101 Ibid 501. Braithwaite and Drahos draw on Peter Haas in describing epistemic communities in this way. Peter M 
Haas, 'Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control' (1989) 43 (3) International 
Organization 3 77 . 
102 See, eg, Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 91, 494-97, 559-63. 
103 See, eg, Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations 
and Comparative Politics', above n 75, 400-01. 
104 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 91, 7. 
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states (and, in particular, the United States) remain the type of actor that has had the greatest 
regulatory influence.105 In recognising the influence of states, they confirm 'the basic tenet of 
realist international relations theory - that states are the major actors in world affairs'. 106 
However, they reject 'the realist model of the global, as bigger- and smaller-state billiard balls 
using their weight to push one another around a table' .107 They argue that states are both 
' constituted by' and help to ' constitute a web ofregulatory controls' .108 
Each of these actors is relevant in understanding the regulatory domain of Indigenous 
peoples ' rights and the role of the special procedures mandate-holders within that domain. 
States are crucial given that the focus here is on how the special procedures regulate state 
behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. States with which the special procedures have engaged 
are especially relevant. International organisations of states that are important include the HRC, 
its predecessor the CHR, and the GA. The OHCHR, an international organisation reliant on 
state funding, is also of note. NGOs of core concern include domestic, regional, international 
and transnational human rights NGOs and IPOs, especially those that have been involved in 
special procedures mandate-holders' work in some way. Indigenous peoples and their 
supporters are the primary relevant mass public, whether as an audience, for example, of 
Indigenous peoples at large or as an audience of Indigenous women or Indigenous persons with 
disabilities and so on. Epistemic communities of relevance include academics in the field of 
Indigenous peoples and their rights. Individual actors, such as the special procedures mandate-
holders, Indigenous leaders and advocates, are also relevant. The categories are not exclusive. 
For example, I understand special procedures mandate-holders as individual actors (because of 
the uniquely independent nature of their mandates) engaged by an international organisation of 
states (the HRC) who often belong to epistemic communities of academics, may have 
associations with NGOs or IPOs and can act as members of mass publics. In international law 
scholarship the special procedures are also viewed as a 'mechanism' of the international human 
rights system, although they are not a 'mechanism' as I, and Braithwaite and Drahos, use the 
term to articulate webs of influence. 
(b) Principles 
Actors, often in coalitions that vary from domain to domain, push for or against 
different principles. I adopt Braithwaite and Drahos ' understanding of principles as unspecific 
' abstract prescriptions that guide conduct', 109 and that reflect actors' 'general values, goals and 
105 Ib id 475. 
106 Ib id 4 78. 
107 Ibid . 
108 Ib id 479 . 
109 Ibid 9. 
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desires'. 110 Principles are the most important component of the regulatory webs because they 
'set the direction of regulatory change'. 111 They do this by unifying thinking, giving actors a 
proposition to fight for. 112 They 'can also operate as tools of capture', providing a concept on 
which other policies can 'hang '. 113 Different actors can support the same principle for distinct 
motives. Sometimes this is because single principles are able to encompass different goals or 
interests, allowing alliances between disparate actors to be forged. 114 The way that principles are 
used and their status can also change over time. 115 
Principles are rhetorical, symbolic and instrumental. Principles are rhetorical in that 
they are used to 'attempt to sway judgment' using rhetorical techniques, such as by ' [a]rousing 
passion and emotion' .11 6 This is often best achieved through telling stories of effects on human 
lives; for example, Braithwaite and Drahos identify the important role of stories in triggering the 
concern of mass publics. 117 They can function symbolically. For instance, where principles are 
incorporated in framework agreements that require little direct state action their value is 
primarily symbolic in that they simply 'help to unify perceptions about the importance of an 
issue' and allow states to further consider the issues. 11 8 Principles also have an instrumental use, 
the use identified by Braithwaite and Drahos as most important. Principles are used 
instrumentally when they are used by actors to secure change consistent with the actors' goals. 
Principles do this by setting the direction of action and acting as a precursor to rule 
development. Principles do not themselves change conduct, processes for agreeing rules of 
conduct then need to take place. Braithwaite and Drahos argue that principles are active, and 
thus capable of operational effect, when they are used rhetorically or instrumentally. They are 
passive, and rarely capable of effect, when they are used symbolically ( or not at all). 119 
Braithwaite and Drahos identify thirteen key recurring principles in their case studies. 
Several of these principles could be relevant, with some modification, in the regulatory domain 
of Indigenous peoples' rights. The principle of continuous improvement could be engaged by 
special procedures mandate-holders to promote improved state commitment to international 
Indigenous rights norms. Braithwaite and Drahos define continuous improvement as ' [t]he 
prescription of doing better every year than the previous year in terms of a regulatory objective 
11 0 Ibid 19. 
111 Ibid 522. 
112 Ibid 528-29. 
113 Ibid 525. 
114 Ibid 530. 
115 Ibid 529. 
11 6 Ibid 528 . 
117 Ibid 500. Correspondingly, Joseph Nye argues that in the information age the actor with the most power ' may be 
the state ( or non-states) with the best story' . Joseph S Nye, The Future of Power (Public Affairs , 201 1) x.i ii. For 
comment on the power of stories for ' outgroups' , including Indigenous peoples see, eg, Richard Delgado, 
'Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others : A Plea for Narrative' (1989) 87(8) Michigan Law Review 2411 , 24 13 -15 ; 
Robert A Williams, 'Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of 
Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World' (1990) Duke Law Journal 660. 
118 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 91, 529. 
119 Ibid 19, 529 . 
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such as protecting the environment, even if legal requirements were exceeded in the previous 
year.' 120 So too could the principles of world's best practice, which is the prescription that 
activity be 'conducted under rules that substantially exceed the requirements set by present 
practice or regulation', 121 and transparency, which Braithwaite and Drahos define as '[t]he 
prescription that any person should be able to observe regulatory deliberation or easily discover 
the outcomes (and their justifications) of the deliberation.' 122 States could foreseeably leverage 
principles such as rule compliance, which prescribes that actors 'ought to consider that legality 
exhausts their obligations; to go as far as the rules require ( eg in reducing pollution) but no 
further', 123 and national sovereignty, which prescribes 'that the nation-state should be supreme 
over any other source of power on matters affecting its citizens or territory.' 124 These principles 
are indicative only. The principles that may be engaged are limitless as new principles are 
perpetually invented, acquired from other regulatory domains and revived following defeat. 125 
In setting the direction for action principles are related to 'framing'. The notion of 
framing comes from social movement theory. 126 Drahos defines framing as 'a form of public 
dialogue in which actors wishing to change political processes offer an alternative conceptual 
scheme through which to reinterpret those processes.' 127 As Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry point 
out, ' [ fJrames are not themselves ideas, but ways of packaging and presenting ideas that 
generate shared beliefs, motivate collective action, and define appropriate strategies of 
action' .128 Frames signify or assign meanings and they do so with the intention of mobilising 
potential supporters, securing the support of bystanders and demobilising antagonists. 129 Frames 
impact how 'problems are defined and understood, how causes of problems and their solutions 
are theorized and which perspectives are rejected completely.' 13° Characterising an issue as an 
international Indigenous rights or human rights issue is an example of framing. 
The idea of framing shows the sometimes blurred boundaries between the concepts of 
principles and mechanisms. Drahos argues that where actors find themselves 'on the losing side 
120 Ibid 25. 
121 Ibid 24. 
122 Ibid 25 . 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid 23-4. 
126 Sally Engle Merry, 'Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle' (2006) 108(1) 
American Anthropologist 38, 41. See generally David A Snow et al, 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, 
and Movement Participation' (1986) 51 ( 4) American Sociological Review 464; Sidney G Tarrow, Power in 
Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge University Press, 3 ed, 2011). 
127 Peter Drahos, 'Does Dialogue Make a Difference? Structural Change and the Limits ofFraming' (2008) 117 The 
Yale Law Journal Pocket Part 268, 268. 
128 Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry, 'Vemacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women's Rights in Peru, 
China, India and the United States' (2009) 9( 4) Global Networks 441 . 452. In support, Levitt and Merry cite Snow et 
al, above n 126; Tarrow, above n 126. See also Merry, above n I 26, 41. 
129 David A Snow and Robert D Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization' (1988) 1 
International Social Movement Research 197, 198 quoted in Merry, above n 126, 41. See also Morgan, above n 66, 
45-7. 
130 Peggy Levitt and Sally Merry, 'Vemacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women's Rights in Peru, 
China, India and the United States' (2009) 9(4) Global Networks 441,452. 
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of a global regulatory contest' they 'should reframe that contest using different principles. ' 131 
On this understanding principles are what are used to reframe debates. But he also comments 
that framing is ' a mechanism that will rarely work on its own', rather ' [i]t needs the support of 
other mechanisms'. 132 And in so doing he advocates an understanding of framing as a 
mechanism. David Snow and Robert Benford's understanding of frames also shares 
characteristics with Braithwaite and Drahos' idea of a mechanism as they posit that frames must 
have 'prognostic attribution ' ; that is, they argue that frames must not only identify problems but 
also propose solutions to those problems. 133 This is similar to the mechanism of modelling, 
discussed in the next section, for example. I prefer to view framing as related to principles in 
this context, given that frames, like principles, are a way of packaging ideas to promote 
regulatory change. As a result, I see frames , like principles, as in need of mechanisms to have 
effect. 
(c) Mechanisms 
Actors push for or against different principles using various mechanisms. I utilise 
Braithwaite and Drahos ' definition of mechanisms as 'tools that actors use to achieve their 
goals.' 134 Actors can use mechanisms without principles . But ' [m]echanisms need principles to 
guide action effectively' and ' [p ]rinciples need mechanisms to be made concrete in a regulatory 
domain.' 13 5 Mechanisms can be abstracted to different levels. For example, speech is a 
mechanism at a high level of abstraction (a ' higher-order mechanism'), as are rational choice 
and social norms. 136 In contrast, lower-order mechanisms are more concrete specifications of 
these mechanisms. 137 
Braithwaite and Drahos identify seven lower-order mechanisms that recur in their case 
studies, each of which may be pertinent to the Indigenous rights domain: military coercion, 
economic coercion, systems of reward, modelling, reciprocal adjustment, non-reciprocal 
coordination and capacity-building. Military coercion is ' the threat, fear or use of military 
force. ' 138 Economic coercion is ' the threat, fear or use of economic sanctions.' 139 Systems of 
reward raise ' the expected value of compliance with a globalizing order (as distinct from 
coercion, which reduces the expected value of non-compliance).' 140 Modelling is ' action(s) that 
constitute a process of displaying, symbolically interpreting and copying conceptions of action' 
131 Drahos, above n 127, 270. In support, Drahos references Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 91, 571 -76. l ' ? 
,_ Drahos, above n 127,272. 
133 David A Snow and Robert D Benford, 'Master Frames and Cycles of Protest' in Aldon D Morris and Carol M 
Mueller (eds), Frontiers in Social Movement Theo1y (Yale University Press, 1992) 135, 137. 
134 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 91, 9. 
135 Ibid 530. 
136 Ibid 16. 
137 Ibid 16, 532. 




and a model is a conception of action displayed during such process. 14 1 Reciprocal adjustment is 
'non-coerced negotiation where parties agree to adjust the rules they follow. This is conceived 
as cooperative adjustment where reciprocation occurs without coercion ' .142 Non-reciprocal 
coordination is 'when movement toward common rules happens without all parties believing 
they have a common interest in that movement. One party believes the new rule is in their 
interest, but this belief is not reciprocated.' 143 It ' often involves non-reciprocity within an 
overall reciprocity of issue linkage' .144 Capacity-building is 'helping actors get the technical 
competence to satisfy global standards, when they wish to meet them but lack the capacity to do 
so. ' 145 Other mechanisms not identified by Braithwaite and Drahos as recurrent in their study 
may also be relevant in the Indigenous rights domain. The technique of shaming, which is the 
expression of disapproval for non-compliance, is one example given its prevalence across the 
bodies of the international human rights system.146 
Not all mechanisms are equally available to all. The mechanisms of military coercion, 
economic coercion and systems of reward are generally only available to powerful actors with 
' concentrated and liquid resources', such as states and transnational corporations.147 For 
example, in their case studies Braithwaite and Drahos found that '[e]conomic coercion is most 
effectively applied by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank', then 
' dominant states ' (the United States above all), and sometimes private corporations.148 The 
remaining mechanisms: modelling, reciprocal adjustment, non-reciprocal coordination, 
capacity-building and shaming are available to both powerful and 'weak' actors, although for 
reasons discussed below modelling is a mechanism that in certain ways may advantage the 
'weak'. Braithwaite and Drahos point out that no one mechanism is all-conquering, how 
effective a mechanism is will depend on the specific actor or actors engaging it and on the 
regulatory domain in which it is engaged. 149 
3 The Importance of Dialogic Webs 
Actors, principles and mechanisms form the basis for webs of influence. Like 
Braithwaite and Drahos I distinguish between two different types of webs of influence: webs of 
reward and coercion and dialogic webs. In recognising the relevance of both types of webs I 
141 Ibid 581. 
142 Ibid 25. 
143 Ib id 25-6. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid 26. 
146 For a defin ition of 'shame ' see, eg, Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 1,306. Regarding the 
prevalence of shaming in the international human rights system see, eg, Elvira Dominguez Redondo, 'The Universal 
Periodi c Review - Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?' (20 12) 4 New 
Zealand Lcrw Review 673,687. . 
147 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 9 1, 552 . 
148 Ibid 535. 
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navigate a course between realist theorists' emphasis on the explanatory power of coercive 
measures and constructivist theorists' emphasis on the explanatory power of persuasion and 
other normative or social factors. Webs ofreward and coercion include rewards and military 
and economic coercion and, as identified above, are generally only available to powerful actors. 
Braithwaite and Drahos frame dialogic webs as webs of persuasion; formal or informal, official 
or unofficial. Dialogic webs can be woven by all actors. They involve the remaining 
mechanisms. 150 
Dialogic webs are common. Braithwaite and Drahos argue that the inability of 'weak' 
actors to access webs of reward and coercion ' leaves resource-poor actors less disadvantaged 
than might be assumed, because dialogic webs are generally more influential and more common 
than webs ofreward and coercion. ' 151 Braithwaite and Drahos posit that most actors prefer to 
rely on dialogue before activating webs of reward and coercion because states, like individuals, 
tend to react to threats by redefining ' their interests in the direction of resisting the threat ', 152 
and ' that extrinsic incentives (rewards or punishments) undermine intrinsic motivations to 
comply ', thus undermining long-term commitment in favour of short-term compliance. 153 
Goodman and Jinks make a corresponding argument in support of 'softer' international human 
rights law enforcement mechanisms such as reporting and monitoring. 154 
Dialogic webs are influential. Braithwaite and Drahos argue that webs of dialogue 
regularly globalise 'forms ofregulation that are complied with moderately well' without 
activating webs of reward or coercion. 155 They attribute this ability to five characteristics of 
dialogic engagement. First, dialogue enables actors to define their interests, and then to redefine 
those interests as an interest in solving a problem. 156 Secondly, it allows actors to understand 
relationships of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye term 'complex interdependency' , where 
issues can only be resolved cooperatively. 157 It also allows actors to identify issue linkage, 
which can prompt reciprocal adjustment and non-reciprocal coordination, and thus 'motivate 
agreement and compliance' .158 This is because ' in a world of complex interdependency' actors 
150 Ibid 552-57. 
151 Ibid 552. 
152 Ibid 558. Braithwaite and Drahos point to the work of Sharon and Jack Brehm as support for this proposition at 
the individual level. Sharon S Brehm and Jack Williams Brehm, Psychological Reactance: A Theory of Freedom and 
Control (Harper & Row, 1981). 
153 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 91, 558 . Braithwaite and Drahos rely on Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite in 
making this point. Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992) 49. 
154 Goodman and Jinks, 'How to ln.fluence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law' , above n 30, 
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fear that if they do not comply, even in the absence of sanctions, others 'will not cooperate in 
solving other agreed problems ' . 159 As identified above, arguments for reciprocity and 
coordination are rtot as obviously applicable in the Indigenous rights domain. But, as Chapter 
VII will show, attempts at such linkages have been made. Thirdly, dialogue can constitute 
normative commitments - actors are persuaded that 'compliance is morally right ' .160 This 
normative commitment can then be harnessed to develop an agreement on principles, then rules 
and sometimes a commitment to enforce those rules.161 Fourthly, dialogue can generate and 
institutionalise habits of compliance 'into bureaucratic routines or standard operating 
procedures ' .162 Modelling can also globalise practice. 163 Fifth, and lastly, it can institutionalise 
'informal praise and shame for defection from the regime' and build capacity. 164 In Braithwaite 
and Drahos ' case studies, informal praise and shame often played an important influential role 
in the dialogues within epistemic communities. 165 Overall, they find that ' [w]hen many different 
types of actors use many dialogic mechanisms of this sort, both impressive regime-building and 
impressive compliance have been repeatedly demonstrated.' 166 The work of constructivist 
scholars, and some rationalist scholars, discussed in Part C supports the tenor of these 
conclusions in the domain of international human rights . 
The news is not all good though. Braithwaite and Drahos find that powerful states and 
corporations still tend to dominate dialogic webs of control. As they assert, ' [h]egemony means 
that within dialogic webs there is more reason to hear the voices of those with a capacity to 
escalate to webs of reward and coercion.' 167 Or, as Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite phrase 
it, ' [ c ]onversation works better when we have an aura of power in the eyes of the other. ' 168 
Because of this Braithwaite, along with Ian Ayres and others, has advocated for a networked 
escalation regulatory enforcement pyramid based on principles of responsive regulation. 169 Such 
a pyramid dictates soft and weak dialogic webs ofregulation at the base of the pyramid and 
progressively moves up to measures that are more coercive. 170 It hypothesises that persuasion 
should presumptively be tried first, with punishment meted where persuasion is unsuccessful. 171 
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Braithwaite observes that '[t]he paradox of responsive regulation is that by having a capability 
to escalate to tough enforcement, most regulation can be about collaborative capacity 
building.' 172 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite's enforcement pyramid moves from 
'[e]ducation and persuasion about a problem' to '[s]hame for inaction' to '[s]anctions to deter' 
to '[ e]scalated sanctions' to 'capital punishment' .173 The emphasis is on minimising ' the 
escalation of coercion' and avoiding threats as 'threat and coercion undermine goodwill and, 
therefore, the trust that makes cooperative compliance work'. 174 It also works on the basis that 
where 'regulation is seen as more legitimate and more procedurally fair, compliance with the 
law is more likely. ' 175 Special procedures acting alone do not have the ability to mete out 
sanctions or to incapacitate states. But they can network in other actors who can. 
Networking is a central component of the pyramid. Braithwaite identifies that actors 
that do not have the ability to control a situation should 'consider networking with partners 
horizontally, or better still with partners who can de-escalate coercion, before considering 
vertical escalation.' 176 He also posits that where vertical escalation is required but the regulator 
does not have the power or resources to do so, the regulator should 'scan creatively and 
optimistically for potential network partners' who have the resources required. 177 'Weak' actors 
can also be useful. Braithwaite suggests searching ' for other weak actors whose combined 
power tied in a node governs the situation with greater power than the sum of its parts.' 178 
Commenting on the strategy of escalated networking in the regulation of human rights 
specifically, Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Soares explain: 
In practice, responsive regulation of states that perpetrate human rights abuses tends to be 
accomplished by escalated networking of informal sanctioning by mo_re network partriers in the 
international system - states, businesses, media organisations, human rights NGOs, traditional 
chiefs, UN agencies, foundations and other donors - becoming enlisted in a widening web of 
sanctions against the rights-abusing state: naming and shaming, withdrawal of donor support, 
trimming trade links, cutting defence support, cutting diplomatic support, terminating the 
membership of international organisations, and so on. 179 
Although special procedures mandate-holders do not have coercive powers, they could temper 
this handicap by networking in other actors to escalate up the pyramid as Braithwaite, 
Charlesworth and Soares suggest. 
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4 A Micro-Macro Theory of the Processes of Globalisation 
(a) Entrepreneurial Individuals 
Multiple processual theories of norm compliance are possible. Braithwaite and Drahos 
put forward three processual theories of globalisation. In one, entrepreneurial individuals are 
central, in the other two individuals play a more minor role. 180 As I am concerned with 
strategies that may be engaged by entrepreneurial individuals - the special procedures mandate-
holders - I focus on the dimensions of the former theory. It is a proactive micro-macro theory. 
Its sequence is ' individual entrepreneurship, enrolment of organizational power, modelling and 
then globalization of standards.' 181 Each of the components of this sequence demands some 
attention. Entrepreneurial individuals are pivotal. Entrepreneurial individuals are savvy actors 
that can guide the actions of even the most powerful actors. Braithwaite and Drahos point out 
that many entrepreneurial individuals do not see themselves ' as passive puppets of inexorable 
global forces', but rather: 
... as deft puppeteers, capable of pulling strings and moving big players that remain passive until 
activated by someone who can show them where their interests lie. Then they help link 
principles to those interests. Their view is that large corporations and state bureaucracies tend to 
dither, paralyzed by the complexity of world regulatory networks, craving guidance by someone 
who can see a clear path of interest-enhancing action through the complexity. 182 
Special procedures experts could fulfill the role of deft puppeteer when it comes to regulating 
state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples . 
(b) Enrolment 
The enrolment of power is crucial to the process. Power, according to Braithwaite and 
Drahos, ' is diffused by the actions of chains of agents, each of whom "translates" it according to 
their own projects' and in the process of translation draws power away from the powerful's 
control. 183 It draws on Bruno Latour' s theory of power as translation or enrolment of the 
180 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 9 1, 551 , 559-62 . Individuals can still play a role in Braithwaite and Drahos' 
reactive micro-macro theoretical sequence of the processes of globalisation. In thi s sequence individual entrepreneurs 
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individuals, such as special procedures mandate-holders . But it highlights the specia l procedures' abi li ty to steer the 
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181 Ibid 561. 
182 Ibid 495. 
183 Ibid 482. 
54 
capacities of other actors. 184 Braithwaite and Drahos argue 'that effectiveness at enrolling others 
to one's projects is a more important determinant of the effective exercise of power than 
resources possessed.' 185 Actors 'who exercise the greatest power are those who enrol many 
others with more resources and authority than themselves, and, more importantly, those who 
can enrol others who are even better at enrolling others than themselves.' 186 Braithwaite and 
Drahos underscore the sometimes key role of intellectuals in enrolling powerful actors given 
their ability to 'synthesize more clearly than others the direction where much thinking and 
innovative practice is going.' 187 This is promising for a number of the special procedures experts 
for whom the moniker aptly fits. Braithwaite and Drahos also identify treaty secretariats as sites 
where powerful individuals can often 'enrol the power of many business, state and NGO 
actors ', given they are sited in metropole's 'where many enrolled heads of power come 
together.' 188 The special procedures experts' access to the HRC, GA and other UN bodies such 
as the PFII and EMRIP is an advantage as they are sites where state, NGO, and IPO actors meet. 
Additionally, actors, such as special procedures experts, can harness fissions within 
governments to enrol state actors because, as Braithwaite and Drahos explain, states are not 
unitary in the way that realists propose. 189 
(c) Modelling 
Modelling is also decisive in the proactive sequence. Braithwaite and Drahos identify 
modelling as 'the most consistently important mechanism of globalization'. 19° Compliance, they 
find, 'globalizes more through modelling than by legal enforcement.' 191 Modelling works 
because the complexity of regulatory environments gives an advantage to those entrepreneurs 
who can identify a clear and 'plausibly interest-enhancing path'. 192 The tool is particularly 
useful for weaker actors because 'battles over models are not just battles won and lost in terms 
of economic interests (if this were true, the stronger interests would always prevail), but are also 
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battles over identities. ' 193 Braithwaite and Drahos point out that the significance of modelling is 
' neglected in the regulatory and international relations literatures', which ' is a pity, because 
modelling works with a subtlety that is intriguing, and intriguingly connected to normative 
theories of global politics.' 194 
The modelling process involves the work of four key actors: model makers, model 
missionaries, model mercenaries and model mongers. According to Braithwaite and Drahos, 
those on the periphery ' imputed low status by a dominant power' are able to develop models, or 
adapt existing models from other polities, that oppose or 'invert the hegemonic status 
system' .195 I term these actors 'model makers ' (they can also be model takers). Braithwaite and 
Drahos identify that ' [ e ]pistemic communities of the excluded are the incubus of regulatory 
models for asserting the claims of the excluded' .196 They illustrate the roles of these actors with 
examples drawn from the feminist movement. For example, they identify women who inverted 
' the housewifely virtues' in the 1960s in order to pursue careers as fulfilling the role of model 
makers. 197 
'Model missionaries ' and 'model mercenaries ' then create an opening for the models. 
Model missionaries are the actors that popularise the oppositional models. Braithwaite and 
Drahos use the example of popular feminist authors such as Germaine Greer in the 1970s. Once 
model missionaries have secured 'a toehold' it is then up to model mercenaries to tum these 
'toeholds into footholds' .198 They cite publishers who 'promote women's magazines with a 
feminist orientation' as an example. 199 
The role of 'model mongers' in this process is critical. Model mongers float multiple 
different models, as opposed to a single model, in order to make the most of scarce resources. 
This prevents limited resources from being expended on losing campaigns. Braithwaite and 
Drahos give the example of Australian women promoting feminist models during international 
conferences, including the 1995 Beijing Congress on Women. They point out that dominant 
actors generally do not engage in model mongering. Instead, they focus on defending the 
existing models that grant their privilege. As a result, oppositional groups have the ability to set 
the framework for the discussion. Braithwaite and Drahos argue that, ' [b ]ecause the model has a 
power that is independent of the interests that advocate it, a weak interest group with a strong 
model can defeat a strong interest group. ' 200 
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(d) The Power of Models 
The power of models lies in their ability to instigate identity crises. Braithwaite and 
Drahos argue that '[m]odel mongering is a key to the powerless acquiring a strategic advantage 
over the powerful because persistent application of the strategy eventually draws out 
contradictions in the identities propagated by dominant models' .201 Model mongers are 
successful 'when they experiment with insurgent models until they strike one that poses an 
insoluble collective-action problem for the dominant group. ' 202 Braithwaite and Drahos term 
this 'political ju-jitsu', using the identitive power of existing majoritarian models against the 
power structures they support. 203 Keeping with their examples drawn from the feminist 
movement, they point to the way that feminist models that highlighted contradictions between 
the patriarchy that exists and 'and a national identity valuing equality of opportunity' led to 
'identity crises among nations that claim to be democracies' causing 'a succession of nations to 
give women the vote' .204 It put 'powerful actors on the spot', forcing 'them to choose between 
their egalitarian and patriarchal identities. ' 205 Braithwaite and Drahos note that pre-packaged 
models have particular appeal to actors in the legislative and executive branches of states who 
have limited time and resources to devote to finding solutions to all of the issues regarding 
which states 'would like to be seen to be making progress' .206 They also identify the 
mobilisation of mass media and the Internet as important throughout the modelling process.207 
The special procedures experts can foreseeably assume each of the roles in the 
modelling process that Braithwaite and Drahos describe. Mandate-holders can develop or adapt 
models that oppose the dominant status system. They can operate as model missionaries to 
popularise the oppositional models that are produced or as model mercenaries to capitalise on 
the openings made by model missionaries. They may also play the role of model monger, 
experimentally floating different oppositional models. Goodman and Jinks and Jim Ife have 
referenced the idea of models in deliberation on the influence of international human rights 
norms, although neither explores the concept in depth or discusses models in relation to the 
special procedures. 208 
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Three features of modelling make it a particularly useful mechanism for weaker actors, 
such as the special procedures experts. First, Braithwaite and Drahos' data on modelling 
indicates that whether a model is effective depends more on the power of the model than of the 
resources and capacities of the model monger promoting it.209 Secondly, weaker actors have less 
to lose by mongering multiple models until a chord is struck in the identity of mass publics. 
They argue: 
Those with little to lose can take the risks of setting a hundred agendas running. For those who 
have entrenched power, it is foolish ... to start a hundred agendas, any one of which could unseat 
them if it ran out of control. The vaster the organizational empires controlled by the powerful, 
the more profound their collective-action problems, the more fissures that can be prised open to 
tum part of the empire against itself. Strength engenders specific weaknesses that can be 
exploited by the strategy of model mongering. 210 
Thirdly, modelling has the ability to globalise regulation even absent enforcement 
mechanisms. 211 There is also an important psychological dimension to models that is of especial 
relevance to Indigenous peoples: they are empowering. Braithwaite and Drahos point out that 
'[p ]owerlessness begets hopelessness and political paralysis. What the powerless need to 
conquer the psychology of defeatism is models of other powerless actors in similar 
circumstances in other places prevailing against powerful odds.' 212 Mechanisms that further 
empower Indigenous peoples, and those who advocate for their rights, are emphatically 
required. 
Modelling does have limitations for less powerful actors. Braithwaite and Drahos point 
out that while weaker actors, such as individuals, can use modelling to frame the terms of the 
debate, they tend not to have the resources to sufficiently monitor implementation of the model. 
As a result, other actors can - and often do - 'wage an effective war of resistance at the 
implementation stage. ' 213 In such cases, the reward is largely symbolic - powerful actors protect 
their interests by failing to implement the model. 214 Braithwaite and Drahos contend that '[e]ven 
the symbolic victories are important, however, in sustaining an international momentum for 
citizen empowerment. ' 215 Given that I am interested in strategies the special procedures 
mandate-holders can institute to counter the implementation gap in Indigenous peoples' rights I 
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am interested in more than simply symbolic victories in the recognition of those rights. Yet, 
symbolic reforms might also bring gains in the longer term. For example, Goodman and Jinks 
theory of acculturation suggests that even shallow reforms can translate into absolute gains 
· · 2 16 given time. 
5 Harnessing Continuous Improvement 
Braithwaite and Drahos synthesise their extensive analysis by identifying strategies that 
NGOs - one of the weakest actors in regulating global business behaviour - can leverage to 
improve global standards.2 17 One of those strategies is a potentially powerful weapon for the 
special procedures in the regulatory domain of Indigenous peoples ' rights: continuous 
improvement. Continuous improvement was identified above as a recurrent principle in webs of 
influence. It is a management philosophy capturing the notion of an ongoing effort to improve 
or ratchet-up standards. Braithwaite and Drahos emphasise the importance of working with 
target actors to change their practices in accordance with the principle of continuous 
improvement. They argue that persuading both 'an innovator to lead the pack' and 'the pack that 
continuous improvement is a good thing (so it has to catch up with the leader)' can matter 
enormously. 21 8 
Notably, continuous improvement is identified in the regulatory literature as a principle 
that can help to move beyond ritualism. A strengths-based regulatory approach that fosters 
continuous improvement features centrally in Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite's strategy 
for transcending ritualism in aged care regulation. In Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite's 
view, one way to move beyond ritualism is to develop a new regulatory-environment that has 
two linked and complementary models . On the one hand, 'a regulatory model backed by 
enforcement' , which they conceive as a regulatory enforcement pyramid. And, on the other 
hand, 'a strengths-based model backed by rewards ' , which they conceive as a strengths-based 
pyramid.2 19 The enforcement pyramid, which was introduced above, is designed to use 
networked escalation (from deterrent to incapacitative sanctions) to 'solve a problem' , ensuring 
that the minimum standards set by the regulator are met. 220 In contrast, the strengths-based 
pyramid is designed to 'expand a strength' building from micro to macro strengths in order to 
lift the standards 'beyond the minimum to continuously higher levels.' 22 1 It engages 'praise and 
pride' for realising strengths 'that might take the industry up through a ceiling' , rather than the 
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regulatory pyramids ' disapproval and shame for failing to manage a risk'. 222 Braithwaite, 
Makkai and Braithwaite's strengths-based pyramid goes from ' [e]ducation and persuasion about 
a strength ', ' [i]nformal praise for progress' , ' [p]rize or grant to resource/encourage/facilitate 
strength-building', ' [ e] scalated prizes or grants to resource/encourage/facilitate strength-
building' to the highest award.223 The strengths-based approach rests on the theory that 
eventually the actors' 'strengths will grow to conquer more weaknesses, or to compensate for 
them. ' 224 It also posits that regulators will 'often achieve more by working with the friends of 
continuous improvement than by working against its enemies'. 225 Braithwaite argues that the 
approach can help to reengage those regulatees who have disengaged from the regulatory 
system because, when the focus is on what an actor is good at, it 'provides a point of entry to 
getting them engaged with projects of continuous improvement that regulator and regulatee can 
begin to see as shared projects. ' 226 This is the basis for expanding strengths using the strengths-
based pyramid.227 Ultimately, Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite hypothesise that in the long 
run ' the most important thing regulators do is catalyse continuous improvement. ' 228 
The value of the principle of continuous improvement in promoting compliance with 
international human rights norms has been recognised. This is despite the fact that the principle 
is counter-intuitive to many legal scholars: legal rights imply accountability or punishment for a 
breach rather than support to promote improved recognition.229 Charlesworth argues that the 
principle of continuous improvement's focus on a learning culture, rather than a culture of 
blame, could be useful in fostering improved human rights protection: 
How can we work against human rights ritualism, so often present in international 
peacebuilding? The regulatory literature offers the idea of continuous improvement, which 
emphasises incremental, constantly monitored steps, rather than great leaps forward . It means 
' doing better every year than the previous year in terms of a regulatory objective' . This can be 
achieved by moving from a culture that administers blame to a culture that encourages learning, 
a development that would be useful in the field of international human rights protection. 230 
Charlesworth emphasises that moving 'to a learning culture requires the engagement of local 
actors, above all. ' 231 This means translating human rights so that they are relevant to local 
contexts. She also suggests that strategies such as fostering a free and professional media can be 
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engaged. But she cautions that it is necessary to be vigilant to 'the process of continuous 
improvement itself becoming ritualised. ' 232 Braithwaite promotes restorative regulatory 
processes to continuously improve respect for human rights too. He argues that human rights 
reporting teams should couple persuasion with offers of capacity-building assistance as a first 
strategy in seeking to improve poor human rights performance. In his view, praise should have a 
role where human rights performance is reliably shown to have improved. While he favours 
'[c]arrots more than sticks' he also sees a role for 'a degree of shaming at meetings in Geneva' 
where there is not continuous improvement in the human rights situation (or reporting on it). 233 
He acknowledges that this approach may take time to see results. In his words, it ' requires 
patience, eschewing the quick fix in favour of the long haul'. 234 
E Conclusion: The Regulatory Power of the 'Weak ' 
The message ofthis chapter is one of hope. Even without coercive capability and 
plentiful capital the special procedures have the strength to weave webs of influence that can 
lead to state conformity to the international Indigenous rights norms they push. States can 
respond to international Indigenous rights norms in various ways. They can conform, innovate, 
ritualise, retreat or rebel. Existing scholarship underscores the need to remain alert to states 
engaging in Indigenous rights ritualism, which disguises actors' inward rejection of the goals of 
the relevant norms. Regulators, such as the special procedures experts, need to tailor their 
regulatory interventions to match these behaviours. Importantly for the experts, when state 
behaviour is understood as a product of state identities, which in tum are constituted in part by 
norms, international Indigenous rights norms and the special procedures that push them are 
imbued with the power to regulate states. Understanding regulation as a product of webs of 
influence opens up a host of regulatory strategies to the special procedures. Special procedures 
experts can weave dialogic webs, which are often more influential and common than webs of 
reward and coercion. They can be proactive in micro-macro processes of globalisation as 
individual entrepreneurs, emolling organisational power and promoting models that highlight 
contradictions in majoritarian identities. They can leverage the principle of continuous 
improvement to build on states ' latent strengths. These strategies are drawn together in the idea 
of two regulatory pyramids, one focused on enforcement and the other on building strengths. 
Having established the special procedures' potential to wield influence over states, I tum to 
focus on the actualities of their work. In Chapters IV to VII the strategies engaged by special 
procedures mandate-holders to influence state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples are 
232 Ibid 15 (citations omitted). 
233 Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, above n 93,202 . Drawing on the idea of networking, 
~e suggests strengthening this dialogic diplomacy by linking it ' to preventive diplomacy by the major powers. ' 2
"
4 Ibid 205 . 
61 
explored both in general terms and in relation to the two case study sites. In the next chapter I 
examine the special procedures experts' mandate regarding Indigenous peoples. 
62 
III REALISING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS: THE 
MANDATE 
A Introduction 
The special procedures are mandated to advance the realisation of international 
Indigenous rights norms. In this Chapter I analyse the dimensions of that mandate. I begin by 
briefly outlining what the special procedures mechanism is. The existing literature explores the 
nature of the mechanism in depth so that is not attempted here. Rather, a basic understanding of 
its core features is provided in order to situate its Indigenous mandate. The discussion highlights 
the unsystematic evolution of the mechanism. The mechanism's mandate regarding Indigenous 
peoples' rights is examined with reference to three defining moments: the creation of the first 
special procedures mandate, a time when Indigenous peoples' barely registered on the UN's 
radar; the issue of the CHR's 1993 resolution recommending that all thematic special 
procedures mandate-holders pay particular attention to the situation of Indigenous peoples, 
prompted by increased focus on the position of Indigenous peoples by the greater UN apparatus; 
and the creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, the thematic 
mandate devoted to Indigenous peoples. I go on to explore the connections between the special 
procedures' Indigenous mandate and the mandates of the array of other international 
mechanisms that also promote the realisation of international Indigenous rights norms. I focus 
in particular on the relationship between the mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples, the PFII, the EMRIP and the EMRIP's predecessor: the WGIP. Understanding these 
relationships is important for grasping the boundaries of the special procedures' mandate 
regarding Indigenous peoples in practice. 
B Afterthought to Centrepiece: The Evolution of the Mechanism 
1 Origins 
The 'special procedures' is the general name given to the collection of UN mandates 
established to address human rights concerns either on a thematic or country-specific basis. The 
mechanism was developed by the CHR, a commission composed of 53 member states, which 
was the UN's primary body for the promotion and protection of human rights from 1946 to 
2006. The CHR itself was created by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) under the 
authority of Article 68 of the UN Charter. 1 The special procedures are thus a Charter-based 
1 United Nations Charter, signed 26 June 1945, TS 993 (entered into force 24 October 1945). 
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mechanism because their legal basis is ultimately derived from the UN Charter, rather than a 
treaty. 2 In 2006 the CHR was replaced by the HRC, a council composed of 47 member states, 
amid criticisms of the CHR's politicisation and ineffectiveness.3 In the process the HRC 
assumed responsibility for the special procedures. The historical precursor to the current system 
of special procedures was the CHR's creation in 1967 ofan ad hoc working group of experts to 
investigate the human rights situation in South Africa.4 This was a significant step as the CHR, 
along with its parent body the ECOSOC, had previously resolved that the CHR had 'no power 
to take any action in regard to any complaints concerning human rights.' 5 But the CHR yielded 
to the mounting pressure to deal with the host of individual petitions for action emanating from 
South Africa and created the working group. The creation of the working group in tum led 
ECOSOC (at the CHR's prompting) to adopt resolution 1235 (XLII) in 1967. The resolution 
authorises the CHR 'to examine information relevant to gross violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms' and, 'in appropriate cases', to carry out 'a thorough study of situations 
which reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights'. 6 The CHR interpreted the 
wording of ECO SOC Resolution 1235 as providing implicit authorisation for it to appoint 
experts to examine information on human rights violations and report on the result of those 
studies. Following the resolution the CHR slowly began creating more mandates, initially 
focused on country situations, including the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) in 1969 and 
Chile in 1975. Later it created mandates regarding thematic human rights concerns, beginning 
2 Philip Alston, 'Critical Appraisal of the UN Human Rights Regime' in Philip Alston (ed), The United Nations and 
Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Calrendon Press, 1992) 1, 4. 
3 See, eg, David Weissbrodt, 'United Nations Charter-Based Procedures for Addressing Human Rights Violations: 
Historical Practice, Reform, and Future Implications' in Geoff Gilbert, Frans;oise Hampson and Clara Sandoval (eds), 
The Delive,y of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Professor Sir Nigel Radley (Routledge, 2011) 13, 15-16; Paulo 
Sergio Pinheiro, 'Being a Special Rapporteur: A Delicate Balancing Act' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of 
Human Rights 162, 165; Philip Alston, 'Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the 
New UN Human Rights Council' (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 185, 187-204; Matthew Davies, 
'Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations' (2010) 35 Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 449, 451-59. 
4 CHR Res 2 (XXIII) (6 March 1967). See, eg, Tania Baldwin-Pask and Patrizia Scannella, 'The Unfinished Business 
ofa Special Procedures System' in M CherifBassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN 
Human Rights Machine,y (lntersentia, 2011) 419, 419. 
5 CHR Report of the First Session, UN Doc E/259 (1947) [22] ; Communications Concerning Human Rights, 
Economic and Social Counci l (ECOSOC) Res 75(V), 5th sess, UN Doc E/573 (5 August 1947) 20. See, eg, Surya P 
Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs' (201 1) 33 Human Rights 
Quarterly 201, 205 -06; Jeroen Gutter, Thematic Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and 
International Law: In Search of a Sense of Community (lntersentia, 2006) 41 -5; Ingrid Nifosi, The UN Special 
Procedures in the Field of Human Rights (lntersentia, 2005) 8-9. 
6 ECOSOC Res 1235 (XLII), 42 UN ESCOR Supp (No 1) 17, UN Doc E/4393 (1967) paras 2-3. A later resolution 
estab li shed a procedure to deal confidentially with complaints relating to a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
human rights: Procedure for Dealing with Communications Relating to Violations of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, ECOSOC Res 1503 (XL VIII), 163 rd plen mtg (27 May 1970). For background on the 1503 
and 1235 procedures see Philip Alston, 'The Commission on Human Rights' in Philip Alston (ed), The United Nations 
and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press, 1992) 126,145-81 ; Manfred Nowak, 'Country-Oriented 
Human Rights Protection by the UN Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission' (1991) 22 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 39; Gutter, above n 5, 55 -69 ; Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of 
Human Rights, above n 5, 13-6, 36-41. 
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with the Working Group on enforced disappearances in 1980. Thus, the special procedures 
mechanism was progressively (and unsystematically) born. 7 
The number of special procedures mandates has grown rapidly since the 1980s making 
the mechanism the HRC's primary instrument for monitoring and promoting state compliance 
with international human rights norms. In October 2013 there were 51 special procedures 
mandates in existence, comprised of 14 country mandates and 37 thematic mandates.8 The 
country mandates concern states including Haiti, Belarus, Sudan, Cambodia, the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, Mali, the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPT.9 As O'Flaherty 
points out, '[t]here is no particular logic to the list of countries subject to the mandate of 
country-specific special mechanisms', with many countries that would benefit from devoted 
attention absent from the list. 10 Initially thematic mandates focused on civil and political rights 
but they have moved to focus on a host of economic, social and cultural rights too. 11 The 3 7 
thematic mandates concern issues including racism, education, arbitrary detention, food, 
minorities, human rights defenders, torture, cultural rights, extrajudicial executions, the sale of 
children, extreme poverty, truth and justice, health, freedom ofreligion, transnational 
corporations, democracy, the environment, housing, and enforced disappearances. 12 Country 
mandates generally have a term of one year, which is capable of renewal, 13 although the 
mandate regarding the OPT was established to function until the occupation ends. 14 Thematic 
mandates are generally established for a term of three years, which is also capable of renewal. 
Mandate-holders may serve a maximum of six years in the role. 15 But they will subsequently be 
eligible for appointment to a different mandate. Several experts have held more than one 
appointment. 16 
7 See generally Gutter, above n 5, 66-7, 75-100; Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, Los Procedimientos Publicos 
Especiales de la Comision de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas (Tirant lo Blanch, 2005) part 1; Nifosi, The 
UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above n 5, 17-9; Allison L Jemow, 'Ad Hoc and Extra-
Conventional Means for Human Rights Monitoring' (1995-1996) 28 Journal of International Law and Politics 785, 
789-791, 795-97; Oliver Hoehne, 'Special Procedures and the New Human Rights Council - A Need for Strategic 
Positioning' (2007) 4(1) Essex Human Rights Review 48, 49-52. 
8 The figures are correct as at 1 October 2013. For the latest figures see OHCHR, Special Procedures of the Human 
Rights Council <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/index.htm>. Between 2000 and 2010 alone there 
was an almost fifty per cent increase in the number of thematic mandates, see Ted Piccone, 'The Contribution of the 
UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms' (2011) 15(2) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 206, 209. For some time the number of country mandates was in decline but this trend has 
since reversed. Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 4,419. 
9 For the full list see OHCHR, Counfly Mandates <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Countries.aspx>. 10 Michael O'Flaherty, 'Future Protection of Human Rights in Post-Conflict Societies: The Role of the United Nations' 
(2003) 3( 1) Human Rights Law Review 53, 68. 
11 See, eg, Christophe Golay, Claire Mahon and loana Cismas, 'The Impact of the UN Special Procedures on the 
Development and Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (2011) 15(2) International Journal of 
Human Rights 299, 299; Hoehne, above n 7, 51. 
12 For the full list see OHCHR, Thematic Mandates <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Themes.aspx>. 13 Ted Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights 
(The Brookings Institution, 2010) 5-6. 
14 Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine, CHR Res 
1993/2, 49th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1993/2 (19 February 1993). 
15 Special Procedures, Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008) [7] ('Manual of Operations'). 
16 See, eg, Pinheiro, above n 3, 163. 
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Special procedures experts hold their positions either as Special Rapporteurs, 
Independent Experts or members of Working Groups. Working Groups are usually composed of 
five independent experts one from each of the UN recognised geographical regions. 17 Formerly, 
the experts could also hold the position as Representatives of the CHR and Representatives and 
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. 18 Historically, the different titles were 
intended to reflect the mandates' different focuses: 'Special Rapporteurs' were purportedly 
concerned with fact-finding and monitoring whereas 'Special Representatives' and 
'Independent Experts' were focused on technical assistance and advisory services, for 
example. 19 Today, the various titles do not reflect any major differences in the general 
responsibilities and methods of work of the experts, if historically they ever did in practice. 20 All 
of these terms - especially Rapporteurs and Working Groups - are commonly used throughout 
the UN system ( and beyond) to refer to investigators and groups tasked with specific areas of 
work. Therefore, not all references to UN 'Special Rapporteurs' are references to special 
procedures mandate-holders, for example. Whether they qualify as a special procedures 
mandate will depend on the authority under which they were created and the nature of their 
task.21 
2 Catalysing Rights Improvements 
The mandates of the special procedures are established and defined by the individual 
resolutions that create each specific role. The resolutions often give the experts significant 
latitude.22 Usually they will be called on 'to examine, monitor, advise and publicly report on 
17 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 13 , 27. 
18 Moves towards greater uniformity in the titles given to mandate-holders followed the HRC's 2007 resolution that 
'[i]t should be considered desirable to have a uniform nomenclature of mandate-holders, titles of mandates as well as 
a selection and appointment process, to make the whole system more understandable.' Institution-Building of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council HRC Res 5/1, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1 (18 June 2007) annex para 59 (' HRC 
Institution Building') . See generally Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 4, 429 n 33 . 
19 See, eg, Manual of Operations, above n 15, 6 n 5; Janusz Symonides (ed), Human Rights: International Protection, 
Monitoring, Enforcement (Ashgate, 2003) 51; Hoehne, above n 7, 52-3 ; Jemow, above n 7, 791-92. For example, 
regarding the intention behind the different titles given to the country mandate-holder on Guatemala, see Joan 
Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 133-35. Note that some, such as the former expert on transnational 
corporations, attach greater standing to the title of ' Special Representative of the Secretary-General' over that of 
'Special Rapporteur ' , see Philip Alston, 'Hobbling the Monitors: Should UN Human Rights Monitors be 
Accountable?' (2011) 52(2) Harvard International Law Journal 561, 570 n 26. 
20 See, eg, Alston, 'Hobbling the Monitors : Should UN Human Rights Monitors be Accountable?', above n 19, 570. 
21 See, eg, Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 4, 422. Especial confusion is possible in the Indigenous rights field 
as to whether experts such as the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the HRC 's EMRIP, Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues (PFII) and former Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), or the former Special Rapporteur 
entrusted to conducted a study on treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements between States and 
indigenous populations, qualify as ' special procedures '. They do not. Their titles simply reflect the common usage of 
the term 'Rapporteur ' to refer to reporters within the UN system. Similarly, the WGIP was not a special procedures 
mandate, given the authority under which it was created. The EMRIP, PFII and WGIP are discussed in Part D of this 
chapter. 
22 See, eg, Menno T Karnminga, 'The Thematic Procedures of the UN Commission on Human Rights' (1987) 34 
Netherlands International Law Review 299, 322; Joanna Naples-Mitchell , 'Perspectives of UN Special Rapporteurs 
on their Role: Inherent Tensions and Unique Contributions to Human Rights' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal 
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human rights situations in specific countries or territories ... or on major phenomena of human 
rights violations worldwide' .23 Awareness-raising is thus a central feature of the experts' 
function. Most also understand the experts as having a role in helping to catalyse tangible 
human rights improvements. For example, Joanna Naples-Mitchell, who interviewed a 
collection of special procedures mandate-holders, their assistants, other OHCHR staff and 
human rights experts, found that '[t]he ultimate purpose of the country missions and 
communications, in the view of everyone I interviewed, is to promote the concretisation of 
human rights norms in specific contexts. ' 24 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),25 key international human rights treaties, other human rights instruments and 
customary international law provide the mandates' normative framework. 26 But one of the 
unique and positive features of the special procedures is their ability 'to investigate the situation 
of human rights in all parts of the world, irrespective of whether a particular government is a 
party to any of the relevant human rights treaties' or has expressed support for a declaration of 
the GA.27 In addition, the special procedures are not constrained by the UN human rights treaty 
bodies' standard operating procedure of only considering the human rights situation in a state 
when a periodic report has been submitted.28 Alston, Morgan-Foster and Abresch argue that 
' [t]his greater breadth as compared to treaty bodies is a virtue of the system'.29 
The special procedures carry out various activities to fulfil their mandates, which are 
examined in finer detail in the next chapter. But I introduce these activities now. Most mandate-
holders conduct country assessments, where they undertake country visits to investigate specific 
human rights violations and report their findings and recommendations following those 
missions to their parent body.3° Country missions break down the linguistic, financial and visa 
barriers that inhibit Indigenous peoples' access to the UN because they bring the UN to 
Indigenous peoples. The experts' ability to shuttle 'between these two worlds - the 
headquarters, as centre, and the field, as periphery' distinguishes the special procedures from 
of Human Rights 232, 234; Taryn Lesser, 'The Role of United Nations Special Procedures in Protecting the Human 
Rights of Migrants' (2010) 28(4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 139, 141. 
23 OHCHR, Human Rights Bodies <http: //www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx>. 24 Naples-Mitchell, above n 22, 240. Compare Lempinen who argues 'that it is not the task of a Special Rapporteur to 
improve -the situation of human rights in a particular country, but to raise awareness of that situation'. Miko 
Lempinen, Challenges Facing the System of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi University, 2001) 119. 
25 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 
(10 December 1948). 
26 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 8, 209; Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster and William Abresch, 'The Competence of the 
UN Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the 
'War on Terror" (2008) 19(1) The European Journal of International Law 183, 201-02; Naples-Mitchell, above n 22, 
233. 
27 Manual of Operations, above n 15, [4]; Lempinen, above n 24, l; Jernow, above n 7, 802. 28 See generally O'Flaherty, above n 10, 67; Sir Nigel Rodley, 'The United Nations Human Rights Council, its Special 
Procedures and its Relationship with Treaty Bodies: Complementarity or Competition?' in Kevin Boyle (ed), New 
Institutions for Human Rights Protection (Oxford University Press, 2009) 49, 58-65. 
29 l Aston, Morgan-Foster and Abresch, above n 26, 202. 
30 See, eg, Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human 
Rights, above n 13, 9-11. 
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myriad other UN human rights mechanisms. 31 For example, UN human rights treaty bodies do 
not generally conduct on-site country visits. 32 Mandate-holders receive information on 
allegations of human rights violations and request state governments to clarify the facts, which 
are called 'communications'. Unlike complaints made to UN human rights treaty bodies, 
domestic remedies do not have to be exhausted before the special procedures will action a 
complaint. Further, while few states have ratified the protocols permitting treaty bodies to 
review individual complaints, the special procedures can send communications to any state.33 
Mandate-holders have a promotional role, promoting best practice through technical advisory 
assistance and their dialogues with various actors. They also conduct and participate in thematic 
studies on issues or themes relevant to their mandates, which in tum can assist in the 
development of international norms.34 The parallels between their working methods and the 
methods ofNGOs are apparent. Central features such as the communications process have been 
borrowed directly from NGO practice.35 But a core distinguishing feature between the work of 
the experts and that ofNGOs is that their association with the UN often enables them to access 
the highest levels of the UN and governments, including heads of state.36 The experts present 
their work to the HRC (and formerly the CHR) annually. Some experts also report to the GA.37 
A small number have informally briefed the UN Security Council.38 In addition, the experts 
meet with high-level government representatives during their country missions and engage with 
Geneva-based diplomats in the course of their work. 
3 The Centrality of Independence 
The mandate-holders enjoy an unusual position within the UN human rights system. 
They are independent, which is a cornerstone of their work.39 Special procedures experts are not 
31 Hoehne, above n 7, 56. See also Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions: Between Remedy and Ritual 
(Polity, 2007) 61-2. 
32 See, eg, Sir Nigel Rodley, 'The United Nations Human Rights Council, its Special Procedures and its Relationship 
with Treaty Bodies: Complementarity or Competition?', above n 28, 61. 
33 See, eg, ibid 63-5; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of 
Human Rights Norms', above n 8, 209; Ingrid Nifosi-Sutton, 'The System of the UN Special Procedures : Some 
Proposals for Change' in M CherifBassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human 
Rights Machinery (lntersentia, 201 I) 389,405. 
34 Oberleitner, above n 31, 59-60. 
35 See, eg, Jemow, above n 7, 787, 809-10. 
36 Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 2010). See also Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special 
Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 8, 211. 
37 Ibid 207 . Piccone recounts that '[s]ome rapporteurs reported a higher quality, more substantive interactive dialogue 
in New York': at 228 n 21. 
38 See, eg, Manual of Operations, above n 15, [89] ; Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, 
above n 5, 59. 
39 See, eg, Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-Holders of the Human Rights Council, HRC Res 5/2, 9th 
mtg, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/5/2 ( 18 June 2007) art 3 (' Code of Conduct'); Manual of Operations, above n 15, [ 11]; 
Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs' , above n 5, 212. See 
generally Alston, 'Hobbling the Monitors: Should UN Human Rights Monitors be Accountable?', above n 19; Rhona 
KM Smith, 'The Possibilities of an Independent Special Rapporteur Scheme' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal 
of Human Rights 172. 
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representatives of their government, the UN Secretary General or particular rights groups.40 
They are not UN staff members - they serve in their personal capacities - and do not receive 
salaries.41 However, all of the experts are considered as an 'expert on mission' within the 
meaning of the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 42 And the 
UN does pay mandate-holders a per diem allowance and their travel expenses for around two 
country missions per year, as well as some travel to Geneva (and, for some experts, New 
York).43 These payments should not be discounted - as one ex-OHCHR bureaucrat pointed out 
'[a]lthough it may not be much to a United States law professor, for some others to receive 
US$7,000-8,000 or US$12,000 is not peanuts.' 44 But the absence of a salary is exacerbated by 
the fact that while the UN advises mandate-holders that they need to commit around three 
months of time to the mandate each year, in reality, the workload is full-time. 45 It is a feature of 
the mandates repeatedly raised by the experts; in the words of one, '[i]t is full-time. It is major 
full-time' .46 As Baldwin-Pask and Scannella explain, '[i]t is a remarkable testament to the 
commitment and dedication of mandate-holders that they are prepared to devote significant 
amounts of their own time to perform their functions as Special Procedures, and that they do so 
for an extended period. ' 47 However, not all mandate-holders can commit to the role full-time, 
with some relying heavily on UN support to perform the work. The lack of financial 
remuneration is touted as an important part of the mandates ' independence and impartiality.48 
This independence affords the mechanism flexibility that other institutionalised UN 
mechanisms do not have, a characteristic that Alison Jemow suggests is 'the clue to their 
strength' .49 At the same time, it can make commitment to, and performance of, the role 
problematic for many experts. The time commitment means that those best positioned to 
perform the role are often tenured academics, especially those based at-universities in the global 
North who receive financial and institutional support from their home institutions such as a 
reduced teaching load and student support with research and administration. so 
Mandate-holders receive some personnel, policy, research and logistical support from 
the OHCHR and formerly the UN Centre for Human Rights. This support is discussed in 
4° Code of Conduct, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/5/2, art 3; Manual of Operations, above n 15, [9]. 41 Ibid [10]. See also, eg, Nifosi-Sutton, above n 33, 391; Naples-Mitchell, above n 22, 234. 
42 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, opened for signature 13 February 1946, 1 UNTS 
15 (entered into force 17 September 1946); Manual of Operations, above n 15, [13]-[15]. See generally Nifosi, The 
UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above n 5, 49-55 . 
43 Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights 
Norms', above n 8,224. 
44 Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 2010). 
45 See, eg, Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 4,454; Smith, 'The Possibilities ofan Independent Special 
Rapporteur Scheme', above n 39, 177. 
46 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). 47 Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 4,473 . 
48 See, eg, Naples-Mitchell, above n 22, 234. 
49 Jemow, above n 7, 835. See also Naples-Mitchell, above n 22, 233; Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through 
the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 5, 225. 
50 See generally Naples-Mitchell, above n 22, 242; Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 11 , 309; Smith, 'The 
Possibilities of an Independent Special Rappmteur Scheme', above n 39, 177; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's 
Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 8, 225. 
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Chapter IV, along with its limitations. A former member of the OHCHR summed up the 
relationship between the OHCHR and the special procedures mandate-holders as 'delicate' .51 In 
part this is a product of the tensions that arise where the OHCHR seeks to exercise control over 
the special procedures' work and the mandate-holders, emphasising their independence, resist 
those efforts.52 The OHCHR's attempts at control are rooted in the reality that, ultimately, the 
OHCHR's budget (and existence) is controlled by states. 53 
The experts' independence is promoted through the formal appointment process. 
According to the HRC, experts are selected for their expertise, experience in the field of the 
mandate, independence, impartiality, personal integrity and objectivity. 54 Experts have included 
former diplomats, academics, judges, lawyers, members ofNGOs, economists and former UN 
staff.55 Consideration is given to gender balance and equitable geographic representation, as 
well as to an appropriate representation of different legal systems, but the emphasis is on 
finding individuals with expertise.56 Today, special procedures experts are appointed via an 
open process: vacancies are advertised; various actors can nominate candidates (governments, 
regional groups, international organisations, NGOs, other human rights bodies, individuals, and 
NHRls compliant with the Paris Principles); the OHCHR prepares a public list of candidates 
who will apply for each specific vacancy; shortlisted candidates are interviewed by a 
Consultative Group, which provides the President of the HRC with a list of suitable candidates; 
following consultations the President of the HRC identifies an appropriate candidate Gustifying 
the decision if the order of priority proposed by the Consultative Group is not followed); and, 
the candidate is appointed following the approval of the HRC.57 Previously, appointments were 
closed and made by the Chairperson of the CHR, the Secretary-General or the HCHR upon 
request from the CHR.58 
As independent experts appointed on an ad hoc basis, special procedures mandate-
holders were not originally part of any special procedures 'system'. However, they have banded 
together as such.59 The experts have held annual meetings since 1994 'to harmonize and 
rationalize their work. ' 60 In 2005 the special procedures established a Coordination Committee 
51 Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 2010). 
52 Ibid. See generally Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of 
Human Rights Norms', above n 8, 21 O; Theodore J Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN 's Independent 
Experts Promote Human Rights (Brookings Institution Press, 2012) 58. 
53 Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 52, 59. 
54 HRC Institution Building, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/1, annex [39]. 
55 See, eg, Rhona KM Smith, Texts and Materials on International Human Rights (Routledge, 2 ed, 20 I 0) 200. 
56 HRC Institution Building, UN Doc A!HRC/RES/5/1, annex [40]-[41]. 
57 Ibid [ 42]-[53] ; Review of the Work and Functioning of the Human Rights Council , HRC Res 16/21, 16th sess, UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/16/21 (25 March 2011) annex para 22. See generally Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 4, 452-
61 ; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation ofHuman Rights 
Norms', above n 8, 227 n 9. 
58 See generally Pinheiro, above n 3, 164; Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 4,453 . 
59 See generally Oberleitner, above n 31, 60-1; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts 
Promote Human Rights, above n 52, 14-5 . 
60 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action UN Doc NCONF.157/23 (25 
June 1993) pt II [95] . 
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composed of five mandate-holders supported by the OHCHR to further coordinate their work; 
liaise with the OHCHR, the larger UN system and NGOs; raise mandate-holders' concerns 
before the HRC; and promote the standing of the special procedures, including through 
encouraging state cooperation with the experts.61 Further, the experts adopted both a revised 
Manual of Operations and an Internal Advisory Procedure in 2008.62 The Manual of Operations 
provides guidance to mandate-holders on how to perform the role. The Internal Advisory 
Procedure allows stakeholders to bring concerns regarding the special procedures' working 
methods, acts and practices to the attention of the Coordination Committee.63 In addition, 
mandate-holders sometimes undertake joint country missions and often issue joint statements 
and communications on matters of shared concern. 64 Since 2011 the special procedures have 
reported on their communications jointly.65 Systematising the special procedures' operations 
both helps to professionalise the experts' work and protect the experts.66 But, despite these 
efforts at coordination and integration, there is agreement that the mandates remain 
fragmented. 67 
4 Parent-body Politics 
The human rights concerns the subject of the special procedures' attentions are political 
issues. As a result, while the special procedures' current and former - state populated - parent 
bodies have continually created more mandates, they have also placed constraints on the 
experts' work. Despite opposition from many special procedures mandate-holders and human 
rights NGOs, in 2007 the HRC imposed a Code of Conduct on the special procedures. 68 The 
Code of Conduct sets out the responsibilities and expected practices and. behaviour of mandate-
61 OHCHR, Coordination Committee of Special Procedures 
<http: //www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/ccspecialprocedures.htm>. Stavenhagen sat on the Coordination 
Committee in its first year, from 2005 to 2006. 
62 Coordination Committee of Special Procedures, Internal Advisory Procedure to Review Practices and Working 
Methods (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008) (' Internal Advisory Procedure'); Manual of 
Operations, above n 15 . The original Manual of Operations was adopted at the special procedures' sixth annual 
meeting in 1999. 
63 Internal Advisory Procedure, above n 62. See generally Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures 
to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 8, 224; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the 
UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 52, 89. 
64 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 8, 222-23. 
65 HRC Communications Report of Special Procedures, UN Doc A/HRC/18/51 (9 September 2011) [2] ('Joint 
Communications Report September 2011'). 
66 See, eg, Sir Nigel Rodley quoted in Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote 
Human Rights, above n 52, 122. 
67 Baldwin-Pask and Scannella argue that the 2006-2007 and 2011 institutional reviews of the HRC represented two 
'missed opportunities' to create 'a comprehensive and coherent system of special procedures '. Baldwin-Pask and 
Scannella, above n 4, 423-24. See also Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote 
Human Rights, above n 52, 15-7. 
68 Code of Conduct, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/5/2. See generally Alston, 'Hobbling the Monitors: Should UN Human 
Rights Monitors be Accountable?', above n 19, 582-601 ; Sir igel S Rodley, 'On the Responsibility of Special 
Rapporteurs' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 319; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's 
Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 8, 223-24; Baldwin-Pask 
and Scannella, above n 4, 463-70. 
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holders. 69 Core aspects of the code are highlighted in Chapter IV. While most agree that the 
Code was designed to constrict the experts' activities, opinion on its practical effect is divided. 
Sir Nigel Rodley; a former mandate-holder, argues that it contains ' little that did not reflect 
existing best practice,' 70 whereas other experts have reported that 'it has had a chilling effect on 
their ability ... to speak out clearly against violations.' 71 As state-based bodies, the HRC and 
CHR have also been unwilling to action recommendations made in the mandate-holders' 
reports, particularly where it involves singling out individual states for disapproval. 72 The 
bodies ' lack of meaningful engagement with the special procedures' findings and concerns has 
prompted criticism from frustrated experts, as has the sometimes absent support from the UN 
hierarchy when the experts come under attack. 73 Some negative judgements of the experts' work 
are credible, but overwhelmingly they are retaliatory remarks by states affronted by the experts' 
assessment of their domestic rights situation. 74 Despite these clashes, all mandates, bar two ( on 
Cuba and Belarus), were retained following the HR.C's 2006-2007 institutional review.75 While 
further moves to rein-in the special procedures were expected in 2011 when the HR.C's 
functioning and work was again reviewed, the mechanism came out largely unscathed with 
several new country and thematic mandates subsequently created. 76 
69 Alston, 'Hobbling the Monitors: Should UN Human Rights Monitors be Accountable?', above n 19; Sir Nigel 
Radley, 'On the Responsibility of Special Rapporteurs' , above n 68 ; Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the 
Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 5. 
70 Sir Nigel Radley, 'On the Responsibility of Special Rapporteurs' , above n 68, 321. 
71 Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights 
Norms', above n 8, 224. 
72 See, eg, Lempinen, above n 24, 105-09; Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above n 
5, 134-35 ; Kamminga, above n 22, 317; Pinheiro, above n 3, 169-70; Amnesty International, Organization of the 
Work of the Session: Written Statement Submitted by Amnesty International, a Non-Governmental Organization in 
Special Consultative Status, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/NGO/250 (27 March 2006) 2; HRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24 (20 May 2010) 
[91]. Regarding the highly politicised nature of actions taken based on the experts' reports see, eg, Davies, above n 3, 
453; Katarina Tomasevski, 'Has the Right to Education a Future Within the United Nations? A Behind-the-Scenes 
Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998-2004' (2005) 5(2) Human Rights Law Review 
205,213 . 
73 See, eg, Tomasevski, above n 72, 208 ; Yash Ghai , former expert on Cambodia, quoted in Michael Kirby, 'UN 
Special Procedures - Reflections on the Office of the UN Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia' 
(2010) 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law 491 , 503 . Tomasevski went so far as to recommend that the 
mandate on education not be renewed, see CHR, The Right to Education: Report Submitted by the Special 
Rapporteur, Katarina Tomasevski, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/45 (15 January 2004) [l]. See generally Subedi, 'Protection 
of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 5, 224-25 . 
74 See, eg, Sir Nigel Radley, 'On the Responsibility of Special Rapporteurs', above n 68, 319-20; Baldwin-Pask and 
Scannella, above n 4, 469; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human 
Rights, above n 52, 88, 131 ; Kamminga, above n 22 , 305-07. Surya Subedi, the expert on Cambodia, has remarked 
that ' [b ]ecause this institution is more robust and effective than are many other human rights mechanisms, it is natural 
that it comes under greater scrutiny as well as stronger concerted attacks.' Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights 
through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 5, 228. 
75 See, eg, Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 882. The 2006-2007 review was provided for in Human Rights Council, GA Res 60/251, UN 
Doc A/RES/60/251 (3 April 2006) para 6. 
76 The 2011 review was provided for in Human Rights Council, GA Res 60/251 , UN Doc A/RES/60/25 1 (3 Apri l 
2006) para 16. To see a list of the mandates created since 2006 see the ' Recent Developments ' subsection of 
OHCHR, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council: Introduction 
<http: //www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx>. On the reviews generally see Baldwin-Pask and 
Scannella, above n 4, 423-29. 
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C The Indigenous Mandate 
1 Indigenous Rights on the Fringe 
The special procedures mechanism enjoys a mandate to advance the realisation of 
international Indigenous rights norms. There are three key defining moments in the 
development of the special procedures ' mandate regarding Indigenous peoples. The first was the 
creation of the special procedures mechanism itself. When the historical forerunners to the 
special procedures were first established in the late 1960s the concept of Indigenous peoples 
was relatively new to the UN. Augusto Willemsen Diaz, a former UN bureaucrat, has recounted 
some of the challenges involved in getting the UN to examine Indigenous peoples' rights in the 
mid-1950s when the concept of 'Indigenous peoples ' was not well understood. 77 Over time this 
position changed. In 1971 the CHR's Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights (Sub-Commission) authorised Martinez Cobo to conduct his well-known study 
on discrimination against 'Indigenous populations' .78 In 1977 the Sub-Commission organised a 
conference concerning discrimination against 'Indigenous populations ' in the Americas. In 1981 
there was a UN conference regarding Indigenous peoples and land. Eventually, in 1982, the first 
Indigenous-focused UN body was created: the WGIP. 79 However, it was .not until the late 1980s 
that the term 'Indigenous peoples' came into common usage. 80 Accordingly, Indigenous peoples 
and their rights were not of central concern to the UN when the earliest special procedures 
mandates were established, even though Indigenous rights concerns were present in the states 
subject to early mandates such as South Africa and Chile. As momentum regarding Indigenous 
peoples' rights slowly grew within the UN so too did the attention of mandate-holders to 
Indigenous peoples and their rights. For example, during the 1980s country mandate-holders, 
including the expert on Guatemala, and thematic mandate-holders, including the expert on 
77 Augusto Willemsen Diaz, 'How Indigenous Peoples' Rights Reached the UN' in Claire Charters and Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 16, 17. Note that the first of the ILO treaties regarding Indigenous peoples was adopted in 
1957: ILO Convention 107. 
78 CHR, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: Final Report (First Part) Submitted 
by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Jose R Martinez Cobo E/CN.4/Sub.2/476 (1981); CHR, Study of the Problem of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations: Final Report (Supplementary Part) Submitted by the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr Jose R Martinez Cobo E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2 (1982); CHR, Study of the Problem of Discrimination 
Against Indigenous Populations: Final Report (Last Part) Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Jose R Martinez 
Cobo E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21 (1983); CHR, Jose Martinez Cobo, Special Rapporteur, Study of the Problem of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations - Volume 5: Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (March 1987). See generally S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2 ed, 2004) 62. 
79 See, eg, David Barton Bray, 'Rodolfo Stavenhagen: The UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples' (2011) 
113(3) American Anthropologist 502, 502; Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 57, 63. For 
background on the WGIP see, eg, Asbj0rn Eide, 'The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples' in Claire Charters and 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 32; Douglas Sanders, 'The UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations' (1989) 11(3) Human Rights Quarterly 406. 
80 See, eg, Bray, above n 79, 502. See generally Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the 
Politics of Identity (University of California Press, 2003). 
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torture, referred at least in passing to the position of Indigenous peoples in their reports. 81 But 
even as the UNDRJP began its long drafting process and !LO Convention 169 was adopted, 
Indigenous rights did not feature centrally in special procedures experts' reports. The CHR 
recognised this lacuna. 
2 A Call for Thematic Attention 
The second defining moment in the development of the special procedures ' Indigenous 
mandate was the issue of CHR Resolution 1993/60. The 1993 resolution recommended 'all 
thematic rapporteurs, special representatives, independent experts and working groups to pay 
particular attention, within the framework of their mandates, to the situation of indigenous 
people. ' 82 It was the first time the CHR had issued a recommendation explicitly recognising the 
relevance of Indigenous rights concerns to the mandates of all thematic special procedures. The 
recommendation was issued to further the UN's International Year of the World's Indigenous 
People in 1993.83 It was passed without a vote, reflecting the general state support for its 
contents. It was a call later repeated by the CHR. For example, in a 2004 resolution concerning 
the UN's first International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples, the CHR again invited 
all thematic special procedures ' to take duly into account in their deliberations the particular 
situation of indigenous people and to ensure that it is properly reflected in their periodic reports 
to their superior bodies ' . 84 It was also a sentiment echoed in resolutions of the Sub-Commission 
regarding the WGIP, which invited all thematic special procedures and treaty bodies to advise 
WGIP 'how they take into account ... the promotion and protection of indigenous peoples ' 
rights ' .85 
The CHR' s resolution was significant because it recognised the relevance of the human 
rights of Indigenous peoples to all thematic special procedures' mandates. Special procedures 
mandates established at the time of the resolution concerned topics including arbitrary 
detention, the sale of children, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, freedom of 
81 See, eg, CHR, Report by the Expert, Mr Hector Gros Espiell, on Guatemala, prepared in accordance with 
paragraph JJ a/Commission resolution 1987/53 UN Doc E/CN.4/1988/42 (10 December 1987) [59] (b); CHR 
Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to any form of Detention or Imprisonment, Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr P Kooijmans, 
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1989/33 UN Doc E/CN.4/1990/17 (18 December 1989) [74). 
82 CHR Res 1993/30, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1993/30, para 2. 
83 International Year for the World 's Indigenous People, GA Res 45/164, UN Doc A/RES/45/164 (18 December 
1990). The GA proclaimed the first International Decade of the World 's Indigenous People commencing on 10 
December 1994, see International Decade of the World 's Indigenous People, GA Res 47/75, UN Doc A/RES/48/163 
(21 December 1992). The GA proclaimed a Second international Decade of the World's Indigenous People in 2005, 
see Second International Decade of the World 's Indigenous People, GA Res 59/1 74, UN Doc A/RES/59/ 174 (20 
December 2004). 
84 Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, and the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples, CHR Res 2004/58, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2004/58 (20 April 2004) para 4. 
85 See, eg, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights Res 2006/13 , UN Doc AIHRC/Sub. l/RES/2006/13 (24 August 2006) para 5. 
74 
religion and torture. As identified above, the list has expanded substantially in the intervening 
years. While Indigenous peoples' rights are relevant to all of the thematic mandates some 
mandates particularly lend themselves to Indigenous rights concerns, including those 
concerning racism, cultural rights, education, food, health, human rights defenders, 
transnational corporations, water, the environment, freedom of religion, housing, extreme 
poverty, torture and violence against women. 86 A number of thematic mandate-holders have 
heeded the CHR and Sub-Commission's recommendations, as Chapters IV to VI will show. 
The CHR's resolution did not recognise the relevance of Indigenous peoples' human 
rights situation to country mandates. This is despite the fact that the position oflndigenous 
peoples was relevant to many of the country mandates in existence at this time. Guatemala is a 
striking example, which is considered in Chapter VI. The situation of Indigenous peoples was 
also topical in places such as Cambodia, Myanmar, the OPT and Somalia, all of which had 
country mandates in 1993.87 Regardless, some country mandate-holders continued to comment 
on the position of Indigenous peoples in the course of their work, for example, the expert on 
Cambodia. 88 
Despite the CHR's directive, the degree of attention special procedures experts have 
paid to the human rights situation of Indigenous peoples - and the quality of that attention -has 
depended highly on the individual mandate-holder. For example, while the expert on racism has 
devoted sizeable attention to the human rights situation of Indigenous peoples, the expert on the 
sale of children has not.89 Even where attention has been given it has sometimes been 
incomplete. For example, the expert on racism noted that during his 1994 mission to the United 
States he was repeatedly asked to address the issue of Indigenous self-determination, but he was 
of the view that the issue did not fall within the purview of his mandate -and so he did not take it 
86 See, eg, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and Erlyn Ruth Alcantara, Engaging the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
People: Opportunities and Challenges (Tebtebba Foundation, 2004) 21-2; Luis Rodriguez-Pifiero, "'Where 
Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples ' Rights Under the Declaration' in Claire Charters and 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 314, 330-34; Luis Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los 
Derechos Indigenas: El Pape) del Relator Especial' in Mikel Berraondo et al (eds), Los Derechos de los Pueblos 
lndigenas en el Sistma Internacional de Naciones Unidas (Instituto Promocion Esudios Sociales, 2010) 109, 124-26. 87 For access to the enabling resolutions of each of these mandates see OHCHR, Country Mandates 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Countries.aspx>. 
88 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Mr 
Thomas Hammarberg, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1997/49, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/95 (20 
February 1998) [147]-[153] . 
89 See eg, CHR, Report by Mr Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance on his Mission to the United States of Americaji-om 9 to 
22 October 1994, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1993/20 and 1994164, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1995/78/Add.l (16 January 1995) [6] , [8] , [24] , [26], [28], [52] , [83], [88] ('Expert on Racism United States 
1995'); CHR, Report by Mr Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur on Contempora,y Forms of Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance on his Mission to Brazil.from 6 to 17 June 1995, 
Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolutions 1993/20 and 1995/12, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1996/72/Add.l (23 January 1995) [32] , [37], [61] , [70]; CHR, Report by Mr Maurice Glele-Ahanhanzo, 
Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance: 
Addendum Mission to Colombia, UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/71/Add.1 (13 January 1997) [4], [6]-[10], [12] , [14] , [17]-
[19], [21] , [31]-[33] , [40] , [46] , [47] , [49] , [50], [53] , [57], [59], [61]-[64] , [67], [68]. 
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up in his report. 90 Examples such as this signalled the need for directed attention by a special 
procedures mandate created specifically to deal with the human rights situation of Indigenous 
peoples. 
3 Creation of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples 
(a) The Fruition of Indigenous Demands 
The third, key, moment in the development of the special procedures' mandate 
regarding Indigenous peoples was the creation of the thematic mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people. 
The mandate was created by consensus resolution of the CHR on 24 April 2001, despite the 
reported strong objections of the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Russia. 91 
An Indigenous-focused special procedures mandate was a long-standing demand of Indigenous 
peoples that had been raised at various international conferences, including the World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993.92 Such a mandate was seen as necessary to receive and 
investigate complaints regarding violations of Indigenous peoples' human rights. 93 The 
International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), one of the IPOs that spearheaded the establishment 
of the mandate, commented ' [ w ]e saw an urgent need to have a UN mechanism that could put a 
stop to these gross and massive attacks on the survival of Indigenous communities or at least 
denounce them for the grave violations that they are. ' 94 Following lobbying by IPOs and NGOs 
the Governments of Mexico and Guatemala agreed to cosponsor the resolution that led to the 
creation of the mandate, securing the support of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean 
Countries (GRULAC) and others.95 
90 Expert on Racism United States 1995, UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/78/Add. l, [8]. 
91 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001 /57. The mandate was subsequently renewed through the following 
resolutions: Human Rights and Indigenous Issues, CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62 (21 April 2004) 
para 1 ('CHR Res 2004/62'); Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/6/12 (28 September 2007) (' HRC Res 6/12') para 1; Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: Mandate of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, HRC Res 15/1 4, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14 (30 
September 2010) ('HRC Res 15/14') para 1; Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: Mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, HRC Res 24/9, UN Doc A/HRC/24/9 (26 September 2013) para 1. 
Regarding state objections to the resolution see Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 86, 5-6. 
92 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011 ); Jens Dahl, The Indigenous Space and 
Marginalized Peoples in the United Nations (Pal grave Macmillan, 2012) 61-2. 
93 See, eg, Alberto Saldamando, 'The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Human Rights' (2002) 5(1) 
Indigenous Affairs 32, 33-4. 
94 International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Human Rights 
<http://www.treatycouncil.org/section_21141712l l l .htm>. See also Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 86, 5. 
95 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 20 I l); Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, 'Los 
Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! de! Relator Especial', above n 86, 114. 
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(b) Breadth and Flexibility 
The Special Rapporteur's enabling resolution afforded the expert a broad mandate to 
investigate, and provide suggestions on how to prevent and remedy, specific violations of 
Indigenous peoples' human rights. The CHR resolved: 
to appoint, for a three-year period, a special rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, with the following functions: 
(a) To gather, request, receive and exchange information and communications from all relevant 
sources, including Governments, indigenous people themselves and their communities and 
organizations, on violations of their human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
(b) To formulate recommendations and proposals on appropriate measures and activities to 
prevent and remedy violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
people; 
(c) To work in close relation with other special rapporteurs, special representatives, working 
groups and independent experts of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, taking into account the request 
of the Commission contained in resolution 1993/30; ... 96 
The Special Rapporteur was also invited to pay 'special attention' to discrimination against 
Indigenous women and violations of Indigenous children's rights in fulfilling the mandate as 
well as taking into account a gender perspective. 97 This is a huge mandate. As one of the experts 
who took on the role has commented, it was 'a mandate that was difficult to put into practice 
because all the rights that humanity has ever invented affect Indigenous.peoples.' 98 At the same 
time, the mandate is constrained by the types of remedial action possible to take to address 
Indigenous rights violations, a factor considered in Chapter IV. In order to fulfil the mandate the 
CHR encouraged the UN, states, regional intergovernmental organisations, NGOs, Indigenous 
peoples, independent experts and interested institutions to cooperate fully with the mandate.99 
Further, the UN Secretary-General and HCHR were requested to provide the expert with 'all the 
necessary human, technical and financial assistance'. 100 
The resolution itself offered the Special Rapporteur little guidance as to how to 
implement the mandate. The resolution establishing a special procedures mandate can provide 
guidance on particular human rights concerns. But the CHR resolution simply cited the UDHR 
96 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001/57, para 1. 
97 Ibid paras 2-3. 
98 Stavenhagen quoted in Jennifer Preston et al, The UN Special Rapporteur: Indigenous Peoples Rights: Experiences 
and Challenges (IWGIA, 2007) 11. Similarly, Anaya has observed, '[m]y mandate is worldwide and simply the 
magnitude of the kinds of problems, the extent and breath of them, is a challenge.' Anaya quoted in GA, 
' Implementation oflndigenous Rights Declaration Should Be Regarded as Political, Moral, Legal Imperative without 
Qualification, Third Committee Told' (Press Release, UN Doc GA/SHC/3982, 18 October 2010). 99 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001/57, paras 6-8. This is discussed in Chapter IV. 100 Ibid para 11. 
77 
and the problems faced by Indigenous peoples 'in areas such as human rights, the environment, 
development, education and health.' 101 As with other resolutions creating special procedures' 
mandates, the resolution did not dictate specific working methods for the Special Rapporteur, 
beyond obtaining and exchanging information from a vast range of sources; 102 working closely 
with other experts, including considering the relevant recommendations of the World 
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, the 
WGIP and the PFII; 103 and requiring the expert to present annual reports on the mandate's 
activities to the CHR. 104 This provided the Special Rapporteur with significant leeway to 
determine the mandate's approach. As with the special procedures more generally, each Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has acted to fulfil the mandate in practice by taking on the 
four roles identified above, which are explored in the next chapter: conducting country 
assessments, issuing communications, promoting best practice and preparing thematic 
studies. 105 
The title of the original mandate -the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people - reflected the debate over Indigenous 
peoplehood that had been ongoing within the UN. The absence of a pluralised 'people' in the 
title suggested the UN did not view Indigenous peoples as 'peoples' who enjoyed the right to 
self-determination under international law. 106 IPOs who lobbied for the term 'peoples' to be 
used were told at the time 'that it was not possible to use "Indigenous Peoples" in the title 
because this term had not yet been accepted by the UN system.' 107 Late in 2010 this was 
addressed. The title of the mandate was shortened to 'the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous peoples' .108 Notably, the word 'people' was pluralised in order to conform to the 
terminology of the UNDRIP and to affirm Indigenous peoples' right to self-determination. A 
small number of states, including some who had voted in favour of the UNDRIP, objected to the 
change. But Indigenous delegates, Mexico and Guatemala (who again took the lead in drafting 
the resolution) and other states were eventually successful in securing agreement for use of the 
term 'peoples'. The Executive Director of HTC remarked 'it is an historic, if overdue, step for 
the UN's main Human Rights body to decide to use the term "Indigenous Peoples" in the 
10 1 Ibid Preamble paras 2, 4. The Preamble to the resolution also references aspects of the recommendations adopted 
by the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. 
102 Ibid para l(a); CHR Res 2004/62 UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, para 5; HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc 
AIHRC/RES/6/12 para 1 (b ); HRC Res 15/ 14, UN Doc AIHRC/RES/15/14 para 1 (b ). 
103 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001 /57, paras l(c), 4, 5. The Special Rapporteur has been encouraged 
to coordinate its work with other bodies, both those that focus exclusively on Indigenous rights and those with a more 
general human rights focus, in the resolutions that define and revise its mandate . This is considered below in Part D. 
104 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001 /57, paras 4, 5, 10. 
105 See generally Preston et al, above n 98. 
106 Jeff Comtassel, 'Partnership in Action? Indigenous Political Mobilization and Co-optation during the First UN 
Indigenous Decade (1995-2004)' (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 137, I 60. 
107 IITC, 'UN Human Rights Council Renews the Mandate and Changes the Name of United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights ofindigenous Peoples ' (Press Release, 30 September 2010) 
<http: //www.treatycounci l .org/PDF /Press%20release%20HRC%20SR %209301 0finrev l. pdf.>. 
108 HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/ 15/ 14. 
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Rapporteur's title. It has now been brought into line with existing international standards, in 
particular the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. ' 109 
(c) Bringing in the Experts 
As identified in Chapter I, two experts have held the role of Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples. The first expert to hold the position was Rodolfo Stavenhagen. In the 
resolution creating the mandate the CHR requested ' the Chairperson of the Commission, 
following formal consultations with the Bureau and the regional groups through the regional 
coordinators, to appoint as special rapporteur an individual of recognized international standing 
and experience' .110 IPOs, such as the IITC, encouraged the appointment of a Rapporteur with 
knowledge of the UN system, an understanding of Indigenous peoples ' cultures and a 
willingness to consult with Indigenous peoples in the exercise of the mandate. Many Indigenous 
peoples also called for the appointment of an Indigenous expert. The list of candidates 
suggested to the Chair of the CHR included Indigenous rights experts: James Anaya (who 
would later become the second expert in the role) and Nobel Laureate Rigoberta Menchu Tum 
of Guatemala. It also included non-Indigenous experts: former Chair of the WGIP Erica-Irene 
Daes of Greece; Willemsen Diaz of Guatemala, a former UN bureaucrat mentioned earlier in 
this chapter; and Stavenhagen. 111 Stavenhagen was announced as the first Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples on 25 June 2001. 11 2 Stavenhagen held the role through to April 2008, seeing 
it through two extensions of the mandate in 2004 and 2007 .113 He attributes his successful 
appointment in part to the support of GRULAC, reflecting that although the nomination process 
for the role was open, given Guatemala and Mexico ' s lead role in securing the creation of the 
mandate, GRULAC decided to support a candidate put forward by those two states. 11 4 
Stavenhagen had a breadth of expertise for the role. Stavenhagen is a noted sociologist. 
He had researched and published on the position of Indigenous peoples and held a research 
professorship at El Colegio de Mexico. 11 5 He had a distinguished background in human rights, 
including having been founding president of the Mexican Academy for Human Rights. 11 6 He 
109 IITC, UN Human Rights Council Renews the Mandate and Changes the Name of United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, above n 107. 
11° CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001/57, para 9. 
111 IITC, The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Human Rights 
<http://www.treatycouncil.org/section 21141712111.htm>. 
11 2 Ibid. 
-
113 CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62; HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc AIHRC/RES/6/12 . 11 4 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011 ). 
11 5 See, eg, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 'The Right to Cultural Identity' in Jon Berting et al (eds), Human Rights in a 
Pluralist World: Individuals and Collectivities (Meckler, 1990) 255; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 'Indigenous Peoples: 
Emerging Actors in Latin America' in Ralph Espach (ed), Ethnic Conflict and Governance in Comparative 
Perspective (Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995) 112; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 'Indigenous Rights: Some Conceptual 
Problems' in Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (eds), Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and 
Society in Latin America (Westview, 1996) 141. 
11 6 See, eg, IITC, The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Human Rights, above n 111. 
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also had extensive experience in the international sphere, including as a former Deputy General 
Director of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 11 7 
Stavenhagen had connections with the Mexican Government too. He had worked for a time as a 
public servant, was a representative of the Mexican Government in the ILO at the time that !LO 
Convention 169 was drafted and he had attended sessions of the WGIP as an observer 'at some 
points for the Mexican Government' .118 Although Stavenhagen was non-Indigenous, his 
appointment as Special Rapporteur was welcomed by high profile Indigenous delegates to the 
UN. For example, Tauli-Corpuz, the former Chair of the PFII, commented along with Alcantara 
' [ w] e have no doubt that Mr Stavenhagen is an excellent choice. His track record in terms of 
support for indigenous peoples is excellent and he has the trust of both indigenous peoples and 
most governments.' 119 
The second expert to hold the role of Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples was 
James Anaya. Anaya is Indigenous, of Apache and Purepecha descent. Anaya was appointed to 
the position on 26 March 2008, despite opposition to his appointment from the United States 
and other governments. Anaya reflects, 'I understand that when my name was being put forward 
there were countries that said that I was too partial, that I could not be objective or independent' 
because he identified as Indigenous. 120 What was most striking about Anaya's appointment is 
that it was reportedly one of the only times that a special procedures mandate-holder has been 
appointed without the sponsorship of a state. Instead, he was nominated and supported in his 
nomination by IPOs, including the Saami Council and the Asia Pacific Indigenous Peoples 
Coalition. 121 Thus, his eventual appointment is a testament to the clout of the global Indigenous 
movement. 122 
Anaya was an obvious choice for the role. He is a leading expert in Indigenous peoples' 
rights under international law. He is the author of the preeminent treatise on the topic, amongst 
many other scholarly contributions in the area. 123 He is a law Professor at the University of 
117 See, eg, Bray, above n 79, 502 . 
118 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011); Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Pioneer on 
Indigenous Rights (Springer and El Colegio de Mexico, 2013) 3. 
11 9 Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 86, 6-7. 
120 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by email 5 July 201 3). 
121 Rodriguez-Pinero Rayo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas : El Pape! de! Relator Espec ial', 
above n 86, 11 7. 
122 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). Regarding 
the general necessity of state support or at least acquiescence, see Pinheiro, above n 3, 164. 
123 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78. See also, eg, James Anaya, 'A Contemporary 
Definition of the International Norm of Self-Determination' ( 1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 131 ; James Anaya and Claudio Grossman, 'The Case of A was Tingni v Nicaragua: A New Step in the 
International Law oflndigenous Peoples' (2002) 19( 1) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law l ; 
James Anaya and Robert A Williams, 'The Protection oflndigenous Peoples' Rights Over Lands and Natu ral 
Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System' (200 1) 14 Harvard Human Rights Journal 33; S James 
Anaya, 'Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law' (1991) 8 Arizona Jounral of International & 
Comparative Law 1; S James Anaya, 'International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move towards the 
Multicultural State' (2004) 2 1 (1) Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law 13; S James Anaya, 
'Divergent Discourses about Internati onal Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: 
Toward a Realist Trend' (2005) 16 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 237; S James 
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Arizona. He has extensive experience as an advocate for Indigenous peoples' rights in different 
international fora, including before the UN bodies responsible for drafting the UNDRIP, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) and the Inter-
American system. 124 He was lead counsel for the Indigenous parties in the landmark case of 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (Merits), 125 in which the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court) held for the first time 'that the 
international human right to enjoy the benefits of property, particularly as affirmed in the 
American Convention on Human Rights, includes the right of indigenous peoples to the 
protection of their customary land and resource tenure.,1 26 Anaya's appointment was extended 
for a second term in 2010 and will expire at the end of April 2014. 127 A new expert will be 
appointed to the role at the HRC's 25 th session in March 2014. Indigenous delegates in some 
international fora began informally discussing potential candidates in 2012. 128 
( d) Convergence and Divergence in Interpretation 
Stavenhagen and Anaya both understand their role as Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples as multifaceted, variously describing their function as independent fact-finders, giving 
voice to Indigenous peoples and, depending on the mandate-holder, either engaging in 
diplomacy or the provocation of dialogue. Anaya remarks, ' [ w ]hen I sit down with government 
I want them to see me as someone who is concerned about the truth and not simply in framing 
facts for one particular agenda or another.' 129 In a similar vein, Stavenhagen has emphasised the 
independent orientation of the mandate, 'I report to the UN but I don't work for the UN ... .I 
don't work for any government .. .I don't work for NGOs either, and I certainly don't work for, 
in the sense of employment, Indigenous peoples.' 130 Anaya also understands his role as being an 
'interlocutor' or 'sort of quasi-diplomat', viewing his search for the truth as a foundation for 
diplomatic engagement. 131 Stavenhagen makes no such connection. Rather, he sees the 
mandate's role in sparking debate 'one of the tasks of a Special Rapporteur is to be provocative, 
to consciously put something on paper that will eventually generate a negative reaction . . . to get 
people debating the issue for, against, how, when, why.' 132 The experts' different 
conceptualisations of this aspect of their role plays out in their contrasting work styles, as 
Anaya, 'Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have Contributed to International Human Rights Law' (2006) 22 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 107. 
124 The University of Arizona, Faculty Profile: James Anaya 
<http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/faculty/facultyDetail.cfm?facultyid=3 l >. 125 IACHR Series C No 79, 31 August 2001. 
126 Anaya and Grossman, above n 123, l. 
127 HRCRes 15/14, UNDocA/HRC/RES/15/14 [l] . 
128 Fleur Adcock 'Meeting Notes: Expert Mechanism on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples: Fifth Session' (July 2012). 129 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by email 5 July 2013). 130 Stavenhagen quoted in Jennifer Preston et al, above n 98, 12. 
13 1 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by email 5 July 2013). 132 Stavenhagen quoted Preston et al, above n 98, 11. 
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Chapters IV to VI demonstrate. But both experts underscore their central role in giving voice to 
Indigenous peoples. Anaya identifies his key role as Special Rapporteur 'as really trying to give 
a voice to Indigenous peoples and their concerns' in a system where Indigenous peoples' 
perspectives have historically been excluded. 133 Similarly, Stavenhagen has described his role as 
a kind of 'spokesperson' for Indigenous peoples before the UN. 134 
At the same time, both Special Rapporteurs expressed an expectation that their work 
would go beyond simply awareness-raising and have some practical impact. Stavenhagen 
remarked, ' [ o ]f course I think it is the hope and expectation of every Rapporteur that his or her 
recommendations to governments will be taken up and will be followed by the governments 
concerned' as well as by the other actors to whom recommendations are made. 135 However, he 
was under no illusions that his recommendations acted as some sort of 'magic fix' .136 Anaya 
was more cautious in his expectations of what the mandate of the Special Rapporteur could 
achieve: 
I think it can have some effect if only ... to help to raise the voices of Indigenous peoples to be 
heard, and maybe arrest a little bit of what governments might do if no one knew what was 
happening, and if you have that as the measure of effectiveness then I think that, yeah, yeah, the 
mandate can be effective. But [if] the measure of effectiveness [is]: are we going to bring about 
change, are we talking about major dramatic change? No, the mandate cannot do that. It is all 
part of a broader process. 137 
While Anaya's more wary assessment does not contemplate significant direct change through 
the work of the mandate, it does envisages a role (albeit limited) for the mandate beyond acting 
solely as a mouthpiece. 
(e) Normative Framing from the UNDRIP and Beyond 
The normative framework that informs the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples is drawn from an extensive collection of instruments, including treaties and 
declarations of the GA, as well as customary international law. The UNDRIP is the guiding 
instrument. Following the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007 the HRC requested the Special 
133 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). 
134 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). See also Bertrand G Ramcharan, The 
Protection Role of National Human Rights Institutions (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 10. Anaya and 
Stavenhagen are not alone in conceptualising their role as one of many hats. Subedi, the expert on Cambodia, states 
that 'I have tried to play the role of an international diplomat, a human rights activist, a human rights academic, and a 
government adviser - simultaneously.' Surya P Subedi, 'The UN Human Rights Mandate in Cambodia: The 
Challenge of a Country in Transition and the Experience of the Special Rapporteur for the Country' (2011) 15(2) The 
International Journal of Human Rights 249, 262. 
135 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19April 2011). 
136 Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A!HRC/4/32/Add.4, [79]. 
137 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 20 I 3). 
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Rapporteur '[t]o promote the United Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples 
and international instruments relevant to the advancement of the rights of indigenous peoples, 
where appropriate' .138 Anaya has expressly embraced the UNDRIP as the guiding framework 
for his work as Special Rapporteur, 139 whether or not the particular state he is examining voted 
in support of, or has endorsed, the instrument. 140 The approach has not met with public 
resistance from states. Anaya remarks that he has received 'no push back at least outwardly, no 
one went on record saying that I should not do that, no one went on record saying "that is not 
the standard", so from the very beginning I have used the Declaration as the benchmark' . 141 
Anaya's approach is an example of what Nifosi has described as the special procedures 
'augmenting the legal force of soft law instruments by constantly urging states to comply with 
them and monitoring such compliance.' 142 She argues that such approaches 'have established a 
sort of mandatory significance of such instruments which is in between the exhortative power of 
a UN Declaration and the legal force of a human rights Convention.' 143 As identified in Chapter 
I, given my theoretical perspective the ascription of 'hard' and 'soft' status to the legal 
instruments leveraged by the experts is oflittle concern here. But the boldness of Anaya's 
explicit embrace of this declaration as the guiding framework in his dealings with all states is 
noteworthy. Anaya has commented that having the standards in the UNDRIP agreed on ' is an 
advantage I have over my predecessor' .144 But even prior to its adoption Stavenhagen drew on 
the draft UNDRJP in performing his role as Special Rapporteur. 145 
A host of other international instruments inform the Special Rapporteur ' s work too. ILO 
Convention 169 is relevant, as is its now discredited, assimilation driven, predecessor the ILO's 
Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and 
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 107) for those states to 
138 HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l(g) . See also HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para 
l(g) . 
139 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, S James Anaya UN Doc A/HRC/9/9 (11 August 2008) [34]-[43] (' Anaya Annual Report 2008' ). 
See also General Assembly (GA), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc 
A/68/317 (14 August 2013) [3] , [57] ('Anaya Report to GA 2013'). 
140 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). Note that UN 
human rights treaty bodies have similarly advocated use of the UNDRJP as a guide in interpreting the treaties they 
monitor regardless of states' position on the UNDRIP, see, eg, CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America, UN Doc CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (8 
May 2008) [29] . 
141 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by email 5 July 2013). 142 Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above n 5, 134. 
143 Ibid (emphasis in original). See also Alston, Morgan-Foster and Abresch, above n 26, 201 ; Jemow, above n 7, 
807. 
144 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by email 5 July 2013). 145 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 2001/57, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2002/97 (4 February 2002) [15]-[16], [55], [78], [99] ('StavenhagenAnnual Report 2002' ). Stavenhagen also 
pushed for the UNDRIP's adoption in the form proposed by Indigenous peoples. Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011 ); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32 (27 February 2007) [78]-
[80] ('Stavenhagen Annual Report 2007') ; CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88 (6 January 2005) [9] (' Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005'). 
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which it still applies. 146 As Stavenhagen remarked in 2006, although !LO Convention 169 has 
only been ratified by a small number of states (22 countries by late 2013) 'it is of decisive 
regional influence since it has been ratified by virtually all the countries of Latin America, is 
used as a framework for donor countries' cooperation activities and serves as an influential 
model in Asia and, more recently, in Africa.' 147 Anaya made similar remarks in 2008. 148 In 
addition, the Special Rapporteur's work is informed by all of the core international human rights 
instruments, the UDHR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (JCCPR); I49 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); I 50 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ( CERD); 151 Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); I 52 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC); 153 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CA1); 154 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) .155 Each of these instruments is relevant to Indigenous peoples. For 
example, the JCCPR and ICESCR in a shared article 1 affirm the right to self-determination, the 
bedrock of Indigenous claims; 156 the CERD Committee has issued a General Recommendation 
regarding Indigenous peoples; 157 the CRC specifically references Indigenous children in article 
30; 158 and the CRPD refers to Indigenous peoples in its preamble.159 Other non-human rights 
instruments, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity ( CED) with its article 8G) 
concerning Indigenous peoples' rights regarding their traditional knowledge, are also 
relevant. 160 Instruments directly authored by Indigenous peoples have a bearing on the mandate 
146 Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal 
Populations in Independent Countries, opened for signature 26 June 1957, ILO Convention No 107 (entered into 
force 2 June 1959) ('!LO Convention 107') . See generally Lee Swepston, 'The ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention (No 169): Eight Years After Adoption' in Cynthia Price Cohen ( ed), The Human Rights of indigenous 
Peoples (Transnational Publishers, 1998) 17. 
147 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78, [57]. 
148 Anaya Annual Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9, [33] . 
149 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) ('ICCPR'). 
150 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) ('ICESCR'). 
151 In ternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 
December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) ('CERD') . 
152 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 18 December 
1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981) ('CEDAW'). 
153 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature on 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 2 September 1990) (' CRC'). 
154 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signature 10 December 1984, 1465 illHS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) ('CAT). 
155 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature on 30 March 2007, 25 15 UNTS 3 
( entered into fo rce on 3 May 2008) (' CRPD'). 
156 JCCPR art l; ICESCR art l. 
157 CERD Committee, 'General Recommendation on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, Adopted by the Committee, at 
Its 1235th Meeting, on 18 August 1997' in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
annex V, A/52/18 (1997). 
158 CRC art 30. 
159 CRPD Preamble para (p) . 
16° Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 ( entered into force 19 
December 1993) (' CBD' ). Regarding the normative framework of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
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too. For example, in 2013 Anaya stated that the outcome document from Indigenous peoples' 
global meeting in preparation for the 2014 high-level plenary meeting of the GA to be known as 
the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples ' is an important normative instrument and plan of 
action in its own right' and its recommendations will 'guide my approach to issues I examine 
within the scope ofmy mandate. ' 16 1 
There is no accepted definition of who constitute 'Indigenous peoples ' in these 
instruments or elsewhere, although ILO Convention 169 provides some guidance in its 
statement of who the convention applies to. 162 As a result, both experts have had to navigate 
their own path regarding this contested issue. Both have embraced an expansive understanding 
of the term. Anaya has avoided defining the term in the abstract for the purposes of his 
mandate. 163 Instead he focuses on how the attributes of the particular collective he is examining 
align with the objectives of the UNDRIP, international programmes and his mandate: 
I look at the particular issues that have been raised and if I find that those particular issues fall 
within a concern of the objectives of the Declaration, say, and other international programmes 
and with what I see as the objectives of my mandate then I consider them within my mandate. 
Groups that are disadvantaged because of their historical occupation of territory, that have been 
moved off them, that are trying to retain their identities and transmit them to future generations, 
these are the issues I am concerned with, so I look at it from that standp~int. 164 
Stavenhagen's first annual report to the CHR identified the ongoing debate over the definition 
of who is Indigenous but did not settle on a definition. 165 In practice, when challenged by 
governments that his attentions were unnecessary because there were no Indigenous peoples 
within their territories, Stavenhagen adopted an approach similar to Anaya. He would look to 
the particular circumstances of the country under study: ' [t]here was no hard and fast definition, 
Indigenous peoples generally see OHCHR, Normative Framework 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/SRindigenousPeoples/Pages/NormativeFramework.aspx>. 161 James Anaya, 'Statement on Panel on the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples ' (Statement to EMRJP, 
Geneva, 8 July 2013) <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/statement-by-the-specia1-rapporteur-on-panel-on-the-
world-conference-on-indigenous-peoples-6th-session-of-the-expert-mechanism>. 
162 ILO Convention 169, arts 1-3. 
163 Anaya has pointed to the usefulness of the definition in ILO Convention 169 for companies seeking clarity 
regarding who is Indigenous. HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37 (19 July 2010) [52] ('Anaya 
Annual Report 2010' ). 
164 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). See, eg, 
HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People, James Anaya: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Botswana UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.2 (2 June 2010) 
[ 15] ('Anaya Report on Botswana' ); HRC, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya: Report on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Nepal, 
UN Doc A/HRC/12/34/Add.3 (20 July 2009) [11]-[16] ('Anaya Report on Nepal'). 165 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, [92]-[100]. 
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certainly no legal definition that had a worldwide acceptance so in every case we had to work 
with the particular circumstances of a particular country.' 166 
(I) Emphasising Effective Protection and Further Developments 
The Special Rapporteur's mandate has developed over the years . Subsequent emphasis 
has been placed on the Special Rapporteur's role in securing the effective protection of 
Indigenous peoples' rights. For example, from 2002 the Special Rapporteur was encouraged to 
identify ways to overcome 'obstacles to the full and effective protection' of Indigenous peoples' 
rights, 167 and in 2005 the expert was requested to prepare the Study on Best Practices regarding 
implementation of his general and country recommendations. 168 As a result, Rhiannon Morgan 
has remarked that the expert's role is 'a clear opportunity to encourage implementation' of 
Indigenous peoples' rights. 169 The Special Rapporteur has been instructed to carry out additional 
tasks, including advancing debate on the then draft UNDRIP; 170 working to institute 
preventative measures regarding the protection of Indigenous peoples from genocide; 171 
submitting recommendations to the outcome of the Durban Review Conference; 172 and assisting 
to explore modalities for the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples. 173 Since 2004 the 
Special Rapporteur has been requested to report on the mandate's activities to the GA. 174 
Additionally, in 2012 the HRC encouraged 'relevant United Nations mechanisms', which would 
166 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). See also GA, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, UN Doc A/62/286 (21 August 2007) [ 45]. 
167 Human Rights and Indigenous Issues, CHR Res 2002/65, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/65 (25 April 2002) para 2 ('CHR Res 2002/65'); Human Rights and Indigenous Issues, CHR Res 2003/56, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2003/56 (24 
April 2003) para 2 ('CHR Res 2003/56'); CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, para 3; Human Rights 
and Indigenous Issues, CHR Res 2005/51, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51 (20 April 2005) para 2 (' CHR Res 
2005/51'); HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l(a). In the resolutions from 2002 to 2005 the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples was also requested 'to respond effectively' to information the mandate received 
regarding violations of the human rights oflndigenous peoples: CHR Res 2002/65, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/65, 
para 4; CHR Res 2003/56, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2003/56, para 4; CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, 
para 5; CHR Res 2005/51, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51, para 4. 
168 CHR Res 2005/51, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51, para 9. The Special Rapporteur was further instructed to 
identify, exchange and promote 'best practices' to overcome obstacles to the protection oflndigenous peoples ' rights, 
see HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l(a); HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para J (a). 169 Rhiannon Morgan, Transforming Law and Institution: Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights 
(Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011) 160. 
17° CHR Res 2002/65, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/65, para 5; CHR Res 2003/56, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2003/56, para 
5; CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, para 6; CHR Res 2005/51, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51, 
paras 5, 7. 
171 CHR Res 2005/51, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51, para 10. 
172 Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, HRC Res 9/7, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/9/7 (18 September 2008) ('HRC Res 
917'). 
173 Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, HRC Res 18/8, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/18/8 (29 September 2011) para 4 
('HRC Res 18/8 ') para 12. 
174 CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, para 14; CHR Res 2005/51, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51, 
para 18; Indigenous Issues, GA Res 63/161 , UN Doc A/RES/63/16 1 (18 December 2008) para 1 ('GA Res 63/161'); 
Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, HRC Res 12/13, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/12/13 (12 October 2009) para 3; HRC 
Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para 3; HRC Res 18/8, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/18/8, para 3; Human Rights and 
Indigenous Peoples, HRC Res 21 /24, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/21 /24 ('HRC Res 21/24') (28 September 2012) para 3; 
Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, HRC Res 24/L.22, UN Doc AJHRC/24/L.22 (26 September 20 13) para 3. 
The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples did not report to the GA in 2008. 
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include all special procedures mandates, 'to increase their attention to the human rights of 
indigenous persons with disabilities' .175 Moves to confine the parameters of the Special 
Rapporteur's mandate have been evident in slight language shifts too, such as inclusion of 
reference to the Code of Conduct in the preamble to the renewing resolutions since 2007 .176 
4 The Continuing Role of All Special Procedures 
The creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples does not 
remove the role of examining Indigenous rights issues from the purview of other special 
procedures mandates, whether country or thematic. Indigenous peoples continue to call on other 
thematic special procedures experts to address their rights concerns, in acknowledgement of 
their particular expertise. For example, speaking before the PFII in 2003 the PFII member from 
Canada stated that the right to health of the Indigenous peoples of the Treaty Number 6 
Territory of Western Canada 'was one that must be addressed by the Special Rapporteur on 
Health.' 177 Further, in 2013, IPOs from Asia called for various experts, including those on 
extrajudicial executions, internally displaced persons, violence against women and religious 
intolerance, to carry out country missions in Asia. 178 Since 2006 the PFII has invited different 
thematic mandate-holders to participate in its annual sessions in recognition of their important 
role in advancing the realisation of Indigenous peoples' rights. 179 It has also directed requests 
for action at different thematic experts. 180 The same normative framework that guides the 
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples informs other special procedures' mandates when 
they consider Indigenous peoples' rights too, directed by the focus of the relevant expert's 
particular mandate. 181 While the enabling resolutions of other special procedures' mandates may 
not reference the UNDRIP, the UNDRIP itself recognises a role for these mandates in realising 
the rights it affirms. Articles 41 and 42 of the UNDRIP state that the 'organs and specialized 
175 HRC Res 21/24, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/21/24, para 17. 
176 HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, Preamble; HRC Res 15/ 14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, Preamble. 
The language of the resolutions has also moved from requesting the usual report on the expert's 'activities' to asking 
the expert to 'report on the implementation of his/her mandate' , see, eg, CHR Res 2001 /57, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2001/57, [10]; HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para lQ). The reports of the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples have been received with differing levels of enthusiasm by the mandate' s parent 
body over the years. For example, the expert's report received a 'welcome' in 2002, was taken 'note of in 2004 and 
was taken 'note with appreciation of in 2012 and 2013 . CHR Res 2002/65, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/65, para 1; 
CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, para 2; HRC Res 21/24, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/21 /24, para 2; 
Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples , HRC Res 24/L.22, UN Doc A/HRC/24/L.22 (26 September 2013) para 2. 177 PFII, 'Speakers in Permanent Forum Highlight Violations of Rights ofindigenous Peoples, During Human Rights 
Discussion' (Press Release, UN Doc HR/4673, 20 May 2003). 
178 World Conference on Indigenous Peoples 2014, A Call to Action from Indigenous Peoples in Asia to the World 
Coriference on Indigenous Peoples (2012) <http://wcip20l4.org/regions-caucuses/asia> 8-9. 179 Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! de! Relator Especial', 
above n 86, 127. 
180 Ibid 127. See, eg, PFII, Report on the Seventh Session (21 April - 2 May 2008), UN Doc E/C.19/2008/1 3 (2008) [74], [136]. 
181 Rodriguez-Pinero Royo sets out in tabu lar form the primary normative framework of the different thematic special 
procedures mandates, and the Indigenous rights, and associated UNDRIP articles, with which they align. Rodrfguez-
Pifiero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples' Rights under the Declaration', above 
n 86, 331-34. 
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agencies of the United Nations system shall contribute to the full realization of the provisions of 
the Declaration' and that 'the United Nations and its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies .. .. shall promote respect and full application of the 
provisions of this Declaration and follow-up on the effectiveness of this Declaration', 
respectively. The ' organs' and 'bodies' referred to in these articles include the special 
procedures mechanism. Consistent with this view, the special procedures experts were briefed 
on the UNDRIP at their 2008 annual meeting, which followed the UNDRIP's adoption. 182 
Coordination and collaboration between the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples 
and other special procedures mandate-holders on Indigenous rights issues occurs on an erratic 
basis. There is no formal process for collaboration, where it happens it happens informally 
according to the interests and agendas of the individual experts. Stavenhagen recalled 
exchanging information on the position of Indigenous women with the expert on violence 
against women 'very often', for example. 183 Anaya worked with Ruggie, the former expert on 
transnational corporations, on the question of corporate responsibility for Indigenous rights 
violations. 184 But in some instances Anaya viewed it as appropriate to leave consideration of 
Indigenous rights issues to different special procedures experts, 'there certainly are other 
mandate-holders who are doing very important work relevant to Indigenous peoples that I think 
needs to happen, but that work does not necessarily need my involvement given all the other 
issues I have.' 185 Stavenhagen suggested that the differing agendas and concerns of the experts 
can make coordination difficult ' [ s Jome of us were very eager to work together but it did not 
work out very well because every mandate-holder has his or her agenda, his or her particular 
concerns, and so it is a bit difficult.' 186 Correspondingly, Anaya identified that coordination 
between the experts is 'complicated' by their differing working methods. 187 Further examples of 
the experts' joint efforts on Indigenous rights concerns are considered in the next chapter. 
182 Julian Burger, 'Making the Declaration Work for Human Rights in the UN System' in Claire Charters and Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen ( eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 304,304,312 n 13. 
183 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). 
184 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). Anaya also 
promoted Ruggie's framework in his reports, see, eg, Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc 
AIHRC/ 18/35/Add.3 , [70]. 
185 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 201 I , updated by email 5 July 2013). 
186 Interview wi th Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011 ). 
187 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). 
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D Commonality, Competition and Cooperation: The Mandate in Context 
l Carving Space amongst the Indigenous-exclusive UN Bodies 
(a) Cooperation with the WGIP and PFII 
The special procedures are not the sole international mechanism with a mandate to 
advance the realisation of Indigenous rights norms. The experts join a legion of international 
mechanisms in this effort, most notably the other UN mandates with an Indigenous-exclusive 
focus: the former WGIP, the EMRIP and the PFII. 188 At the time that the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples' mandate was established concerns were expressed regarding how the 
mandate would sit with the WGIP and the then newly established PFII. Some states and 
Indigenous representatives thought the Special Rapporteur would duplicate or diminish the role 
of the existing bodies. 189 The WGIP, which consisted of five experts, was established in 1982 
under the CHR's subsidiary body: the Sub-Commission. Its mandate was twofold: ' to review 
developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous populations' and 'to give special attention to the evolution of standards 
concerning the rights of indigenous populations' .190 It was in accordance with the latter 
dimension of its mandate that the WGIP developed the initial draft of the UNDRIP. The Special 
Rapporteur shares a similar mandate in that the expert examines ways of protecting Indigenous 
peoples' human rights and, before its adoption by the GA, the expert was instructed to assist in 
advancing the debate on the draft UNDRIP. 191 
The PFII's mandate also overlaps with that of the Special Rapporteur and, previously, the 
WGIP. The PFII, composed of sixteen experts, was created in 2000 as a high level advisory 
body to the ECOSOC. 192 It held its first annual session in 2002; a year after the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur was created. Human rights are one of six of the PFII's mandated focuses. 
The PFII is mandated to discuss 'indigenous issues' relating to economic and social 
188 As identified in Chapter I, Charters provides an in-depth and insightful analysis of the jurisdictional competition 
and efforts at coordination between the Indigenous-exclusive UN bodies. In this examination, although I am heavily 
informed by her discussion, I focus on how that competition and cooperation impacts the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur in particular. Claire Charters, The Legitimacy of Indigenous Peoples' Norms Under International Law 
(PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011) 63-5, 67-8, 75-80, 88-91. 
189 See, eg, Saldamando, above n 93, 33 . 
190 Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, ECOSOC Res 1982/34, UN Doc 
E/RES/1982/34' (7 May 1982) [1]-[2]. See generally Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 63, 
221-22. 
191 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001 /57, para l(b); CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, 
para 3, 6; HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRCIRES/6/12, para l(a), (g); HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, 
para l(a), (g). Later the Special Rapporteur was requested to advance the UNDRIP and other international 
instruments relevant to Indigenous peoples: HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l(g); HRC Res 15/14, 
UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para l(g). 
192 Establishment of a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ECOSOC Res 2000/22, UN Doc E/2000/INF/2/Add.2 
(28 July 2000) 50-2 ('ECOSOC Res 2000/22'). The PFII was created following extensive lobbying by Indigenous 
peoples with the support ofNGOs and some states. Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 86, 19-20. See generally 
Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 219-20. 
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development, culture, the environment, education, health and human rights. Specifically the 
PFII 's mandate is to: 
(a) Provide expert advice and recommendations on indigenous issues to the Council [ECOSOC), 
as well as to programmes, funds and agencies of the United Nations, through the Council; 
(b) Raise awareness and promote the integration and coordination of activities relating to 
indigenous issues within the United Nations system; [and] 
( c) Prepare and disseminate information on indigenous issues; . .. 193 
The Special Rapporteur shares with the PFII a mandate to examine Indigenous rights issues.194 
Despite the overlap there is a central distinction between these three mandates. Neither 
the former WGIP nor the PFII's mandate formally includes the investigation of allegations of 
specific human rights violations or the assessment of states ' Indigenous rights situations. In fact, 
the Chair of the WGIP would frequently interrupt Indigenous speakers ' oral interventions 
concerning Indigenous rights violations during its sessions to warn them that the mechanism 
could not address specific cases of human rights violations. 195 Thus, the Special Rapporteur's 
mandate complements the work of the two bodies by permitting the investigation of specific 
complaints of violations oflndigenous peoples' rights and of the Indigenous rights situations in 
states. 196 
To address the overlapping dimensions of the mandates, cooperation between the three 
mechanisms was encouraged by the CHR, the Sub-Commission and later the HRC. The 
resolution that created the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples invited the expert to 
consider recommendations made by the WGIP and the PFII relevant to the mandate. 197 The 
Special Rapporteur was requested to participate in the PFII's annual sessions.198 The Special 
Rapporteur was also invited to coordinate with the PFII and the WGIP. 199 Similar requests were 
made of the PFII and WGIP.200 Stavenhagen reflects that he ' tried to be as close to them [the 
PFII and WGIP] as possible and both the groups always counted on me as well. ' 201 He attended 
193 ECOSOC Res 2000/22, UN Doc E/2000/INF/2/Add.2, [2]. 
194 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001 /57, para l (b); CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, 
para 3; HRC Res 6112, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l (a), (g); HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para 
l(a), (g). 
195 See, eg, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 222. 
196 See, eg, IITC, The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Human Rights, above n 111; Tauli -Corpuz 
and Alcantara, above n 86, 20. 
197 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001 /57, para 4. 
198 See, eg, CHR Res 2002/65, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/65, para 7; CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc 
E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, para 8; HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l (e); HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/15/14, para l (e) . 
199 See, eg, CHR Res 2005/51, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51, para 11 . 
200 See, eg, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights Res 2006/13 , UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/ 13 (24 August 2006) paras 8-11. Cooperation was also encouraged 
between the WGIP and the special procedures more generally: at para 6. 
201 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). 
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their annual sessions and kept them updated on his activities.202 He viewed the three 
mechanisms as complementary in mandate and practice, identifying that human rights were only 
a small part of the PFII's focus and the WGIP's mandate was to draft the UNDRIP ' [s]o we had 
a sort of division of labour which was very clear on paper and in reality and fact between the 
Permanent Forum, the Working Group and the Special Rapporteur.' 203 Cooperation between the 
three mechanisms functioned to contain, in a large part, the cross-over between their mandates, 
but was complicated by the creation of the EMRIP and subsequent moves by the PFII. 
(b) Negotiating Jurisdiction with the PFII and EMRIP 
(i) Overlaps and Encroachments 
In 2007, during the institutional reform of the UN's human rights activities, the WGIP 
was replaced by the EMRIP. The EMRIP, composed of five experts, was established as a 
subsidiary body to the HRC.204 The EMRIP is mandated to provide the HRC with expert 
thematic advice on the rights of Indigenous peoples, mainly in the form of studies and research, 
as directed by the HRC. The EMRIP may also suggest proposals to the HRC for its 
consideration and approval.205 Its mandate is not as far-reaching as that of the former WGIP and 
it is more restrictive than Indigenous peoples had lobbied for. For example, its enabling 
resolution excludes a role for the EMRIP in monitoring the implementation of the UNDRIP, 
which Indigenous peoples had advocated for. 206 Indigenous peoples argued that an institution to 
provide advice on Indigenous rights issues to the HRC was needed partially because of the 
characteristics of the existing mechanisms: the Special Rapporteur's mandate focused on the 
implementation of Indigenous peoples' rights and the PFII operated under the ECOSOC rather 
than the UN's human rights machinery.207 Thus, the view was that a body focused on providing 
thematic advice concerning the human rights situation of Indigenous peoples would supplement 
the bodies' mandates. However, Rodriguez-Pinero counters that the EMRIP's establishment 
202 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Submitted in accordance with Commission Resolution 2001/65, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2003/90 (21 January 2003) [ 4] (' Stavenhagen Annual Report 2003 ' ); CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Submitted 
in accordance with Commission Resolution 2001/65, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80 (26 January 2004) [5] ('Stavenhagen 
Annual Report 2004'). 
203 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). 
204 Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, HRC Res 6/36, UN Doc A/HRC/ RES/6/36 (14 
December 2007) paras 1, 3 ('HRC Res 6/36'). 
205 Ibid paras 1, 2. 
206 Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! de! Relator Especial' , 
above n 86, 127; Rodriguez-Pinero, "'Where Appropriate" : Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples' Rights 
under the Declaration', above n 86, 334-35. 
207 IITC and the International Organization of Indigenous Resource Development, Memorandum on the Indigenous 
Peoples Human Rights Expert Body to the Human Rights Council, Submitted by the International Indian Treaty 
Council (/ITC) and the International Organization of Indigenous Resource Development (IOIRD), July 2007, UN 
Doc IMWGIP/2007/CRP.6 (2007). 
91 
'can actually be explained more as a response to the demands of indigenous peoples, afraid of 
"losing" an institutional space within the new Human Rights Council machinery .. . than as [a] 
conscious step towards cohesive institution building. ' 208 Given the commonalities between the 
mandates explored below, his argument has merit. 
The mandates of the three current Indigenous-exclusive mechanisms - the Special 
Rapporteur, the PFII and the EMRIP - also overlap. All three mechanisms have a thematic 
dimension. The Special Rapporteur has a mandate to examine ways of protecting Indigenous 
peoples' human rights, which has prompted the Special Rapporteur to dedicate the mandate's 
annual reports to particular Indigenous rights topics. 209 Thematic reports were a central focus of 
Stavenhagen's work as Special Rapporteur. 210 The EMRIP is mandated to provide thematic 
expert advice on Indigenous rights topics to the HRC. 211 The PFII also organises its sessions 
thematically every second year. 212 
In addition, following the creation of the EMRIP, the PFII made moves to encroach 
upon the Special Rapporteur's role in investigating allegations of specific human rights 
violations and of assessing the Indigenous rights situations in states. The PFII is the only one of 
the three Indigenous-exclusive UN mechanisms expressly named in the UNDRIP as having a 
role in promoting and following-up on the effectiveness of the UNDRIP.213 Buoyed by this 
reference the PFII has undertaken activities to investigate specific rights infractions and 
conducted country visits to Bolivia, Paraguay and Colombia, for which it has issued reports and 
recommendations, as well as carried out follow-up during its annual sessions.214 The PFII's 
extension of its mandate in this manner was enterprising. As identified above, human rights are 
only one of six issues the PFII focuses on, whereas it is the sole focus of the Special Rapporteur 
208 Rodriguez-Piliero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples' Rights under the 
Declaration', above n 86, 334. 
209 CHR Res 2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001/57, para l(b); CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, 
para 3; HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l(a), (g); HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para 
l(a), (g). For comment by Anaya on the overlaps between the mandates see HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/34 (15 July 2009) [7]-[14] ('Anaya Annual Report 2009'). 
210 Rodriguez-Piliero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples' Rights under the 
Declaration', above n 86, 334; Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El 
Pape! de! Relator Especial', above n 86, 127. 
2 11 HRC Res 6/36, UN Doc A/HRC/ RES/6/36, para 1. 
21 2 At the PFII's first six sessions a different theme was discussed each year. Since its sixth session the PFII has 
alternated between theme years and review years. PFII, The Sessions of UNPFII 
<http://undesadspd.org/IndigenousPeoples/UNPFIISessions.aspx>. 
2 13 UNDRIP art 42 . 
2 14 PFII, Lars-Anders Baer, Study on the Status of Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997, 
Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc E/C.19/2011 /6 (18 February 2011 ); PFII, Summa,y and 
Recommendations of the Report of the Mission of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, UN Doc E/C.19/2010/6 (21 January 201 O); PFII, Summary and Recommendations of the Report of 
the Mission of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to Paraguay, UN Doc E/C.19/2010/5 (21 January 2010); 
PFII, Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Danger of Extinction in Colombia: Summary of the Report and 
Recommendations of the Mission by the Permanent Forum to Colombia, UN Doc E/C.19/2011/3 (11 February 2011). 
The PFII has followed-up the visits with an in-depth dialogue with members of the PFII, the relevant state, UN 
country teams and affected Indigenous peoples during its sessions, see, eg, PFII, Report on the Ninth Session (19-30 
April 2010) , UN Doc E/C. 19/2010/ 15 (2010) [54]-[90] . See generally Lola Garcia-Alix, 'UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues' in Kathrin Wessendorf ( ed), The Indigenous World 2011 (IWGIA, 2011) 492, 495-96. 
92 
and the EMRIP. And the Special Rapporteur ' s mandate expressly authorises the expert to 
receive allegations oflndigenous rights violations, while the PFII ' s mandate does not. To some 
extent the PFII ' s moves to extend its mandate were prompted by pressure from Indigenous 
peoples unconcerned with the particularities of its enabling mandate who frequently demanded 
action regarding the rights violations they raised during the PFII ' s annual sessions. 215 Anaya 
himself is not opposed to the PFII conducting country visits, recognising the different strengths 
of the two bodies: ' [t]hey are not as agile as I might be able to be in sort of getting around 
different areas in a country, finding things out. At the same time, they do not have the sort of 
diplomatic constraints that I might either so they might be able to take a stronger stand' .216 But 
he is of the view that strategic thought needs to be directed at the methodology and ultimate 
purpose of such visits as the PFII has 'no specific rules of engagement for county visits' .217 He 
also argues for greater coordination between the PFII and the Special Rapporteur regarding the 
visits, reflecting ' that has not happened as much as it should' .218 
(ii) Functioning Together 
Efforts at cooperation and coordination between the Special Rapporteur, the PFII and 
the EMRIP have been made, however. The three bodies have held meetings at least annually ' to 
share work agendas, identify the strengths and limitations of our respective mandates, and 
explore methods of channeling our work in ways that it will be most effective. ' 219 They have 
participated in one another 's annual meetings.220 In 201 2 the EMRIP instituted a new practice of 
hosting an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples and a 
representative of the PFII concerning the UNDRIP, allowing for a dynamic exchange between 
the three bodies and EMRIP participants on efforts to promote implementation of the 
instrurnent.221 The three bodies have jointly participated in other international meetings 
regarding Indigenous peoples.222 The Special Rapporteur has contributed to the thematic work 
215 Charters, above n 188, 63-5 , 92. 
216 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 20 11, updated by email 5 July 20 13) . 217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 James Anaya, ' Statement to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues' (New York, 15 May 201 2) James Anaya 
<http ://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/statement-of-special-rapporteur-to-un-permanent-forum-on-indigenous-
issues-201 2>; Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc AJ68/3 l 7, [44]. 
220 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Extractive 
Industries and Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc AJHRC/24/4 1 (1 July 2013) annex [4] ('Anaya Annual Report 2013 ) . 221 EMRIP , Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on its Fifth session (Geneva, 9-13 
July 2012), UN Doc AJHRC/2 1/52 (17 August 20 12) [57]-[74] ('EMRIP Report on 5th Session') . See also Anaya 
Report to GA 2013, UN Doc AJ6 8/3 l 7, [ 45] . In 2013 the panel participating in the dialogue was extended to include 
other actors, including a member of the CERD Committee. EMRIP, Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples on its Sixth session (Geneva, 8-12 July 2013) UN Doc AJHRC/EMRIP/24/49 (31 July 2013) 
[91]-[104]. 
222 See, eg, HRC, Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc AJHRC/24/41, [6]. 
93 
of the EMRIP and the PFII. 223 This cooperation has been promoted by the HRC, with the 
Special Rapporteur's mandate revised to request the Rapporteur '[t]o work in close cooperation 
and coordination' with the EMRIP.224 This is in addition to the request that the expert work 
cooperatively with the PFII, as noted above. Coordination between the EMRIP and other special 
procedures experts has been advocated too. In 2012 the EMRIP proposed that the HRC request 
that the special procedures, and other actors, 'utilize the recommendations and advice of the 
Expert Mechanism within their activities' .225 In the same year, the Chair of the EMRIP also 
identified the importance of collaboration between the Working Group on transnational 
corporations and the Indigenous-exclusive mechanisms, in order to promote implementation of 
the UNDRIP in relation to Ruggie's Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which 
elaborate on corporate responsibility for human rights. 226 
The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has been especially proactive in 
promoting coordination between the three Indigenous-exclusive mechanisms. Anaya has 
emphasised his 'clear mandate to investigate and make recommendations on specific 
human rights situations of indigenous peoples', in contrast to the mandates of the EMRIP and 
the PFII.227 He has reminded the PFII that multiple mechanisms have a role in implementing the 
UNDRIP despite the fact that the PFII is the only body expressly mentioned in the instrument. 
In his 2012 report to the GA he commented: 
Although the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues is specifically mentioned in article 42 of 
the Declaration, the mandate to promote respect for the Declaration clearly applies throughout 
the United Nations system and in particular to United Nations institutions that in some way touch 
upon indigenous issues. 228 
He has also encouraged the PFII to focus its attentions on its mandate of advising the UN 
system on Indigenous matters, which he sees as 'an extremely important task' for which 'there 
223 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, UN Doc 
A/HRC/21/47 (6 July 2012) [6] ('Anaya Annual Report 2012'); Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35 , 
[3] ' 
224 See, eg, HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/1 4, para l(d). 
225 EMRIP Report on 51h Session, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /52, 6, proposal 8(c). 
226 Ibid [25]. In 2011 the HRC endorsed the 'Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework' proposed by John Ruggie, then the expert on 
transnational corporations, see Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, HRC 
Res 17/4, UN Doc A/HRC/C/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011) para 1. The Guiding Principles are contained in Ruggie 's 2011 
report to the HRC, see HRC, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy " Framework, UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/3 1 (21 March 2011) annex ('Ruggie 's Annual Report 201 J'). See generally Susan Ariel Aaronson and Ian 
Higham, "'Re-Righting Business": John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International Human Rights Standards 
for Transnational Finns' (20 13) 35(2) Human Rights Quarterly 333. 
??7 
-- Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [11] . 
228 GA, James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/67/301 (13 
August 2012) [27] (' Anaya Report to GA 2012 '). 
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is a huge need' .229 In addition to participating in the annual sessions of both the PFII and the 
EMRIP, since 2009 Anaya has met privately with Indigenous peoples attending those sessions 
who wish to raise allegations of specific rights violations.230 In 2012 he described these parallel 
meetings as '[a]n especially important part of the Special Rapporteur's coordination with 
the Permanent Forum and Expert Mechanism' .231 
The three bodies have also taken steps to refine the work they do in order to avoid 
duplication. Anaya has limited his thematic work in order not to replicate the work of the 
EMRIP. In 2009 Anaya commented: 
taking into consideration the establishment of the expert mechanism on the rights of indigenous 
peoples, with a mandate to provide thematic expertise and recommendations to the Human 
Rights Council on issues affecting indigenous peoples, the Special Rapporteur now sees his own 
work in carrying out thematic studies as secondary to the other areas of his work. 232 
In the same year he indicated that he would focus 'mainly on providing observations on the core 
issues that have arisen during his work' that 'will, for the most part, be practically oriented and 
identify best practices, where they exist. ' 233 The EMRIP has emphasised that its mandate is 
'strictly thematic, in contrast to the Special Rapporteur' .234 And the PFII has since recognised 
that the Special Rapporteur and the EMRIP also have a role to play in implementing the 
UNDRIP. 235 As a result, the three mechanisms maintain a degree of concordance between their 
respective mandates.236 But negotiations over the boundaries will be ongoing: reflecting on how 
the mandates of the Special Rapporteur, the PFII and the EMRIP fit together Anaya has 
commented 'I like to think of them all as complementary but we have not quite worked that out · 
yet. ' 237 Accordingly, he has advocated for '[g]reater efforts ... to systematize methods of 
229 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). See also, eg, 
Anaya Report to GA 2012, UN Doc A/67/301, [31]; James Anaya, 'Statement to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues' (New York, 19 May 2011) <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/statement-unsr-tenth-session-of-the-un-
permanent-forum-on- indigenous-issues>. 
230 See, eg, Anaya Report to GA 2012, UN Doc A/67/301 , [4]. See generally Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc 
A/68/317, [46]. 
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- naya nnua Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47, [4] . Anaya's 2012 report to the GA focused on the need to 
harmonise the UN' s activities regarding Indigenous peoples, see Anaya Report to GA 2012, UN Doc A/67/301 . 232 GA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, UN Doc A/64/338 (4 September 2009) [26]. 
233 Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [13]. 
234 OHCHR, International Expert Seminar on the Role of UN Mechanisms with Specific Mandate Regarding the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Madrid, 4-6 February 2009 (2009) [22]. As with sessions of the PFII and the former 
WGIP, respective Chairs of the EMRIP have reminded Indigenous participants that the EMRIP does not have a 
mandate to hear allegations of specific rights violations. Fleur Adcock ' Meeting Notes: UN Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights oflndigenous Peoples' (July 2010); Fleur Adcock 'Meeting Notes: UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples' (July 2011); Fleur Adcock 'Meeting Notes: UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights oflndigenous 
Peoples' (July 2012); Fleur Adcock 'Meeting Notes: Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: Tenth Session' (May 
2011). The practice was less pronounced at EMRIP' s 2012 annual meeting. 
235 See, eg, PFII, Report of the Eighth Session (18-29 May 2009), UN Doc E/C.19/2009/14 (2009) [24]. 236 Cha1iers, above n 188, 80. 
237 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by email 5 July 2013). 
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cooperation, especially in regard to the flow of information on matters of mutual concern. ' 238 It 
should be borne in mind that the jurisdictional competition that remains can be constructive too. 
It can be a source of innovation, help to address oversights by the individual mandates and 
promote the robust articulation and promotion of Indigenous rights norms, 239 although this does 
not detract from the need for continuing dialogue between the three bodies. 
2 Reaching Out to the Wider International System 
(a) Intermittent Coordination with Treaty Bodies 
Beyond the PFII and the EMRIP there are a host of international mechanisms whose 
mandates overlap with, and complement, the special procedures' Indigenous mandate, the UN 
human rights treaty bodies in particular. The UN human rights treaty bodies monitor the 
implementation of human rights treaty obligations by state parties. The bodies require state 
parties to periodically report on their conformity to the rights set out in the relevant treaty. 240 
The treaty bodies responsible for monitoring compliance with the CERD, ICCPR, ICESCR, 
CEDAWand CRC- all instruments that contribute to the Special Rapporteur ' s normative 
framework- have each interpreted state parties' conformity to Indigenous peoples' rights norms 
as relevant to their guiding treaties.241 For example, the CERD Committee has commented 
frequently on the rights of Indigenous peoples in the course of its concluding observations and 
has also heard a number of complaints regarding Indigenous peoples' rights under its Early 
Warning and Urgent Action Procedure.242 But, beyond the CERD Committee,243 the treaty 
bodies receive complaints on violations of individuals' rights only, not the rights of 
238 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/31 7, (86]. 
239 For comment on the advantages of having 'multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions' generally see Paul 
Schiff Berman, 'A Pluralist Approach to International Law' (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International Law 302, 308. 
See also Charters, above n 188, 93. 
240 Sir Nigel Rodley and Lempinen provide detailed analyses of the relationship between the special procedures' 
mechanism and the UN human rights treaty bodies. Sir Nigel Rodley, 'UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special 
Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights - Complementarity or Competition' (2003) 25 Human Rights 
Quarterly 882; Sir Nigel Rodley, 'The United Nations Human Rights Council, its Special Procedures and its 
Relationship with Treaty Bodies: Complementarity or Competition?', above n 28; Lempinen, above n 24, 181-232. 
For comment on some of the limitations of the treaty bodies, see Patrick J Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human 
Rights Institutions (Praeger Publishers, 1998) 36-8. 
241 See, eg, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 112, 130-37, 139, 141, 155, 228-32. 
242 See, eg, CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: United States of America, UN Doc CERD/C/USAJCO/6 (8 May 2008) (19] , [29]-(30]. See generally 
Claire Charters and Andrew Erueti, 'Report from the Inside: The CERD Committee's Review of the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004' (2005) 36 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 257; Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law, above n 78, 23 1. For add itional examples from across the different UN human rights treaty bodies 
see Fleur Adcock, 'Indigenous Peoples Rights Under International Law: The Year in Review' (2011) 9 New Zealand 
Yearbook of International Law 296, 303-06; Fleur Adcock and Claire Charters, 'Indigenous Peoples' Rights Under 
International Law: The Year in Review' (2010) 8 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 203, 211-1 2 ('Adcock 
and Charters 2010'); Fleur Adcock and Claire Charters, 'Indigenous Peoples' Rights Under International Law: The 
Year in Review' (2009) 7 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 308, 314-19 ('Adcock and Charters 2009'). 
243 CERD, art 14. 
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collectives.244 As identified in Part B above, the treaty bodies ' mandates and working methods 
differ from the mandate and methods of the Special Rapporteur in several respects too. 
Cooperation and coordination between the treaty bodies and the special procedures is 
advocated. The Manual of Operations encourages ' [ c ]ross-fertilization between the work of 
Special Procedures and that of the treaty bodies' .245 Also, the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples is mandated to consider relevant recommendations , observations and conclusions of 
treaty bodies.246 Steady 'cross-fertilization' remains an unrealised ideal. But, in practice, efforts 
at coordination have been made. For example, the CERD Committee has encouraged states to 
receive country missions from the Special Rapporteur.247 At times it has referred favourably to 
the work of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples and other special procedures experts 
regarding Indigenous peoples.248 The CRC Committee has also encouraged states to take into 
account the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur and referenced Ruggie's 2008 Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework on Business and Human Rights, which informed his Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.249 And the Human Rights Committee regularly 
consults special procedures experts' reports regarding states under review, drawing attention to 
the experts' recommendations in their dialogues and reports. 250 The Special Rapporteurs have 
frequently referenced the work of treaty bodies, including the CERD Committee, the Human 
Rights Committee, the CRC Committee and the Committee monitoring the CESCR, in their 
annual reports.251 Less emphasis is given to the Special Rapporteurs' direct engagement with the 
treaty bodies in the reports of the experts, although some efforts are noted. For example, 
Stavenhagen identifies that he transmitted a statement to the CRC Committee during its 
244 See generally Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 253-58. However, in respect oftbe 
Human Rights Committee, Anaya notes that the Committee's restriction to hearing complaints from individuals 'has 
constituted mostly a limitation of form for admissibility purposes and has not kept the committee from 
adjudicating ... group rights': at 254. 
245 Manual of Operations, above n 15, [119]. It is a point repeated at annual meetings of the special procedures too, 
see, eg, HRC, Report on the Eighteenth Meeting of Special Rapporteurs/Representatives, Independent Experts and 
Chairs of Working Groups of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC/18/41 (21 July 
2011) [12] , [27], [28] ('Report of the Special Procedures ' 18th Meeting') . Regarding efforts at coordination between 
the treaty bodies and special procedures generally see, eg, Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent 
Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 52, 65-6. 
?46 
- See, eg, CHR Res 2002/65, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/65, para 6; CHR Res 2004162, UN Doc 
E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, paras 4, 7; HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l(i); HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/15/14, para l(i). 
247 CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), UN Doc CERD/C/BOL/CO/17-20 (10 March 2011) [6]. 
248 See, eg, CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: Suriname, UN Doc CERD/C/SUR/CO/12 (13 March 2009) [8]; CERD Committee, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Mexico, UN Doc 
CERD/C/MEX/CO/16/17 (4 April 2012) [1 5]. 
249 See, eg, CRC Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention: New Zealand, UN Doc CRC/C/NZL/CO/3-4 (11 April 2011) [22]-[23], [57]. 
250 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 13, 42-3. 
r 1 
-' See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37, [40]; Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/34, [40], [41]; Anaya Annual Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9, [22]-[25]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 
2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32, [13], [61] , [70], [74], [75]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78, 
[22], [52]-[55]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88, [ 42]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2004, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80, [5] , [34], [40]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2003, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90, [1 8], [24]; 
StavenhagenAnnualReport2002, UNDocE/CN.4/2002/97, [50], [98], [104], [1 07], [11 0]. 
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discussion on the rights oflndigenous children in 2003.252 And Anaya states that he 'has, on 
occasion, coordinated with United Nations human rights treaty bodies, especially the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Human Rights Committee,' both in relation 
to their periodic reviews of states and their consideration of specific complaints.253 
(b) Occasional Collaboration with Others 
Other mechanisms hailing from across the international system whose mandates overlap 
with that of the Special Rapporteur abound. Many international mechanisms consider 
allegations of specific violations of Indigenous peoples' human rights or assess the Indigenous 
rights situations in states. There are the three ILO monitoring bodies, including the ILO 
Committee of Experts that monitors the implementation of all ILO Conventions, such as ILO 
Conventions 169 and 107. The ILO Committee of Experts regularly fields concerns regarding 
the application of the ILO Convention 169 from trade unions in cooperation with IPOs.254 The 
HRC's UPR process, by which all UN member states are examined for compliance with 
international human rights norms by other states, has seen a number of states questioned on 
their treatment of Indigenous peoples.255 Regional human rights courts and commissions are 
also relevant. In particular, the Inter-American system is playing a lead role in promoting 
Indigenous rights.256 It has had its own Special Rapporteur on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples 
since 1990 and drafting of the Organization of American States' (OAS) American Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples continues.257 The African Commission on Human and 
252 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2004, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80, [5]. Regarding efforts at coordination between 
Stavenhagen and the UN human rights treaty bodies generally see Preston et al, above n 98, 22-3. 253 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [ 49]. 
254 Under the ILO's tripartite system workers' organisations can submit information to the ILO monitoring bodies. 
See, eg, ILO Committee ofExperts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), Individual 
Observation Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No 169) Guatemala (Ratified 1996), ILO 
Doc 062006GTM169 (2006). See generally Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 226-28; 
Luis Rodriguez-Pinero, Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime, 1919-1989 
(Oxford University Press, 2005); Swepston, above n 146. 
255 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: New Zealand, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/8 (4 June 2009) [27]-[30] , [33] , [36] , [40], [44], [46] , [49]-[50], [62]-[64], [66]-[67] ('HRC UPR New 
Zealand'). For further examples see Adcock, above n 242, 306-07; Adcock and Charters 2010, above n 241,213; 
Adcock and Charters 2009, above n 242, 310-11 , 319-20. 
256 The Inter-American system has produced an important body of case law regarding the rights oflndigenous 
peoples, see, eg, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (Merits) IACHR Series C No 79, 31 August 
200 I ; Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) IACHR Series C No 
172, 28 November 2007; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACHR 
Series C No 125, 17 June 2005; Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v Belize (Merits) IACHR 
Report No 40/04, Case 12.053 12 October 2004 <www.cidh.oas.org>; Ma,y and Carrie Dann v United States 
IACHR Report No 75/02, Case 11 .140, 27 December 2002 <www.cidh.oas.org>. See generally Luis Rodrfguez-
Pifiero, 'The Inter-American System and the UN Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples: Mutual 
Reinforcement' in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing, 2011) 457; Isabel Madariaga Cuneo, 'The Rights oflndigenous Peoples and the 
Inter-American Human Rights System' (2005) 22(1) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 53, 53-
4; Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 70, 114-15, 134, 140-41 , 145-48, 185-86, 232-34, 
258-71. 
257 Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Approved by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at its 1333rd session, 95th Regular Session) 
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Peoples Rights (ACHPR) has also devoted increasing attention to Indigenous rights issues and 
has had a Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities since 2000.258 The European 
Council has played a lesser role, lacking a mechanism with a specific mandate to protect 
Indigenous rights,259 as has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).26° Further, 
bodies such as the World Bank hear complaints, including on behalf of Indigenous peoples, that 
its actions do no accord with its own policies and procedures.261 Other actors play a role in 
developing or interpreting Indigenous rights norms too, including the CBD secretariat, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), UNESCO, the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP), the World Health Organization, the World Bank Group,262 the UN Population Fund,263 
the UN Development Fund for Women,264 the UN's Inter-Agency Support Group on Indigenous 
Issues (which, together with the PFII, plays a coordination role on Indigenous issues within the 
UN system),265 and the OHCHR.266 
Varying degrees of collaboration and dialogue between the Special Rapporteur and 
these additional bodies have occurred. Cooperation is promoted in the resolutions that define 
and revise the expert's mandate,267 other resolutions of the HRC,268 and the special procedures' 
Manual of Operations.269 In practice, the Special Rapporteur has referred to the work of the ILO 
OEA/Ser/LN /. II.95 Doc.6 (1997); Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 66, 87; Cuneo, 
above n 256, 53 ; Mauro Barelli, 'The Interplay Between Global and Regional Human Rights Systems in the 
Construction of the Indigenous Rights Regime' (20 l 0) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 95 l , 962-63. 
258 See, eg, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya ACPHR 276/2003, 4 February 2010; The Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre/or Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria ACHPR 155/96 (2001); Katangese Peoples ' Congress v Zaire 
(Merits) ACHPR 75/92 (1995). See generally Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 66; 
Barelli, above n 257, 964-66. 
259 However, there is the Council of Europe' s Framework Convention/or the Protection-of National Minorities, 
opened for signature 1 February 1995, CETS No 157 (entered into force 1 February 1998) . See generally Barelli, 
above n 257. 
260 The heads of state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states adopted the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration on 18 November 2012. It is silent regarding Indigenous peoples. The declaration can be 
accessed from <http://aichr.org/documents/>. See generally Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, 'The ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration 2012' (2013) 13(3) Human Rights Law Review 557. 
261 See generally Celine Germond-Duret, Banque Mondiale, Peuples Autochtones et Normalisation (Karthala, 2011 ). 262 See, eg, Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 78, 67, 88-9 n 126, 91 n 137, 132-33, 140, 145, 
149, 150,155, 176 n 168. 
263 See, eg, Director of the Asia and the Pacific Region at United Nations Population Fund, ' Statement to the 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: Sixth Session' (New York, 21 May 2007) 
<http://www.unfpa.org/rights/people.htm>. 
264 See, eg, PFII, Report on the Fourth Session, UN Doc E/C.19/2005/9 (2005) [119] . 
265 See, eg, PFII, Report of the lnteragency Support Group on Indigenous Issues, UN Doc E/C.19/2008/6 (1 February 
2008) annex. 
266 See, eg, HRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, UN Doc A/HRC/24/26 (1 July 2013). 
267 S ee, eg, HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para l(d), (t); HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, 
para l(d), (f), (i); CHR Res 2003/56, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2003/56, para 3; CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc 
E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, para 4; CHR Res 2005/51 , UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51 , para 3. 268 For example, the HRC has encouraged the UN Indigenous Peoples' Partnership (UNIPP) established in 2011 to 
perform its mandate regarding the UNDRIP in 'close cooperation' with 'Human Rights Council mechanisms, United 
Nations bodies and agencies relating to indigenous peoples', amongst others, which include the Special Rapporteur 
on Indigenous peoples as well as other special procedures mandates, see HRC Res 18/8, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/1 8/8, 
para 20. For information on the UNlPP see the United Nations Indigenous Peoples' Partnership, Strategic Framework 
2011-2015 (2011). 
269 See, eg, Manual of Operations, above n 15 , [130]. 
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Committee in the mandate's annual reports. 270 The UPR draws on the work of the special 
procedures: country reviews are based on three official documents one of which is a compilation 
of information from UN sources, including relevant special procedures experts' reports. 271 
During the UPR states have referred back to the special procedures' work regarding Indigenous 
peoples too. 272 The experts have engaged with the regional systems. For example, in 2005 
Stavenhagen participated in a plenary session of the ACHPR in Banjul and also met with the 
Commission's Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities.273 He directed 
recommendations to both the Inter-American system and the African system in his reports.274 
Anaya has coordinated especially closely with the Inter-American system,275 a structure with 
which he has had a long professional relationship. He has exchanged information with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission) on alleged violations of 
Indigenous peoples' rights. 276 He has also presented expert testimony regarding Indigenous 
peoples' right to be consulted before the Inter-American Court.277 The reports of the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples have been drawn upon by a number of these regional 
bodies.278 The Special Rapporteur has engaged with other regional actors to a lesser extent, 
although in 2013 Anaya participated in an exchange workshop on Indigenous peoples' rights 
with the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American 
Commission and the ACHPR, along with the expert on minority issues.279 Further, the experts 
have fed into the work of international bodies such as the UNDP concerning Indigenous 
270 See, eg, Stavenhagen Annual Report 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78, [57], [66]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 
2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, [12], [85], [106] , [109], [110]. 
271 See, eg, Oliver de Frouville, 'Building a Universal System for Protection of Human Rights: The Way Forward' in 
M CherifBassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery: What 
Future for the UN Treaty Body System and the Human Rights Council Procedures? (Intersentia, 2011) 241, 251. 
Several authors identify the importance of the HRC's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for following-up on, and 
bringing attention to, special procedures experts' recommendations, see, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's 
Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 8,218; Golay, Mahon and 
Cismas, above n 11, 311; Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', 
above n 5, 204. 
272 See, eg, HRC UPR New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/12/8, [36], [40], [46], [62]-[63]. See generally Anaya Report to 
GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [50]. 
273 Preston et al, above n 98, 25 . 
274 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32, [80] . 
275 See, eg, Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [53]-[54]. 
276 See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [7]. 
277 Kichwa Indigenous Peoples of Sarayaku v Ecuador (Merits and Reparations) IACHR Series C No 245, 27 June 
2012; James Anaya, 'La Norma de Consulta Previa: lntroducci6n a Peritaje ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, Caso Sarayaku' (Media Release, 7 July 2011) <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/ la-norma-de-
consulta-previa-introduccion-a-peritaje-ante-la-corte-interamericana-de-derechos-humanos-caso-sarayaku>. 278 See, eg, Centre fo r Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya ACPHR 276/2003, 4 February 2010 [147], [149], [154] , [157], [245], [293]; 
Saramaka People v Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) IACHR Series C No 172, 28 
November 2007 [98] , [135]-[136]; Escue-Zapata v Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACHR Series C No 
165, 4 July 2007 [46] , [48]. See generally Study on Best Practices , UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [11] . Other special 
procedures experts ' reports have sometimes been drawn on too. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights drew on the report of the expert on extrajudicial executions in Moiwana Community v Suriname (Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs) IACHR Series C No 171 (15 June 2005) 31 nn 26, 28, 32 n 30. 279 Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 , annex [6]; African Union African Commission on Human & 
Peoples ' Rights, Final Communique of the Exchange Workshop on Indigenous Peoples ' Rights between the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights and the 




rights,280 some examples of which are highlighted in the next chapter. However, overall, 
mandate-holders, including Anaya, have identified that there is scope for greater coordination 
between the various experts.281 
E Conclusion: A Broad Indigenous Mandate 
The special procedures mechanism has a wide mandate to help realise international 
Indigenous rights norms that largely complements the Indigenous rights mandates of other 
bodies within the international system. The special procedures have evolved from their 
haphazard creation to become the HRC's primary instrument for monitoring and advancing 
state compliance with international human rights norms. The specific roles of these 
independent, unsalaried, experts are established and defined by their individual enabling 
resolutions, although the experts often enjoy significant licence. There were three landmarks in 
the development of the experts' mandate regarding Indigenous peoples' rights. The first was the 
creation of the special procedures mechanism itself. The second was the issue of the CHR's 
1993 resolution, which recognised the relevance of the human rights of Indigenous peoples to 
all thematic special procedures' mandates; but not the country mandates. The third was the 
creation of the thematic mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, a position 
held first by Stavenhagen and subsequently by Anaya. The Special Rapporteur's enabling 
resolution affords the expert a substantial mandate to investigate, and provide suggestions on 
how to prevent and remedy, specific violations of Indigenous peoples' human rights. Later 
revisions to the terms of the mandate have seen the Special Rapporteur's role in securing the 
effective protection of Indigenous peoples' rights emphasised. Other international mechanisms 
enjoy an overlapping role, in particular the PFII and the EMRIP, although consequent efforts at 
cooperation and coordination have mostly contained the crossover. Even with the establishment 
of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, all special procedures experts 
retain a role in advancing the realisation of international Indigenous rights norms, which some 
experts have embraced. In the next chapter I explore the tools that the experts have engaged to 
give effect to this mandate. 
280 Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [14]. 
281 See, eg, Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [51], [56]. 
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IV DIALOGIC POWER: THE EXPERTS' WORKING 
REPERTOIRE 
A Introduction 
The special procedures draw on an assorted set of techniques to perform their mandate 
to advance the realisation of international Indigenous rights norms. In this chapter I critically 
analyse the major mechanisms they leverage. All of the core regulatory mechanisms the experts 
wield are dialogic. But their powers are not inconsequential: my theoretical framework 
acknowledges the pivotal role of dialogue in bringing about norm conformity. I begin by 
outlining the basis for the special procedures' reliance on dialogic mechanisms: the experts do 
not have the authority to coerce compliance with their recommendations. I then examine the 
variety of dialogic mechanisms the experts engage. While the individual working styles of the 
special procedures mandate-holders differ there are a number of commonalities. I argue that 
shaming is the overriding mechanism engaged by the experts, with dialogue-building and 
capacity-building the two other significant tools invoked. Shaming permeates the experts' 
country missions and reports, communications, 'special' missions and reports on specific cases, 
and media releases. Dialogue-building can be engaged through each of these outputs too, with 
the experts' commentary acting as a witness to rights violations and some experts offering 
praise to encourage states for positive developments. But it is most evident in the experts' 
efforts to improve knowledge regarding the substance of international Indigenous rights norms. 
The experts do this above all through their thematic studies, although it can also drive their 
dialogues with different actors. Capacity-building is deployed through the special procedures' 
technical advisory assistance, which fonns part of the experts' mandate to promote 'best 
practice'. I close by exploring the, insufficient, UN institutional support afforded the experts in 
exploiting these mechanisms. 
B Dialogue by Design: The Mechanism's Lack of Coercive Authority 
The special procedures engage dialogic regulatory mechanisms because those are the 
tools available to them. States are not obliged to cooperate with the special procedures' 
mandate-holders in their work. According to Piccone, this renders state cooperation 'highly 
uneven and generally disappointing, with some notable exceptions. ' 1 The same instrument that 
1 Ted Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights 
Norms' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 206, 210. Other actors, such as companies, are 
similarly not obliged to cooperate with the experts, see, eg, Miko Lempinen, Challenges Facing the System of Special 
Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Institute for Human Rights, Abo Akademi 
University, 2001) 298. 
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is the ultimate authority for the creation of the special procedures - the UN Charter - also 
affirms the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.2 States 
may refuse to permit a mandate-holder to conduct a country visit to assess the human rights 
situation of its Indigenous peoples, neglect to respond to the request or consistently delay an 
agreed visit. Even where a state has issued a standing invitation, meaning that in principle the 
state is willing to receive a country visit from any thematic special procedures mandate-holder, 
state consent to each visit is still required. 3 Further, states may elect not to respond to special 
procedures experts' communications regarding alleged violations of Indigenous peoples' rights. 
Research suggests that half of special procedures experts' communications to states go 
unanswered, with the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' communications no 
exception;4 although states may act on the matter the subject of the communication even if they 
do not respond to it. 5 States may also provide a perfunctory and immaterial response to special 
procedures experts' communications, simply acknowledging the communication's receipt, 
denying the allegations without providing any supporting evidence, responding to only part of 
the allegations or setting out irrelevant information that does not address the allegations in 
question. When such responses are taken into account the response rate is far lower. 6 
The special procedures' parent body, the HRC (and before it the CHR), does not have 
any power to compel states or other bodies to cooperate with special procedures' experts. 
However, it has encouraged states to do so, as has the GA. The Code of Conduct adopted by the 
HRC 'urges all States to cooperate with, and assist, the special procedures in the performance of 
2 Charter of the United Nations, art 2(7) (' UN Charter'). 
3 Code of Conduct, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/5/2, art ll(b). As at 3 September 2013 a total of95 states had issued 
standing invitations to thematic special procedures, see OHCHR, Standing Invitations 
<http://www.ohcbr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Invitations.aspx>. Regarding state cooperation generally see Tania 
Baldwin-Pask and Patrizia Scannella, 'The Unfinished Business ofa Special Procedures System' in M Cherif 
Bassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machine,y (lntersentia, 2011) 
419, 440-44; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1, 209-10, 213; Ted Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's 
Independent Experts on Human Rights (The Brookings Institution, 2010) ix; Ingrid Nifosi, The UN Special 
Procedures in the Field of Human Rights (lntersentia, 2005) 65-6; Patrick J Flood, The Effectiveness of UN Human 
Rights Institutions (Praeger Publishers, 1998) 126; Christophe Golay, Claire Mahon and Ioana Cismas, 'The Impact 
of the UN Special Procedures on the Development and Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' 
(2011) 15(2) International Journal of Human Rights 299, 312-13; Ingrid Nifosi-Sutton, 'The System of the UN 
Special Procedures: Some Proposals for Change' in M CherifBassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New 
Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery (lntersentia, 2011) 389, 394; Joanna Naples-Mitchell, 'Perspectives 
of UN Special Rapporteurs on their Role: Inherent Tens ions and Unique Contributions to Human Rights' (2011) 
15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 232, 237-38; Michael O'Flaherty, 'Future Protection of Human 
Rights in Post-Conflict Societies: The Role of the United Nations' (2003) 3(1) Human Rights Law Review 53, 69. 4 See, eg, HRC Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17 
(13 December 2012) [81] ; Joint Communications Report September 201 I, UN Doc A/HRC/18/51, 8; Piccone, 
Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above n 3, x, 23-4, 
75. 
5 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above n 
3, 31; Golay, Mabon and Cismas, above n 3, 307. 
6 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above n 
3, x, 23-24, 75; Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster and William Abresch, 'The Competence of the UN Human Rights 
Council and its Special Procedures in relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the 'War on Terror" 
(2008) 19(1) The European Journal of International Law 183 , 190-91. 
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their tasks'. 7 The CHR strongly encouraged states to cooperate with the experts and to extend 
standing invitations to thematic special procedures. 8 Purportedly the GA takes into account 
' [t]he extension of a standing invitation, and the overall cooperation afforded to Special 
Procedures ' when assessing the 'pledges and commitments' states make when seeking election 
to the HRC.9 But states that have not issued standing invitations have been elected to the HRC, 
for instance.10 The enabling resolutions of some special procedures mandates also call on states 
to cooperate. For example, in the resolution creating the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples the CHR '[r]equests all Governments to cooperate fully with the special 
rapporteur in the performance of the tasks and duties mandated, to furnish all information 
requested and to react promptly to his/her urgent appeals' and ' [ e ]ncourages all Governments to 
give serious consideration to the possibility of inviting the special rapporteur to visit their 
countries' .11 Further, the HCHR has urged states to fully cooperate with the experts; 12 as have 
some states. 13 
States are similarly not obliged to comply with any findings that the special procedures 
experts may make. Even if a mandate-holder is able to conduct a country visit to assess the 
human rights situation of the country's Indigenous peoples the expert can offer only 
recommendations to the state, the same applies in their annual reports and other interactions 
with states. 14 Even if the experts' findings were binding, the special procedures (like other 
international human rights bodies) would not possess the power to directly coercively enforce 
compliance with them. Nor does the special procedures' parent body have any power to compel 
states to take any action in response to the experts' recommendations. It has encouraged their 
implementation, for example calling upon states 'to study carefully the recommendations 
addressed to them by special procedures and to keep the relevant mechanisms informed without 
undue delay on the progress made towards their implementation' .15 It may pass a resolution 
7 Code of Conduct, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/5/2, art 1. See also Special Procedures, Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008) [58] ('Manual 
of Operations' ). 
8 CHR Res 2004/76, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2004/76, arts 1-3. 9 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [ 58). See generally Human Rights Council, GA Res 60/251, UN Doc 
A/RES/60/251 (3 April 2006) para 9. 
10 See, eg, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010 (2010) 269. See generally Theodore J Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights (Brookings Institution Press, 2012) l 00. 11 CHR Res 2001 /57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001 /57, paras 7-8. The same injunctions are repeated in later years 
regarding the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, see, eg, HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/ 14, paras 2-4. 
12 See, eg, Navi Pillay, 'Statement to the United Nations General Assembly' (New York, 24 October 2012) 
<http: //www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/D isplayNews.aspx?NewsID= l2690&LangID=E>. 13 See, eg, Danish Government representative speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue (20 September 2011) James Anaya 
<http:/ /u ns r.j ames ana ya. org/v id eos/we bcas t - l 8th-session-of-th e-h uman-ri ghts-co u nc i 1-statement-o f-spec i al-
ra ppo rteur-an d- interactive-dialogue>. 
14 See, eg, Surya P Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs' (2011) 33 Human Rights Quarterly 201 , 203 ; Ingrid Nifos i, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above 
n 3, 146. Flood argues that the corollary of membership to the UN, which draws states under the authority of the UN Charter, is an obligation to recognise the validi ty of the special procedures as a mechan ism and the experts' 
'decisions'. Flood, above n 3, 91-2. 
15 CHR Res 2004/76, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2004/76, para 3. 
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condemning a state's actions or inactions. Special procedures experts have occasionally asked 
the HRC or CHR to do so. But, as Chapter III noted, rarely have those requests been acted on. 
Additionally, as Part D of this chapter will show, the experts are acutely under-resourced by the 
UN, which inhibits their ability to incentivise state compliance through economic rewards. 
Acting within these constraints special procedures experts have sought to leverage the dialogic 
regulatory mechanisms available to them to advance the realisation of international Indigenous 
rights norms. 
C Shaming, Dialogue-Building and Capacity-Building: The Key Regulatory Tools 
I The Primacy of Shaming 
Shaming is the central regulatory mechanism engaged by the experts to fulfil their 
Indigenous mandate. It is the primary regulatory mechanism engaged by much of the UN 
human rights machinery. 16 However, the gusto with which it is embraced depends on the 
individual expert. For example, Stavenhagen's style ofreporting was more forthright than 
Anaya's. As Chapter II identified, shaming involves expressing disapproval for non-compliance 
with a standard. 17 In this context shaming is reliant on the state being made aware in private or 
in public that it is non-compliant with international Indigenous rights norms and that this non-
compliance is disapproved of. The idea being that this disapproval will shame or embarrass 
states into better compliance. At the least, knowing that its Indigenous rights situation is being 
monitored may prevent a state from allowing a situation of concern to escalate even if it does 
not result in a resolution to the rights issue. 18 Crucially, it requires that the state concerned cares 
about whether it has a positive or negative Indigenous rights reputation. A state may be 
concerned to have a reputation as an Indigenous rights respecter for a host ofreasons: to 
maintain investment and aid flows, ensure stability within the state or maintain an image as a 
responsible member of the international community. As identified above, the tool of shaming is 
engaged primarily through the special procedures' country reporting, communications process, 
Anaya's special reports on specific cases, and media releases. 
16 See, eg, Elvira Dominguez Redondo, 'The Universal Periodic Review - Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming 
in Human Rights Implementation?' (2012) 4 New Zealand Law Review 673, 687. 
17 See, eg, John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai and Valerie Braithwaite, Regulating Aged Care (Edward Elgar, 2007) 306. 18 The experts can also act as a form of early warning system for the international system regarding serious rights 
violations, see, eg, Ingrid Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights, above n 3, 134-35, 152; 
Oliver Hoehne, 'Special Procedures and the New Human Rights Council - A Need for Strategic Positioning' (2007) 
4(1) Essex Human Rights Review 48, 57; Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3, 437-39. 
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(a) Multifaceted Shaming in Country Missions and Reports 
(i) A Defining Attribute 
Special procedures experts' country missions and reports on those missions are a 
defining feature of their work. Both thematic and country mandate-holders conduct country 
visits to investigate first-hand the human rights situation at a national level. 19 Hundreds of 
missions have been undertaken to countries from across the world; in 2012 alone special 
procedures experts conducted 80 country missions to 55 states and territories.20 Most special 
procedures mandate-holders conduct two country visits per year, with each mission lasting 
around one to two weeks, visiting the capital and other sites of concern.2 1 Anaya has generally 
secured funding to conduct at least three missions per year, a situation he describes as ' lucky'. 22 
Occasionally the experts undertake country missions jointly.23 Factors that influence whether a 
country mission is undertaken include the ' expected impact of the visit and the willingness of 
national actors to cooperate with the mandate-holder, [and] the likelihood of follow-up on any 
recommendations made' .24 The agenda for each country mission is determined by the relevant 
expert often with the assistance of the OHCHR. 25 The special procedures adopted terms of 
reference for their country visits in 1998, providing for freedom of movement and inquiry 
amongst other things, which act as a guide to governments in the conduct of visits.26 The experts 
meet with a wide range of actors during the missions, including state representatives, such as 
members of the executive, legislature and judiciary as well as regional and local authorities; 
members of the NHRI, if one exists; NGOs and victims of human rights violations; the UN and 
other inter-governmental agencies with a presence there; academics and business actors, where 
relevant; and the domestic press. Where experts consider Indigenous rights concerns they will 
generally meet with Indigenous leaders, representatives of IPOs and Indigenous communities, 
as well as Indigenous individuals who have experienced rights violations. During the visits the 
experts also receive written submissions, documents and other information from different 
19 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [52]. Note that not all thematic special procedures mandates conduct country 
missions and that some experts have conducted missions to international organisations, such as the World Bank, and 
transnational corporations, see, eg, Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 3, 312 . 
20 OHCHR, United Nations Special Procedures: Facts and Figures 2012(20 13) 13. 
21 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [53]; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Proced ures to National 
Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 1, 212. 
22 Interview with James Anaya (Te lephone Interview, 24 January 20 11 , updated by ema il 5 July 2013). He includes in 
this figu re ' special ' country missions, which are discussed separately below. 
23 Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 3, 309. 
24 For other considerations see Manual of Operations, above n 7, [57]. 
25 Ibid [64] . Preston et al suggest that, fonnerly at least, governments exercised signifi cant say over the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples ' itinerary and meetings, see Jennifer Preston et al , The UN Special Rapporteur: 
Indigenous Peoples Rights: Experiences and Challenges (IWGIA, 2007) 34. 
26 Manual of Operations, above n 7, annex III. 
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sources often in quantities impossible to digest in the timeframe or 10,000 word limit available 
for the report on the mission.27 
The action is not over when the missions end. Following their visits, special procedures' 
mandate-holders submit a report on the mission to the HRC (previously the CHR) setting out 
their findings and recommendations.28 A few experts issue short preliminary notes soon after the 
mission setting out their key findings in order to capitalise on media interest generated during 
the visit, as it often takes many months for the final report to be released.29 In exceptional cases 
governments provide formal written responses to the reports, which are attached as addenda to 
the reports.30 Most do not, meaning that state views on the reports have to be gleaned from 
statements made by the government during the interactive dialogue where the report is 
presented to the special procedures' parent body and in media releases. 31 
(ii) Expansive Indigenous Rights Scrutiny 
The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has conducted country missions to a large 
number of countries from both the global North and South. By late 2013 the mandate had 
conducted missions to 26 countries from across Africa, Asia, Central and South America and 
the Caribbean, the Arctic, Eastern Europe, North America and the Pacific, some of them 
multiple times.32 Both experts conducted country missions to their home states: Stavenhagen to 
Mexico and Anaya to the United States. The majority of states that Stavenhagen carried out 
missions to were in Central and South America, reflecting his scholarly and physical connection 
to the region, the openness of these states to the missions, the large populations of Indigenous 
peoples there and the grave Indigenous rights abuses that persist in the region. Stavenhagen 
conducted country missions to Guatemala and the Philippines in 2002;33 Mexico and Chile in 
2003;34 Colombia and Canada in 2004;35 South Africa and New Zealand in 2005;36 Ecuador and 
27 Ibid [85] ; Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 2010). 
28 Ibid [84]. 
29 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Preliminary Note on the Situation of Sarni People in the Sap mi Region spanning 
Norway, Sweden and Finland, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.6 (7 July 2010). 
3° Code of Conduct, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/5/2, art 8(d); Manual of Operations, above n 7, [74]. 
31 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1,208. 
32 The mandate-holders have visited many more countries in their role as Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, 
these are simply the countries where an official country mission to assess the general Indigenous rights situation has 
been conducted. See generally Preston et al, above n 25, 30-47. 
33 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2; CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 
Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/65: Mission to the Philippines, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.3 (5 March 2003). 
34 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to Mexico, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.2 (23 December 2003); 
CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2003/56: Mission to Chile, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.3 (17 November 2003). 
35 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
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Kenya in 2006;37 and Bolivia in 2007.38 Stavenhagen also conducted two follow-up country 
missions to assess the impact of his earlier recommendations to Guatemala and Mexico in 
2006.39 The recurrent feature of Guatemala and Mexico in his visits reflects the lead taken by 
these states in supporting his work and in the creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur 
on Indigenous peoples. 
Anaya has conducted country missions to a more diverse mix of states. Anaya 
conducted country missions to Brazil and Nepal in 2008;40 Australia, Botswana and the Russian 
Federation in 2009;41 the Sapmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland, and the Republic of the 
Congo in 2010;42 New Caledonia and Argentina in 2011;43 the United States, El Salvador and 
Namibia in 2012;44 and to Panama in 2013.45 Anaya had a further visit planned for the end of 
Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to Colombia, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.2 (10 November 
2004); CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to Canada, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.3 (2 December 2004). 36 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to South Africa, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.2 (15 December 
2005); Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3. 
37 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to Ecuador, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.2 (28 December 2006); 
HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to Kenya, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/ Add.3 (26 February 2007). 38 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to Bolivia, UN Doc A/HRC/11/11 (18 February 2009) (' Stavenhagen Report on Bolivia 2009'). 
39 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32, (23), (24), (58)-[70). In the same report Stavenhagen also 
commented on recent developments in Canada, Chile and Colombia despite not having conducted follow-up country 
visits to those states: at [ 42) -[57], [71 ]-[76). Stavenhagen conducted a form of follow-up mission to the Philippines, 
organised by IPOs and NGOs (rather than an official mission at the state's invitation), see HRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen: General Considerations on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
Peoples in Asia, UN Doc A/HRC/6/15/Add.3 (1 November 2007) [4]. Stavenhagen also conducted a joint visit to 
Mexico with the expert on housing in 2007, which is discussed below. 
40 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Report on the Situation of Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Brazil, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/34/ Add.2 (26 August 2009); Anaya Report on Nepal, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34/ Add.3. 41 HRC, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Australia, UN Doc A/HRC/15/3 7 / Add.4 ( 1 June 
201 O); Anaya Report on Botswana, UN Doc A/HRC/15/3 7 / Add.2; HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya: Situation of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Russian Federation, UN Doc AIHRC/15/37/Add.5 (23 June 2010). 
42 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The Situation of the 
Sarni People in the Sapmi Region a/Norway, Sweden and Finland, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add .2 (6 June 2011) ('Anaya Report on Sapmi Region 201 l'); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, James Anaya: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of the Congo, UN Doc 
AIHRC/ 18/35/Add .5 (11 July 2011). The report on the Sapmi region was the first country report by the Special 
Rapporteur specifically examining Indigenous peoples' rights across state borders. 43 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The Situation of Kanak 
People in New Caledonia, France, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.6 (23 November 2011); HRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Argentina, 
UN Doc A/HRC/21 /47/Add.2 (4 July 2012). 
44 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The Situation of 
Indigenous Peoples in the United States of America, UN Doc A/HRC/21/4 7 /Add. I (30 August 2012) ('Anaya Report 
on US 2012'); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The 
Situation of Indigenous Peoples in El Salvador, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 /Add.2 (25 June 2013); HRC, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in 
Namibia, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 /Add.l (25 June 2013). 
45 James Anaya, ' Declaraci6n del Relator Especial sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas al Concluir su Visita 
Oficial a Panama' (Media Release, 26 July 20 13) <http ://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/declaracion-del-relator-
especial-sobre-los-derechos-de-los-pueblos-indigenas-al-concluir-su-visita-oficial-a-panama>. 
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2013, to Peru. He also hoped to visit 'one or two final countries before his mandate ends in 
April 2014.'46 In addition, Anaya has conducted several follow-up missions to assess the impact 
of Stavenhagen's recommendations: to Chile in 2009,47 Colombia in 2009,48 New Zealand in 
2010,49 and Canada in 2013.50 
Other special procedures mandate-holders have also directed attention at Indigenous 
rights concerns in the course of their country visits and follow-up reports. An array of thematic 
experts have done so, including those regarding freedom ofreligion,51 housing,52 violence 
against women,53 slavery,54 mercenaries,55 internally displaced persons,56 extrajudicial 
executions,57 education,58 racism,59 human rights defenders,60 health,61 enforced 
46 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [20]. 
47 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Chile: Follow-up to the Recommendations 
made by the Previous Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34/Add.6 (5 October 2009). 
48 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Mr James Anaya: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Colombia: Follow-up to the 
Recommendations made by the Previous Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.3 (25 May 2010). 
49 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4. 
50 James Anaya, 'United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Statement 
upon Conclusion of the Visit to Canada' (Media Release, 15 October 2013) 
<http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/statement-upon-conclusion-of-the-visit-to-canada>. 
51 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Heiner Bielef eldt: Mission to 
Paraguay, UN Doc A/HRC/19/60/Add.l (26 January 2012); CHR, Report Submitted by Mr Abdelfattah Amor, 
Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 1998/18: Visit to the United States of America, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.l (9 December 1998). 
52 See, eg, HRC, Raquel Rolnik Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right 
to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context, Raquel Rolnik: Mission 
to Argentina, UN Doc A/HRC/19/53/Add.l (21 December 2011); HRC, Miloon Kothari Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, Miloon Kothari: 
Mission to Australia, UN Doc A/HRC/4/18/ Add.2 (11 May 2007). -
53 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, 
Rashida Manjoo: Follow-up Mission to El Salvador, UN Doc A/HRC/17/26/Add.2 (14 February 2011); CHR, Yakin 
Ertilrk Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertilrk: 
Mission to Mexico, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/61 /Add.4 (13 January 2006). 
54 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, including its Causes and 
Consequences, Gulnara Shahinian Addendum Mission to Peru, UN Doc A/HRC/18/30/ Add.2 (15 August 2011) 
('Expert on Slavery Peru 2011'). 
55 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mr Jose Luis Gomez 
de! Prado: Mission to Peru, UN Doc A/HRC/7/7/Add.2 (4 February 2008). 
56 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons, Walter Kalin: Mission to Colombia, UN Doc A/HRC/4/38/Add.3 (24 January 2007). 57 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summa,y or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Mission 
to Ecuador, UN Doc A/HRC/17 /28/ Add.2 (9 May 2011 ); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Mission to Colombia, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/ Add.2 (31 March 
2010). 
58 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Vernor Munoz: Mission to Mexico, UN 
Doc A/HRC/14/25/Add.4 (2 June 2010); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Vernor 
Munoz Villalobos: Mission to Malaysia, UN Doc A/HRC/11/8/Add.2 (20 March 2009). 
59 See, eg, CHR, Report Submitted by Mr Doudou Diene, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance: Mission to Brazil, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.3 (28 
February 2006); CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Doudou Diene: Mission to Japan, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.2 (24 January 
2006). 
60 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Margaret Sekaggya: 
Mission to India, UN Doc A/HRC/19/55/Add.l (6 February 2012). 
61 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover: Mission to Australia, UN Doc 
A/HRC/14/20/Add.4 (3 June 2010). 
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d. 6? . 63 . d d f. d 64 fi d 65 66 l I . h 67 . 1sappearances, - terrorism, m epen ence o JU ges, oo , water, cu tura ng ts toxic 
wastes,68 and extreme poverty. 69 Country mandate-holders, such as the experts on Cambodia 
and Guatemala, have considered the human rights situation of Indigenous peoples during their 
· · 70 country m1ss10ns too. 
(iii) Shaming through Speech Acts from the Field 
Special procedures experts engage the mechanism of shaming to advance their 
Indigenous rights mandate in several ways throughout the country visit and reporting process. 
They do so through speech acts while in the target country. They shame state actors during 
meetings. Special procedures mandate-holders often have access to very high levels of 
government, including heads of state, government ministers, senior government bureaucrats , 
and members of the legislature both from inside and outside of the governing political party or 
parties. This is an important attribute of the mechanism. It is access that many Indigenous 
peoples and Indigenous rights advocates do not have. 71 Mandate-holders will usually meet with 
62 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Mission to Colombia, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/56/ Add. l (17 January 2006). 
63 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin: Peru, UN Doc A/HRC/16/51 /Add.3 (15 
December 20 10). 
64 See, eg, HRC, Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers: Mission to Mexico, UN Doc A/HRC/17/30/Add.3 (18 April 2011); CHR, 
Follow-up Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Leandro 
Despouy: Follow-up Mission to Ecuador, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/52/ Add.2 (3 1 January 2006). 65 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter: Mission to Canada, UN 
Doc A/HRC/22/50/ Add.1 (24 December 2012); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean 
Ziegler: Mission to Bolivia, UN Doc A/HRC/7/5/Add.2 (30 January 2008). 
66 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, 
Catarina de Albuquerque: Mission to the United States of America, UN Doc A/HRC/18/33/ Add.4 (2 August 201 1 ); 
HRC, Joint Report of the Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, Magdalena 
Sepulveda Cardona, and the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Related to Access to Safe 
Drinking Water and Sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque: Mission to Bangladesh (3-10 December 2009), UN Doc 
A/HRC/15/55 (22 July 2010) ('Experts on Poverty and Water Bangladesh 2010'). 
67 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed: Brazil, UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/38/Add.1 (2 1 March 201 1). 
68 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Implications for Human Rights of the Environmentally 
Sound Management and Disposal of Hazardous Substances and Wastes, Calin Georgescu: Mission to the Marshall 
Islands (27-30 March 2012) and the United States of America (24-27 April 2012), UN Doc A/HRC/21 /48/Add . I (3 
September 20 12); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and 
Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Okechukwu Ibeanu: 
Mission to the United Republic a/Tanzania, UN Doc A/HRC/9/22/Add .2 (18 August 2008). 69 See, eg, Experts on Poverty and Water Bangladesh 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/15/55 (22 July 20 10). 70 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, Surya P Subedi, 
UN Doc A/HRC/18/46 (2 August 201 I); CHR, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Human Rights in Cambodia, Peter Leuprecht, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/1 16 (20 December 2004); CHR, Report by the 
Independent Expert, Mrs Monica Pinto, on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Prepared in Accordance 
with Commission Resolution 1993/88, UN Doc EiC .4/ 1994/ 10 (20 January 1994) ('Pinto Report 1994'); CHR, 
Report by the Independent Expert, Mr Christian Tomuschat, on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, 
Prepared in Accordance with Paragraph 14 of Commission Resolution 1990/90, UN Doc E/CN.4/199 1/5 (1 1 January 
1991) (' Tomuschat Report 1991'). 
71 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by emai l 5 July 2013). See also 
Katarina Tomasevski , 'Has the Right to Education a Future With.in the Uni ted Nations? A Behind-the-Scenes 
Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998-2004' (2005) 5(2) Human Rights Law Review 
205 , 3 I I. 
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the government authority responsible for the visit, often the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the 
beginning and end of their visit. The experts use these meetings to raise Indigenous rights 
concerns and shame, gently or forcefully depending on the expert, state representatives into 
addressing those concerns.72 During the initial meeting the government is usually informed of 
the visit's purpose, the key issues to be addressed and the mandate-holders' anticipated 
approach. During the departing meeting the mandate-holder typically shares his or her 
preliminary findings and recommendations with the government, the process for preparing the 
report and any follow-up measures.73 The fact that the experts are physically present in the 
country, looking government actors in the eye during these conversations, is an advantage of the 
mechanism. 
Special procedures mandate-holders shame states through the media as part of their 
country visits. It is uncommon for experts to speak with domestic media regarding specific 
rights concerns during their visits because it can suggest a pre-determined position on the rights 
situation and can put the government, with whom the expert is seeking cooperation, offside. 
Most experts hold-off engaging with the media on rights concerns until the end of their country 
visit. At the end of the country visit experts customarily hold a press conference where they 
discuss their visit and, in some instances, highlight key preliminary findings drawing public 
attention to their concerns.74 For example, in the media statement at the end of his country 
mission to Namibia in September 2012 Anaya commented, 1 have detected a lack of coherent 
Government policy that assigns a positive value to the distinctive identities and practices 
of . .. indigenous peoples, or that promotes their ability to survive as peoples' .75 Stavenhagen and 
other special procedures experts have similarly highlighted Indigenous rights concerns in the 
media statements they have issued at the conclusion of their country visits.76 Piccone argues 
that, from the perspective of domestic human rights advocates, it these media statements made 
by the experts while they are in the country that matter most, given the momentum sapping time 
lags between when the visits occur and when the final country reports are produced and 
presented to the HRC. 77 
72 Jemow has described mandate-holders behaviour generally as located ' along a scale from low-key diplomatic 
negotiations to full-blown exposure.' Allison L Jemow, 'Ad Hoc and Extra-Conventional Means for Human Rights 
Monitoring' (1995-1996) 28 Journal of International Law and Politics 785, 810. 
73 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [71]. 
74 Ibid [72]; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1,212; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human 
Rights, above n 10, 27, 72. 
75 James Anaya, 'Namibia: UN Expert Calls for Greater Inclusion ofindigenous Peoples at All Levels' (Media 
Release, 28 September 2012) James Anaya <http: //unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/namibia-un-expert-calls-for-
greater-inclusion-of-indigenous-peoples-at-all- levels>. 
76 See, eg, OHCHR, 'Special Rapporteur of United Nations on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People Concludes Visit to South Africa' (Media Statement, 8 August 2005) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=458&LangID=E>; OHCHR, 'United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Right to Food Concludes Mission to Bolivia' (Media Statement, 23 May 2007) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=433&LangID=E>. 
77 Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights 
Norms', above n 1, 212. 
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(iv) Shaming via Text 
Shaming is prominently leveraged as a regulatory tool in the experts' elaboration of 
rights concerns in their country reports, including reports regarding follow-up country missions. 
Following the mission the expert produces a report assessing the general rights situation of the 
relevant country, highlighting areas where the state is falling short of international human rights 
norms. The reports have been described as the experts' most visible and important human rights 
contribution,78 although their style and quality varies across experts as well as across missions 
by the same expert.79 Naming and shaming is at their centre. Gerd Oberleitner goes as far as 
describing the reports as fulfilling a " 'prosecutorial" function' .80 He argues that 'however 
cautiously worded or academically paraphrased some of these assessments may be, they 
inevitably speak out on ' right' and 'wrong'. This comes close to the work of a prosecutor in 
national legal systems' .81 Before the reports are made public mandate-holders give the 
concerned state an opportunity to comment on the factual content of an advance draft, 82 which 
also provides states with an opportunity to prepare a strategy to manage any anticipated fallout 
from the report. Indigenous peoples and their organisations have no comparable opportunity, 
although the special procedures ' Manual of Operations provides that the experts may solicit 
comments on the draft report from UN country teams 'and other appropriate sources ', 83 and 
Anaya remarks that ' on a number of occasions ' he has advised Indigenous peoples of 
recommendations directed at them before making them public. 84 
Indigenous peoples ' rights to their land and natural resources are the centrally recurring 
concern across special procedures experts ' statements regarding Indigenous peoples in their 
country reports. They feature in every country report of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples. For example, in his report on Chile in 2003 Stavenhagen identified '[o]ne of the most 
serious long-standing problems affecting indigenous peoples in Chile relates to land ownership 
and territorial rights, as a result of a long process that has left them stripped of their lands and 
resources', 85 while in his report on Botswana in 2010 Anaya devoted especial attention to the 
78 Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (Cambridge University 
Press, 20 I 0) 894; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of 
Human Rights Norms', above n 1, 2 11. 
79 See, eg, Joan Fitzpatri ck, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System fo r Protecting Rights During States of 
Emergency (Univers ity of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 127. 
80 Gerd Oberleitner, Global Human Rights Institutions: Between Remedy and Ritual (Poli ty, 2007) 58. 81 Ibid 58 ( citations omitted) . 
82 Code of Conduct, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/5/2, art 13(c). See generall y Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special 
Procedures to National Leve l Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 1, 212. 
83 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [74] 
84 Tnterv iew with James Anaya (Te lephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by email 5 July 2013 ). 85 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2003/56: 
Mission to Chile, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80/Add .3 (17 November 2003) 2. 
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removal of Indigenous peoples from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. 86 Other special 
procedures mandate-holders have similarly expressed concerns regarding land and natural 
resources, including the experts on internally displaced persons concerning Colombia, 87 slavery 
regarding Peru,88 racism in respect of Japan,89 and Cambodia in relation to that state.90 
Indigenous rights concerns that also feature frequently in special procedures experts' 
reports include those regarding Indigenous peoples' participation in decision-making; racism 
and discrimination; rights to culture, especially regarding bilingual education; social welfare and 
development; access to justice; and conflict and violence. As an illustration, in his 2004 report 
on Colombia Stavenhagen identified core concerns regarding the armed conflict in Indigenous 
areas; violence, drug trafficking and human rights ; the environment, land and human rights; 
access to justice and Indigenous law; the situation of Indigenous women; sustainable 
development and the recognition of Indigenous identity; as well as the extension of basic social 
services.91 Anaya examined similar issues in his 2011 report on New Caledonia, where he 
focused on the UN-supported decolonisation process and human rights issues regarding 
customary authority and the administration of justice; Kanak participation in the political arena 
and governance; lands and resources; the Kanak language; maintaining and broadening 
awareness of Kanak culture and heritage; persistent social and economic disparities; children 
and youth; and issues confronting Kanak women. 92 Additional special procedures' mandate-
holders have also touched on these issues. For example, the expert on terrorism has expressed 
concerns regarding Indigenous peoples' right to culture in respect of Peru;93 the expert on health 
has highlighted the need for Indigenous participation in decision-making in Australia;94 and the 
expert on the independence of judges has highlighted access to justice issues for Indigenous 
peoples in Mexico.95 
The experts further leverage the regulatory power of shaming through the 
recommendations that they offer in each country report. At the end of each country report the 
86 Anaya Report on Botswana, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.2 , 1-2. 
87 HRC, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, 
Walter Kalin: Mission to Colombia, UN Doc A/HRC/4/38/Add.3 (24 January 2007) [80](d). 
88 Expert on Slavery Peru 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/30/Add.2, [73](c), (d), (f), (g). 
89 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance, Doudou Diene: Mission to Japan, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.2 (24 January 2006) [85]-
[87] . 
90 HRC, Report of the Special Representative of the Secreta1y-Generalfor Human Rights in Cambodia, Yash Ghai, 
UN Doc A/HRC/4/36 (30 January 2007) [108]. 
91 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to Colombia, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.2 (10 November 
2004) [23]-[89]. 
92 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The Situation of Kanak 
People in New Caledonia, France, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.6 (23 November 20 11) [18]-[63]. 93 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin: Peru, UN Doc A/HRC/16/51 / Add.3 (15 December 2010) 
[39]. 
94 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Eve1yone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover: Mission to Australia, UN Doc A/HRC/14/20/Add.4 (3 June 
2010) [100]. 
95 HRC, Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers: Mission to Mexico, UN Doc A/HRC/17/30/Add.3 (18 April 2011) [94]Uj), (kk). 
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special procedures mandate-holder sets out a suite ofrecommendations. The vast majority of 
these recommendations are directed to the government of the country concerned, but the experts 
also sometimes direct recommendations to the UN and international system, Indigenous 
peoples, business actors and civil society. The Code of Conduct requires that the 
recommendations are 'objective' and the Manual of Operations that they are 'SMART: specific, 
measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound. ' 96 The nature and formulation of the 
recommendations varies between the experts and the states concerned. But the 
recommendations issued touch on all of the core concerns identified above. The Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' recommendations have included that 'special priority should 
be accorded to the agrarian land regularization process' in Bolivia;97 '[a] comprehensive 
programme of law and policy reform should be in place to advance, in consultation with 
indigenous peoples, implementation of Nepal's commitments under Convention 169 and the 
United Nations Declaration' ;98 and that '[t]he Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
should be fully consulted about all initiatives being developed to overcome indigenous 
disadvantage' in Australia.99 Additional special procedures mandate-holders have also issued 
recommendations directed at shaming states into Indigenous rights conformity, including the 
expert on Cambodia who recommended that the Government '[b] an the sale of land and the 
granting of economic land and other concessions in areas occupied by indigenous communities, 
pending the registration of indigenous claims over traditional lands and the collective titling 
process '; 100 the expert on education who recommended that the Government of Paraguay 
' [ d]evelop initiatives to promote and enhance the status of indigenous languages and cultures, 
so that all social groups, including non-indigenous groups, can see the benefits of intercultural 
education'; 101 and the Working Group on mercenaries who recommended to the Peruvian 
Government that '[t]he mechanisms of prior consultation established under the 1989 ILO 
Convention No. 169 ... should be observed.' 102 
(v) Follow-up as Repeat Shaming 
Shaming is a particular focus of special procedures mandate-holders follow-up country 
visits. Mandate-holders sometimes conduct follow-up visits to a country they, or their 
96 Code of Conduct, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/5/2, arts 12(a), 13(b); Manual of Operations, above n 7, [98]. 97 Stavenhagen Report on Bolivia 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/11 /1 1, [87]. 
98 Anaya Report on Nepal, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34/Add .3, [78]. 
99 HRC, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Australia, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.4 (I June 
20 10) [92]. 
100 HRC, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia, Yash Chai, 
UN Doc A/HRC/4/36 (30 January 2007) [108]. 
101 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Mr Vernor Munoz: Mission to 
Paraguay, UN Doc A/HRC/14/25/Add.2 (16 March 2010) [82](k). 
102 HRC, Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mr Jose Luis Gomez 
de! Prado: Mission to Peru, UN Doc A/HRC/7/7/Add.2 (4 February 2008) [75](j). 
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predecessors in the mandate, visited before them in order to assess the extent to which the 
earlier recommendations have been implemented. According to the Manual of Operations, 
follow-up 'is considered to be a crucial element in ensuring that appropriate measures are taken 
in response to the work of the Special Procedures.' 103 These visits give experts an opportunity to 
shame states by highlighting areas where the state continues to be noncompliant with 
international Indigenous rights norms, as well as to praise any progress made. Given resource 
constraints follow-up missions are limited in number, with many experts preferring to visit a 
wide number of states rather than to continually follow progress in only a few. 104 As a result, the 
experts are heavily reliant on the efforts of IPOs, NGOs, NHRis and UN actors such as OHCHR 
country teams to follow-up on implementation of their recommendations. 105 But the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples is one of the mandates to have conducted the most follow-up 
visits. 106 As identified above, Stavenhagen conducted follow-up missions to Mexico and 
Guatemala. In Mexico Stavenhagen reported some moves to implement his recommendations, 
including the adoption oflegislative measures at state level recognising Indigenous peoples' 
rights; steps to review the administration of justice in order to address Indigenous peoples' 
needs; and efforts to improve the institutions of, and resources available to, bilingual 
intercultural education. But he found that '[d]espite these positive steps, many important human 
rights concerns pointed out in the Special Rapporteur's recommendations have still not been 
addressed.' 107 He identified some positive advances in Guatemala too, 108 which are considered 
in Chapter VI. 
Anaya conducted follow-up missions to Chile, Colombia, New Zealand and Canada 
where he saw mixed results. In Chile Anaya noted some progress, including ratification of ILO 
Convention 169, constitutional reform initiatives regarding Indigenous peoples and the 
development of plans in response to Stavenhagen's recommendations. But he identified major 
challenges yet to be addressed, particularly regarding 'consultation and cooperation, rights to 
land and territory, development of natural resources, and policies on conflicts connected with 
claims to Mapuche lands.' 109 In Colombia Anaya identified few positive developments. He 
acknowledged the Government's 'readiness' to recognise Indigenous peoples' rights and the 
103 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [88]. 
104 See, eg, Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3, 447-448; Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution 
of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above n 3, 19-20. 
105 Some of these actors undertake impressive activities in this regard. See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen: Study Regarding Best Practices Carried Out to Implement the Recommendations Contained in the 
Annual Reports of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4 (26 February 2007) [21], [27], [30], [31], 
[38]-[ 41]. 
106 Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation ofHwnan Rights 
Norms', above n 1,227 n 40. 
107 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32, [65]-[70]. 
108 Ibid [58]-[64]. 
109 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Chile: Follow-up to the Recommendations 
Made by the Previous Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34/ Add.6 (5 October 2009) 1-2. 
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proposals developed to address Stavenhagen's recommendations. However, he expressed 
concern at the grave situation of Indigenous peoples there, including the lack of laws, 
programmes and policies ensuring the effective protection of Indigenous peoples rights to their 
lands and natural resources, prior consultation, and economic, social and cultural rights, which 
was aggravated by the continuing internal conflict. 110 In the press conference at the close of his 
October 2013 visit to Canada Anaya identified that Canada had 'addressed some of the concerns 
that were raised by my predecessor', including actions to address gender concerns in the 
country's Indian Act. Yet, he identified that 'daunting challenges remain' and concluded 'that 
Canada faces a crisis when it comes to the situation of indigenous peoples of the country.' 111 
Anaya noted the most positive developments in New Zealand, 112 which are examined in the next 
chapter. 
(vi) Constrained Dissemination 
Wide dissemination of the reports and media statements is crucial to their coming to the 
attention of actors who may bring pressure to bear on the concerned state to action them. The 
country reports are publicised and made publically available but primarily over the Internet. The 
reports are presented annually to the HRC (and before it the CHR). Summaries are also 
sometimes presented to the GA; the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples is one mandate 
that presents annually to the GA. 113 Advance unedited versions of the country reports are 
released to the public in advance of their submission to the HRC. The advance and final reports 
are available online through the OHCHR's website and, where they exist, the personal websites 
set up by special procedures mandate-holders to promote their work. Additional efforts are 
sometimes made to share the reports' findings with Indigenous peoples and other actors at the 
country-level, such as through video conferences or meetings. 114 
Since 2003, country reports are also publicised to an international audience during the 
interactive dialogue before the HRC (and formerly the CHR) at which each mandate annually 
presents its reports. These dialogues are now webcast over the Internet, opening them up to a 
broader audience. They provide the mandate-holder with an opportunity to publically raise 
concerns regarding the Indigenous rights situation in countries they have visited that year and 
110 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Mr James Anaya: T71e Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Colombia: Follow-up to the 
Recommendations Made by the Previous Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/HRC/ 15/37/ Add.3 (25 May 2010) 1-2. 111 James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Statement 
upon Conclusion of the Visit to Canada, above n 50. The Act referred to is the Indian Act, RSC 1951 C 1-5. 112 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.4, 1-2. 
113 Since 2004 the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has been requested to present almost annually to the 
GA. CHR Res 2004/62, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2004/62, para 14; CHR Res 2005/51, UN Doc E/CN/4/RES/2005/51, 
para 18; GA Res 63/161, UN Doc A/RES/63/161, para l ; HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/ 15/14, para 3; HRC 
Res 18/8, UN Doc A/HRC/Res/18/8, para 3; HRC Res 21/24, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/21 /24, para 3. 114 See, eg, OHCHR, United Nations Special Procedures: Facts and Figures 2010 (2011) 12; Anaya Report to GA 
2013, UN Doc A/68/3 17, [25]. 
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the representatives of the concerned countries then have an opportunity to comment. 115 Since 
2011 this has been followed by an opportunity for the representative of the NHRI from the 
concerned country to speak. 11 6 The mandate-holder also has an opportunity to respond to state 
and NHRI's comments. In principle the dialogue is an excellent innovation. It provides for a 
more dynamic exchange of information between core interested parties regarding countries ' 
rights situations. However, in practice it is constrained by the minimal amount of time available 
to those speaking: participants have only a few minutes to present their concerns and comments. 
And rarely have mandate-holders used the interactive dialogue as an opportunity to express 
especial criticism of states' Indigenous rights situations preferring to make generalised 
statements of thanks for state cooperation and to make fleeting or opaque comments regarding 
areas requiring attention by states. 117 Some states, on the other hand, have not held back in 
voicing their opposition to the contents of special procedures experts' reports regarding their 
Indigenous rights situations, personally attacking the experts and occasionally requesting that 
experts' reports be withdrawn. 118 For example, during the interactive dialogue at which 
Stavenhagen's country report on the Philippines was presented, the Philippine delegation 
reportedly described Stavenhagen as having 'malicious intentions ' and his report on the country 
as 'nothing more than a litany of unsubstantiated allegations and ridiculous 
recommendations.' 119 A scathing response is sometimes the cost of shaming governments. But it 
might bring other benefits. Preston et al observed that the severity of the Philippine's response 
inspired great curiosity about Stavenhagen's report. 120 
(vii) Publicising Unresponsiveness 
Where a request to visit a state has been sent and a positive response has not been 
received from the relevant government some mandate-holders will note with regret that this is 
the case in their annual reports, before international fora, or in the media in order to shame 
states into agreeing to the visit. Anaya has previously identified, inter alia, India, Indonesia, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the United States and Canada as states 
115 Manual a/Operations, above n 7, [86]. 
116 See, eg, New Zealand Human Rights Commission (NZHRC) commissioner, Rosslyn Noonan, speaking in HRC, 
Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, 
above n 13. 
117 See, eg, James Anaya speaking in ibid. Piccone states of the practice generally it 'is typically neither interactive 
nor a dialogue.' Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 
10, 52. 
118 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). 
11 9 Philippine Government representative, Denis Yap Lepatan, cited in CHR, 'Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
People Presents Report to Commission on Human Rights ', (Press Release, UN Doc HR/CN/1028, 10 April 2003) 
('Press Release CHR 2003' ). Stavenhagen recounts that he was also 'accused of giving support to terrorist 
organisations . . . once or twice'. Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011 ). 120 Preston et al, above n 25 , 33 . Regarding the heightened attention negative government responses to the experts can 
gamer see generally Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, 
above n 10, 116. 
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with outstanding requests to visit. 121 The dominance of Asian states in this list is notable. It 
prompted Anaya to conduct a two-day ' consultation' in Kuala Lumpur early in 2013, 
circumventing the requirement for state consent to a country visit, where he met with 
Indigenous peoples from Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Viet Nam, 
Bangladesh, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar. He presented his findings as a special 
report on the situation oflndigenous peoples in Asia in 2013 and subsequently engaged with the 
relevant governments on the concerns raised. 122 He has since expressed the hope 'that Asian 
Governments will show increased openness to engaging on indigenous issues and will increase 
cooperation with the mandate'. 123 At times the experts' tactic of shaming states with outstanding 
requests has been successful: Anaya ultimately conducted country missions to the United States 
and Canada. 124 At other times mandate-holders do not single out specific states but rather 
encourage states generally to respond positively to their request. 125 A periodically updated table 
of the status of requests for country visits is maintained on the OHCHR's website, which further 
draws attention to recalcitrant states for those actors who know where to look. 126 
(b) Communications and the Art of Subtle Shaming 
(i) · Elemental Device 
Communications are another fundamental aspect of most special procedures experts' 
shaming repertoire, although the shaming techniques engaged are more indirect. 
Communications comprise a large portion of many thematic special procedures mandate-
holders' work and feature in some country mandate-holders working methods too. 127 
Communications in the thousands have been sent to all regions of the world; during 2012 alone 
over 600 communications were sent to the governments of 127 countries. 128 Some are also sent 
121 Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [31] , [60] ; Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35, [16] . 
122 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Consultation on the 
Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Asia, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 / Add.3 (31 July 2013). See also Anaya Report to GA 
2013, UN Doc A/68/3 17, [19] , [23]-[24] . 
123 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [24]. 
124 For example, during the interactive dialogue in the HRC the United States assured Anaya that its failure to 
respond was 'an administrative oversight,' stated that it would respond promptly and invited Anaya to visit in 20 12. 
United States Government representative speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Part 
II, Clustered Interactive Dialogue on Indigenous Peoples, 19th Plena,y Meeting (2 1 September 2011) United Nations 
<http ://www. unrnultimedia.org/tv/webcast/20 11 /09/part-i i-clustered-interactive-d ialogue-on-i nd igenous-peoples-
l 9th-plenary-meeting. htrnl>. Preston et al noted that Stavenhagen had issued requests to visit the Russ ian Federation 
and Malaysia, visits that did not transpire, although Anaya later conducted a miss ion to the Russian Federation . 
Preston et al, above n 25, 32. 
125 See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/2 1/47, [19] . 
126 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [56]. 
127 For an example ofa country mandate-holder that has sent communications see HRC, Progress Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Tomas Ojea Quintana, UN Doc A/HRC/ 19/67 (7 
March 2012) [5]. 
128 OHCHR, United Nations Special Procedures. Facts and Figures 2012 (2013) 10. Note that the High 
Comm issioner for Human Rights (HCHR) identifies the number of countries as slightly lower at 125. HRC, Annual 
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to non-government actors, such as companies. 129 Communications refer to the letters and 
follow-up letters special procedures experts send to governments, via diplomatic channels, 
regarding specific allegations of human rights violations that fall within their mandates. 
Communications can include reference to individual cases; general trends and patterns; 
violations affecting a particular group; the content oflegislation incompatible with international 
human rights standards; and rights violations that have occurred or are ongoing or that have a 
high risk of occurring. They can be sent by one expert alone or, more commonly, jointly with 
one or more others. 130 Three-quarters of the communications sent in 2012 were sent jointly by 
two or more mandate-holders. 131 
Communications take two forms: urgent appeals or letters of allegation. Urgent appeals 
'communicate information in cases where the alleged violations are time-sensitive in terms of 
involving loss of life, life-threatening situations or either imminent or ongoing damage of a very 
grave nature' that require urgent intervention. 132 Letters of allegation 'communicate information 
about violations that are alleged to have already occurred' and are of a less urgent nature. 133 In 
both instances the general process entails sending a communication to the concerned 
government 'requesting information, commenting on the allegation and suggesting that 
preventive or investigatory action be taken.' 134 Communications are confidential until their 
publication in reports presented to the special procedures' parent body. 135 This means that those 
who share information regarding alleged rights violations can be left in the dark about any 
action taken by the experts for long periods. 136 Mandate-holders are not required to inform those 
who provide information of any action taken ( although the Manual of Operations encourages it), 
and resourcing issues prevent many experts from doing so. 137 As a result, valuable time in which 
those individuals or groups could be leveraging the shame factor associated with the experts' 
involvement can be lost. As identified in the previous chapter, since 2011 mandate-holders have 
produced a joint communications report, although a few experts, such as Anaya, still prepare 
individual communications reports to set out their observations and analysis on the cases. 138 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17 (13 December 2012) 
[81]. 
129 See, eg, Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [34]. 
130 See, eg, Manual of Operations, above n 7, [28]-[48]; OHCHR, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/lntroduction.aspx>; OHCHR, OHCHR Report 2011 (2012) 441. 131 HRC, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17 (13 
December 2012) [81]. 
132 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [43]. 
133 Ibid [46]. 
134 OHCHR, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Communications 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/lssues/IPeoples/SRlndigenousPeoples/Pages/Communications.aspx>. See also OHCHR, 
Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council: Communications 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Communications.aspx>. 
135 See, eg, Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 3, 307. 
136 See, eg, Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3, 446. 
137 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [25], [48] , [95]. This has attracted criticism from NGOs, see, eg, Piccone, 
Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 10, 58 . 138 For access to Anaya's communications reports see James Anaya, Communications - Cases Examined 
<http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/list/communications-cases-examined>. 
119 
Whether a mandate-holder intervenes on the basis of information it receives is at the 
discretion of the expert. Given the volume of cases mandate-holders receive most are not able to 
respond to every situation. 139 Since 2007 the assessment of whether to act has been guided by 
the admissibility criteria set out in the special procedures' Code of Conduct. Experts will 
usually look to ' the reliability of the source and the credibility of information received; the 
details provided; and the scope of the mandate', although the specific requirements will depend 
on the expert. 14° For example, Anaya 'gives priority consideration to those cases involving 
infringements of the collective rights of indigenous peoples', 141 in recognition of the fact that 
other special procedures' mandates and UN bodies can consider individual rights violations of 
Indigenous persons, and where he 'has a reasonable chance of having a positive impact' .142 In 
contrast to other human rights mechanisms, information regarding an alleged rights violation 
can be provided to the mandate-holder by any person or organisation, no relationship to the 
alleged victim or victims is necessary; the experts can send communications regardless of 
whether the alleged victim has exhausted all domestic remedies; and a detailed legal argument 
regarding the case is not required. The emphasis is on rapid action to protect victims and 
potential victims. 143 
(ii) Concerted Focus on Indigenous Rights 
Special procedures experts issue many communications to states around the world each 
year concerning alleged violations of Indigenous peoples' rights. Stavenhagen instituted the 
practice early on in the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples. 144 Shortly 
after taking on the role Anaya described communications as the central aspect of his work, 145 
towards the end of his term he described them as 'a cornerstone' of it. 146 Since the creation of 
the mandate the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has reported on close to 400 
communications to states, most frequently directing its communications to Mexico, Colombia, 
Chile, India and Guatemala. 147 These are just the communications reported on; figures cited by 
139 See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [34]. 
140 OHCHR, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council: Communications, above n 134. See also Manual of 
Operations, above n 7, [38]-[42]; OHCHR, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council: Urgent Appeals and 
Letters of Allegation on Human Rights Violations 
<http:/ /www2 .ohchr .org/engl ish/bodies/chr/special/docs/commun icationsbroch ure _en. pdf>. 
141 OHCHR, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Communications, above n 134. 142 HRC, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Communications 
Sent, Replies Received and Follow-up, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/ Add. I (22 August 2011) [7] ('Anaya Communications 
Report 201 l'). 
143 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [38] , [39], [42] ; OHCHR, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: Communications, above n 134; OHCHR, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, above n 130. 
For discussion see, eg, Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 3, 307; Jemow, above n 72, 802. 
144 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, [103] , [112] , [118] . 
145 Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/ 12/34, [32] , [60]. See generally Preston et al, above n 25, 48-51 . 146 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [38]. 
147 This figure is the author ' s own calculation based on the communications reported in the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples' communications reports each year. 
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Rodriguez-Pinero Royo suggest that the actual number may be dramatically higher. 148 As the 
list of :frequently targeted countries implies, Latin America is the region to which most 
communications have been addressed. 149 To give a flavour of the response rate to the expert, of 
the 232 communications the Special Rapporteur sent between 2004 and 2008, Piccone identifies 
that 55.2 per cent received no response or an immaterial response and only in 9.9 per cent of 
cases did the response indicate that steps had been taken to address the allegation. 150 A number 
of the communications issued by the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples have been joint 
communications. Most often these have been issued with the experts on food, housing and the 
situation of human rights defenders. But they have also been issued with other experts, 
including those concerning torture, extreme poverty, extrajudicial executions, cultural rights, 
arbitrary detention, violence against women, freedom of opinion, internally displaced persons, 
minority issues and freedom ofreligion. 151 
The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' communications canvas a wide range of 
issues reflecting the broad framing of the mandate. They have been issued to countries in all 
regions including Australia, 152 Brazil, 153 China, 154 Ethiopia, 155 Finland, 156 Israel, 157 Thailand, 158 
148 Luis Rodriguez-Piliero Royo, 'Los Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas : El Pape! de! Relator 
Especial' in Mikel Berraondo et al (eds), Los Derechos de los Pueblos lndigenas en el Sistma Internacional de 
Naciones Unidas (Instituto Promocion Esudios Sociales, 2010) 109, 123. 
149 See, eg, Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [35]. 
150 In the remainder of cases either the violation was rejected without substantiation or an incomplete response was 
received. The precise meanings of these categories are outlined in Piccone's report. Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: 
The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above n 3, 23, 75-7. For comment 
regarding the low response rate to the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples ' communications see Preston et al, 
above n 25, 51. See also Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/31 7, [36] , [3 8]. 
151 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: 
Communications Sent, Replies Received, and Follow-up, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47/Add.3 (7 September 2012) [8] , [12] , 
[45], [60] , [69], [82] ('Anaya Communications Report 2012'); Anaya Communications Report 2011, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35/Add.l, 5-7, 10, 11, annex VII [l]; HRC, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya: Cases Examined by the Special Rapporteur, 
UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.1 (15 September 2010) [32] , [37], [38], [169], [177], [198] , [272], [386] , [397] ('Anaya 
Communications Report 201 0'); HRC, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya: Summary of Communications Transmitted and Replies 
Received, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34/Add.1 (18 September 2009) [5], [72], [133], [148], [156], [192], [219], [225] , 
[242], [281], [348] , [364], [404], [405] , [430] , [466] ('Anaya Communications Report 2009'); HRC, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, S James 
Anaya: Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9/ Add. I (15 
August 2008) [8] ('Anaya Communications Report 2008'); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Summary of Cases 
Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, UN Doc A/HRC/6/15/Add.1 (20 November 2007) [65], [74], 
[88], [97], [256] , [359], [376], [394], 76. 
152 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Analysis of Country Situations and Other Activities of the Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.l (16 February 2005) [9] ('Stavenhagen Communications Report 2005'). 153 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Analysis of Countly Situations and Other Activities of the Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.l (18 January 2006) [19]-[25] ('Stavenhagen Communications Report 
2006' ). 
154 See, eg, Anaya Communications Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.l, [169]-[173]. 
155 See, eg, Anaya Communications Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9/Add.l, [199]-[206]. 
156 See, eg, Anaya Communications Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /47/Add.3 , [47]-[51] . 
157 See, eg, Anaya Communications Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/ Add.l, annex VI. 
158 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Analysis of Country Situations and Other Activities of the Special 
Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.l (6 February 2004) [74] ('Stavenhagen Communications Report 2004'). 
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and the United States. 159 Recurring issues include violations of Indigenous peoples' rights to 
participate in decision-making, particularly in relation to natural resource extraction and other 
development projects, and to their lands and resources; violence or threats against Indigenous 
persons, including those defending Indigenous rights; and constitutional or legislative reforms 
that are incompatible with Indigenous peoples' rights . 160 Anaya has used the communications 
process as a form of follow-up on key issues identified in his country reports, 161 such as 
regarding the settlement negotiations process for historical grievances between Maori and the 
New Zealand Government. 162 Other special procedures mandate-holders acting alone also send 
communications to states concerning alleged violations of Indigenous peoples' rights. For 
example, in 1995 the expert on extrajudicial executions sent a communication to the Canadian 
Government urging it to investigate allegations that an Indigenous Chippewa individual was 
killed by police during an unarmed defence of a sacred burial ground. 163 
(iii) Implied Accusations 
Communications rely on shaming states even though the communications process is not 
intrinsically accusatory. According to the OHCHR, communications are not intended to convey 
a value judgment by the mandate holder or to be accusatory per se. Rather, '[t)heir main purpose 
is to obtain clarification in response to allegations of violations and to promote measures 
designed to protect human rights.' 164 But the attribution of wrongdoing to the state or other 
parties over whom the state should exercise control is often implied in the text of the 
communications, particularly in the experts' commentary on the exchanges where such 
commentary is offered. 165 Where a response has been received, mandate-holders publish this or 
a summary or excerpt in their reports inviting the public to assess its veracity and providing an 
opportunity for pressure to be placed on states where incorrect information has been supplied. 
Generally the mandate-holders themselves do not offer any substantive analysis of the 
159 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/65, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2003/90/ Add. l (21 January 2003) [26]-[29]. 
160 See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 , annex [19] ; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc 
A/HRC/21/47, [16] , [17] ; Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [33]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 
2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, 4, [103] , [107], [108]. 
161 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [20]. 
162 Anaya Communications Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 /Add.4, [121]-[124] ; Joint Communications Report 
Februa,y 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/22/67, 78 . 
163 CHR, Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution 199 5/7 3, UN Doc E/CN .4/1996/4 (25 January 1996) [98]-[ 100] ; CHR, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen.· Mission to Canada, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.3 (2 December 2004) [59]. 164 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [30]. See generally Sir Nigel Radley, 'The United Nations Human Rights 
Counci l, its Special Procedures and its Relationship with Treaty Bodies: Complementarity or Competition?' in Kevin 
Boyle (ed), New Institutions for Human Rights Protection (Oxford University Press, 2009) 49, 63. 
165 See, eg, Anaya Communications Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47/Add.3, [16]. 
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response; 166 although Anaya is one of a few who does . In his words, ' [t]he Special Rapporteur is 
aiming to avoid the "revolving door" approach of simply sending a communication and 
receiving a response from the Government concerned'. 167 In 2004 Anaya had criticised 
Stavenhagen' s tendency not to offer proposals on how to remedy the rights violations identified 
through the communications procedure: ' [ w ]ith time it can be expected that the special 
rapporteur will more fully develop his mandate to examine violations and formulate proposals 
to remedy them, much like other thematic mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights 
have done.' 168 Stavenhagen did engage in some detailed back and forth exchanges with 
governments regarding communications too, even where his reported observations were light. 169 
All communications sent by special procedures ' mandate-holders and the responses 
received are eventually published in a report to the HRC (and previously the CHR), providing a 
public avenue for shaming the concerned states. However, the communications reports are 
published in English, French and Spanish only - and often individual communications are 
published in only one of those - restricting the audience that can read them. The report is 
available online through the OHCHR's webpage and the personal webpages of some mandate-
holders. Where a communication has been sent and no response ( or no substantive response) has 
been received from the relevant government, mandate-holders will typically note with regret 
that this is the case in the public communications report, with the intention of shaming the 
government into responding with material information.170 Sometimes mandate-holders will 
encourage states to respond to unanswered communications without naming particular states in 
their annual reports or in the interactive dialogues before the HRC or GA, directing further 
public attention to a generalised failure to respond. 171 In particularly grave situations, or where 
' a Government has repeatedly failed to provide a substantive response to communications,' a 
mandate-holder may issue a media statement or hold a media conference to draw public 
attention to the case and shame the government into action. 172 Sometimes the experts will 
follow-up the situation with further communications or, in Anaya' s case, a special country 
m1ss10n. 
166 See, eg, Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3, 447; Menno T Kamrninga, 'The Thematic Procedures of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights' (1 987) 34 Netherlands International Law Review 299, 315. 
167 Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc AIHRC/12/34, [3 5]. See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2008, UN Doc 
A/HRC/9/9, [13]; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/2 1/47, [17]. See generally Anaya Report to GA 2013, 
UN Doc A/68/317, [29]-[30]. 
168 S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2 ed, 2004) 224. 
169 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, UN 
Doc AIHRC/4/32/Add. 1 (19 March 2007) [272]-[297] ('Stavenhagen Communications Report 2007'). 
170 See, eg, Anaya Communications Report 2012, UN Doc AIHRC/21 /47/Add.3, [16]. 
111 S h ee, eg, Staven agen Annual Report 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, [112]; Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc 
AIHRC/12/34, [60]; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /47, [1 6]; GA, 'Special Rapporteur Highlights 
'Negative, Even Catastrophic' Impact of Extractive Industries on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in Third Committee 
Statement ' (Press Release, UN Doc GA/SHC/4013, 17 October 20 11) (' GA 3rd Committee Press Release 2011 ') . 172 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [49]. See, eg, OHCHR, 'Bangladesh Open-Pit Coal Mine Threatens 
Fundamental Rights, Warn UN Experts' (Media Release, 28 February 2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/N ewsEvents/Pages/DisplayN ews.aspx?N ewsID= 118 78&LangID=E>; Anaya 
Communications Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /47/Add.3, [1 2], [13]. 
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(c) Innovating Shame Practices through Special Missions 
Anaya has taken the innovative step of occasionally conducting country missions to 
investigate specific Indigenous rights violations, rather than the usual assessment of a country's 
overall Indigenous rights situation. Most of the special country missions conducted by Anaya 
have been to Central and South America, namely Panama, Peru, Costa Rica and Guatemala. 173 
He also produced a special report on Australia's Northern Territory intervention following his 
standard country mission there. 174 With the consent of states he conducts these missions to 
investigate more deeply concerns brought to his attention through the communications 
process.175 The working method allows impressive speed in responding to rights concerns: 
Anaya's special mission to Peru in 2009 occurred a week after he issued a press release 
regarding violent clashes between Indigenous protestors and police, which in tum had been 
issued only days after the clashes had begun. 176 However, Anaya faced resistance from some 
within the OHCHR in Geneva to the innovation of special country missions with the move 
perceived to be beyond his mandate. But he pointed to how the visits complied with the Code of 
Conduct and persisted despite the opposition. 177 As the approach was outside of the special 
procedures' standard working methods, Anaya was also forced to secure funding for these 
missions from beyond the UN, which he did. 178 Other special procedures experts have 
undertaken similar missions on a smaller scale. For example, in 2007 Stavenhagen undertook a 
joint mission with the expert on housing to Mexico to examine Indigenous rights issues 
regarding the construction of the Parota hydroelectric project, producing joint findings and 
recommendations on the issue that are reported in the expert on housing's communications 
173 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Observations on the Situation of the Charco la Pava Community and Other 
Communities Affected by the Chan 7 5 Hydroelectric Project in Panama, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34/ Add.5 (7 September 
2009); HRC, Informe def Relator Especial sabre la Situaci6n de las Derechos Humanos y las Libertades 
Fundamentales de las Indigenas, S James Anaya: Observaciones sabre la Situaci6n de las Pueblos Indigenas de la 
Amazonia y las Sucesos def 5 de Junia y Dias Posteriores en las Provincias de Bagua y Utcubamba, Peru, UN Doc 
NHRC/12/34/ Add .8 (18 August 2009); HRC, Informe def Relator Especial sabre las Derechos de las Pueblos 
Indigenas, James Anaya: la Situaci6n de las Pueblos Indigenas Afectados par el Proyecto Hidroelectrico El Diquis 
en Costa Rica, UN Doc N HRC/18/35/Add.8 (11 July 2011); Anaya Special Report on Guatemala 2011, UN Doc 
NHRC/18/3 5/ Add.3. Anaya has produced special reports on other country missions, including on Suriname, Ecuador 
and Chile, which are considered below as examples of capacity-building. In addition, in 2013 Anaya issued a special 
report on Ind igenous peoples in Asia, which is noted in the discuss ion on country and thematic reports. 174 HRC, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Australia, UN Doc A/HRC/15/3 7 / Add.4 ( 1 June 
2010), appendix B. 
175 Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/ 18/35, [1 8]. 
176 HRC, Informe def Relator Especial sabre la Situaci6n de las Derechos Humanos y las Libertades Fundamentales 
de las Indigenas, S James Anaya: Observaciones sabre la Situaci6n de las Pueblos Indigenas de la Amazonia y las 
Sucesos def 5 de Junia y Dias Poster/ores en las Provincias de Bagua y Utcubamba, Peru, UN Doc 
NHRC/12/34/Add. 8 (18 August 2009) [2], [42]-[47]. 
177 Interview with James Anaya (Te lephone Interv iew, 24 January 20 I I , updated by email 5 July 2013). He pointed 
out that he received support from those at the mid-higher level within the OHCHR fo r the innovation. 178 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc N68/317, [33]. 
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report. 179 Yet, Anaya is alone in including the technique as part of his standard working methods 
and in publishing a separate special report on his missions. 
As with the special procedures' general country missions, shaming is engaged in the 
special country visits and reports in several ways. It is engaged in meetings with state 
representatives, in the observations made in the special report prepared following the mission, in 
the recommendations issued in those reports and in statements made to the media regarding the 
situation. During each of Anaya's special country missions he raised concerns regarding 
violations of Indigenous peoples' rights to their lands and natural resources and of their right to 
be appropriately consulted on matters affecting them. For example, Anaya visited Costa Rica in 
2011 to investigate the situation of Indigenous peoples affected by the proposed construction of 
the Diquis hydroelectric project on the Grande de Terraba river recommending, inter alia, that as 
a priority steps be taken to find solutions by which Indigenous peoples can recover land within 
their territories. 180 The Government's public response was very positive. 181 Other states, such as 
Panama, have publically rejected the criticisms made of their Indigenous rights situations in 
Anaya's special reports .182 
(d) Shaming by Media Spotlight 
Shaming is further engaged through the special procedures mandate-holders ' use of the 
media. In addition to drawing attention to their general and special country visits, the special 
procedures mandate-holders engage the media to publicise especially flagrant or urgent rights 
violations that they become aware of, bypassing the communications and country mission 
processes at least initially. 183 This step is generally only taken in the most serious of cases: the 
Manual of Operations encourages it to be used as a means of last resort. 184 The Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has issued public statements on concerns including the 
Chilean Government's response to protests by Indigenous peoples in Rapa Nui, 185 a hunger 
179 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate 
Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non -Discrimination in this Context, Miloon Kothari: Summary of 
Communications Sent and Replies Received from Governments and Other Actors, UN Doc A/HRC/7/1 6/Add .l (4 
March 2008) [72]-[100] . 
180 HRC, Informe def Relator Especial sabre las Derechos de las Pueblos Indigenas, James Anaya: La Situaci6n de 
las Pueblos Indigenas Afectados par el Proyecto Hidroelectrico El Diquis en Costa Rica, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35/Add .8 (11 July 2011) [44]. In 2012 Anaya returned to Coast Rica to follow-up on his 20 11 visit. Anaya 
Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47, [15]. 
181 Costa Rican Government representative speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: 
Statement of Special Rapporteur and In teractive Dialogue, above n 13 . 
182 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Observations on the Situation of the Charco la Pava Community and Other 
Communities Affected by the Chan 75 Hydroelectric Project in Panama, UN Doc A/HRC/1 2/34/Add.5 (7 September 
2009) appendix. 
18-
J See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [35]; Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35, [19] ; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /47, [18]; Anaya Report to GA 2013, TJN Doc 
A/68/317, [31] . See generally Golay, Mabon and Cismas, above n 3, 308. 
184 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [49]-[51]. 
18 -) Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [19]. 
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strike by Chief Theresa Spence of the Attawapiskat First Nation in Canada, 186 and a proposal to 
repeal core laws arid policies concerning the Sarni in Norway. 187 Anaya has also used 
international media interviews on his thematic work to highlight country specific concerns, 
including regarding Argentina, Panama and Guatemala. 188 As with communications, media 
releases can be issued jointly. For example, in 2012 the experts on Indigenous peoples, human 
rights defenders, extrajudicial executions and peaceful assembly issued a media release urging 
the Guatemalan Government to impartially investigate acts of violence against Indigenous 
peoples in Cumbre de Alaska. 189 At times other special procedures mandate-holders go it alone 
and issue media statements on Indigenous rights concerns. For instance, in July 2013 the expert 
on terrorism urged the Chilean Government to stop using anti-terrorism legislation against 
Indigenous Mapuche peoples seeking to recover their ancestral lands.190 
The engagement of the media relies heavily on shaming states to act to address the 
relevant rights concern. At the least, it is about making the concerned state aware in public that 
it is being watched. The degree to which mandate-holders utilise the media differs depending on 
the expert, with some engaging it very rarely while others use it frequently as a routine 
component of their work. 191 
2 The Ancillary Role of Dialogue-Building 
Dialogue-building is the second major regulatory mechanism engaged by the special 
procedures experts, although it is less prominent than the technique of shaming. By the term 
'dialogue-building' I refer to the experts' efforts to create conditions for dialogue between states 
and Indigenous peoples' representatives, and other relevant actors. Both Stavenhagen and 
Anaya have identified the promotion of dialogue as central to the work of the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples. 192 Anaya, in particular, has oriented his work methods 
186 Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 , [20] ; OHCHR, 'Canada: UN Expert Calls for Meaningful 
Dialogue with Aboriginai Leaders After Weeks of Protests' (Media Release, 8 January 2013) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/N ewsEvents/Pages/D isplayN ews.aspx ?N ewsID= 1291 7 &LangID=E>. 187 James Anaya, 'Norway Could Lose Lead in the Recognition and Protection ofindigenous Peoples' Rights - UN 
Expert' (Public Statement, 28 October 2011) <http ://unsr.jamesanaya.org/notes/norway-could-lose-its-lead-in-the-
recognition-and-protection-of-indigenous-peoples-rights>. 
188 Efe Agency, 'Relator de la ONU Aboga por Derechos de los Pueblos Indfgenas', Prensa Libre (online), 9 Apri l 
2012 <http ://www.prensalibre.com/economia/Relator-ONU-empresas-promover-derechos-pueblos-
ind igenas _ O _679 132237 .html>. 
189 James Anaya, 'Guatemala: UN Experts Call for an Investigation into the Violence in Santa Catarina lxtahuacan' (Press Release, 12 October 2012) <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/notes/guatemala-un-experts-call-for-an-investigation-
into-the-violence-in-santa-catarina-ixtahuacan>. This was fo llowed by a joint allegation letter three days later. Anaya 
Communications Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41/Add.4, [87]-[91] . 
190 Ben Emmerson, 'Chi le Must Stop Us ing Anti-Terrorism Law Against Mapuche Ind igenous Group - UN Expert ' 
(Press Release, 31 July 2013) 
<http ://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=4553 8&Cr=indigenous&Cr I #.U fqsaawXd _ B>. 191 Naples-Mitchell , above n 3, 234-35; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 'Being a Special Rapporteur: A Delicate Balancing 
Act' (20 11) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 162, 168; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the 
UN 's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 10, 116-17. 
192 See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 201 / , UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [7 1] ; Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/34, [ 18]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32, [83]; Stavenhagen quoted in Preston et 
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'towards constructive dialogue with Governments, indigenous peoples ', NGOs, UN agencies 
and others. 193 However, the extent to which dialogue-building is mobilised depends highly on 
the individual mandate-holder. For example, the expert on violence against women has argued 
that mandate-holders must 'speak truth to power very clearly' rather than create spaces for 
dialogue. 194 The technique of dialogue-building seeks to influence state behaviour mainly 
through contributing to a common understanding of the international Indigenous rights 
framework, but also through the acts of witnessing and praising. 
(a) Witnessing 'Truth ' 
The technique of witnessing underlies the special procedures ' country reports, 
communications, special reports on specific cases, and media releases. It is not concerned with 
shaming states and other actors per se. Rather it is concerned with establishing ' truth ', setting 
out evidence or proof of particular events. 195 In this scenario 'truth' is projected as having an 
intrinsic power: the ability to give voice to the otherwise voiceless, to heal and to facilitate 
reconciliation. Because of these qualities truth telling has come to play a pivotal role in 
reconciliation processes globally. 196 Witnessing is a more circuitous regulatory tool than the 
other mechanisms engaged by the experts. It seeks to influence state behaviour by empowering 
Indigenous peoples and Indigenous rights advocates. When Indigenous peoples and Indigenous 
rights advocates are empowered they are in a better position to mobilise and advocate for the 
realisation of Indigenous rights . Witnessing also creates spaces for dialogue - the experts ' 
' truth ' can provide a starting point for discussions between parties with competing perspectives . 
Witnessing is evident most prominently in the reports on common and special country 
missions that the experts prepare, but also in some communications exchanges and media 
releases. In the case ofreports on country missions , the expert has spent time in the country, 
listening to the perspectives of different actors, and sets out in the report an assessment of the 
Indigenous rights situation under study. Usually communications will invite states to respond to 
allegations of rights violations without conducting thorough investigations and typically without 
al, above n 25, 13-4. 
19" 0 Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 , [7]; Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [5]. 194 Radhika Coomaraswamy quoted in Naples-Mitchell, above n 3, 239. 
195 Robert Joseph points out that it is not necessarily about presenting new information, rather the 'public recognition 
of what is already known' . Robert Andrew Joseph, 'A Jade Door: Reconciliatory Justice as a Way Forward Citing 
New Zealand Experience' in Marlene Brant Castellano, Linda Archibald and Mike DeGagne (eds), From Truth to 
Reconciliation: Transforming the Legacy of Residential Schools (Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2008) 205, 214 . 
Lempinen is one scholar that has privileged the experts' fact-finding role specifically as a means for 'enhancing a 
dialogue between all parties concerned'. Lemp in en, above n 1, 117, 11 9. 
196 See, eg, Karen Brouneus, 'The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on 
Psychological Health' (20 10) 54(3) The Journal of Conflict Resolution 408; Melissa Ballengee, 'The Critical Role of 
Non-Governmental Organizations in Transitional Justice: A Case Study of Guatemala' (1999 -2000) 4 UCLA Journal 
of International Law and Foreign Affairs 4 77; Megan K Donovan, 'The International Commission Against Impunity 
in Guatemala: Will Accountability Prevail?' (2008) 25(3) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 
779. 
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expressly attributing blame. Often media releases follow the same approach. However, in some 
instances experts will provide observations and analysis ofrights situations the subject of 
communications and media releases. In such cases the experts invite the reader to accept their 
narratives of the Indigenous rights situation in their reports, communications and media releases 
as 'truth'. 
The mandate-holders endeavour to convince their audience that they present the truth by 
becoming what Clifford Geertz has coined in the anthropological field an 'I-witness' . 197 
Typically the experts do this by taking on the role of Geertz's highly scientific 'Complete 
Investigator' a figure 'rigorously objective, dispassionate, thorough, exact, and disciplined' and 
dedicated to truth. 198 The special procedures experts' reports, communications and media 
releases follow this format. They tend to be written in the UN's favoured quasi-legal style in 
order to convey objectivity and authority: 'facts' are dispassionately stated, human rights 
instruments are cited, gaps in rights implementation are identified.199 To take one example, in 
his 2003 country report on the Philippines Stavenhagen reduces the profound impact on 
Indigenous peoples of the militarisation of their territories to an assorted list of unlawful acts: 
The Special Rapporteur is concerned about multiple reports of serious human rights violations 
involving indigenous peoples, within the framework of a process of militarization of indigenous 
areas. Such abuses include attacks upon the physical integrity and security of indigenous persons, 
dispossession and destruction of property, forced evacuation and relocation, threats and 
harassment, disruption of the cultural and social life of the community, in other words, the 
violation of civic, economic, social and cultural rights. 200 
As the Philippine Government's scathing response noted above reveals, the approach did not 
protect Stavenhagen and his report from attack. 
Less frequently, presumably given experts' perceptions of the independence and 
objectivity demanded by the mandates' terms, the experts adopt the role of empathetic advocate. 
In adopting this role they ask readers to see them as truth tellers given their understanding of 
what it means to have one ' s rights violated.201 The experts do this by drawing in readers with 
197 Cl iffo rd Geertz, Works and Lives: the Anthropologist as Author (Polity Press, 1988) 73-101 cited in John Morton, 
'I-wi tnessing I the Witness: A Response to Ken Maddock on Courtly Truth and Native Title Anthropology' (2002) 
3(2) The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 89, 89. 
198 Geertz, above n 197, 79 quoted in Morton, above n 197, 89. 
199 See generally Stanley Cohen, 'Witnessing the Truth' (1996) 1 Index on Censorship 36; Rosanne Kennedy, 'Moving 
Testimony: Human Rights, Palestinian Memory, and the Transnational Public Sphere' in Chiara De Cesari and Ann 
Rigney (eds), Trans-national Memory: Beyond Methodological Nationalism (de Gruyter, forthcoming 2014). 
Regarding the special procedures speci ficall y, see Hilary Charlesworth, 'Kirby Lecture in International Law -
Swimming to Cambodia: Justice and Ritual in Human Rights After Confl ict' (2010) 29 The Australian Year Book of 
International Law 1, 6. 
20° CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 2002/65: Mission to the Philippines, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.3 (5 March 2003) [62]. 
20 1 The empathetic advocate is simi lar to Clifford Geertz' s 'Absolute Cosmopolite', who is 'a fi gure of such enlarged 
capacities for adaptabil ity and fe llow fee ling, for insinuating himself into practicall y any situation, as to be able to see 
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emotive text, such as direct quotes from rights victims. For example, in his 2012 country report 
on his mission to the United States Anaya quoted a young student from a high school where a 
majority of the students are from a nearby reservation: 'I'm going to be honest with you, 
sometimes I don't eat. I've never told anyone this before, not even my mom, but I don't eat 
sometimes because I feel bad about making my mom buy food that I know is expensive. And 
you know what? Life is hard enough for my mom, so I will probably never tell her. '202 The use 
of testimonies is contemplated by the special procedures' Manual of Operations.203 Direct 
quotes can be particularly empowering as they allow the rights victims, and others in a similar 
position, to literally see themselves and their struggles recognised and acknowledged in the text. 
(b) Praising the Positives 
At times special procedures experts engage praise in their country reports, 
communications, special reports on specific cases, annual reports, media releases, and other 
work too. It is standard for special procedures experts' country reports, and Anaya 's special 
reports on specific cases, to praise states for positive developments in recent years or since a 
previous visit of a special procedures mandate-holder. For example, in his 2004 report on 
Canada Stavenhagen remarked: 
The Special Rapporteur is encouraged by Canada's commitment to ensure that the country's 
prosperity is shared by Aboriginal people, a goal to which the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments devote an impressive number of programmes and projects and considerable financial 
resources, as well as by Canada's commitment to close the unacceptable gaps between Aboriginal 
Canadians and the rest of the population in terms of educational attainment, employment and 
access to basic social services. 204 
However, in the Indigenous rights domain the technique is most readily flexed by Anaya. He 
has collected examples of good practices regarding Indigenous rights recognition that can be 
understood as a form of praise for the subject state. In his 2011 report on his mission to the 
Sapmi region he observed that, ' [i]n many respects, initiatives related to the Sarni people in the 
Nordic countries set important examples for securing the rights of indigenous peoples. ' 205 He 
as [others] see, think as [others] think, speak as [others] speak, and on occasion even feel as they feel and believe as 
they believe.' Geertz, above n 197, 79 quoted in Morton, above n 197, 89 (edits to the quote are Morton's). 202 Anaya Report on US 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /47/Add.l , [32]. Anaya also used the technique in, for example, his 
press statement at the close of his 20 13 mission to Canada. James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Statement upon Conclusion of the Visit to Canada, above n 50 . 203 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [73]. 
204 CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Mission to Canada, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.3 (2 December 2004) [5]. 
205 Anaya Report on Sapmi Region 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.2 (6 June 2011 ) 1. See generally Anaya Annual 
Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [29]. 
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has used his annual thematic reports to recognise positive developments, such as praising states' 
endorsement of the UNDRIP. 206 He has praised states during the interactive dialogue before the 
HRC, including Peru in 2011 for a new law concerning consultation with Indigenous peoples.207 
He sometimes refers to positive developments in his observations on communications.208 He has 
also occasionally praised states' Indigenous rights situations in the media. For example, in 2009 
he ' commended the Government of Nicaragua for taking affirmative steps to implement' the 
decision of the Inter-American Court in Mayagna (Sumo) Community of A was Tingni v 
Nicaragua,209 which awarded the Awas Tingni peoples title to their ancestral lands.210 Praise is 
typically a minor component of all mandate-holders' commentary, however. In the reports it is 
generally restricted to a short paragraph or two, appearing more as a diplomatic nicety than a 
concerted effort to leverage the regulatory power of the principle of continuous improvement. 
(c) Clarifying and Constructing Knowledge 
More commonly the special procedures experts engage in dialogue-building through 
efforts to lift knowledge amongst states and others regarding the content of international 
Indigenous rights norms. In building knowledge around the content of international Indigenous 
peoples' rights norms the experts seek to impact state behaviour in varying ways. The experts 
seek to avoid claims by states that they were unaware of the nature of their Indigenous rights 
obligations or that the content of those rights is unsettled. They seek to add clarity to the law, 
offering up their own interpretations of the content of international Indigenous rights norms and 
even who counts as 'Indigenous'. The mandate-holders endeavour to ensure that Indigenous 
peoples and Indigenous rights advocates are aware of the content of Indigenous peoples' rights 
so that they may then use that information to lobby states. This educative dimension is central as 
the content of international Indigenous rights norms is not generally well known beyond a small 
pool of experts. In performing this work the experts both 'translate' human rights ideas and 
institutions into local contexts for local consumption, as well as translating local concerns and 
ideas into the language of the international human rights system. Sally Engle Merry terms this a 
process of 'vernacularization' .211 The experts further seek to develop the law, reflecting their 
role as norm-makers .212 
206 Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/ 12/34, [25] ; Anaya Annual Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37, 
[13] , [14]; Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [l OJ. See generally Anaya Reportto GA 2013, UN 
Doc A/HRC/9/9 [9]. 
207 James Anaya, final remarks, in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Part II, Clustered 
Interactive Dialogue on indigenous Peoples, 19th Plena,y Meeting, above n 124. 
208 OHCHR, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Communications, above n 134 . 
209 IACHR Series C No 79, 31 August 200 I. 
210 Anaya 's press release is cited in Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [21]. 
211 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice 
(University of Chicago Press, 2006) 220; Sally Engle Merry, 'Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: 
Mapping the Middle' (2006) I 08(1) American Anthropologist 38, 40. Similarly, Piccone argues 'that the special 
procedures play a unique role as independent, flexible and practical instruments for translating international norms to 
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Efforts at enhancing knowledge are evident in a variety of the experts' working 
methods. They are seen in the experts' country reports, communications, special reports on 
specific cases, and media releases. These working methods help to build knowledge of the 
content of international Indigenous rights norms and its application in specific cases. The 
experts' observations and recommendations can provide a basis for finding solutions to the 
rights issues identified. They may inform state policies and legislation and the decisions of 
domestic courts.21 3 Efforts at improving knowledge are also evident in working methods that 
have not yet been analysed, including the experts' thematic studies. 
(i) Elevating Knowledge in Thematic Studies 
(a) Primary Tool 
Thematic studies, which are included in the special procedures' annual reports and 
special reports, are the experts' primary tool for improving knowledge regarding Indigenous 
rights norms. They are focused on awareness-raising,214 with several experts developing 
analytical :frameworks or guidelines regarding particular rights issues-in their reports. 215 The 
studies are produced by thematic mandate-holders, and occasionally by country mandate-
holders.216 A wide variety of actors are generally invited to contribute to the reports, including 
Indigenous peoples, governments and civil society.217 Many special procedures experts conduct 
questionnaires or surveys to collect the views ofrelevant actors, including Anaya's 
questionnaire on the impact of extractive industries operating within or near indigenous 
territories, and Stavenhagen's questionnaire on domestic legislation, policies and programmes 
regarding Indigenous peoples' rights. 218 Expert seminars, conferences and meetings also feed 
practical outcomes.' Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of 
Human Rights Norms', above n 1, 225. 
2 12 See, eg, Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs' , above n 14, 
205; Surya P Subedi et al, 'The Role of the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights Council in the 
Development and Promotion oflnternational Human Rights Norms' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of 
Human Rights 155, 159; Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 3, 303 ; Ingrid Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the 
Field of Human Rights, above n 3, 64-5; Alston, Morgan-Foster and Abresch, above n 6,202; Naples-Mitchell, above 
n 3, 233; Jose L Gomez del Prado, 'Extra-Conventional Protection of Human Rights' in Felipe Gomez Isa and Koen 
de Feyter (eds), International Human Rights Law in a Global Context: Achievements and Challenges (University of 
Deusto, 2006) 285, 335. 
213 Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [70], [71]. 
214 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [106] . See generally Oberleitner, above n 80, 59-60. 215 See, eg, CHR, Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Ms Katarina Tomasevski, 
Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/33, UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/49 (13 
January 1999) [51]-[74] . See generally Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 3, 300-01. 216 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia Surya P Subedi, 
UN Doc A/HRC/18/46 (2 August 2011) [36]-[54]. See generally Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, above n 148, 125. 217 See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41, annex [21]; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc 
AIHRC/21/47, [35]. Indigenous peoples sometimes request topics for study by the experts. For example, in 2011 the 
Pacific Indigenous Caucus requested that the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples ' study climate change and 
IPs' [Indigenous peoples ' ] rights in the Pacific region.' doCip, Update No 94-95 (2011) (January/April) 
<http://www.docip.org/ All-Issues.121.0.html> 14. 
21& A naya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [27] ; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2004, UN Doc 
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into many of the thematic reports. 219 Unlike the country reports, and occasionally the 
communications, the thematic reports do not contain recommendations directed at specific 
states. Typically they contain conclusions and recommendations directed at states and the 
international system more generally. Because the recommendations are generalised the thematic 
reports do not endeavour to shame states into Indigenous rights conformity in the same way as 
other of the experts' working methods. 
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples is a key source of 
thematic studies on Indigenous peoples' rights. The Special Rapporteur conducts studies on 
issues relevant to Indigenous peoples across the world. 220 As identified in the previous chapter, 
since the creation of the EMRIP with its singular role of providing thematic expert advice to the 
HRC the Special Rapporteur has made the production of thematic reports a secondary aspect of 
the mandate's work, focusing on the preparation of 'practically oriented' studies.221 
Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur has produced a host of thematic reports. Generally, a 
different theme has been studied each year, although both experts have considered the content 
of the international instruments relevant to Indigenous peoples' rights, development projects, 
and the rights of Indigenous peoples in Asia. 
Stavenhagen's thematic reports covered an assortment of topics. He produced reports 
concerning the international norms regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples and the major 
human rights issues confronting Indigenous peoples in 2002;222 the impact of large-scale 
development projects on Indigenous peoples' rights, with a focus on dams, in 2003;223 access to 
justice and the relationship between Indigenous customary law and national legal institutions in 
2004;224 Indigenous peoples and education systems in 2005;225 the implementation of domestic 
laws and international standards to protect Indigenous peoples' rights in 2006;226 and trends 
concerning the situation of the rights of Indigenous peoples around the world in 2007.227 
E/CN.4/2004/80, [7]. Other special procedures experts also issue questionnaires, such as the expert on cultural rights. 
OHCHR, Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights: Questionnaire on Access to Cultural Heritage (2010) 
<http: //www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/cultural_rights/cultural_heritage.htm>. 
2 19 See, eg, Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/3 I 7, [42] ; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47, 
[37]; Anaya Annual Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37, [18] ; CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Conclusions 
and Recommendations of the Expert Seminar on Indigenous Peoples and the Administration of Justice, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.4 (27 January 2004) 2; CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Conclusions and Recommendations 
of the Expert Seminar on Indigenous Peoples and Education, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.4 (15 December 2004) 2; 
CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Summary Report of the Conclusions and Recommendations from the International 
Seminars on Constitutional Reforms, Legislation and Implementation of Laws Regarding the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add .5 (17 January 2006) 3. 
220 See generally Preston et al, above n 25, 18-20. 
22 1 Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [1 3]; GA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, UN Doc A/64/33 8 ( 4 September 2009) [26]. 
222 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97. 
223 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2003, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90. 
224 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2004, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80. 
225 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88. 
226 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78. 
227 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32. 
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Stavenhagen also published several special reports with a thematic focus , outlining general 
considerations regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples in Asia in 2007,228 and publishing the 
Study on Best Practices in 2007,229 and a progress version of that report in 2006.230 
The themes of Anaya's reports were also diverse. He prepared reports regarding 
operationalising the UNDRIP in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2013;231 the duty of states to consult with 
Indigenous peoples and obtain their consent before carrying out matters affecting them in 2009 
and 2011 ;232 the responsibilities of corporations regarding Indigenous peoples ' rights in 2010 
and 2011;233 the rights of Indigenous peoples' to development with culture and identity and to 
participate in decision-making in 2010;234 violence against Indigenous women and the need to 
harmonise UN activities regarding Indigenous peoples in 2012;235 and extractive industries 
operating within or near Indigenous territories in 2011, 2012 and 2013.236 Anaya's focus on the 
impact of extractive industries followed his identification of the issue as 'one of the foremost 
concerns of indigenous peoples worldwide, and possibly also the most pervasive source of the 
challenges to the full exercise of their rights. ' 237 Anaya expressed an intention to elaborate a set 
of guidelines or principles to guide protection of Indigenous rights in this context, building on 
Ruggie 's Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.238 Accordingly, his final thematic 
report in 2013 included a set of ' [ c] onditions for getting to and sustaining indigenous peoples ' 
agreement to extractive activities promoted by the State or third party business enterprises ' .239 
Anaya also prepared a special report on the situation of Indigenous peoples in Asia in 2013,240 
228 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Rodolfo Stavenhagen: General Considerations on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples in Asia, UN Doc A/HRC/6/1 5/Add.3 (1 Tovember 2007). 229 Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4. 
23° CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 2005/51: Progress 
Report on Preparatory Work for the Study Regarding Best Practices Carried Out to Implement the Recommendations 
Contained in the Annual Reports of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.4 (26 January 2006) ('Progress Report on Study on Best Practices'). 
231 Anaya Annual Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9; GA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, UN Doc A/64/338 (4 September 2009); GA, 
Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, UN Doc A/65/264 (9 August 2010); Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9. 232 Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34; GA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/66/288 (10 August 2011) ('Anaya Report to GA 2011') . 233 Anaya Annual Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37; Anaya Report to GA 2011, UN Doc A/66/288. 234 GA, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, UN Doc A/65/264 (9 August 2010). 
235 Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47; Anaya Report to GA 2012, UN Doc A/67/301. ? '6 
_, Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /47 ; Anaya 
Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41. 
237 Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [57]. Stavenhagen reached a similar conclusion in 2007, see 
Stavenhagen Annual Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32, [1 7]. ? '8 
_, Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [62] , [74]-[76], [89]; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc 
A/HRC/21/47 [74]-[75], [86]-[89]. 
? '9 
_, Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41, [41]-[78]. 
240 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Consultation on the 
Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Asia, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 /Add.3 (31 July 2013). 
133 
as noted above, and on the outcomes of the international expert seminar on the role of the UN 
mechanisms with a specific mandate regarding the rights oflndigenous peoples in 2009.241 
(b) Variable Elevation 
The degree to which the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' thematic studies can 
actually be said to elevate knowledge of the content of international Indigenous rights norms 
varies. Stavenhagen's thematic reports typically had the sense of summaries of submissions 
made to him regarding the relevant topic, grouped by theme, suggesting that much reliance was 
placed on the veracity of the submissions. It also meant that his thematic reports were 
predominantly comprised of descriptions of situations in various countries with little high-level 
discussion of the key issues. With a social sciences background the reports contain little analysis 
of the international legal framework, bar those reports that expressly examine that infrastructure. 
But they expertly identify underlying socio-political issues. When the reports did seek to outline 
the scope of existing law at times the assessments conflicted with later assessments by Anaya, a 
preeminent legal scholar in the field. For example, Stavenhagen and Anaya differed on when 
Indigenous peoples' right to free prior and informed consent applied. 242 The recommendations 
in Stavenhagen' s reports further tended to be broad and loosely framed. 243 Yet, Rodriguez-
Pifiero Royo and Preston et al argue that Stavenhagen' s thematic reports have contributed to 
debates regarding Indigenous rights norms within academia, human rights bodies and 
international agencies.244 
In contrast, Anaya's thematic reports more confidently elucidate the content of 
international Indigenous rights norms. Reflecting his legal expertise Anaya's thematic studies 
contain sophisticated legal analyses of the content of the particular international Indigenous 
rights norms under study. The reports are erudite, comprehensive and bring clarity to the 
substantive content of Indigenous norms. 245 But they reflect the opinion - albeit skilfully argued 
and articulated - of one person. There is a danger that the authority that attaches to the mandate 
can contribute to drown out other, equally valid, interpretations and understandings of the same 
norms. Anaya's thematic reports typically refer to specific countries only to illustrate general 
principles and reflect independent research and analysis in addition to the content of 
24 1 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Conclusions and Recommendations of the International Expert Seminar on the 
Role of United Nations Mechanisms with a Specific Mandate Regarding the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/34/Add .7 (1 September 2009). 
242 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2003, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90, [73]; Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/34, [ 46]-[ 49]. 
243 See, eg, Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88, [33]. 
244 Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, above n 148, 120; Preston et al, above n 25, 20, 54. 
2
~
5 Anaya 's commentary on Indigenous peoples' right to be consulted on decisions affecting them is one example. 
Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [36]-[57], [6 I ]-[74]; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc 
A/HRC/21/47, [45]-[76], [79] -[87]; Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41, [18]-[40] , [49]-[51] , [58] -
[7I]. 
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submissions made to him. His reports are also focused on providing guidance on how 
Indigenous rights norms can be given effect in practice, embracing a strategy of 'principled 
pragmatism' ,246 as his identification of key conditions for agreements for resource extraction on 
Indigenous peoples' territories reveals. Anaya has described the influence of his thematic 
reports as 'discernible', citing their use in two decisions of the Constitutional Court of Colombia 
in support.247 
The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples is not the only UN expert to have 
contributed to knowledge on the content of these themes, which further affects the degree to 
which the reports add to knowledge of the content of international Indigenous rights norms. 
Speaking to the jurisdictional competition between the three Indigenous-exclusive bodies 
discussed in Chapter III, the WGIP considered topics including land rights, development, 
cultural heritage and intellectual property, health, and education in its annual reports to the Sub-
Commission.248 It also looked at the role of companies with regard to Indigenous rights, 249 as 
did the PFII,250 and the OHCHR.251 During the PFII's first session in 2002 a parallel panel 
discussion on Indigenous peoples and large-scale development projects was held.252 The PFII 
touched on issues regarding consultation and development projects in its thematic focus on 
territories, lands and natural resources and, like Anaya, has devoted attention to the position of 
Indigenous women. 253 It also considered the theme of Indigenous education. 254 The EMRIP has 
followed the Special Rapporteur's lead in producing thematic studies regarding education,255 the 
right to participate in decision-making,256 the extractive industries,257 and access to justice.258 It 
246 Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [72] , [80]. 
247 Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [71]. 
248 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eleventh Session, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (23 August 1993) [106]-[122] , [123]-[130], [137]-[139] . See generally Stavenhagen Annual 
Report 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, [7] . 
249 See, eg, CHR, Report of the Workshop on Indigenous Peoples, Private Sector Natural Resource, Energy and 
Mining Companies and Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/ AC.4/2002/3 (17 June 2002). 250 See, eg, PFII, Report of the International Expert Group Meeting on Extractive Industries, Indigenous Peoples ' 
Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, UN Doc E/C.19/2009/CRP.8 (4 May 2009). 25 1 See, eg, HRC, International Workshop on Natural Resource Companies, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights: 
Setting a Framework for Consultation, Benefit-Sharing and Dispute Resolution, UN Doc A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/5 (3 
July 2009). 
252 UN Parallel Events (2002) <http://www.un.org/rights/indigenous/events.htm>. 253 PFII, Report on the Sixth Session, UN Doc EIC.19/2007/12 (2007) [4]-[38] ; PFII, Report on the Third Session, 
UN Doc E/C.19/2004/23 (2004) 30-1. Anaya's commentary on violence against Indigenous women was a 
reproduction of views he expressed at an expert seminar convened by the PFII on the topic in 2012. PFII, Report on 
the Eleventh Session, UN Doc E/C.19/2012/13 (2012) [19]-[28]. 
254 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88, [80] . 255 EMRIP, Study on Lessons Learned and Challenges to Achieve the Implementation of the Right of Indigenous 
Peoples to Education: Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/HRC/12/33 (31 August 2009). 
256 EMRIP, Progress Report on the Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making: 
Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/HRC/15/35 (23 August 201 0); 
EMRIP, Final Report of the Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making: Report of 
the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/HRC/18/42 (17 August 2011 ). 257 EMRIP, Follow-up Report on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making, with a Focus 
on Extractive Industries, UN Doc A/HRC/21/55 (16 August 2012). 258 EMRIP, Access to Justice in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Study by the 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/HRC/24/50 (30 July 2013). The only study by the 
EMRIP to date that has not already been a focus of thematic study by either Stavenhagen or Anaya is the EMRIP's 
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has devoted attention to the implementation of the UNDRIP in several sessions.259 For the most 
part the crossover has been complementary and constructive. The themes are far larger than a 
single short report can address. The Special Rapporteurs have taken account of, and contributed 
to, the thematic issues examined by the PFII and the EMRIP. 260 However, Anaya's frustration at 
the EMRIP's decision to focus on extractive industries and its suggestion that it develop 
guidelines jointly with Anaya was thinly veiled.26 1 Nevertheless, he indicated his intention to 
coordinate his work with that of the EMRIP on the topic, which he did.262 
Many other special procedures mandate-holders conduct thematic studies as a 
component of their mandate. It is less common for other mandate-holders to explore the specific 
dimensions of Indigenous peoples' rights in a significant way in the course of their thematic 
studies, reflecting the different focus of their mandates. But there are exceptions. In 2013 the 
Working Group on transnational corporations presented a thematic report to the GA on 'the 
challenges faced in addressing adverse impacts of business-related activities on the rights of 
indigenous peoples through the lens of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. ' 263 Further, several experts devote notable, and adroit, attention to the particular 
impact of the rights concerns they examine on Indigenous peoples. For example, the expert on 
housing developed basic principles and guidelines on development-based evictions and 
displacement that devoted especial attention to Indigenous peoples;264 and the expert on food 
examined the threat posed by increasing pressures on land on Indigenous peoples, including 
referencing Indigenous peoples' right to self-determination.265 Some states have claimed that 
these reports have influenced their understanding of the rights issues addressed, including as 
they affect Indigenous peoples.266 
2012 study on languages and cultures: EMRlP, Role of Languages and Culture in the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights and Identity of Indigenous Peoples: Study of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc A/HRC/21 /53 (16 August 2012). 
259 For example, at its annual sessions the EMRlP has an agenda item on the UNDRIP, see EMRlP, Annotated 
Provisional Agenda, UN Doc A/HRC/EMRlP/2013/1/Add.l (26 April 2013) 2-3. Further, in 2012 the EMRlP 
produced a report on its questionnaire on implementation of the UNDRIP, see EMRlP, Summary of Responses fro m 
the Questionnaire Seeking the Views of States on Best Practices Regarding Possible Appropriate Measures and 
Implementation Strategies in Order to Attain the Goals of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /54 
(16 August 20 12). 
260 See, eg, Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88, [80] ; Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35, [20]. 
261 Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47, [42]-[43]. 
262 Ibid [ 42]-[44] ; Anaya Reportto GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/3 17, [47]. 
263 GA, Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Ente,prises, UN Doc A/68/279 (7 August 20 13) 2. 
264 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate 
Standard of living, Miloon Kothari, UN Doc A/HRC/4/18 (5 February 2007) annex 1 ('Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement'). 
265 GA, Oli vier De Schutter, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, UN Doc A/65/28 1 (11 August 
2010) [l] , [3] , [10]-[13] , [23] , [40](c), [43](a)(ii); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Olivier De Schutter: Large-Scale Land Acquisitions and leases: A Set of Minimum Principles and Measures to 
Address the Human Rights Challenge, UN Doc A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (28 December 2009) [30]. 
266 See, eg, Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast 
Human Rights Council Seventeenth Session: Item 3 (30 May 20 11 ) United Nations 
<http://www.un .org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=l 10530>. 
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The content of the thematic studies are publically disseminated, helping to draw 
attention to the knowledge they impart. The studies are presented to the HRC (and previously 
the CHR) annually. Some are presented, in full or in summary form, to the GA. They are 
published on the OHCHR' s website and, where they exist, on the personal websites of mandate-
holders. Information gathered in preparation of the studies can also be made available on the 
OHCHR's website. Occasionally the studies are promoted in media releases, media conferences, 
conference presentations and meetings.267 But dissemination is restricted to the main languages 
of the UN and is generally dependent on readers having Internet access . 
(ii) Knowledge Advancing Dialogues 
The special procedures mandate-holders regularly engage in formal and informal dialogue 
with a range of actors, including governments, Indigenous peoples, UN agencies, regional rights 
bodies, civil society and corporations. The mandate-holders use these discussions to advance 
knowledge about the content of Indigenous rights norms and to advocate for their greater 
protection. For example, Anaya presented expert testimony before both the Inter-American 
Court concerning Indigenous peoples ' consultation rights and the United States Committee on 
Indian Affairs regarding the domestic policy implications of the UNDRJP. 268 As identified in the 
previous chapter, the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples shares information regarding its 
activities (including its thematic work) at the annual sessions of the PFII and the EMRIP, as do 
other special procedures experts. 269 Since 2011 the HRC has held an annual half day panel on an 
Indigenous rights theme, which the Special Rapporteur participates in too. 270 In addition, the 
experts contribute to conferences and seminars regarding Indigenous peoples ' rights beyond the 
UN. For example, Stavenhagen participated in a seminar on multiculturalism in Africa 
organised byNGOs with the support of the OHCHR and UNDP in Gaborone in 2002,271 and the 
expert on violence against women participated, along with Anaya, in a regional consultation on 
267 See, eg, Efe Agency, above n 188. This practice is encouraged in the Manual of Operations. Manual of 
~ferations, above n 7, [107] . 
26 James Anaya, 'La Norma de Consulta Previa: lntroducci6n a Peritaje ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, Caso Sarayak:u' (Media Release, 7 July 2011 ) <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/1a-norma-de-
consulta-previa-in trod uccion-a-perita j e-ante-la-corte-in teramericana -d e-derechos-humanos-caso-sarayaku>; Jam es 
Anaya, 'Testimony before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs' (Media Release, 10 June 2011) 
<http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/testimony-before-the-senate-comrnittee-on-indian-affairs>. 
-
69 See, eg, Catarina de Albuquerque, 'Statement to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues' (New York, 24 May 
2011) <http ://v-.r\, N . un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/clocuments/session _ l O _statement_ SR_ water.pelf>. 270 HRC Resolution 18/8 Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples A/HRC/Res/18/8 (2011) para 14. See, eg, HRC, 
Panel (HalfDa;1 on Language and Indigenous Peoples, 17th Plenmy Meeting (20 September 2011) United Nations 
<http ://w,vw.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/20 11 /09/panel-half-day-on-language-and-indigenous-peoples-17th-
plenary-meeting. html>. Further, the Working Group on transnational corporations' inaugural annual Forum on 
Business and Human Rights in 2012 included a panel discussion concerning the impact of business on Indigenous 
peoples. HRC, Summmy of Discussions of the Forum on Business a,1.d Human Rights, Prepared by the Chairperson, 
John Ruggie, I Doc A/HRC/FBHR/2012/4 (23 January 2013) [11 l] -[118]. 271 CHR, Report on the Third Workshop on Afu1ticulturalism in Aji-ica: Peaceful and Constructive Group 
Accommodation in Situations Involving Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2002/4 (17 
June 2002); Stavenhagen Annual Report 2002, I Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, [3]. 
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violence against Indigenous women in the Asia Pacific organised by NGOs in India in 2008. 272 
3 Capacity-building on the Periphery 
The third and final core regulatory mechanism engaged by the special procedures is that 
of capacity-building. Recall, as discussed in Chapter II, that Braithwaite and Drahos define 
capacity-building as 'helping actors get the technical competence to satisfy global standards, 
when they wish to meet them but lack the capacity to do so. '273 In the present context, I use the 
concept of capacity-building to refer to situations where specific technical assistance is provided 
to improve a state's conformity to international Indigenous rights norms. It does not necessarily 
require the provision of financial resources, which would shift the mechanism from a dialogic 
tool to more of a reward-based one. Capacity-building differs from the technique of shaming in 
that it is proactive rather than simply reactive, developing capacity to avoid further rights 
violations rather than only responding to existing violations. In fact, positive encouragement is 
an important component of capacity-building. It differs from creating conditions for dialogue, in 
particular the technique of improving knowledge, because although it builds knowledge and 
dialogue actual assistance is provided to a state or other actor to realise particular Indigenous 
rights norms. Knowledge is not shared nor is dialogue built in a generalised sense. 
The special procedures mandate-holders engage capacity-building as a tool primarily 
through the technical advisory assistance they provide to states in order to promote best 
practices. But it is not a commonplace tool. Naples-Mitchell identifies the experts' ' tension 
between competing obligations to treat sovereign states as partners and as adversaries'; 274 in 
practice, the latter approach tends to trump, relegating this method to the periphery. However, 
the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' mandate expressly envisages a role for the 
expert in providing technical advisory assistance to states.275 The Special Rapporteur fulfils this 
aspect of the mandate through ' encouraging domestic legal, administrative, and programmatic 
reforms that comply with the standards of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and other relevant human rights instruments. ' 276 Anaya sees this practical 
oriented work as significant to his mandate.277 He also points out that it has involved moving 
away from the 'standard work areas' of the special procedures, requiring 'resourcefulness and 
innovation ' on his part.278 It often, although not always, involves a short visit to the state 
concerned. It can be ongoing; for example, Anaya has furni shed technical assistance to Ecuador 
272 Anaya Annual Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/ I 2/34, [28). 
273 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge Uni versity Press, 2000) 26. 
274 Nap les-Mitche ll , above n 3, 232 . See generall y Pinheiro, above n 191, 166. 
275 HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para l (f). 
276 The University of Arizona Indigenous Peoples Law and Po li cy Program, The Role of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples within the United Nations Human Rights System: A Handbook for Indigenous 
Leaders in the United States (2012) 19. 
277 See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [26), [69), [70) . 
278 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/3 17, [8). 
13 8 
on multiple occasions. Given the cooperative nature of this work it is dependent on states first 
requesting assistance, which several have. 
Anaya has provided technical advisory assistance to Ecuador, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, 
Suriname, Peru, Brazil and Guatemala; all Latin American countries and all developing states. 
Suggestions regarding processes and laws for appropriately consulting with Indigenous peoples 
have dominated his technical advisory work, including in respect of Chile in 2009 and 2012, 279 
Colombia in 2010,280 Guatemala in 2011 ,281 Peru in 2011 and 2012,282 and Brazil in 201 2.283 
Anaya ' s advice to the Guatemalan Government regarding a draft instrument on consultation is 
explored in Chapter VI. Regarding Ecuador, Anaya provided technical advisory assistance to 
the Government on several occasions between 2008 and 2011 , suggesting content for new 
constitutional provisions affirming Indigenous peoples' collective rights , as well as providing 
comments on new legislation aimed at bettering Indigenous peoples ' access to justice and 
coordinating Indigenous justice systems with the national justice system. 284 Anaya' s 2011 visit 
to Suriname was conducted to provide assistance to the Government on the development of 
laws and administrative measures to secure the rights of its Indigenous and tribal peoples, 
particularly regarding their lands and natural resources. 285 In 2013 Anaya provided advice on a 
protocol for justice administrators prepared by the Supreme Court of Mexico concerning the 
rights of Indigenous peoples and individuals.286 In the process of providing his advice Anaya 
has sometimes suggested that countries seek out capacity-building assistance from other bodies, 
such as the Inter-American Commission, UNDP, ILO and World Bank too.287 
The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples also builds the capacity of other actors to 
realise Indigenous peoples' rights, notably Indigenous peoples themselves and international 
bodies. Anaya has provided observations on initiatives regarding Indigenous peoples to a host 
of UN and international organisations during his time in the mandate, including the OHCHR, 
UNESCO, the UNDP, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Finance 
279 HRC, Relator Especial de Naciones Unidas sabre la Situacion de los Derechos Humanos y las Libertades 
Fundamentales de los Indigenas: Principios Internacionales Aplicables a la Consulta en Relacion con la Reforma 
Constitucional en Materia de Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas en Chile, UN Doc A/HRC/1 2/34/Add.6 (24 April 
2009); Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41, annex [9]. 
?80 
- Anaya Annual Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/1 5/37, [16]. 
281 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3, [8]-[10]. ?8? 
- - Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47, [1 0]; Anaya Report to GA 201 3, UN Doc A/68/317, [11] . ?83 
- Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21 /47, [10] ; Anaya Report to GA 201 3, UN Doc A/68/317, [11 ]. 284 Anaya Communications Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9/ Add. l, annex 1 (' Observaciones del Relator Especial 
sabre la Situacion de Derechos Humanos y Libertades Fundamentales de los Indigenas Acerca del Proceso de 
Revision Constitucional en el Ecuador'); HRC, Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya: Observations on the Progress Made and 
Challenges Faced in the Implementation of the Constitutional Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
Ecuador, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.7 (13 September 2010) [l l]-[12] ; Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35, [13]. 
285 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya Addendum Measures 
needed to secure indigenous and tribal peoples ' land and related rights in Suriname A/HRC/18/35/Add .7 (18 August 
2011 ) [2]. 
?86 
- Anaya ReporttoGA2013, UN DocA/68/31 7, [1 2]. 
287 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: Measures 
Needed to Secure Indigenous and Tribal Peoples ' Land and Related Rights in Suriname, UN Doc 
A/HRC/1 8/35/Add.7 (1 8 August 2011 ) [27]-[28]. 
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Corporation of the Word Bank Group and WIPO. 288 For example, in 2011 Anaya provided 
observations on the UNDP 's draft guidelines regarding consultation with Indigenous peoples for 
activities carried out in the context of the climate change mitigation programme for reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, also known as REDD. 289 
Capacity-building to advance the realisation of Indigenous peoples ' rights has not been 
a core component of other special procedures experts' work. Capacity-building did not feature 
prominently in Stavenhagen's work in the role in part because the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples was not extended to include reference to 'technical 
cooperation at the requests of Governments' until the mandate was renewed in 2007, shortly 
before Stavenhagen completed his final term in the role. 290 But Stavenhagen did receive 
requests for technical advisory assistance from states. For example, the Spanish Government 
provided Stavenhagen with a copy of a draft strategy for cooperation with Indigenous peoples 
' for study and possible comments' .291 Examples of other special procedures mandate-holders 
furnishing technical advisory assistance to states regarding Indigenous peoples' rights are 
scarce, given the differing subject matter of their mandates. States too are likely to direct such 
requests to the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, or be directed there by other 
mandate-holders or actors. However, in 2011 the HRC encouraged all mandate-holders to 'pay 
attention to the technical assistance and capacity-building needs of States in their thematic and 
country mission reports ' suggesting that this tool may play an enhanced role in other mandate-
holders' work, including regarding Indigenous peoples, in the future. 292 
D Emaciation and Enrolment: The Experts' Institutional Support 
l Slender UN Assistance 
The special procedures receive insubstantial institutional support from the UN in 
leveraging these regulatory mechanisms. The OHCHR is the primary source of UN support.293 It 
delivers assistance through the Human Rights Council and Special Procedures Division and, 
?88 
- See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 , annex [11] ; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc 
A/HRC/21/47, [11] , [14]; Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [6] , [14] ; Anaya Annual Report 2009, 
UN Doc A/HRC/ 12/34, [15] . See generall y Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/3 17, [13]-[14] . ?89 
- Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [14]. 
290 HRC Res 6/12, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/12, para l (f). 
291 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005 /88, [11] . It is not clear whether Stavenhagen provided 
comments on the draft. 
292 HRC Res 16/21, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/ 16/2 1, para 25. 
293 Special procedures mandates ' enabling resolutions typically request the UN Secretary-General and the HCHR to 
provide the relevant mandate with 'all the necessary human, technical and financial assistance '. See, eg, CHR Res 
2001/57, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2001/57, para 11. See also Manual of Operations, above n 7, [20]-[22]. Before the 
OHCHR the mandates were supported by the UN Centre for Human Rights. Some ad hoc ass istance is also provided 
by other UN bodies and programmes. See, eg, Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88, [1 2]; 
Stavenhagen Annual Report 2004, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80, [7]. 
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within this, the Special Procedures Branch. 294 According to the Manual of Operations, the 
Division 'provides support to thematic Special Procedures with thematic, fact-finding, policy 
and legal expertise, research and analytical work, and administrative and logistical services. ' 295 
A small number of thematic mandates are supported by a different division of the OHCHR: the 
Research and Right to Development Division. The country mandates receive support from yet 
another section - the Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division.296 The OHCHR 
provides common coordination services, including looking after the Quick Response Desk for 
communications, and maintaining the thematic database on communications and internal 
electronic discussion forum for mandate-holders and their staff.297 Other divisions assist with 
the media, administration, and coordinating interactions with the treaty bodies, amongst other 
things.298 But in practice the efficacy of this support is severely hampered. 
The OHCHR is chronically underfunded and understaffed. The OHCHR's budget for 
2010-2011 was less than five per cent of the UN' s overall budget, despite the fact that the 
OHCHR provides support to the steadily increasing number of special procedures mandates, the 
UPR process, the treaty bodies, maintains nearly 60 human rights field presences, conducts 
country missions, furnishes technical assistance to states, and organises activities to promote 
human rights, amongst other tasks. 299 The OHCHR receives only approximately a third of its 
funding requirements from the UN's regular budget, it is otherwise reliant on voluntary 
contributions from states.300 In 2012 the HCHR described the Office as 'stretched to breaking 
point' .301 Although the lack of funding is endemic to the UN human rights system as a whole, 
the absence of financial support for the special procedures is especially striking and is a 
criticism well documented in the literature. 302 Anaya has raised the possibility that the lack of 
funding is an intentional systemic flaw, 'one can interpret it as sort of a way in which 
institutionally the special procedures are in fact inhibited from doing much'. 303 Tomasevski and 
294 See, eg, Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human 
Rights, above n 3, 6. 
295 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [21]. 
296 Ibid [22]. 
297 Ibid [21]. 
29 8 Ibid [22]. 
299 GA, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/67/36 (3 August 2012) [5] ; 
International Service for Human Rights , High Commissioner Calls 3% UN Budget for Human Rights 'Scandalous ', 
in Third Committee Dialogue (31 October 2011) <http: //www.ishr.ch/news/high-commissioner-calls-3 -un-budget-
human-rights-scandalous-third-committee-dialogue>. See generally Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3,471. 300 OHCHR, About OHCHR Funding <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ ABOUTUS/Pages/FundingBudget.aspx>. 301 Navi Pillay, 'Opening Statement' (Statement to the HRC, Geneva, 10 September 2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=l2486&LanglD=e>. 
302 See, eg, Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3, 470-78; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special 
Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 1, 224-26; Piccone, Catalysts for 
Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 10, 47-52; Lempinen, above n 1, 165-
80; Subedi et al, above n 212, 160; Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special 
Rapporteurs', above n 14, 217-18; Pinheiro, above n 191 , 168; Ingrid Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field 
of Human Rights (Intersentia, 2005), above n 3, 148-49; Hoehne, above n 18, 54; Kamminga, above n 166, 323; 
O'Flaherty, above n 3, 69; Tomasevski, above n 71, 218-19; Victoria Tauli-Corpuz and Erlyn Ruth Alcantara, 
Engaging the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People: Opportunities and Challenges (Tebtebba Foundation, 
2004) 30-1; Naples-Mitchell, above n 3, 241 -42. 
303 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). 
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Hoehne concur.304 Anaya estimated that half of the missions he undertakes in the role are 
funded by the OHCHR and the other half by external sources.305 He has invited increased 
financial support for the mandate before the GA and the HRC. 306 
The strain on funding affects staffing levels within the OHCHR, which in tum affects 
the personnel available to provide support to special procedures mandate-holders. Generally 
thematic mandate-holders have only one assistant provided by the OHCHR in Geneva. Country 
mandate-holders receive even less staff support, with the country desk officers that assist them 
also assigned other tasks, such that the expert on Cambodia has described country mandate-
holders as ' a one-man or one-woman army' .307 The OHCHR lacks the resources to conduct 
follow-up monitoring to assess whether states have implemented special procedures experts' 
recommendations, although some OHCHR country offices encourage domestic actors in this 
work.308 In the context of mandates that are essentially fulltime but unpaid, and so require most 
experts to concurrently remain in fulltime employment, the low level of institutional assistance 
. . 1s conspicuous. 
A related issue is the quality of the technical policy and research support the OHCHR 
provides. The OHCHR's Geneva based staff members are not necessarily well versed in the 
human rights issue the subject of each mandate. This is exacerbated by the fact that OHCHR 
staff members are rotated through the Office and so, even where expertise is developed, the staff 
member can be transferred to support another mandate.309 Anaya has received varying levels of 
support from the OHCHR-Geneva staff, recounting having the support of OHCHR-Geneva staff 
unfamiliar with even the basics of international Indigenous peoples' rights law. He comments, 
'[i]t has been mixed. In the past, for example, the staff I have had have [ asked things 
like] .. . "Well, what are Indigenous peoples? Why do you have the 's' behind it?" At the moment 
the staff member who supports me is excellent. But the support is just from one person.' 310 
Stavenhagen was fortunate in that for the latter part of his time in the mandate he had the 
support of an OHCHR-Geneva staff member expert in international Indigenous rights law. 311 As 
304 Tomasevski, above n 71,215; Hoehne, above n 18, 58 . The constrained funding is both attributable to a lack of 
state funding and to the way funds are allocated within the OHCHR. Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3, 474. 
305 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by email 5 July 2013). 
306 See, eg, GA, ' Implementation oflndigenous Rights Declaration Should Be Regarded as Political , Moral , Legal 
Imperative without Qualification, Third Committee Told' (Press Release, UN Doc GA/SHC/3982, 18 October 201 O); 
Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc AIHRC/18/35, [89] . 
307 Subedi , 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 14, 217. See 
also Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights 
Norms', above n 1, 210. 
308 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n I , 218; Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special 
Rapporteurs', above n 14, 2 I 6- 17; Baldwi n-Pask and Scannell a, above n 3, 44 7. 
309 Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human Rights 
Norms', above n 1,225; Interview 9 (Te lephone Interview, 6 September 20 10). 
3 10 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). The question 
regarding the 's' in peoples reflects a lack of knowledge of the long debate over Indigenous peoplehood, mentioned 
in Chapter III, which was fina ll y resolved with the reference to ' peoples ' in the UNDRJP. 
31 1 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interv iew, 19 April 2011); Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 
September 2010). 
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a result, Stavenhagen praised the high level of support he received, both substantively and 
administratively, from the OHCHR's Indigenous Peoples and Minorities Section (prior to the 
creation of a dedicated special procedures section within the OHCHR, the mandates' support 
teams were divided thematically so Stavenhagen was directly supported by that Section).312 In 
contrast, OHCHR country teams (where they exist) are routinely praised for the logistical 
support they provide; linking the mandate-holders with IPOs, NGOs and government actors; 
providing analysis and advice on local issues; disseminating the experts' reports; and promoting 
the reports' implementation. For example, of the OHCHR country teams, Anaya remarks 'I 
have had excellent support and cooperation with them, when I have worked with them, in 
almost all cases. ' 313 But, in some states UN country teams have been more peripheral to the 
special procedures' work, sometimes because of capacity issues and at other times because they 
wish to distance themselves from the sensitive issues that the experts raise. 314 Where there is a 
UNDP or other UN presence, but no OHCHR team, these actors also occasionally provide 
logistical assistance.315 
2 Meaningful Outsider Contributions 
A few special procedures mandate-holders have supplemented the sparse UN assistance 
by enrolling the financial and personnel support of non-UN institutions. The Special Rapporteur 
on Indigenous peoples has been especially deft at enrolling external support. Special procedures 
mandate-holders have secured funding from external institutions, a move supported by the 
Manual of Operations.316 However, one concern with sourcing funding from outside of the UN, 
including from states, is that the funding can be tied to particular criteria. This potentially 
compromises, or gives the appearance of compromising, the independence of the expert.317 This 
is exacerbated by the lack of transparency surrounding the external funding sources of special 
312 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011 ). Other mandate-holders interested in 
Indigenous rights issues also received support from the OHCHR's Indigenous Peoples and Minorities Section during 
that period. Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 2010). 
313 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). See generally 
Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 14, 218. 314 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1,217; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human 
Rights, above n 10, 61; HRC, Report of the Fourteenth Meeting of Special Rapporteurs/Representatives, Independent 
Experts and Chairpersons of Working Groups of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council and of the 
Advisory Services Programme, UN Doc A/HRC/7 /29 (13 December 2007) [77] (' Report of the Special Procedures' 
14th Meeting') . 
315 Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 14,218. But 
see Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 10, 63. 
Assistance from the UNDP and others is encouraged in the Manual of Operations, see Manual of Operations, above n 
7, [124]-[127]. 
316 Manual of Operations, above n 7, [11]. 
317 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). See generally 
Rhona KM Smith, 'The Possibilities of an Independent Special Rapporteur Scheme' (2011) 15(2) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 172, 179; Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special 
Rapporteurs', above n 14, 218; Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3, 474-75. 
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procedures mandate-holders.318 The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has successfully 
secured significant funding from private sources including the Ford Foundation, for example.319 
In addition, the Special Rapporteur receives some financial support via a fund controlled by a 
board comprised of Indigenous rights focused NGOs, including the International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). 320 The additional funding allows the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples to conduct more country visits than would otherwise be possible and helps 
to fund non-UN based expert personnel to support the mandate's work. 
Personnel and expert technical support is also provided to the special procedures by some 
non-UN institutions, including universities and research institutions. Mostly this support is 
secured by experts from or based in the global North, revealing the inequitable position of 
experts from the global South.321 The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples is supported by 
the University of Arizona Support Project for the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous Peoples (Support Project). The Support Project is based out of the University of 
Arizona, where Anaya holds a professorship. Anaya and his staff provided some support to 
Stavenhagen while he was in the role too, although the Support Project did not formally exist at 
that point.322 As a result, Stavenhagen was more reliant on UN support, although he continued 
to receive his salary from El Colegio de Mexico and was given a reduced teaching load during 
the term of his mandate.323 The Support Project has several staff members. All are lawyers with 
experience in Indigenous rights issues.324 The team provides around the clock assistance to 
Anaya in his work, travelling with him on his country missions and attending international 
fora. 325 Anaya is further supported by students from the Special Rapporteur Support Team 
Workshop, a part of his university's law curriculum, which offers students the opportunity to 
conduct research to assist the Special Rapporteur. 326 Anaya similarly enjoys a reduced formal 
teaching load.327 
The Support Project enables Anaya to address Indigenous rights concerns quickly, to 
publicise his work and findings immediately on the non-UN webpage hosted by his university 
( as well as through his personal Special Rapporteur-branded twitter feed, Y ouTube channel and 
other social media tools), and to draw on expert assistance. This is an arrangement that Anaya 
sees benefitting both the mandate and the university - the mandate's work gets done, students 
have an opportunity to work on projects connected with the mandate and the university gets to 
318 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1,225; Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 3, 474-75 . 319 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by emai I 5 July 2013). 
320 Ibid. 
32 1 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1, 225; Naples-Mitchell , above n 3, 242; Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 3, 309. 
'2? 0 
- See, eg, Stavenhagen Annual Report 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78, [4]. 
323 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interv iew, 19 April 2011 ). 
324 James Anaya, Support/or the Special Rapporteur <http: //uns r.jamesanaya.o rg/support/support-for-the-special-
rapporteur>. 
325 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 201 J, updated by email 5 July 2013). 
326 James Anaya, Support/or the Special Rapporteur, above n 324. 
327 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011, updated by email 5 July 2013). 
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promote the international dimension of one of its flagship areas: 'native studies' .328 Anaya 
reflects that if he had limited himself to the resources and support provided by the UN 'I would 
do maybe 20% of what I have been able to do, whatever that is worth. ' 329 The levels of support 
he received from the OHCHR improved towards the end of his time in the mandate, although 
the Support Project retained a central role. Anaya remarks: 
I am comfortable saying that, during the first four or five years of my mandate, 90-95% of the 
substantive work - the writing of the reports, the research that goes into the reports, the 
examination of cases, the drafting of the commentary on cases, the observations we do, the 
preparations for country missions - 90-95% of what was done on the substantive work was by the 
Support Project. That changed, however, a couple of years ago, and the OHCHR staff member 
assigned to me does a significant amount of the substantive work in close cooperation with the 
Arizona team. 330 
But his steps to move the functioning of the mandate away from the UN attracted criticism from 
a former OHCHR-bureaucrat, who equated it with a 'privatisation' of the role: ' [i]t used to be 
that "the UN" was intervening, now it's "Anaya" intervening.' 33 1 However, Anaya is not the 
only special procedures mandate-holder to maintain a non-UN website on his work in the 
mandate, or to draw on significant financial and personnel support from external sources. 332 And 
the same former OHCHR bureaucrat acknowledged that '[t]he Special Rapporteur for 
Indigenous peoples is doing great work. ' 333 
The special procedures receive further informal assistance from a host of other 
institutions and actors, including academics, IPOs and NGOs. The experts are heavily 
dependent on this support, particularly in relation to follow-up. 334 But these actors often face 
their own funding and personnel constraints. As Piccone points out, NGO follow-up campaigns 
regarding special procedures experts' recmnmendations are often 'ad hoc, under-resourced or 
overcome by more urgent matters. ' 335 This leaves gaps in the pressure placed on states to 




331 Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 2010). 
332 Experts, including those on housing and food, have maintained similar websites, see Right to Housing 
<http: //righttohousing.org/en/about/direitoamoradia.org>; Right to Food <http://www.righttofood.org/>. In addition, 
other special procedures experts, including 'Katarina Tomasevski , Paul Hunt, Jean Ziegler, Olivier de Schutter - have 
created or made use of independent academic/research projects to support their mandates'. Golay, Mahon and 
Cismas, above n 3, 309. 
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A/HRC/1 5/37, [3]; StavenhagenAnnual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88, [12] . 335 Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human !Ughts 
Norms', above n 1,218. 
145 
E Conclusion: A Dialogic Toolset 
Shaming, dialogue-building and capacity-building are the major regulatory mechanisms 
engaged by the experts to fulfil their Indigenous mandate. Shaming is the leading tool utilised. It 
is a preeminent feature of the experts' country missions and reports, which are one of the 
experts' fundamental work methods. Using this mode, a host of experts, particularly the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, have shamed states for Indigenous rights violations 
( especially related to land rights) through speech acts from the field and through the texts of 
their country reports and associated media releases. Shaming is leveraged with more subtlety in 
the experts' communications, a further central work method, with the experts' wide-ranging 
accusations of Indigenous rights violations more implied than express. Anaya has broken new 
ground in making special country missions to investigate specific cases a regular part of his 
work, which shame states in much the same way as the experts' general country missions and 
associated reports. The media spotlight is also harnessed by the experts in the most serious and 
urgent cases. In the hands of some mandate-holders, dialogue-building features in these 
approaches too. The technique of dialogue-building is harnessed through the act of witnessing 
the 'truth' of encroachments on Indigenous rights, mainly in the role of Geertz's 'Complete 
Investigator' and, occasionally, through praising states for Indigenous rights improvements. 
However, mostly it guides the experts' thematic studies on Indigenous peoples' rights (and also 
their dialogues with assorted players), which endeavour to build understanding concerning this 
body of norms. Capacity-building is not a common mechanism wielded by the experts as a 
whole. But Anaya stands out for the attention he has devoted to the provision of technical 
advisory assistance to a variety of Latin American states. All three of these prime mechanisms 
are dialogic because the special procedures system was created with no coercive capability. Nor 
are the experts in a financial position to mobilise economic rewards: the support the experts 
receive from the UN is strikingly low, although the Support Project is a shining example of the 
significant non-UN institutional support a few experts have enrolled. The pressing question now 
is the extent to which these tools have advanced the realisation of Indigenous peoples' rights in 
practice; that question is the focus of the following two chapters. 
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V STRATEGIC DEFLECTION: NEW ZEALAND'S 
RESPONSE 
A Introduction 
In order to discern the influence of the special procedures mechanism on state 
behaviour towards Indigenous peoples it is necessary to take a closer look at the mechanism' s 
impact on specific states. In this chapter I analyse the influence of the special procedures 
mechanism on state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples in New Zealand. New Zealand is an 
instructive state to examine as it is a stable, comparatively wealthy, liberal democracy, with a 
minority Indigenous peoples population; it is frequently celebrated for its domestic Indigenous 
rights record; and it has been praised for its 'significant strides ' to address the special 
procedures' concerns regarding the rights ofMaori. 1 Further, although it has only received two 
country visits by a special procedures mandate both visits have concerned the human rights 
situation of Maori. 2 It has also been the subject of several reported communications from special 
procedures experts, two of which directly concerned Maori. 3 Despite this focused attention, in 
New Zealand we see few examples of moves towards full implementation of the special 
procedures ' recommendations and little persuasive evidence that these moves can be attributed 
to the mechanism in anything other than a peripheral way. Recalling the different behavioural 
responses to nonnative orders discussed in Chapter II, I argue that ritualism is the New Zealand 
Government ' s prime behavioural response to the international Indigenous rights norms the 
subject of the special procedures ' recommendations. New Zealand deflects deeper scrutiny of its 
Indigenous rights record by disguising its inward resistance to the special procedures ' 
recommendations regarding hard rights with outward acceptance of those recommendations. It 
leverages its partial commitment to recommendations concerning soft rights to deflect attention 
both from its fuller implementation of those soft rights and its resistance to the hard rights. The 
chapter begins with a precis of New Zealand ' s Indigenous rights situation; moves to consider 
the shaming and dialogue-building tools engaged by the special procedures in the country; 
outlines the Government ' s official response to the special procedures ' attentions, which shifted 
from rejection to a degree of outward commihnent; assesses the Government's action to 
implement the special procedures ' recommendations using three exemplar recommendations 
concerning the hard norms of constitutional protection and land, and the soft cultural right to 
education; and concludes with comment on the state ' s strategy of deflection. 
1 Anaya Follow-up Report on Nev,; Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [66] . 2 Ibid; Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/7 8/Add.3 . 3 Anaya Communications Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41/Add.4, [121 ]-[124] ; Joint Communications Report 
Februa,y 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/22/67, 78; Anaya Communications Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9/Add.1, [339]-[357]. 
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B Background 
New Zealand is a stable liberal democracy. The country 's population of close to 4.5 
million is increasingly diverse, with Maori comprising around 15 per cent; Pakeha (European 
New Zealanders) the majority at around 75 per cent; and, people from Asia and the Pacific 
sizeable portions.4 New Zealand inherited the democratic institutions of its British coloniser: it 
is a constitutional monarchy with the British sovereign as head of state, a unicameral elected 
House of Representatives and an independent judiciary. Two parties dominate domestic politics, 
the centre-right National Party and centre-left Labour Party. In the 2011 general elections the 
National Party returned to power with the support of three smaller parties, including the Maori 
Party, which focuses on Maori concerns. New Zealand is a comparatively wealthy country, with 
a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita that places it in the upper quartile globally.5 It 
scores high on human development indices, with the UNDP ranking it 6th out of 187 countries. 6 
It is regarded as a peaceful country, with one index positioning it as third most peaceful country 
globally. 7 It has long championed itself internationally as a leader in Indigenous rights 
recognition, identifying Indigenous peoples' rights as 'of profound importance' to the state and 
' integral to its identity' .8 And it has ratified the core international human rights instruments (the 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, CEDA W, CRC, CA T and CRPD) that inform the content of 
international Indigenous rights norms, as well as belatedly endorsing the UNDRIP in 2010.9 But 
it has a dark colonial history that continues to manifest itself in the human rights situation of 
Maori today. 
Maori and the lands they knew as Aotearoa were colonised by the British from the early 
19th century. The British Crown proclaimed sovereignty over New Zealand on the combined 
basis of a treaty of cession - the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi (Treaty) - and discovery. 10 Yet, the 
Treaty' s effect as a transfer of sovereignty is contested, 11 in part because it has English and 
4 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2013 - The Rise of the South: 
Human Progress in a Diverse World (201 3) 194; New Zealand Ministry of Social Development, The Social Report 
2010 (20 10) 10, 16. 
5 Centra l Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: New Zealand <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/nz. html>. 
6 UNDP, above n 4, 143. 
7 Institute fo r Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2013: Measuring the State of Global Peace (201 3) 5. 
8 New Zealand Government representative, Rosemary Banks, ci ted in GA, 'General Assembly Adopts Declaration on 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 'Major Step Forward ' Towards Human Rights fo r All , Says Pres ident ' (P ress Release, 
UN Doc GAI i 06 12, 13 September 2007). See generall y Moana Jackson, 'Colonization as Myth-Making: A Case 
Study in Aotearoa' in S Greymoming (ed), A Will to Survive: Indigenous Essays on the Politics of Culture, Language 
and identity (McGraw-Hi ll , 2004) 95. 
9 HRC, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner fo r Human Rights, in Accordance with 
Paragraph 15 (B) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: New Zealand, UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.6/5/NZL/2 (1 1 March 2009) 2. 
10 Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End (Penguin Books, 1990) 97. 
11 See generally F M Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation (Auckland 
University Press, 1999). 
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Maori language versions that provide for very different exchanges. 12 Under the Maori text, the 
British Crown receives governorship and iwi (nations) and hapu (kinship groups) are guaranteed 
tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) over their lands, villages, and tangible and intangible 
treasures. 13 Whether the governance granted to the Crown was over British settlers solely or 
over Maori too is debated; only five years earlier the British Crown had recognised New 
Zealand's independence under the rule of a collection of rangatira (leaders) in the 183 5 
Declaration of Jndependence. 14 In contrast, the English text of the Treaty grants the British 
Crown sovereignty and guarantees iwi and hapu 'the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession 
of their Lands and Estates, Forests Fisheries and other properties' .15 Most Maori signed the 
Maori language version. 16 Nevertheless, two decades after the Treaty was signed the British had 
assumed control over much of the country. 17 
The violence that followed Britain's assumption of sovereignty had a swift and 
devastating impact on Maori. The Maori population was rapidly overrun by the influx of settlers 
and greatly reduced by foreign disease and warfare, including extensive British military action 
against iwi and hapu to free up land for settlers. 18 By the beginning of the 1900s most of New 
Zealand's lands and resources were out of Maori hands, a product of the individualisation of 
property titles, confiscations following the military conflicts, and substantial land cessions. 19 
Maori systems of law and governance were usurped by the imposition of a common law legal 
system. Maori culture was also repressed, including through the suppression of te reo Maori 
(the Maori language) and Maori health practices.20 Maori actively resisted the force of 
colonisation from the earliest times, 21 with Maori protest movements peaking during the 1960s 
and 1970s, epitomised in the 1975 march to end the alienation of Maori land.22 
Prompted by Maori activism and lobbying, the New Zealand Government has made 
some efforts at redress. In 197 5 the Waitangi Tribunal, an independent commission of inquiry 
with mostly recommendatory powers, was established to hear Maori claims regarding breaches 
12 See generally Walker, above n 10, 90-4; David V Williams, 'Te Tiriti o Waitangi - Unique Relationship Between 
Crown and Tangata Whenua?' in I H Kawharu (ed), Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 1989) 64, 76-80. 
13 Walker, above n 10,290. 
14 Jackson, 'Colonization as Myth-Making: A Case Study in Aotearoa', above n 8, 100-01. 15 Walker, above n 10,289. The Treaty ofWaitangi has three written articles and a fourth oral promise. See generally 
Claudia Orange, The Treaty ofWaitangi (Bridget Williams Books, 2 ed, 2011); Michael Belgrave, Merata Kawharu 
and David Williams (eds), Waitangi Revisited - Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 2 
ed, 2004). 
16 See, eg, Williams, above n 12, 76. 
17 See generally Walker, above n 10, 98-152. 
18 Ibid 98-134; Jackson, 'Colonization as Myth-Making: A Case Study in Aotearoa', above n 8, 103-04. 19 Walker, above n 10, 139. 
20 Ibid 146-48, 181 . See, eg the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 (NZ). 21 See, eg, Walker, above n 10, 111-34, 148-85. See generally Lindsay Cox, Kotahitanga: The Search for Maori 
Political Unity (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
22 See, eg, Walker, above n 10, 209-19; Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonising Methodologies: Research and 
Indigenous Peoples (Zed Books, 1999) 109; Jackson, 'Colonization as Myth-Making: A Case Study in Aotearoa', 
above n 8, 104. 
149 
of the Treaty by the Crown.23 The courts moved to identify the Treaty as part of New Zealand's 
constitutional canon in the 1980s.24 A process of settlement negotiations for redress for Treaty 
grievances was instituted by the Government in the 1990s, with a number of important iwi and 
pan-Maori settlements agreed.25 The common law doctrine of aboriginal title was judicially 
recognised.26 In the 1996 elections the number of seats guaranteed to Maori in Parliament, 
which had been static at four since 1867 (when Maori made up half of the population), was 
made proportional to the number of Maori registered on the Maori electoral roll; the current 
allocation is seven seats.27 
The recognition of the rights of Maori as Indigenous peoples is wanting, however. 
Expressions of Maori self-determination are limited by the state to statutorily-constrained fonns 
of iwi self-management of Treaty settlement assets and minority participation in the 
Westminster-derived political institutions of the state.28 The 2011 elections saw the number of 
Maori with seats in the House of Representatives align roughly proportionally with the number 
of Maori in the population. But the number of Maori represented in local government is far 
lower, averaging around five per cent.29 Even with the operation of the Treaty settlement 
process, only approximately five per cent ofNew Zealand land is in Maori ownership. 30 Treaty 
settlements return an estimated one to three per cent of the value of the economic loss to iwi and 
hapu;31 a figure that also ignores the political, social and cultural losses they have endured. 
Public backlash against the recognition of Maori rights in New Zealand is strong: Indigenous 
rights are portrayed as privileges creating dual classes of citizenship.32 Negative stereotypes of 
Maori abound in the mainstream media. 33 The health of the Maori language is fragile. 34 On 
almost every socio-economic indicator Maori fare worse than Piikehii: one in three Maori 
23 Treaty ofWaitangi Act 1975 (NZ). See generally Jackson, 'Colonization as Myth-Making: A Case Study in 
Aotearoa', above n 8, 105-06. 
24 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641,655,664 per Cooke P. See generally 
Jackson, 'Colonization as Myth-Making: A Case Study in Aotearoa', above n 8, 106. 
25 See, eg, Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992 (NZ); Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 
1995 (NZ); Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 (NZ). 
26 See, eg, Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [ 1986] 1 NZLR 680 (HC). 
27 This was made possible by the Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), ss 45, 76-9, 269. The original four seats were created by 
the Maori Representation Act 1867 (NZ). 
28 Annette Sykes, 'The Politics of the Brown Table ' (Bruce Jesson Lecture 2010, The University of Auckland, 27 
October 2010) 4. 
29 Janine Hayward, 'Mandatory Maori Wards in Local Government: Active Crown Protection of Maori Treaty Rights' 
(2011) 63(2) Political Science 186, 187. 
30 New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Maori Land Court <http ://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/maori-land-court>. 31 See, eg, Toon Van Meiji, 'Conflicts of Redistribution in Contemporary Maori Society: Leadership and the Tainui 
Settlement' (2003) 112(3) The Journal of the Polynesian Society 260, 260. Anaya recognised this fact, see Anaya 
Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/ Add.4, [ 40]. 
32 See eg, ACT Party, Fed Up with Pandering to Maori Radicals? (Advertisement, 11 July 2011) 
<http: //www.act.org.nz/fi les/MaoriRadicals.pdf>; Don Brash, 'Nationhood' (Address to the Orewa Rotary Club, 27 
January 2004) National Party <http: //www.national.org.nz> . See generally NZHRC, Tui Tui Tuituia: Race Relations 
in 2012 (20 13) 63 ('Race Relations 2012'). 
33 See, eg, NZHRC, 'Press Counci l Decisions on Commentators Show Need for Accuracy to Support Viewpoints' 
(Media Release, 15 June 2012) <http://www.hrc.co.nz/newsletters/diversity-action-programme/nga-reo-
tangata/2012/06/press-counci I-decisions-on-commentators-show-need-for-accuracy-to-support-viewpoints/>. 
34 Waitangi Tribunal , Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting 
Maori Culture and Identity - Te Taumata Tuarua/Volume 2 (201 1) 441 . 
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children live in poverty, twice the rate for Piikehii children;35 the Maori unemployment rate is 
more than triple that of Piikehii;36 there is a greater than six year gap in life expectancy between 
Maori and non-Maori;37 and, Maori comprise more than 50 per cent of the country's prison 
population despite making up only 15 per cent of the state's total population.38 The 
contemporary Indigenous peoples' rights situation of Maori demands attention and action. 
C Engaging on Miiori Rights 
l Shaming at the Forefront 
The special procedures have a short history of engagement on Indigenous rights issues 
in New Zealand. The special procedures' attentions began soon after New Zealand issued a 
standing invitation to all thematic special procedures in 2004.39 Shaming has been the principal 
regulatory tool leveraged by the mandate-holders. It has been engaged through the two country 
missions from the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, and the accompanying country 
reports and media releases, as well as through two communications.40 Altogether, the special 
procedures have issued around 40 recommendations to the New Zealand Government to address 
its Indigenous rights situation concerning the spectrum of Indigenous rights norms. 
( a) Stavenhagen 's Maximal Approach 
The special procedures first began to take a specific interest in New Zealand's treatment 
of Maori in 2005 when Stavenhagen conducted a country mission to the state. His mission was 
35 Bryan Perry, Household Incomes in New Zealand: Trends in Indicators of Inequality and Hardship 1982 to 2011 (Ministry of Social Development, 2012) 19. 
36 New Zealand Council ofChristian Social Services, Vulnerability Report: Issue 14 (2013) 4; Innovation and 
Employment New Zealand Ministry of Business, Maori Labour Market Factsheet - March 2013 (2013). 37 International Human Rights Instruments, Core Document Forming Part of the Reports a/States Parties: New 
Zealand, UN Doc HRI/CORE/NZL/2010 (11 March 2011) 22. 
38 Ibid 37. 
39 OHCHR, Standing Invitations <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/lnvitations.aspx>. Anaya and 
Stavenhagen are not the only UN human rights experts with mandates on Indigenous peoples to have conducted 
official visits to New Zealand. The former Chairperson-Rapporteur of the WGIP visited in 1992 and the then Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1997. Erica-Irene 
A Daes, Indigenous Peoples: Keepers a/Our Past - Custodians of Our Future (IWGIA, 2008) 42; CHR, Study on 
Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations: Final 
Report by Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20 (22 June 1999) [26]. 40 OHCHR, 'UN Expert on Human Rights oflndigenous People Concludes Visit to New Zealand' (Press Statement, 
25 November 2005) <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=302l&LanglD=E>; 
Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3; Anaya Communications Report 2008, UN 
Doc A/HRC/9/9/Add.l, [339]-[357]; Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4; 'New 
Zealand: More to be done to Improve Indigenous People's Rights, Says UN Expert' (Press Statement, 23 July 2010) 
<http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/new-zealand-more-to-be-done-to-improve-indigenous-peoples-rights-says-
un-expert>; HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya: Preliminary Note on the Mission to New Zealand (18 to 24 July 2010), UN Doc 
A/HRC/15/37/Add.9 (26 August 2010) ('Anaya Preliminary Note on New Zealand'); Anaya Communications Report 
2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41/Add.4, [121]-[124]; Joint Communications Report February 2013, UN Doc 
A/HRC/22/67, 78. 
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prompted by the CERD Committee's findings that legislation extinguishing Maori property 
rights in New Zealand's foreshore and seabed through the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (NZ) 
(Foreshore and Seabed Act) discriminated against Maori .41 The nature and impact of this 
legislation is considered in more detail in Part E. During his eleven day visit Stavenhagen met 
with various domestic actors, including high-level Government representatives; representatives 
of iwi, hapu and Maori IPOs; and, members of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission 
(NZHRC, the country's NHRI), the Waitangi Tribunal, the Maori Land Court (a specialist court 
that hears matters concerning Maori-owned land) and academics.42 Stavenhagen skilfully 
engaged the technique of shaming through the media at the close of his country mission. His 
visit had been closely followed by the media.43 On the last day of his mission Stavenhagen 
issued a press release that criticised the 'significant disparities between Maori and Pakeha in 
regard to social and human development indicators'; the 'inadequate' resourcing ofMaori-
medium schools; the fact 'Maori are grossly over-represented in the criminal justice system'; 
and, described redress for land grabs as 'only partially successful', expressing specific concern 
at the effect of the Foreshore and Seabed Act.44 The media release foreshadowed the issues that 
Stavenhagen devoted attention to in his final report. 
Shaming was a central focus of Stavenhagen's final report on his country mission. 
Stavenhagen's report was highly critical of the human rights situation of Maori. He concluded 
that the lack of constitutional recognition for Maori rights and traditional governance bodies had 
fuelled Maori perceptions that they are the junior partners in the Maori-Pakeha relationship, a 
situation best illustrated by the 'sporadic and insufficient redress' Maori had received for the 
dispossession 'of most of their lands and resources', including the foreshore and seabed.45 He 
also identified continuing disparities between Maori and non-Maori across a range of socio-
economic indicators, including employment, health and education;46 an absence of 'self-
41 The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (NZ); CERD Committee, Decision 1 (66): New Zealand Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004, UN Doc CERD/C/66/NZL/Dec.1 (11 March 2005); Internal Memorandum to Minister ofForeign 
Affairs, Winston Peters, 'Visit of UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Issues', 9 November 2005, obtained under 
Official Information Act 1982 (NZ) ('OJA') request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), 1-2. 
42 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3 , [3]-[5]. Stavenhagen also received 
background information on the position of Maori from various sources. I contributed information related to my 
Master of Laws thesis on affirmative action measures for Maori through an academic colleague who was collating 
background information for him from different scholars. 
43 See, eg, Cherie Taylor 'UN Rep Hears Tearful Plea to Help Maori ', New Zealand Herald (online), 23 November 
2005 <http ://www.nzherald.co .nz/rotorua-daily-post/news/article.cfrn?c _ id= 1503438&objectid= I 0932502>; 'Maori 
Denied Rights, UN Man Told' New Zealand Herald 21 November 2005 
< http://www.nzherald .co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=l&objectid=l 0356212>; Ruth Berry, '"One Law for All 
Races" Risky Says Expert' , New Zealand Herald (online), 21 November 2005 
<http://www.nzherald .co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=I &objectid=l0356201 >; Ruth Berry, ' UN to Check Whether 
Foreshore Law Breaches Maori Rights ', New Zealand Herald (online), 14 November 2005 
<http ://www.nzherald .co.nz/nz/news/article.cfrn?c _id= 1 &objectid= I 035 5092>. 
44 OHCHR, UN Expert on Human Rights of Indigenous People Concludes Visit to New Zealand, above n 40 . 
45 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3 , [78]-[79] . 
46 Ibid [80]. 
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governance mechanisms based on the recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination' ;47 and an increasing return to ' assimilationist models' in public discourse. 48 
Stavenhagen's recommendations to the New Zealand Government to address these 
concerns were far reaching. They included that the Treaty be constitutionally entrenched;49 iwi 
and hapu be favoured as the groupings with which the national and local government engages;50 
the Waitangi Tribunal be granted binding powers of adjudication;51 entrenchment of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) (which affirms, inter alia, the right to be free from 
discrimination and the rights of minorities to their culture, religion and language); 52 the repeal 
and replacement of the Foreshore and Seabed Act by a settlement that recognises 'the inherent 
rights of Maori in the foreshore and seabed';53 that iwi and hapu be able 'to self-determine an 
appropriate corporate structure for receipt and management' of Treaty settlement assets'; 54 the 
Crown negotiate ' a more fair and equitable settlement policy and process ' with Maori;55 more 
resources be allocated to Maori education at all levels;56 Maori sacred sites and other places of 
cultural significance be 'incorporated permanently into the national cultural heritage of New 
Zealand';57 social delivery services, particularly health and housing, continue to be targeted and 
tailored to the needs ofMaori;58 the Government support achievement of the UNDRIP by 
consensus;59 and that the Government ratify ILO Convention 169.60 Stavenhagen's report 
received significant attention in domestic mainstream and Maori media when it was released, 
helping to draw attention to the persisting violations of Maori rights he identified. 61 
(b) Anaya's Moderate Course 
The technique of shaming was further leveraged by Special Rapporteur Anaya in his 
2010 follow-up country mission to New Zealand. Even though it was a follow-up mission, 
Anaya did not attempt to follow-up on all of the issues covered in Stavenhagen's 2006 report. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid [81] . 
49 Ibid [85]. 
50 Ibid [87]. 
51 Ibid [89]. 
52 Ibid [91]. See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), ss 19 and 20. 
~
3 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, [92]. 
)4 Ibid [94] . 
55 Ibid [95]. 
56 Ibid [97]. 
57 Ibid [99] . 
58 Ibid [101] . 
59 Ibid [102] . 
60 Ibid [103]. 
61 See, eg, Tracy Watkins, 'Labour Defiant over UN Rebuke', The Dominion Post (Wellington), 5 April 2006; 'No 
Consensus Over UN Report', Television New Zealand (online), 5 April 2006 
<http://tvnz.co.nz/content/695498/425825.html>; Dan Eaton, 'Pressure Mounts on Govt over UN Report', I71e Press 
(Christchurch), 6 April 2006; Moana Jackson, I71e United Nations on the Foreshore: A Summmy of the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur (2006) Converge <http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mj050406.htm>; New Zealand Press 
Association, 'Urban Maori? UN Envoy was "Stunned"' New Zealand Herald (online), 6 April 2006 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=l&objectid=l0376254>; Kim Triegaardt, 'Search for Calm 
Waters' (2009) 45 Te Karaka 29, 29. 
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His chief focus was an examination of the process for settling claims under the Treaty, although 
other issues were also addressed. Anaya's mission was initiated by the New Zealand 
Government itself following New Zealand's eventual endorsement of the UNDRIP;62 
conceivably out of a belief that the report would highlight positive steps taken following the 
change from a Labour to a National-led Government in 2008, which could gamer Maori 
electoral support for the election the following year. 63 During Anaya's six day visit he too met 
with a range of Government, Maori and civil society actors .64 He also leveraged the impressive 
domestic media attention his visit garnered by issuing a press statement on the last day of the 
mission outlining his initial thoughts. 65 In the statement Anaya expressed concern at 'the 
extreme disadvantage in the social and economic conditions of Maori', highlighted complaints 
regarding the Treaty settlement process, called for legislation replacing the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act to avoid 'any discriminatory effects' and protect iwi rights, and urged the 
Government 'to provide constitutional security' to the Treaty principles and international human 
rights. 66 Anaya raised these issues again in more detail in his preliminary note on the mission, 
which was released around a month after his visit, but it failed to gamer domestic media 
attention. 67 
Shaming was core to Anaya's full country report, although his approach was more 
moderate than Stavenhagen' s. While the report did identify some positive developments, some 
of which are considered below, it also identified persisting rights concerns, including regarding 
Maori political participation, consultation of Maori on decisions affecting them, the work of the 
Waitangi Tribunal, the Treaty settlement process, the domestic insecurity of Maori rights, and 
Maori development. A number of these had been signalled in the earlier press statement and 
62 Anaya Prelimina,y Note on Nf:W Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.9, [2]. 
63 Interview 2 (Wellington, 5 May 2011 ). 
64 Anaya Follow-up Report on Nev, Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [2]. 
65 James Anaya, 'New Zealand: More to be Done to Improve Indigenous People 's Rights, Says UN Expert', above n 
40. Regarding the media attention his visit attracted see, eg, Adam Bennett, 'UN Visitor Checks NZ Race Relations', 
Nf:W Zealand Herald (online), 20 July 2010 
<http://www.nzherald .co.nzJpolitics/news/article.cfm?c_id=280&objectid=l0659949>; 'UN Expert Reports on NZ 
Race Relations', Nf:W Zealand Herald (online), 21 July 2010 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nzJnzJnews/article.cfm?c_id=l&objectid=l06603 l l > ; New Zealand Press Association, 'UN 
Expert Targets Maori Disadvantage' , N f:W Zealand Herald ( online), 26 July 2010 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nzJmaori/news/article.cfm?c_id=252&objectid= l 0661297>; 'NZ Must Improve Indigenous 
People 's Rights - UN' , Scoop (online), 24 July 2010 <http: //www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO 1007 /S00461 /nz-must-
improve-indigenous-peoples-rights-un.htm>; 'More Needed to Improve Indigenous People's Rights ', Scoop (online), 
24 July 2010 <http ://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO 1007 /S00300/more-needed-to-improve-indigenous-peoples-
rights.htm>; Melissa Davies, ' UN: NZ Moving in the Right Direction on Race Relations', 3 N f:Ws (onl ine), 21 July 
2010 <http ://www.3news.co.nz/UN-NZ-moving-in-the-right-d irection-on-race-
relations/tabid/419/arti cleID/1 6683 7 /Default.aspx>; Melissa Davies, ' UN Rep Visits Waitangi Marae ' , 3 N f:Ws 
( on line), 2 1 July 2010 <http: //www.3news.co.nzJUN-rep-visits-Waitangi-
marae/tabid/419/articleID/l 66792/Default.aspx>; Hemopereki H Simon, 'Political Storm on the Horizon' , 
Tangatawhenua (online), 26 July 2010 <http://news.tangatawhenua.com/archives/6321 >; ' Indigenous Rights 
Rapporteur will Shape Views' , Te Karere Ip urangi: Maori Nf:Ws Online, 25 July 2010 
<http://mao rinews.com/karere/2010/indigenous-rights-rapporteur-will-shape-views/>; 'Professor Anaya Meets More 
Ministers this Morning Before Heading to Auckland ' Te Karere Maori Nf:Ws (online), 20 July 2010 
<http://,vww.youtube.com/watch?v=zr4k0Qi0Wqo&feature=channel>. 
66 James Anaya, 'New Zealand : More to be Done to Improve Indigenous People 's Rights, Says UN Expert ' , above n 
40. 
67 Anaya Prelimina,y Note on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/1 5/37/Add .9. 
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preliminary note. Anaya's recommendations to the New Zealand Government to address these 
concerns were not as far-reaching as Stavenhagen's. For example, whereas Stavenhagen 
recommended that the Waitangi Tribunal be granted binding powers of adjudication, Anaya 
recommended that decisions by the Government to act contrary to the Tribunal's 
recommendations should simply 'be accompanied by a writtenjustification', although he stated 
that the justification should accord 'with the principles of the Treaty and international human 
rights standards'.68 While Stavenhagen recommended constitutional entrenchment of the Treaty 
and the Bill of Rights Act, Anaya recommended that the Treaty principles 'and related 
internationally-protected human rights' be afforded 'security' in New Zealand's legal system, 
such as through (at a minimum) the development of vetting safeguards for the Treaty similar to 
those under s7 of the Bill of Rights Act.69 That section requires the Attorney-General to report to 
Parliament on the inconsistency of Bills with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of 
Rights Act.70 Additionally, Anaya's recommendations included that the Waitangi Tribunal 
receive sufficient funding; 71 legislation replacing the Foreshore and Seabed Act be consistent 
with the principles of the Treaty and international standards;72 the Treaty settlement process 
involve all interested groups, provide adequate redress to Maori, and give greater consideration 
to the connection Maori have with their traditional lands and resources; 73 special attention be 
directed at increasing Maori participation in local governance, such as through reversing an 
earlier decision to reject the findings of the Royal Commission on Auckland Governance and 
guarantee Maori seats on the Auckland City Council; 74 and that the Government continue its 
work to address socio-economic disparities between Maori and non-Maori.75 
The concerns Anaya raised in his full report received little media attention. Both his 
advance report and the final report's presentation to the HRC barely received a mention in the 
media, with the main emphasis in those sources that covered it centring on the socio-economic 
disadvantage Anaya found. 76 The public release of his advance report was overshadowed by the 
68 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [72]. 69 Ibid [77] . 
70 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), s 7. 
71 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [70] . 72 Ibid [79]. See also HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: The 
Situation of Maori People in New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/XX/Add.Y (17 February 2011) [79] ('Anaya Follow-
up Report on New Zealand: Advance Version'). Anaya's final report is different in some minor respects to the 
advance version of the report. Most notably, and as discussed in Part E of this chapter, these amendments reflect the 
enactment of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ) in March 2011 , the month following 
public release of his advance report. 
73 Ibid [73]-[74]. 
74 Ibid [ 68]. 
75 Ibid [80]-[85]. 
76 See, eg, New Zealand Press Association, 'Maori "Extremely Disadvantaged" in NZ - UN Repmt' , 3 News (online), 
22 February 2011 <http://www.3news.co.nzJMaori-extremely-disadvantaged-in-NZ--UN-
report/tabid/419/articleID/l99305/Default.aspx>; New Zealand Press Association, 'Maori "Extremely 
Disadvantaged" - UN Report', New Zealand Herald ( online ), 22 February 2011 
<http: //www.nzherald .co.nzJnz/news/article.cfm?c _id=l &objectid=l 0707993>; 'UN Told of Extreme Disadvantage 
for Maori', Stu.ff(online), 22 February 2011 <http://www.stuff.co.nzJnational/4687320/UN-told-of-extreme-
disadvantage-for-Maori>; 'UN Report Shouldn't be Lost in Upheaval' , Waatea603am ( on line), 24 February 2011 
<http://waatea.blogspot.com.au/2011/02/te-puni-kokiri-seeks-quake-role.html>. 
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deadly earthquake that struck New Zealand on the same day. One Maori academic reflected, 
' ( w ]e tried to set up a media interview but. .. nobody cared with the Christchurch earthquake.' 77 
Anaya's final report was released almost a year after his visit when interest in its contents had 
faded. The minimal media attention attached to release of Anaya's follow-up report represented 
a lost opportunity to draw public attention to his criticisms of the rights situation of Maori. 
Anaya returned international attention to some of his criticisms during the interactive dialogue 
on his report before the HRC, where he reiterated that the Treaty settlement process 'suffers 
from evident shortcomings' and that Maori 'face extreme disadvantages in social and economic 
spheres in relation to the rest of New Zealand society' .78 But, again, the interactive dialogue was 
not picked up in the New Zealand media. 
(c) Low-key Communications 
The special procedures experts engaged in some low-key shaming in their 
communications with the New Zealand Government too. Several communications have been 
issued by the experts to New Zealand, two of which directly concerned Maori rights. In 2007 
Stavenhagen, jointly with the experts on terrorism and human rights defenders, issued a 
communication to the Government concerning the arrest of Maori social activists suspected of 
terrorism-related offenses, as part of an operation carried out in various parts of the country 
known domestically as Operation 8.79 Then in 2012 Anaya acting alone sent an allegation letter 
to the New Zealand Government concerning the alleged exclusion of a family collective, the 
Mangakahia Whanau, from the Treaty settlement process as a product of the Government's 
policy of negotiating Treaty settlements with large Maori groupings.80 Neither letter had a heavy 
emphasis on shaming the Government, although Anaya's observations on the Government's 
response to the Mangakahia Whanau communication contained some direct remarks on the 
actions he expected the Government to take to address his concerns.81 The communication 
regarding Operation 8 was unusual in that it was publicised through the media prior to its 
publication in the experts' annual reports. 82 A positive by-product of this focus was that it 
77 Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011). 
78 James Anaya speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special 
Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue (20 September 2011) James Anaya 
<http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/videos/webcast- l 8th-session-of-the-human-rights-council-statement-of-specia1-
ra p porteur-and-in teracti ve-d ial ogue>. 
79 Anaya Communications Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9/ Add. l, [339]-[357]. For background on Operation 8 see 
Danny Keenan (ed), Terror in Our Midst? Searching for Terror in Aotearoa Ne1-11 Zealand (Huia Publishers, 2008). 
80 Anaya Communications Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 /Add.4, [121]-[124]; Joint Communications Report 
Februmy 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/22/67, 78. 
81 Anaya Communications Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 /Add.4 , [123]-[124] . In contrast, Stavenhagen's one 
sentence long observation regarding the Operation 8 communication thanked the Government for its detailed 
response and noted that he would 'continue to monitor deve lopments related to the matter ', although there is no 
evidence that he nor the other experts that joined in the communication did . Anaya Communications Report 2008, UN 
Doc A/HRC/9/9/Add . l , [357]. 
82 
'UN to Investigate Tuhoe ' s Anti -Terror Raids' , 3 Ne\-1/s (online), 16 January 2008 <http: //www.3news.co.nz/UN-
to-investi gate-Tuhoes-anti-terror-raids/tabid/209/artic1e!D/43607 /Default.aspx>; Te Ururoa Flavell, Maori Party MP, 
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brought additional international media attention to Stavenhagen's country report. 83 Anaya's 
communication received no media attention, reflecting another missed opportunity to draw 
attention to Anaya's rights concerns. 
2 Dialogue-building as Postscript 
Efforts at dialogue-building were a supplemental feature of the experts ' country 
missions - mainly Anaya's - and, to a lesser extent, the communications as well. The experts ' 
assessment of the human rights situation of Maori witnesses the rights violations outlined. 
Anaya made an effort to praise what he perceived as positive efforts by the New Zealand 
Government in his follow-up report. He commented that '[e]specially in recent years, New 
Zealand has made significant strides to advance the rights of Maori people and to address 
concerns raised by the former Special Rapporteur ', 84 going on to cite several examples. 85 For 
instance, he observed that 'the Treaty settlement process in New Zealand, despite evident 
shortcomings, is one of the most important examples in the world of an effort to address 
historical and ongoing grievances of indigenous peoples'. 86 Elsewhere in the report he also, inter 
alia, 'welcomes New Zealand's efforts to secure Maori political participation at the national 
level';87 'applauds the availability of Maori language instruction'; 88 and identifies the 
Government' s Whonau Ora programme, a cross-agency culturally anchored social programme 
for reducing inequalities experienced by Maori and others, as ' a positive initiative for Maori 
development' .89 The NZHRC remarked on Anaya's ' astute acknowledgement of the progress 
being made' .90 Praise was also a feature of Anaya's press release at the conclusion of his visit 
and his preliminary note, which echoed the praise of the final report.91 In contrast, 
Stavenhagen's country report on New Zealand offered little praise - he only went so far as to be 
'encouraged' at the Government's commitment to reduce Maori inequality and see Maori share 
in development,92 and acknowledge the shift from an 'assimilationist model ' of ethnic relations 
'Government' s Human Rights Humiliation' (Press Release, 17 January 2008) 
<http: //www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0801/S00129.htm>; New Zealand Press Association, 'UN Sends 'Please Explain' 
Letter over Terror Raids', Converge ( online ), 17 January 2008 <http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/tr 170108.htm>. 83 See, eg, Jon Henley, ' The Maori Resistance' , The Guardian (online), 6 November 2007 
<http: / /www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2007 /nov/06/features 1 l .g2>. 
84 Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [66). 
85 Ibid [ 66]-[ 67). 
86 Ibid [ 67) . 
87 Ibid [68) . 
88 Ibid [80). 
89 Ibid [84) . 
90 NZHRC commissioner, Rosslyn Noonan, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: 
Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 78. 91 James Anaya, 'New Zealand: More to be Done to Improve Indigenous People ' s Rights, Says UN Expert' , above n 
40; Anaya Preliminary Note on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.9, [3]-[5] , [8], [10) . 92 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/ Add.3, 2. Stavenhagen also identified 'progress' in 
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to one of biculturalism. 93 However, in his annual thematic reports Stavenhagen has frequently 
held Indigenous rights developments in New Zealand out as positive.94 Further, the Special 
Rapporteur ' s country reports and dialogues with state and other actors sought to improve 
knowledge within New Zealand concerning the content of international Indigenous rights norms 
and their specific application to Maori. Anaya, for example, expressly referred to the provisions 
of the UNDRIP in assessing the Bill designed to repeal and replace the Foreshore and Seabed 
Act.95 And Stavenhagen, in his Study on Best Practices, stated that his New Zealand 'visit was 
reportedly seen as a basic point ofreference by indigenous organizations ' . 96 
D Astringent to Amiable: The Government 's Official Response 
l Stavenhagen in the Firing Line 
The New Zealand Government' s official response to the special procedures ' 
consideration of the human rights situation of Maori varied markedly. Despite its reported 
strong objection to the creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples,97 it permitted each country visit by the mandate and it formally cooperated with the 
special procedures ' communications regarding the rights of Maori, responding promptly and 
substantively to each of them, although it largely dismissed the concems.98 The latter fact is 
significant in light of the high number of governments that do not respond either at all or 
substantively to the experts' communications, as discussed in the previous chapter. 99 But the 
Government's attitude towards Stavenhagen's visit and report was particularly negative. 
Stavenhagen expressed 'his gratitude to the people and Government of New Zealand for their 
hospitality and cooperation' in his country report. 100 Yet, during his visit Stavenhagen received 
minimal cooperation from the Government such that Preston et al use New Zealand as an 
example of governments that ' show little interest' in the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
93 Ibid [77]. 
94 See, eg, Stavenhagen Annual Report 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, [60]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2003, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2003 /90, [30]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2004, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80, [64], [75]-[76]; 
Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88, [66], [74] . 9-) Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [56] . See also Anaya Follow-up Report 
on New Zealand: Advance Version, UN Doc A/HRC/18/XX/Add.Y, [56]. 
96 Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4 , [1 5]. 
97 Victori a Tau Ii-Corpuz and Erlyn Ruth Alcantara, Engaging the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People: 
Opportunities and Challenges (Tebtebba Foundatio n, 2004) 6. 
98 Anaya Communications Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9/Add . l , [349]-[356]; Letter fro m Brian Wil son to James 
Anaya, 18 October 2012, and Letter from Brian Wi lson to James Anaya, 6 November 20 I 2, accessib le through Joint 
Communications Report Februa,y 201 3, UN Doc AIHRC/22/67, 78. 
99 At the time of ew Zealand's response regarding the Operation 8 communication New Zealand was bidd ing fo r a 
place on the HRC, a bid it ultimately lost. This may have al so influenced the tenor of its response to that 
communication, which was notably more positive than its response to Stavenhagen 's country miss ion only two years 
earlier. New Zealand 's bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Counci l in 2015 -20 16 may have affected the 
tone of its responses to the later commun ication . 
100 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/C .4/2006/78/Add.3 , 2. 
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peoples' visits and 'are not collaborative' .101 The Prime Minister did not meet with him. 102 Even 
before Stavenhagen set foot in New Zealand some Maori perceived that the Government went to 
work to 'minimise both his role and the importance of his visit', supported by sectors of the 
media who expressed 'outrage that the country should be even hosting such a visit and casting 
doubts on the Special Rapporteur's competence and impartiality'. 103 
The Labour-led New Zealand Government's response to Stavenhagen's country report 
was vitriolic. Privately, the Government proposed extensive corrections to Stavenhagen' s draft 
report. Revealing of the depths of its unhappiness, it even explored the possibility of delivering 
its comments on the report not only to the OHCHR, as is standard practice, but also to 
Stavenhagen personally in Mexico. 104 The only positive aspect of this hyper-critical response is 
that the Government took the time and care to respond, in detail, to the report. Publically, the 
Prime Minister claimed the report was 'unbalanced' .105 In a lengthy press release the Deputy 
Prime Minister called it 'selective', ' disappointing' and 'narrow', as well as claiming that it was 
full of errors of fact and interpretation. 106 He commented that '(h]is raft ofrecommendations is 
an attempt to tell us how to manage our political system. This may be fine in countries without a 
proud democratic tradition, but not in New Zealand where we prefer to debate and find solutions 
to these issues ourselves.' 107 The press release criticised the short period of time Stavenhagen 
had spent in New Zealand arguing that he had ' failed to grasp the importance of the special 
mechanisms we have in place to deal with Maori grievances and the progress successive 
governments have made' .108 It criticised several of the specific concerns raised in Stavenhagen' s 
report, including regarding the Treaty settlement process, Maori political representation and the 
protection of Maori cultural heritage. For example, the Government expressed indignant 
surprise that Stavenhagen's comments on the Waitangi Tribunal and Treaty settlement process 
were generally negative when it asserted that other UN bodies had praised it. But its most 
extensive criticisms were directed at Stavenhagen's conclusions and recommendations 
regarding Maori rights over the foreshore and seabed, which are considered in the next part of 
this chapter. 109 Elsewhere the Government ridiculed Stavenhagen for allegedly being surprised 
at the high proportion of urban-based Maori, 110 a further tactic to undermine Stavenhagen's 
intellectual authority. As Tom Bennion and Darrin Cassidy point out, domestically '[t]he 
101 Preston et al, above n 25, 35. 
102 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, [3]. 103 Moana Jackson, 'The United Nations and the Foreshore' (2006) 68 Mana, 18, 18. 104 Internal briefing to New Zealand' s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ' Special Rapporteur's Draft Report on 
the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms oflndigenous Peoples in New Zealand', 3 February 
2006, obtained under OJA request from MF AT, 4. 105 
'UN Report Critical of Foreshore Act' , Television New Zealand ( online), 4 April 2006 <http://tvnz.co.nz/politics-
news/un-report-cri ti cal-foreshore-act-69 515 3 >. 
106 Michael Cullen, Deputy Prime Minister, 'Response to UN Special Rapporteur Report ' (Press Release, 4 April 
2006) <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/response-un-special-rapporteur-report>. 107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 New Zealand Press Association, 'Urban Maori? UN Envoy was "Stunned"' , above n 61 . 
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impression given was of an error-ridden report worthy of dismissal' .111 The Government stated 
that it would make 'a brief and carefully worded formal response to the UN but will not act on 
its recommendations' .11 2 Its statement to the UN HRC was polite, but largely ignored the 
report's contents, instead emphasising New Zealand's capacity to address its issues itself and 
professing its progress in Indigenous rights recognition. 11 3 The response was part of a strategy 
privately described by the Government as one that 'deliberately avoids engaging on the Special 
Rapporteur's unacceptable recommendations', such as regarding the foreshore and seabed, 114 
presumably to discourage further public attention to his criticisms. 
The response is even more striking given that immediately prior to Stavenhagen's visit 
the Government had heaped praise on the special procedures as a human rights mechanism. 
Less than a month before the visit it observed that many special procedures experts 'prepare 
excellent reports that are currently largely ignored by delegates rehashing old debates in their 
resolutions' .115 It went on, '[f]or the most part, the Special Procedures have been instrumental in 
highlighting issues that need to be discussed, and providing expert and independent 
contributions to the debate.' 116 When a special procedures expert was critical of New Zealand's 
own human rights situation this positive sentiment was quickly forgotten. 
The Labour-led Government was not the only political party to respond bitterly to 
Stavenhagen's criticisms. The Maori Affairs Spokesman for the National Party, which was then 
in Opposition, rejected the initial conclusions Stavenhagen shared at the close of his visit. He 
stated 'New Zealanders don't need to be told by the UN what it means to be a Kiwi . Fair-minded 
Kiwis will reject these statements outright, because they know them to be untrue'. 117 He too 
criticised the short period of time Stavenhagen spent in the country and described 
Stavenhagen's statement as 'full of unsubstantiated assertions and loaded language' .118 He also 
intimated that Stavenhagen was advocating for 'two standards of citizenship' in New 
Zealand. 119 He advised the Government that 'they should do themselves and race relations in 
New Zealand a favour' and tell Stavenhagen 'not to bother' writing his final report. 120 
111 Tom Bennion and Darrin Cassidy, 'Special Rapporteur's Report Taken for a Spin' (2006) 70 Mana 40, 41. 
11 2 Television New Zealand, 'No Consensus Over UN Report', above n 61. 
11 3 Don Mackay, New Zealand Permanent Representative, 'Human Rights Council: Presentation of Report by Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms oflndigenous Peoples' (Statement to 
the HRC, Geneva, 19 September 2006) <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MF AT-
speeches/2006/0-19-September-2006.php>. 
114 Internal briefing to New Zealand ' s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ' International Indigenous Issues', 6 
April 2006, obtained under OJA request from MF AT. 
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118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid . 
120 Ibid . 
160 
Stavenhagen's report did contain some minor errors and ambiguities that the 
Government leveraged in its critique. Bennion and Cassidy note that several recommendations 
'reflect the time pressures Special Rapporteurs work under' .121 For example, Stavenhagen 
recommended that New Zealand's Mixed-Member Proportional electoral system be 
entrenched. 122 The system is entrenched, and was at the time of Stavenhagen's visit, although 
the position is complicated by the fact that the provision entrenching that system is not itself 
entrenched. 123 But on the whole Stavenhagen's report was a good reflection of the central 
Indigenous rights concerns in New Zealand. In the words of one domestic observer, he 'got to 
the heart of issues'. 124 The Government's dismissal of the entire report on the basis of a small 
number of errors and ambiguities underscores the importance of the experts being diligent in 
their fact checking and clear in the communication of their concerns and recommendations. 
States will be quick to seize on any opportunities to delegitimise the reports. Piccone picks up 
on this, arguing that such errors are used not only to undermine the special procedures' work but 
the work of other UN actors too. 125 
2 Whitewashing Anaya 's Report 
Five years later, Anaya's visit and report on New Zealand received a warmer welcome 
from the Government. Still, as one Maori academic reflected, 'the Crown didn't exactly jump up 
and down with enthusiasm' at having him in New Zealand. 126 The Prime Minister met with 
Anaya, although the Prime Minister primed the public to ignore his report if it was too critical: 
following his meeting with Anaya, the Prime Minister described New Zealand as a ' leader' 
'when it comes to dealing with indigenous rights' and indicated that he placed more value on 
New Zealanders' views of the country's race relations than the views of the UN.127 Internal 
Government documents describe Anaya as 'informed and engaged', that he had 'a sophisticated 
appreciation of how to engage with governments and ways of progressing issues for indigenous 
peoples', and that 'his programme was a good news story for New Zealand' .128 When Anaya's 
advance report was released the Government issued no public criticism of the report. In fact, it 
made no public comment all; in part because of the earthquake mentioned above. Privately, the 
Government described Anaya's advance report as 'a substantial and carefully considered piece 
12 1 Tom Bennion and Darrin Cassidy identify Stavenhagen's recommendation regarding environmental concerns at 
Maketu as one example. Bennion and Cassidy, above n 111. 
122 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, (86]. 12' 
, Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), s 268. 
124 Interview 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011). Bennion and Cassidy reach the same conclusion. Bennion and Cassidy, 
above n 111, 41. 
125 Ted Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 206, 216. 126 Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011). 
127 Bennett, above n 65. 
128 Internal briefing from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Wellington to Geneva and New 
York, 'Visit to New Zealand of Professor James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples ' , 
13 August 2010, obtained under OJA request from MFAT, 1-2. 
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of work' .129 The Government's concerns regarding the report centred on how it represented the 
treaty settlement process. 130 But it also expressed an interest in hearing more about one of 
Anaya's recommendations (that alternative dispute resolution options be pursued in the Treaty 
settlements process), suggesting it was open to at least one of Anaya' s proposals .13 1 
The New Zealand Government's main public statements on the full report were made 
before international fora, where Anaya' s criticisms were largely whitewashed. In a formal 
statement on the final report to the HRC the Government expressed appreciation for the report 
and Anaya's ' identification of progress made as well as significant problems still to be 
addressed' .132 It did acknowledge several of the concerns Anaya raised. But at the same time it 
toned down Anaya' s criticisms, for example the ' extreme' socio-economic disadvantage that 
Anaya identified was reduced to the ' generally . .. lower socio economic status ' experienced by 
Maori in the Government' s statement. 133 The Government's moves to play down Anaya' s 
criticisms were evident in later references to the report too. For example, in its periodic report 
submitted to the CERD Committee in 2012 the Government included a statement on Anaya' s 
report. But it focused on Anaya' s praise, only mentioning Anaya' s concerns regarding socio-
economic development, ignoring the remainder of his criticisms.134 Before the HRC the 
Government also tied its recognition of ' the significant challenges that still remain regarding the 
situation of Maori in New Zealand' to commentary on the overrepresentation of Maori in the 
prison system and socio-economic concerns, rather than to political or land rights issues. 135 The 
Government took the opportunity to promote what it presented as developments in accordance 
with Anaya' s recommendations in front of the HRC, including regarding the constitutional 
review process, its historical Treaty settlements, the foreshore and seabed, Maori participation 
in decision-making, efforts to reduce Maori recidivism, and its Whanau Ora social programme. 
In fact, the Government asserted that it was ' already acting on many of Anaya' s 
recommendations and will continue to draw on the report over time' .136 A similar statement was 
made before the GA, where it described the special procedures as the HRC ' s ' eyes and ears' . 137 
At the prompting of the NZHRC, the Government also expressed an intention to establish a 
129 Internal briefin g from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Well ington to Geneva, 
' Preliminary Report: Visit to New Zealand of James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the Rights oflnd igenous 
Peoples', 7 February 2011 , obtained under OJA request fro m MFAT, 2. 
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monitoring function across multiple ministries to track implementation of Anaya' s 
recommendations, but this has not materialised. 138 
Again, the positive tone of the Government's public statements was a deliberate 
strategy. An internal Government document reveals an agreement that the tone of the statement 
'needs to be positive and upbeat' and 'should draw on two or three positive developments since 
Anaya's visit, such as the passing of the Marine and Coastal Areas Bill ' , the new foreshore and 
seabed legislation. The internal document explicitly comments that '[t]he statement should not 
be a detailed response to Anaya's report' as this 'could create unnecessary tension in the 
Government's relationship with Professor Anaya, which to date has been open, collaborative 
with reasonable [sic] positive and constructive results'. 139 While the Government' s reaction is 
more positive than it was with Stavenhagen, the documentation indicates little attention being 
paid to the actual implementation of his recommendations, the focus instead being on how to 
manage the reputational impacts of, and potential publicity surrounding, his report. 
The Government had moved from rejection of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples' country assessment of the human rights situation of Maori, under Stavenhagen, to a 
degree of outward commitment to the follow-up assessment by Anaya five years later. The 
concern here is to what extent this rejection and then apparent commitment to the Special 
Rapporteur's country assessments translated into action to implement the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations. 
E Ritualism Revealed: The Government 's Actions 
1 Partial Implementation as Diversion 
The New Zealand Government has actioned few of the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations in their totality. The fact that many of Anaya's outstanding Indigenous rights 
concerns echoed those made by Stavenhagen is itself indication of the small number of matters 
on which the Government took action in the time between the reports. The Government has 
conformed to some recommendations. The recommendations that have been implemented are 
recommendations that simply require endorsement of an international instrument - the 
UNDRIP 140 - or the continuation of existing Government action, such as support for New 
138 Interview 1 (Wellington, 5 May 2011); Interview 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011). 139 Internal New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade email from Hine-Wai Loose to Lucy Te Moana, John 
Whaanga, Stuart Beresford, David Crooke, Lois Searle and Ben Keith, 30 March 2011 , obtained under OJA request 
from MFAT. 
140 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, [102]. The Government announced its 
support for the UNDRIP during the PFII in 2010, see Pita Sharples, Minister of Maori Affairs , 'Statement delivered 
to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues' (New York, 19 April 2010) <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-
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163 
Zealand's Maori Television station, 141 and the Government's Whanau Ora social programme. 142 
But even these moves have been problematic. To take endorsement of the UNDRIP as an 
example, Stavenhagen's recommendation was that '[t]he Government of New Zealand should 
continue to support efforts to achieve a United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous 
peoples by consensus, including the right to self-determination.' 143 The Government initially did 
the opposite. Soon after the conclusion of Stavenhagen's visit the New Zealand Government 
moved from a moderate stance in relation to negotiations on the then draft UNDRIP to an 
oppositional one, 144 eventually voting against its adoption before the GA in 2007 alongside the 
United States, Canada and Australia. 145 It was only in 2010 that New Zealand changed its 
position and endorsed the UNDRIP. 146 When it did so, its endorsement was qualified. In the 
Government's statement endorsing the UNDRIP it repeatedly emphasised the aspirational 
nature of elements of the UNDRIP and implied that no changes to bring its domestic practices, 
policies and legislation into line with the rights affirmed in the UNDRIP were necessary. 147 The 
Prime Minister later confirmed this in the House of Representatives when, during question time, 
he reassured members that '[i]t is an expression of aspiration; it will have no impact on New 
Zealand law and no impact on the constitutional framework' .148 Nor is there credible evidence 
to suggest that these moves were made in response to the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations. For instance, the Government's endorsement of the UNDRIP is most 
persuasively attributable to domestic lobbying efforts, in particular by the Maori Party.149 The 
shift also took place in the context of moves by the other states who were originally also in 
opposition to the UNDRIP publically reversing, or indicating their intention to reverse, their 
141 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [81]. For evidence of continued funding 
for Maori Television see, eg, The Treasury, The Estimates of Appropriations for the Government of New Zealand for 
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position.150 New Zealand's international human rights reputation would be negatively impacted 
were it to stand alone in defiance of the instrument. 
The Government has outright resisted - in Mertonian terms, engaged in retreatism from 
- some recommendations. The Government has indicated that it has no plans to action 
Stavenhagen's recommendation that the Waitangi Tribunal be granted binding powers of 
adjudication. 151 It has stated that it will not ratify !LO Convention 169.152 Nor has it followed 
Anaya's recommendation to reconsider its earlier decision to reject guaranteed Maori seats on 
the Auckland City Council. 153 Yet, conformity and resistance only explain the Government's 
response to a small number of the recommendations. 
Ritualism has been the Government's dominant behavioural response. Ritualism is 
evident in the partial implementation of the bulk of the Special Rapporteur's recommendations. 
Some will paint the fractional implementation of these recommendations as a success story for 
the Special Rapporteur. Certainly, any moves in line with the experts' recommendations, 
however small, are deserving of celebration. Yet, a deeper reading reveals that this pattern of 
partial implementation is a deflection technique. The Government deflects attention from its 
failure to substantively implement the Special Rapporteur's recommendations by taking some 
shallow steps consistent with those recommendations. To understand the nature of this ritualised 
approach to implementation it is necessary to examine the Government's behaviour in some 
depth. The Government's approach is illustrated here using three of the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations concerning constitutional protection, land rights and education. 
2 Improbable Constitutional Protection 
(a) Domestic Insecurity 
The New Zealand Government's response to the special procedures ' recommendations 
regarding the constitutional protection of Maori rights is an apt example of the Government' s 
ritualistic behaviour. Maori rights as Indigenous peoples are subject to a high degree of 
insecurity in New Zealand's domestic legal system. New Zealand's constitution is unusual in 
that it is drawn from a variety of sources, including statutes, common law and convention. 
Beyond provisions regarding the term of Parliament and the functioning of New Zealand's 
electoral system, New Zealand statutes are capable of amendment by a simple Parliamentary 
150 Jenny Macklin, Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 'Statement on the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples ' (Statement to Parliament House, Canberra, 3 April 
2009); Michaelle Jean, Governor General of Canada, 'Speech from the Throne' (Speech to Canada' s 40th Parliament, 
Ottawa, 3 March 2010). 
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the same recommendation, which the Government rejected. NZHRC, Tui Tiii Tuituia: Race Relations in 2010 (2011) 
8. 
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majori ty. 154 While, since the late 1980s, the Treaty has often been cited as New Zealand's 
founding constitutional document, 155 the orthodox legal position is that the Treaty requires 
incorporation into domestic statute in order to be legally enforceable; it is not a source of 
enforceable rights in itself. 156 For a short period from the mid-1980s the Government moved to 
incorporate references to the principles of the Treaty in various statutes, securing some 
significant gains for Maori. 157 But in the last decade this practice has abated.158 There is no 
reference to Maori or the Treaty in New Zealand's relatively emasculated Bill of Rights Act or 
the Constitution Act 1986 (NZ). The Bill of Rights Act is not supreme law: no legislation can be 
struck down because it violates rights affirmed in the Act; 159 although, as noted above, the 
Attorney-General assesses Bills for consistency with the rights it affirms. 160 The Act also 
provides that where a Bill of Rights Act-consistent interpretation ' can be given' it should be 
preferred. 161 
Both Stavenhagen and Anaya identified the domestic insecurity of Maori rights as a 
concern. Stavenhagen found that 'New Zealand's human rights legislation does not provide 
sufficient protection mechanisms regarding the collective rights of Maori that emanate from 
article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi (their tino rangatiratanga).' 162 He recommended that a 
' convention should be convened to design a constitutional reform' to regulate the Government-
Maori relationship ' on the basis of the Treaty ofWaitangi and the internationally recognized 
right of all peoples to self-determination.' 163 He went on to recommend, inter alia, that the 
Treaty and the Bill of Rights Act be entrenched. 164 Five years later, Anaya raised the issue of the 
domestic legal insecurity of Maori rights under the Treaty and international human rights in his 
report. 165 He recommended that ' [t]he principles enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi and related 
internationally-protected human rights should be provided security within the domestic legal 
154 Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), s 268. 
155 See, eg, New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 , 655, 664 per Cooke P; Sir Robin 
Cooke, 'Fundamentals' (1988) New Zealand Law Journal 158, 159-60. See generally Matthew SR Palmer, The 
Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand's Law and Constitution (Victoria University Press, 2008). 
156 Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v Ao tea District Maori Land Board [ 1941] AC 308 (PC). 
157 Statutory references to the princip les of the Treaty of Waitangi are contained in, fo r example, the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986 (NZ), s 9; Conservation Act 1987 (NZ), s 4; Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ), s 8. Case 
law on such references includes New Zealand Maori Co uncil v Attorney-General [1 987] 1 NZLR 64 1 (HC & CA); 
New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [ 1989] 2 NZLR 142 (CA); Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc v 
Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 64 1 (CA). For di scuss ion of the gains secured by Maori see Paul Rishworth, 
'Minority Rights to Cu lture, Language and Rel igion fo r Ind igenous Peoples: the Contribution ofa Bill of Rights ' 
(Paper presented to International Center fo r Law and Reli gion Studies Austral ia Conference, Canberra, 2009); Paul 
Rish worth et al , The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford Uni versity Press, 2003) 17-8. 
158 However, after extensive lobbying by Maori, a reference to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi was included, 
in 2012, in the Public Finance (Mixed Ownership Model) Amendment Act 2012 (NZ), s 45 Q. 
159 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), s 4. 
160 Ibid s 7. 
161 Ibid s 6. See generaily Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (Lexis 
Nexis, 2005) 3. 
161 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add .3, [1 3]. 
163 Ibid [84]. 
164 Ibid [85], [91]. 
165 Anaya Follow-up Report on _ ew Zealand, 1 Doc A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.4, [46] -[5 l], [77]. 
166 
system of New Zealand so that these rights are not vulnerable to political discretion'. 166 'At a 
minimum' he proposed 'the development of safeguards similar to those under the Bill of Rights 
Act' for the Treaty, referring to the section 7 vet of Bills under that Act. 167 
(b) From Resistance to 'Conversation' 
The Government initially rejected the Special Rapporteur's recommendations, but 
ultimately it took some steps in apparent accordance with them. Privately, the Government 
identified Stavenhagen's position regarding New Zealand's constitutional structure as one of 
three key concerns in his draft report observing that ' [ e ]ntrenchment can be seen to disregard 
the essential character of the New Zealand constitution' .168 Before the HRC it dismissed the 
need for constitutional change, stating: 
the report raises questions concerning possible constitutional change. There is a diverse range of 
opinion about this subject in New Zealand and at this stage there is no consensus for 
constitutional change. However, any agreed change will be brought about through the free and 
full exercise of democratic prerogatives by Maori and non-Maori alike. 169 
Consistent with this position, for several years there was no movement on this recommendation. 
But late in 2008 the National Party, taking power, signed a confidence and supply agreement 
with the Maori Party, which committed to establishing no later than early 2010 'a group to 
consider constitutional issues including Maori representation' .170 Soo!1 after Anaya's mission 
ended the Government announced the terms ofreference for the review. It included 
consideration of Maori representation - including the Maori electoral option, Maori electoral 
participation, and Maori seats in Parliament and local government - as well as the role of Maori 
customs and the Treaty in New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. 171 It also included 
consideration of the size and term of Parliament, Bill of Rights Act issues and whether New 
Zealand should have a consolidated constitution. A Constitutional Advisory Panel was 
appointed in 2011. The public were given an opportunity to provide submissions to the 
Constitutional Advisory Panel, which will report its advice to the Government by the end of 
166 Ibid at [77]. 
167 Ibid at [77]. 
168 Internal briefing to New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Special Rapporteur's Draft Report on 
the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms oflndigenous Peoples in New Zealand ', 3 February 
2006, obtained under OJA request from MFAT, annex: Special Rapporteur 's Report: Additional Commentary on 
sgecific Paragraphs, 2. 
1 9 Mackay, above n 113. 
170 National Party and Maori Party, Relationship and Confidence and Supply Agreement (16 November 2008) 
<http://www.national.org.nz/files/agreements/National-Maori_ Party_ agreement.pdf> 2 (' Relationship Agreement 
2008' ). 




2013 , with the Government providing its response by mid-2014. 172 Anaya's report, which was 
released after the terms of reference were announced, identified the constitutional review 
process as one of the 'significant strides' taken by the Government 'to advance the rights of 
Maori people and to address concerns raised by the former Special Rapporteur'. 173 
The constitutional review process only goes a small way towards giving effect to either 
Special Rapporteur's recommendations to provide security for Maori rights, however. The 
Government has committed to a conversation only. No specific action is required following the 
review. Majority interests, in Parliament and amongst the public, will hold sway regardless of 
the legitimacy of Maori claims for constitutional recognition of their rights as Indigenous 
peoples : the Government has advised that any significant proposals that come out of the review 
will need either to pass a referendum or receive broad cross-party support to be irnplemented. 174 
As a result, the likelihood of moves to centre the Treaty in New Zealand's constitutional 
arrangements, or to give effect to the right of Maori to be self-determining, is slim, for example. 
As noted in Part B, Maori form a minority in the population and in Parliament and domestic 
rhetoric around perceived Maori privileges remains strong. Further, the terms of reference make 
no mention of Indigenous peoples' right to self-determination or international Indigenous rights 
norms. Some have also argued that the Treaty is marginalised because the review is concerned 
with how the Treaty fits into the constitution rather than how the constitution is drawn out of the 
Treaty. 175 Concerns about the focus of the Government's Constitutional Advisory Panel 
prompted the creation of a parallel iwi-led constitutional working group: Aotearoa Matike Mai. 
It has engaged with Maori to develop a model constitution based on Maori kawa (protocol) and 
tikanga (custom), the Treaty and the 1835 Declaration of Jndependence. 176 
(c) Limited Role 
The role of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples in bringing about the 
Government's flawed constitutional review was minimal. The confidence and supply agreement 
with the Maori Party was the prime driver for its institution, in turn reflecting decades long 
debate among Maori regarding New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. As Risse and Ropp 
explain, changes in domestic politics - such as the move here from a Labour to a National-led 
coalition Government with the support of the Maori Party - can often act as a forerunner to 
172 Bill Engli sh, Deputy Prime Minister, and Pita Sharples, Maori Affairs Minister, 'Constitutional Advisory Panel 
Named' (Press Release, 4 August 20 11 ) <http://www.beehive.govt.nzJrelease/constitutional-advisory-panel-named>. 
173 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [66] . 
174 English and Sharples, above n 172. 
175 Interview 3 (Wellingto n, 3 May 201 1); Peace Movement Aotearoa, NGO Information for the 82nd Session of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2013) Office of the High Commiss ioner for Human Rights 
<http ://www2 . ohch r .org/engl ish/bodies/ cerd/docs/ngos/PeaceMovementAotearoa _NewZealand _ CERD82. pd f-> [21] 
('NGO Information to CERD 2013'). 
176 Converge, Independent Iwi Constitutional Working Group: Aotearoa Matike Mai 
<http: //v-rww.converge.org.nzJpma/iwi .htm>. 
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improved domestic approaches to human rights. 177 The work of the Maori Party, rather than any 
particular commitment to Indigenous rights by the National Party, was central to the change. 178 
Other domestic actors, such as the NZHRC, have made domestic legal security for the 
principles of the Treaty and international human rights a priority for action too. 179 Further, 
international actors additional to the Special Rapporteur have raised similar concerns over the 
years, including the CERD Committee and states during New Zealand's first UPR before the 
HRC. 180 But Stavenhagen's recommendation provided an additional leverage point for the 
Maori Party's advocacy for a review. 181 And, the New Zealand Government has projected the 
impression that it has taken on board and acted upon Anaya's recommendations on this issue: 
before the HRC in 2011 it highlighted the steps it had taken in conformity to Anaya's 
recommendations on domestic protection for Maori rights. 182 Anaya's report also provided a 
platform for domestic actors to critique the Government on this matter on the world stage -
before the PFII in 2012 the Maori caucus stated that the Government 'must fully implement' the 
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' recommendations during discussion on the 
constitutional review .183 
In this constitutional protection example the New Zealand Government moved from 
resistance to some apparent commitment. But the 'commitment' was ritualistic. The 
Government initiated a constitutional dialogue but Indigenous peoples' rights under the Treaty 
and international law, including to self-determination, are marginalised and majoritarian 
interests will reign. Through its constitutional conversation the Government has been able to 
tick off its obligations under the 2008 confidence and supply agreement with the Maori Party, 
and claim progress towards recommendations from Stavenhagen, Anaya, and other international 
bodies. In effect, the Government's moves have enabled international calls for domestic security 
for Maori rights to be neutralised, at least for the time being. 
177 Thomas Risse and Stephen C Ropp, 'Conclusions' in Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), 
The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 234, 
241. 
178 Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011); Interview 2 (Wellington, 5 May 2011). 179 See, eg, NZHRC commissioner, Rosslyn Noonan, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth 
Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 78. 
180 See, eg, CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: New Zealand, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/CO/17 (15 August 2007) [13] ('CERD Committee on New 
Zealand 2007'); HRC UPRNew Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/12/8, [81](21). 
181 Interview 2 (Wellington, 5 May 2011). 
182 Dell Higgie, New Zealand Government representative speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council 
Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 78. 183 Maori Indigenous Caucus cited in doCip Update No 104 (2013) (January/April) <http://www.docip.org/All-
Issues.121.0.html> 18. 
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3 Continuing Foreshore and Seabed Discrimination 
(a) Appropriation of Maori Property Rights 
Ritualism is further evident in the New Zealand Government's response to the special 
procedures' recommendations regarding the right of Maori to their lands. Indigenous peoples' 
rights to their lands and natural resources are a central issue in New Zealand, as elsewhere. In 
the last decade a prime controversy has centred on the Government's appropriation of extant 
Maori property rights to New Zealand's foreshore and seabed through the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act and later replacement legislation. 184 The Foreshore and Seabed Act was enacted 
following a decision of New Zealand's Court of Appeal that opened the way for the potential 
recognition of Maori freehold property interests in the foreshore and seabed. 185 The Government 
reacted by passing legislation under urgency without adequate consultation with Maori to 
override the decision: the Foreshore and Seabed Act. The Act vested those areas of the 
foreshore and seabed where Maori might have an interest in the Crown, but excluded existing 
freehold titles from the vesting; extinguished the ability to recognise any freehold title for 
Maori; and instituted onerous tests for Maori to prove new legislatively constrained customary 
rights. 186 The Government's response to the Court decision prompted protest in New Zealand on 
a scale not witnessed since the 1970s, including a 50,000 people strong hzkoi (march) on 
Parliament; 187 which the Prime Minister dismissed as led by 'haters and wreckers'. 188 The 
Government's approach was the subject of a scathing Waitangi Tribunal report, which found 
that: 
The policy clearly breaches the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. But beyond the Treaty, the 
policy fails in terms of wider norms of domestic and international law that underpin good 
government in a modem, democratic state. These include the rule of law, and the principles of 
fairness and non-discrimination. 189 
184 For di scussion of the foreshore and seabed legislation in relation to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) 
see Fleur Adcock, 'Maori and the Bill of Rights Act: A Case of Missed Opportunities?' (201 3) forthcoming New 
Zealand Journal of Public and International Law. 
185 Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA). 
186 See generally Claire Charters and Andrew Erueti, 'Report from the Inside: The CERD Committee's Review of the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004' (2005) 36 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 257; Claire Charters and 
Andrew Erueti (eds), Maori Property Rights in the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last Frontier (Victoria Universi ty 
Press, 2007). 
187 
' Timeline: Foreshore and Seabed Act ', Television New Zealand (online), I July 2009 <http://tvnz.co.nz/politics-
news/timeline-foreshore-and-seabed-act-282 11 3>. 
188 
' Maori March to Defend Beaches' , BBC News (online), 5 May 2004 <http ://news. bbc.co .uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/3 6849 53 .stm>. 
189 Waitangi Tribunal , Report on the Crown 's Foreshore and Seabed Policy (2004) xiv. 
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The CERD Committee also invoked its early warning and urgent action procedure to review the 
Act while in Bill form, finding that it discriminated against Maori. 190 Despite this, the 
Government pushed the legislation through Parliament in substantially the same form as the 
much criticised policy. It asserted that the Act did not infringe the human rights of Maori. 191 In 
support, it had the Attorney-General's suspect vet of the legislation under section 7 of the Bill of 
Rights Act, which found that the prima facie discriminatory treatment of Maori rights was 
justified as a 'reasonable limit' and there was no prima facie breach of the right of minorities to 
enjoy their culture under the Act. 192 The Attorney-General's support for the legislation 
underscores the insecurity of Maori rights under New Zealand law. 
Stavenhagen and Anaya each offered recommendations on the foreshore and seabed 
issue in their reports on New Zealand. Stavenhagen's recommendations were made in relation to 
the Foreshore and Seabed Act, which was enacted the year before his mission. Stavenhagen 
found that the Act 'extinguished all Maori extant rights to the foreshore and seabed in the name 
of the public interest and at the same time opened the possibility for the recognition by the 
Government of customary use and practices through complicated and restrictive judicial and 
administrative procedures.' 193 He recommended that the Foreshore and Seabed Act 'be repealed 
or amended' and that the Government and Maori negotiate a Treaty settlement that recognises 
'the inherent rights of Maori in the foreshore and seabed' and that establishes 'regulatory 
mechanisms' that allow for the general public' s ' free and full access' to New Zealand's beaches 
and coastal areas without discrimination. 194 
(b) Defiance to Camouflage 
Again, the Government resisted Stavenhagen's recommendations in strong terms but 
eventually took some steps in accordance with them. Privately, the Government identified 
Stavenhagen's position regarding Maori interests in the foreshore and seabed as one of its key 
concerns with his draft report. 195 Publically, the Deputy Prime Minister erroneously claimed that 
Stavenhagen had misstated the effect of the legal decision that had led to enactment of the 
19
° CERD Committee, Decision 1 (66): New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, UN Doc 
CERD/C/66/NZL/Dec.1 (11 March 2005) [6]. See generally Charters and Erueti, 'Report from the Inside: The CERD 
Committee's Review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004', above n 186. 
191 Michael Cullen, Deputy Prime Minister, ' Waitangi Tribunal Report Disappointing' (Press Release, 8 March 2004) 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/19091>. See generally Catherine Iorns Magallanes, 'The Foreshore and Seabed 
Legislation: Resource- and Marine-Management Issues' in Charters and Erueti, above n 186, 119, 131. 192 Margaret Wilson, Attorney-General, 'Foreshore and Seabed Bill ' (Attorney-General Compatibility Report) 
Ministry of Justice 6 May 2004 <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/constitutional-law-and-human-rights/human-
rights/bill-of-rights/foreshore-and-seabed-bill> [36], [ 102]-[l 03]. 
193 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, [79]. In his 2006 annual report 
Stavenhagen described the Act as ' curtailing' Maori rights, also identifying the CERD Committee' s criticism ofit. 
Stavenhagen Annual Report 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78, [22] , [52]. 
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195 Communication from MFAT to the UN Human Rights and Commonwealth Division, 'Special Rapporteur 's 
Report on Indigenous Rights and Freedoms in New Zealand ' , 17 February 2006, obtained under OJA request from 
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Foreshore and Seabed Act and the legal position prior to that decision; failed to recognise the 
changes made to the Act while it was in Bill form as a result of the Waitangi Tribunal report and 
public submissions; and, misstated the effects of excluding freehold interests from the Crown 
vesting. 196 But four years later, in September 2010, the Government introduced legislation to 
repeal and replace the Act into the House of Representatives as Stavenhagen had recommended: 
the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Bill. 197 The Attorney-General assessed that the 
discrimination under the new Bill was again reasonably justified under the Bill of Rights Act; the 
Attorney-General did not consider whether there was a potential breach of the right of 
minorities to enjoy their culture under that Act. 198 
Contrary to Stavenhagen's recommendations, the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai 
Moana) Bill only proposed to slightly improve the position under the Foreshore and Seabed 
Act. As with the Foreshore and Seabed Act, the Bill intended to extinguish Maori interests in 
the foreshore and seabed. But instead of transferring them to the Crown as the original Act did it 
would transfer them to a new construct called a 'common space', over which the Crown 
exercised control. As with the Act, the replacement Bill also discriminated against Maori. In 
effect, it would only apply to areas where Maori may have an interest, excluding the bulk of 
foreshore privately held by others from its scope. It did differ from the original Act in that it 
restored to Maori their right of access to the Courts - Maori would have six years to lodge a 
claim to have their 'customary title' in the 'common space' recognised. But the 'customary title' 
would be a new form of subordinate title less than the freehold title potentially available prior to 
enactment of the Foreshore and Seabed Act. In order to establish title Maori would also have to 
prove exclusive use and occupation of the relevant area without substantial interruption since 
1840, a difficult task for most, especially given the Government's history of confiscations of 
Maori land. 199 Peace Movement Aotearoa, a New Zealand NGO, concluded in a submission to 
the CERD Committee that '[t]he replacement legislation retains most of the discriminatory 
aspects of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 as it treats Maori property differently from that of 
others, and limits Maori control and authority over their foreshore and seabed areas' .200 
The recommendations in Anaya's advance report concerned the Marine and Coastal 
Area (Takutai Moana) Bill, as his mission had taken place just prior to its introduction into 
Parliament. By the time Anaya had finalised his report for presentation to the HRC the Bill had 
196 Cullen, 'Response to UN Special Rapporteur Report', above n 106. 
197 The Marine and Coastal Area (J'akutai Moana) Bill is available from the New Zealand Parliament website 
<http://www.parliament.nz>. 
198 Simon Power, Acting Attorney-General, 'Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Bill ' (Attorney-General 
Compatibil ity Report) Ministly of Justice 2 September 20 l 0 <http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/constitutional-law-
and-human-rights/human-rights/bill-of-rights/marine-and-coastal-area-takutai-moana-bill> [34]-[35]. For criticism of 
the Attorney-General's assessment see, eg, Treaty Tribes Coalition, Submission on the Marine and Coastal Area 
(Takutai Moana) Bill to the Maori Affairs Select Committee (16 November 2010) Converge 
<http: //www.converge.o rg.nz/pma/fsttcl 0.pdf> [ 17]-[28]. 
199 Moana Jackson, A Further Primer on the Foreshore and Seabed: The Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) 
Bill (8 September 20 10) < http ://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mj0809 l 0.htm>. 
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been enacted. In his advance report Anaya commented that the Bill 'represents a notable eff01i 
to reverse some of the principal areas of concern of the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act' .201 But 
he noted ' that the bill still allows for certain past acts of extinguishment of Maori rights to have 
effect' .202 This prompted him to remind 'the Government that the extinguishment of indigenous 
rights by unilateral, uncompensated acts is inconsistent with the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. ' 203 In addition, Anaya noted concerns that the Bill only required the 
Government to 'acknowledge' rather than 'give effect' to the Treaty and that there was a six 
year limitation to lodge claims for customary interests.204 Anaya recommended that the 
Government consult widely with Maori on the contents of the Bill ' in order to address any 
concerns they might still have' .205 He further recommended that special attention be directed to 
the Bill's sections on 'customary rights, natural resource management, protection of cultural 
objects and practices, and access to judicial or other remedies for any actions that affect their 
customary rights' so as 'to ensure that those provisions are consistent with the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi and international standards. ' 206 The final report mirrored these findings and 
recommendations, with some minor refinements to reflect the enactment of the Bill the month 
following public release of Anaya's advance report. 207 Notably, in the final report Anaya moved 
to recommend that the provisions of the Act 'are implemented in a way that is consistent with 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and international standards. ' 208 
The Government outwardly vocalised commitment to Anaya's recommendations on the 
legislation but did not action them. The Bill was enacted without substantive amendment as the 
Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ) (Marine and Coastal Area Act). The 
Act did not address Maori concerns or conform to the principles of the Treaty and international 
standards, as Anaya recommended. Jacinta Ruru concludes, '[t]he 2011 Act is comparatively a 
little better on the property question, but not much.' 209 In fact, in 2013 the CERD Committee 
expressed concern that the Act 'contains provisions that, in their operation, may restrict the full 
enjoyment by Maori communities of their rights under the Treaty ofWaitangi, such as the 
provision requiring proof of exclusive use and occupation of marine and coastal areas without 
interruption since 1840' .210 Yet, during the second reading of the Bill the Attorney-General 
claimed that he had 'looked at international developments - as I was urged to do by the UN 
201 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand: Advance Version, UN Doc A/HRC/1 8/XX/Add.Y, [78] . 202 Ibid [ 56]. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid [79]. 
206 Ibid. 
201 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [56], [78]-[79] . 208 Ibid [79] (emphasis added). 
209 Ruru, above n 148, 974. 
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special rapporteur, James Anaya' in developing the tests for ' customary title' in the Bill.211 The 
Government also misrepresented Anaya's report: during the same reading another member of 
the governing National Party erroneously asserted that 'nowhere in the report does it say that 
there is anything wrong with this bill'. 212 During its final reading the Attorney-General drew 
attention to Anaya' s praise for the Bill too, neglecting to mention any of his concerns.213 
Additionally, during the 2011 interactive dialogue on Anaya's report before the HRC, New 
Zealand stated that it had ' taken note of the Special Rapporteur ' s concerns about customary 
rights over the marine and coastal area' .214 It asserted that ' [t]he new Act follows extensive 
consultations with all New Zealanders, including Maori ' and 'also reflects express consideration 
of international human rights standards relevant to such customary claims ' .215 The Government 
may have ' considered' international human rights standards but those standards are not reflected 
in the Act. For example, it continues to unilaterally extinguish Maori rights without 
guaranteeing compensation. Nor was the Bill enacted following adequate consultation with 
Maori . The Parliamentary Select Committee considering the Bill received approximately 6000 
submissions on the Bill.216 All bar one of the submissions from marae (Maori meeting places), 
hapu, iwi, Maori land owners, Maori organisations, and Maori collectives opposed passage of 
the Bill as it was drafted.217 Yet, the Select Committee issued a briefreport in response 
recommending that the Bill be passed without amendment.218 The flaws in the Act are such that 
its provisions cannot be 'implemented in a way that is consistent with the principles of the 
Treaty ofWaitangi and international standards', as Anaya recommended in his final report. 219 
(c) Minor Hand 
Again, the Special Rapporteur 's role in helping to bring about the largely superficial 
changes in the foreshore and seabed legislation was small. The Government did profess to have 
taken on board Anaya's concerns. Attention on the issue from Stavenhagen and Anaya also 
2 11 New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 March 2011 , vol 670, 16976 (Christopher 
Finlayson, Attorney-General). 
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bolstered domestic opposition to the legislation.220 And it meant that the Government was 
repeatedly being asked to explain its approach on the international stage.221 But Stavenhagen 
and Anaya were not the only international actors expressing concern at the legislation. Actors 
including the CERD Committee,222 states participating in New Zealand's first UPR,223 and the 
UN Human Rights Committee,224 issued recommendations or raised questions on it. However, 
domestic factors again had the most sway. In the same 2008 confidence and supply agreement 
between the National and Maori Parties that provided for a constitutional review, the parties 
agreed to ' initiate as a priority a review of the application of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 
to ascertain whether it adequately maintains and enhances mana whenua' .225 'Mana whenua' is 
the exercise of authority over an area. A Government appointed Ministerial panel was 
established to fulfil this task. In its 2009 report the Ministerial panel determined that the Act, 
amongst other things, discriminated against Maori and recommended that it be repealed, with a 
more appropriate balance being struck between Maori property rights and public rights and 
expectations.226 The replacement Act was a product of this determination. 
The role of the Maori Party was again pivotal. The Government itself publically 
acknowledged that the review of the legislation was a product of its agreement with the Maori 
Party.227 Key domestic actors, such as member of the NZHRC, underscored the important role 
of the Maori Party's relationship with the National Party in the 'significant developments for 
Maori' that occurred between Stavenhagen's and Anaya's visits.228 And, the Maori Party 
viewed its own role as decisive, with one of its members stating of the replacement legislation 'I 
don't think it's [happened] because of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People or 
James Anaya coming. I think it's because of being in the arrangement we're in [with the 
National Party]' .229 In tum, the Maori Party had been formed and entered Parliament on the 
back of the groundswell of mass Maori opposition to the Foreshore and Seabed Act. This is 
testament to the force the Maori mass public can wield in New Zealand. But the Maori Party did 
leverage Stavenhagen's criticisms of the legislation while it was in Opposition.230 It also 
leveraged Anaya's comments on the replacement legislation when it was in a relationship with 
220 Interview 2 (Wellington, 5 May 2011); Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011); Interview 5 (Christchurch, 6 May 
2011); Interview 6 (Panama City, 3 June 2011). 
2? 1 
- See, eg, HRC UPR New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/12/8, [36], [40] , [81](58). 
222 CERD Committee on New Zealand 2007, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/CO/17, [19]. 
223 S ee, eg, HRC UPR New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/12/8, [61]. 
224 Human Rights Committee, List of Issues to be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of the Fifth 
Periodic Report of New Zealand (CCPRICINZL/5), UN Doc CCPR/C/NZL/Q/5 (24 August 2009) [9]. 225 National Party and Maori Party, Relationship Agreement 2008, above n 170, 2. 226 New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Pakia ki Uta, Pakia ki Tai: Report of the Ministerial Review Panel - Ministerial 
Review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (2009) 12-3. 
227 See, eg, Simon Power, 'Response to Questions 1 to 16: Minister Simon Power' (Statement delivered to the Human 
Rights Committee, New York, 15 March 2010) <http: //www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/response-questions-l-16-
minister-simon-power>. 
228 NZHRC commissioner, Rosslyn Noonan, cited in Bennett, above n 65 . 
229 Interview 2 (Wellington, 5 May 2011). 
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' [W]e were in Opposition at the time and we were keen to hang it out there as a statement that had come from an 
independent international expert'. Ibid. 
175 
the Government. The Maori Party used Anaya's positive comments on the replacement 
legislation to justify its compromise position in the face of continued opposition to the Marine 
and Coastal Area Act from its Maori constituents: 'we probably used it politically to ... justify 
the position that we took because we said "if the international Rapporteur came to New Zealand 
and said that we're doing alright [we must be]"'.23 1 The Maori Party's approach reveals that 
even Indigenous-focused political parties will selectively edit the special procedures' reports to 
support perceptions of human rights improvements if it could reflect positively on the party. 
In this example we see another illustration of the New Zealand Government's resistance 
to the special procedures' recommendations that transforms into ritualised 'commitment'. While 
the Government, including the Maori Party, has painted the Marine and Coastal Area Act as a 
positive development, significant issues with its content remain. It replaces the former Act with 
an equally discriminatory regime that continues to marginalise Maori rights to the foreshore and 
seabed. But having enacted new, difficult to demystify, legislation the Government can deflect 
(in some measure) international and domestic criticism of its approach to Maori rights to the 
foreshore and seabed. 
4 Modest Moves for Maori Education 
(a) A System Failing Maori 
The New Zealand Government further deflects attention from its ritualistic behaviour 
towards these hard rights to self-government and land through its partial commitment to soft 
rights, such as the right of Maori to an education tailored to their cultural needs. Maori 
educational outcomes and access to a quality education in te reo Maori remain a concern in New 
Zealand. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries New Zealand adopted an 
assimilationist education model, with the use of te reo Maori in schools actively discouraged 
and high levels of discrimination against Maori within educational institutions and curricula. As 
a result, by the latter half of the twentieth century te reo Maori was on the verge of being lost 
and Maori educational outcomes were poor. Maori-led efforts resulted in the creation of 
kohanga reo (te reo Maori immersion preschools in the 1980s); the recognition of te reo Maori 
as an official language in the Maori Language Act 1987 (NZ); the development of a Maori 
Language Strategy in 2003 ; and, the creation of wananga or Maori tertiary education providers. 
Due to these and other initiatives, immediately prior to Stavenhagen' s mission there were 61 te 
reo Maori immersion schools; 83 bilingual schools, as well as others with some immersion and 
bilingual classes; and, Maori participation in tertiary education had grown rapidly. But there 
231 Ibid . 
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remained a shortage of professionally trained te reo Maori teachers and Maori educational 
outcomes continued to be low when compared with those of non-Maori.232 
Both Stavenhagen and Anaya issued recommendations to address concerns regarding 
Maori educational outcomes and teaching in te reo Maori in their reports. Stavenhagen found 
that '[d]espite progress thus far, the schooling system has been performing on average less well 
for Maori than for non-Maori students, a problem which points to as yet unresolved issues 
concerning culturally appropriate educational methodologies.' 233 He recommended that '[m]ore 
resources should be put at the disposal of Maori education at all levels, including teacher 
training programmes and the development of culturally appropriate teaching materials. ' 234 
Relatedly, he recommended that revival of the Maori language continue to be recognised and 
respected through appropriate educational channels.235 Five years later Anaya identified 'many 
key improvements in Maori education since the 2006 report of the previous Special 
Rapporteur.' 236 This drew some criticism from Maori educationalists - he was accused of 
painting an overly positive picture of the state of Maori education 'only because we seem to be 
doing better than other Indigenous peoples', when the appropriate comparator group is non-
Maori New Zealanders.237 But Anaya similarly concluded that 'the education achievement of 
Maori children still lags behind that of other New Zealanders, particularly in early childhood 
education and in secondary school retention. ' 238 In his recommendations Anaya urged 'the 
Government to work to overcome the shortage of teachers fluent in the Maori language and to 
continue to develop Maori language programmes. ' 239 
(b) Narrow Commitment 
The Government's actions reveal a degree of commitment to improve Maori 
educational outcomes and teaching in te reo Maori in line with the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations. The Government did not publically criticise either expert's recommendations 
on these issues. Nor did it do so in internal documents concerning the visits and reports. Instead, 
it has publically reiterated its commitment to te reo Maori and improved educational outcomes 
?32 
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43; Wally Penetito, What's Maori About Maori Education? (Victoria University Press, 2010). 
233 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/ Add.3, [64]. 
234 Ibid [97]. 
235 Ibid [ 100]. Stavenhagen also recommended that ' [ s ]tudent fees should be lowered and allowances increased so as 
to stimulate the passage of more Maori students from certificate and diploma to degree level programmes in tertiary 
education': at [98]. 
236 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [59]. 
237 Interview 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011). 
238 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [59]. 
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for Maori. 240 More resources have been devoted to Maori education, although not at all levels. 
For example, the Government' s 2013 budget allocates NZ$8 million over a four year period to a 
new Maori Language Research and Development Fund administered by Te Taura Whiri i te Reo 
Maori, the Maori Language Commission, 'to strengthen the evidence base for effective Maori 
language policies and programmes'. 241 It also devotes funds to a package of scholarships for 
students training to become teachers in Maori-medium education and high-school level te reo 
Maori.242 There have been some positive moves in the development of teacher training 
programmes and culturally appropriate teaching materials. The New Zealand Curriculum, the 
revised curriculum for both primary and secondary schools, was released in 2007. It includes 
references to the Treaty, acknowledges that te reo Maori is an official language for delivery of 
the curriculum, and recognises the importance of a curriculum that reflects and values te ao 
Maori, the Maori world.243 Te Marautanga o Aotearoa was introduced into schools in 2011. It is 
a companion document built upon the values of kohanga reo and kura kaupapa (Maori medium 
primary schools) that sets out the curriculum for schools teaching in te reo Maori.244 It was the 
first New Zealand educational curriculum to be developed and written in te reo Maori. Further, 
Ka Hikitia - Managing/or Success: The Maori Education Strategy 2008-2012 was released in 
2006 with a focus on 'increasing the learning and capacity of teachers, placing resourcing and 
priorities in Maori language in education, and increasing whanau [ extended family] and iwi 
authority and involvement in education' .245 Ka Hikitia -Accelerating Success 2013-2017, the 
revised Maori education strategy, was released in mid-2013.246 Tau Mai Te Rea, the Ministry of 
Education's Maori language in education strategy for 2013 to 2017, was released at the same 
time.247 A new Maori Language Strategy will also be released in late 2013.248 Additional 
strategies have been designed to improve Maori students' educational success, including Tu 
Maia e te Akonga 2013-2016 and Te Rautaki Maori 2012-17.249 These are just some of a 
240 See, eg, Parekura Horomia, Minister of Maori Affairs and Associate Education Minister, 'Transforming Education 
to Deliver For Maori' (Press Release, 15 April 2008) <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/transforming-education-
deli ver-maori>; Pita Sharples, Maori Affairs Minister, 'Review Aims to Benefit Maori Language' (Press Release, 1 
September 20 10) <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/re lease/review-aims-benefit-maori-language>. 241 Pita Sharples, Maori Affairs Minister and Associate Education Minister, ' Increased Investment in Maori 
Language ' (P ress Release, 16 May 201 3) <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/increased-investment-m%C4%8 l ori-
language>. 
242 Ib id. 
243 New Zealand Min istry of Education, The Nr?W Zealand Curriculum (2007). 
244 New Zealand Ministry of Education, Te Marautanga o Aotearoa (2008). 
245 Anaya Follow-up Report on Nr?W Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.4, [58]. New Zealand Ministry of 
Education, Ka Hikitia - Managing fo r Success: The Maori Education Strategy 2008 - 2012 (2008). 246 New Zealand Ministry of Education, Ka Hikitia - Accelerating Success 2013-2017: The Maori Education Strategy (20 13). 
247 New Zealand Ministry of Education , Tau Mai Te Reo: The Maori Language in Education Strategy 2013-2017 
(20 13). 
248 Sharples, ' Increased Investment in Maori Language ', above n 241. 
249 NZHRC, Race Relations 2012, above n 32, 81. 
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constellation of initiatives directed at improving Maori educational outcomes and the health of 
te reo Maori.250 
Issues remain, however. In 2012 the New Zealand Government acknowledged the 
existence of 'significant challenges' in relation to Maori education, including regarding 
improving 'effective teaching and learning for Maori students, especially in relation to cultural 
responsiveness', increasing 'the resources and support available for teachers in Maori 
medium/settings', increasing 'the supply of teachers proficient in te reo Maori', and ensuring 
that 'secondary schools enable Maori students to gain worthwhile qualifications and make 
subject choices that open up future opportunities' .251 Maori educational achievement continues 
to lag behind that of non-Maori. For example, half of Maori leave school without upper 
secondary school qualifications, twice the number of Pakeha.252 There are concerns that 
teachers are not being supported in the implementation of the Treaty dimension of The New 
Zealand Curriculum, affecting the quality with which it is taught. 253 Ka Hikitia has been 
criticised for failing to make provision for a kaupapa Maori (an ideologically Maori) approach 
to learning within mainstream educational institutions.254 Two Waitangi Tribunal reports have 
further highlighted concerns. In 2011 the Tribunal found that the Crown had failed in its duty to 
protect te reo Maori under the Treaty, describing the health of the language as 'fragile at best' 
and recommending urgent action. 255 In 2013 the Tribunal found that the Government had failed 
to adequately sustain kohanga reo as an environment for language transmission, in breach of the 
Treaty and recommending, inter alia, that the Government develop a policy and funding regime 
tailored to kohanga reo.256 Further, in 2013 the Government announced that it would cease 
funding Te Kotahitanga, a highly successful education programme that enhances Maori student 
achievement by developing culturally responsive pedagogies, which had been in operation since 
2004.257 
250 See generally New Zealand Report to CERD Committee 2012, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/18-20, [133], [137], [141], 
[203]. 
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Educational Research, 2011) 38, 41. 
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(c) Slight Part 
The role of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples in contributing to 
the modest positive steps to improve Maori educational outcomes and the teaching of te reo 
Maori is difficult to assess. There is no evidence that either expert influenced the Government's 
moves. The Government has not publically tied its steps to either Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations, as it did with Anaya's recommendations under the Marine and Coastal Area 
Act, for example. Nor do the timing of the moves hint at a focal role for the visits or 
recommendations. Other international actors have also expressed concern at the educational 
achievement of Maori students and at the state of the Maori language. 258 But the primary driver 
for these developments is again the lobbying of domestic actors. This includes the actions of 
claimants before the Waitangi Tribunal, such as the Kohanga Reo National Trust. It also 
includes the work of the NZHRC, which made New Zealand's status as a well-established 
bilingual nation a priority in its 2005 to 2010 action plan for human rights, for example.259 The 
Maori Party features heavily again too. Its confidence and supply agreements with the National 
Party saw the then co-leader of the Maori Party appointed as Associate Minister of Education 
following the national elections in both 2008 and 2011.26° Further, in the 2011 confidence and 
supply agreement the National Party agreed to advance Maori Party policies providing for 
increases in Maori participation in early childhood education; improved Maori achievement in 
primary, secondary and tertiary education; and, to consider recognising the unique status of 
Maori medium education providers through their own statutory legislation.26 1 But the Special 
Rapporteur 's recommendations bolstered the lobbying efforts of these domestic actors. 262 For 
example, the NZHRC seized upon Anaya's recommendations on education and language before 
the HRC in 2011.263 
The Government's response to Maori rights to education differs from the previous two 
examples in that at least aspects of the conforming steps are not ritualistic. In the former 
examples the Government resists conformity to the Special Rapporteur 's recommendations 
regarding the constitutional protection of Maori rights and Maori rights to the foreshore and 
seabed, but disguises this resistance with ceremonial moves in apparent conformity with the 
recommendations: the Government engages in a constitutional review process unlikely to result 
258 See, eg, CERD Committee on Ne-w Zealand 2013, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/CO/ 18-20, (15] , [17]; CERD Committee 
on Ne-w Zealand 2007, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/CO/17, (20]. 
259 NZHRC, Mana Id Te Tangata/The Ne-w Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights: Priorities for Action 2005-2010 (2005) (4.4]. In addition, in 2007 and 20 10 the NZHRC 'called fo r a national languages policy and specific strategies 
forte reo Maori' , see Karen Johansen, NZHRC, 'Language and Culture' (Statement to EMRIP, Geneva, 2012) 
<http ://www.docip .org/gsd l/col lect/cendocdo/index/assoc/HASHedfc/f944 5 5 7 4 .d ir/EM l 2karen065. pd f-> 3. 260 National Party and Maori Party, Relationship Agreement 2008, above n 170, 3; National Party and Maori Party, 
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in improved protection for Maori rights and enacts legislation that effectively perpetuates the 
discrimination it purports to remedy. In contrast, in the current example the Government has 
taken more substantive steps to conform to aspects of the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations. These steps reflect a partial commitment to the Indigenous education and 
language norms underlying the Special Rapporteur's recommendations. They are not simply a 
commitment to the institutionalised means for achieving those goals, such as conducting a 
review or developing a policy that exists on paper only. Yet, deflection is occurring in this 
example too. 
5 A Strategy of Deflection 
The New Zealand Government ritualises its conformity to the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations regarding hard rights in order to deflect attention from its underlying 
resistance to those rights. It leverages its partial conformity to the Special Rapporteur's 
recommendations regarding soft rights for the same purpose. As identified in Chapter I, I 
characterise constitutional protection of Maori rights and Maori rights to the foreshore and 
seabed as hard rights because they correlate to Indigenous peoples' rights to self-determination 
and to their lands, both of which entail power and wealth sharing on the part of the state. In 
contrast, the right of Maori to an education tailored to their cultural needs is a soft right because 
it is a cultural right and generally does not challenge existing state power and wealth structures 
to the same extent. 
Sheryl Lightfoot recognises the same resistance to hard rights and, what she views as, 
an 'over-compliance' with soft rights in New Zealand. Lightfoot argues that New Zealand 
emphasises 'individual rights and soft collective rights (language, culture, education, etc), while 
simultaneously resisting the hard rights of land and self-determination' .264 She posits that it is 
reflective of a state-centric model of reconciliation that continues to rely on the doctrine of 
discovery to avoid or deflect conversations on hard rights.265 This idea forms part of a larger 
argument she constructs concerning Indigenous rights 'over-compliance'. According to 
Lightfoot, 'over-compliance' occurs where a state 'paradoxically takes constitutional, legal 
and/or policy actions which recognize specific rights or a category ofrights that go beyond that 
state's international human rights treaty obligations or its normative international 
commitments. ' 266 In her view, over-compliant states like New Zealand focus on, and excel in, 
264 Sheryl Lightfoot, 'Emerging International Indigenous Rights Norms and 'Over-Compliance' in New Zealand and 
Canada' (2010) 62(1) Political Science 84, 96. 
265 Ibid 104. 
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complying with soft rights while simultaneously resisting hard rights. 267 However, 'over-
compliance' is a problematic term. It suggests that New Zealand is more than compliant with 
the soft international Indigenous rights norms to which it has committed, which it is not. 
Lightfoot's argument predates New Zealand's endorsement of the UNDRJP. Now that New 
Zealand has endorsed that instrument it cannot be said that New Zealand is domestically 
recognising soft rights that go beyond its normative international commitments. In fact, this was 
the case even before that endorsement given the strong Indigenous rights jurisprudence of the 
bodies monitoring compliance with the international human rights treaties to which New 
Zealand is party. I do not embrace the idea that New Zealand is 'over-compliant'. But I do see 
the New Zealand Government as using its semi-compliance with soft rights to deflect from its 
resistance to hard rights. 
The New Zealand Government has much to gain from this approach. It affords the 
Government the appearance of rights conformity, while it avoids commitment to the substance 
or goals of hard Indigenous peoples' rights. By deflecting attention from its ritualised behaviour 
New Zealand avoids outright confrontation with the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
Indigenous peoples, as occurred with Stavenhagen. It avoids the negative press associated with 
such an approach. As identified above, the Government's rejection of Stavenhagen's report was 
the subject of significant domestic media attention, whereas Anaya's report and the 
Government's benign response largely flew under the media's radar. It also avoids strong 
critique from the Special Rapporteur: by eventually moving to ritualise its conformity to 
Stavenhagen's recommendations the Government was praised for its perceived progress in 
Anaya's 2011 follow-up report and received more muted criticisms from Anaya for ongoing 
concerns. Because the Government does not outright reject the norms the subject of the Special 
Rapporteur's recommendations its resistance is more understated and, thus, more difficult to 
identify. This carries implications for how the human rights situation of Maori is viewed both 
domestically and on the world stage. In particular, it enables New Zealand's self-propagated 
image as a world leader in Indigenous rights recognition to go largely unquestioned. It feeds 
into what Moana Jackson has called 'a powerful new myth: that New Zealand leads the world 
not only in the benevolence of its actual colonization, but also in the way it now seeks to redress 
the wrongs of its past' .268 The analysis offered here indicates that New Zealand's approach to 
Indigenous rights recognition is in fact more complex, favouring recognition of soft rights over 
hard rights. And, even then, its recognition is partial. 
267 Ibid I 04 . Moana Jackson similarly argues that ' [t]he only reality Maori are permitted to define and inhabit is a 
"cultural" construct of language, music, art and custom.' Jackson, 'Colonization as Myth-Making: A Case Study in 
Aotearoa', above n 8, 107. 
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F Conclusion: Maintaining the Myth of Rights Leadership 
This case study reveals that being a stable liberal democracy with a reputation as a 
world leader in Indigenous rights recognition is no guarantee of conformity to special 
procedures mandate-holders' recommendations concerning Indigenous peoples' rights. The 
Government has implemented some of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' 
recommendations, it has rejected others. But ritualism, dressed up as partial implementation, has 
been the Government's most prominent behavioural response. The Government initially 
rejected the Special Rapporteur's recommendations concerning the protection of Maori rights in 
New Zealand's constitutional arrangements and in the foreshore and seabed, only to later take 
steps that give the appearance of a commitment to those recommendations. But the commitment 
is not to the goals of the Special Rapporteur's recommendations, namely: domestic legal 
security for Maori rights under the Treaty and international human rights law, including in 
respect of the foreshore and seabed. Rather, it is to the institutionalised means for achieving 
those goals: a constitutional conversation and new (equally discriminatory) foreshore and 
seabed legislation. The Government has demonstrated a degree of commitment to the Special 
Rapporteur's recommendations regarding improved educational outcomes for Maori and Maori 
access to an education in te reo Maori. But it leverages its limited conformity to this soft 
cultural right to education to deflect attention from its underlying resistance to the hard rights 
regarding self-determination and land. When Charlesworth raised the idea that states engage in 
rights ritualism in the context of discussing Cambodia's behaviour towards international human 
rights regulation she commented that such behaviour was 'not confined to developing 
countries', observing that Australia engaged in ritualism too. 269 This chapter confirms that 
countries from the global North also engage in ritualism in response to international human 
rights regulation. 
The role of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples in bringing about the small, 
mostly ceremonial, gains in line with the country recommendations is slight but tangible. The 
experts have afforded legitimacy to domestic lobbying efforts for improved rights recognition, 
and have been leveraged by domestic actors for that purpose. Notably, the Government 
professed to have taken on board Anaya's recommendations in refining the replacement 
foreshore and seabed legislation. But the Special Rapporteur's Indigenous rights praise, as 
tendered by Anaya, has also been used by the New Zealand Government to legitimise ritualistic 
rights moves. Domestic actors, such as the Maori Party, have been the major drivers behind the 
developments consistent with the Special Rapporteur's recommendations. Overall, New 
Zealand has inwardly committed to few of the Special Rapporteur's recommendations. The 
analysis indicates that human rights investigators must be vigilant to the possibility that states 
269 Hilary Charlesworth, 'Kirby Lecture in International Law - Swimming to Cambodia: Justice and Ritual in Human 
Rights After Conflict' (2010) 29 The Australian Year Book of International Law 1, 13. 
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Government's initial reaction, has been largely positive; examines the Government's ritualised 
implementation of the recommendations, again, using three exemplar recommendations 
regarding the soft cultural right to an intercultural bilingual education, as well as the hard rights 
of Indigenous participation in decision-making and Indigenous peoples' rights to their lands; 
and closes with observations on the Government's approach of providing soft commitments and 
hard resistance to the experts' recommendations. 
B Background 
l Contemporary Rights Crisis 
Guatemala possesses all the trappings of a democracy but is facing a serious human 
rights crisis. The most populous Central American country, 2 it has an estimated population of 
15.1 million,3 the majority of which are Indigenous. Maya are the main Indigenous peoples, 
comprising almost 60 per cent of the total population and accounting for 22 of the 24 different 
Indigenous languages spoken within its borders.4 Two other Indigenous peoples are recognised 
by the Government - the Xinka and Garifuna - who together make up around 2.5 per cent of the 
total population.5 The Xinka are a distinct Indigenous people from Eastern Guatemala.6 The 
Garifuna are of Carib, Arawak and West African descent and reportedly arrived in Guatemala 
early in the 1800s. 7 But I follow the state and Stavenhagen' s lead in treating them as 
'Indigenous peoples' for the purposes of this discussion. 8 The remainder of the population are 
mestizo ( of Spanish and Indigenous descent) and European. Despite being a numerical minority, 
2 Eduardo Jimenez Mayo, 'The Violence after "La Violencia": The Guatemalan Maya and the United Nations-
Brokered Peace Accords of 1996' (2011) 7(3) Alter Native 207, 2 I 5. 
3 UNDP, Human Development Report 2013 - The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World (2013) 196. 4 Regarding the estimated size of Guatemala's Indigenous peoples population, see HRC, Annual Report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the Activities of Her Office in Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/19/21/Add.l (30 January 2012) [52] ('HCHR Report 
on Guatemala 2012'). Twenty-two different Maya languages are recognised in the decree creating the Academy of 
Mayan Languages, see Ley de la Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala, Government Decree No 65-90 
(Guatemala) art 7. Regarding the total number oflndigenous languages spoken in Guatemala, see Luis Enrique 
Lopez, Reaching the Unreached: Indigenous Intercultural Bilingual Education in Latin America - Background Paper 
Prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010, Reaching the Marginalized, UN Doc 
20 I 0/ED/EF A/MR T/PI/29 (2009) 3 (' Reaching the Unreached'). 
5 Government of the Repub lic of Guatemala, Un idad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca and United Nations, 
Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations, 31 March 1995) ('Agreement on Identity 
and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1995'). Regarding estimates of the population size of the Xinka and Garffuna 
peoples see, eg, Instrumentos lntemacionales de Derechos Humanos, Documento Basico que Forma Parte Integrante 
de los Informes de los Estados Partes: Guatemala, UN Doc HRI/CORE/GTM/2012 (9 October 2012) [14] 
('Guatemala Background Document 2012'). 
6 Roddy Brett, 'Confronting Racism from within the Guatemalan State: The Challenges Faced by the Defender of 
Indigenous Rights of Guatemala's Human Rights Ombudsman's Office' (20 11 ) 39(2) Oxford Development Studies 
205, 224 n l . 
7 CHR, Report by Mr Doudou Diene, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.2 (11 March 2005) [ 40] ('Expert on Racism 
Guatemala 2005'). 
8 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/ Add.2, [ l O]. 
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VI SOFT COMMITMENT, HARD RESISTANCE: 
GUATEMALA'S RESPONSE 
A Introduction 
One case study provides limited guidance on the influence of the special procedures 
mechanism on states ' behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. Accordingly, in this chapter I 
analyse the influence of the special procedures mechanism on state behaviour towards 
Indigenous peoples in a second, markedly different, state: Guatemala. Guatemala is an ideal 
counter-point to New Zealand in an assessment of the special procedures' influence on states' 
behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. Apart from its dramatically different history and 
contemporary reality, it is one of the states most studied by the special procedures and, 
superficially, it is an example of a state where the special procedures have had a discernibly 
positive influence on state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples; sources including 
Stavenhagen, Preston et al, Piccone, and Bray have identified it as such. 1 Certainly, in contrast 
to New Zealand where none of the examples of moves towards implementation of the special 
procedures' recommendations were attributable to the mechanism in anything other than a 
peripheral way, there are two noteworthy examples of the mechanism having a direct influence 
in Guatemala. However, a closer reading reveals that the Guatemalan Government engages in 
Indigenous rights ritualism as much as the New Zealand Government. Ritualism - the 
Government's foremost behavioural response - is again apparent in the Government's 
implementation of aspects of the soft rights the subject of the special procedures' 
recommendations. This ritualistic behaviour operates to deflect attention from the Government's 
failure both to more fully implement those soft rights as well as to implement the hard rights 
reflected in the experts' proposals for action. It is also evident in the Government 's deflection 
tactic of publically committing to recommendations concerning hard rights, only to resist those 
rights in more sophisticated ways. This chapter introduces Guatemala's Indigenous rights 
situation; analyses the way in which each of the special procedures' dialogic mechanisms of 
shaming, dialogue-building and capacity-building have been leveraged in the state; identifies the 
Government's official response to these efforts, which, in contrast to the New Zealand 
1 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011 ); Study on Best Practices, UN Doc 
A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [58]-[64]; Jennifer Preston et al, The UN Special Rapporteur: Indigenous Peoples Rights: 
Experiences and Challenges (IWGIA, 2007), 35 , 39; Ted Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of 
the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights (The Brookings Institution, 2010) appendix E 66; 
David Barton Bray, 'Rodolfo Stavenhagen: The UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples' (2011) 113(3) 
American Anthropologist 502, 503. The impact of special procedures experts in Guatemala beyond the Indigenous 
rights sphere has also been identified. See, eg, Christophe Golay, Claire Mahon and Ioana Cismas, 'The Impact of the 
UN Special Procedures on the Development and Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (2011) 
15(2) International Journal of Human Rights 299, 311; Allison L Jemow, 'Ad Hoc and Extra-Conventional Means 
for Human Rights Monitoring' (1995-1996) 28 Journal of International Law and Politics 785, 805 . 
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Government's initial reaction, has been largely positive; examines the Government's ritualised 
implementation of the recommendations, again, using three exemplar recommendations 
regarding the soft cultural right to an intercultural bilingual education, as well as the hard rights 
of Indigenous participation in decision-making and Indigenous peoples' rights to their lands; 
and closes with observations on the Government's approach of providing soft commitments and 
hard resistance to the experts' recommendations. 
B Background 
l Contemporary Rights Crisis 
Guatemala possesses all the trappings of a democracy but is facing a serious human 
rights crisis. The most populous Central American country, 2 it has an estimated population of 
15.1 million,3 the majority of which are Indigenous. Maya are the main Indigenous peoples, 
comprising almost 60 per cent of the total population and accounting for 22 of the 24 different 
Indigenous languages spoken within its borders.4 Two other Indigenous peoples are recognised 
by the Government - the Xinka and Garifuna - who together make up around 2.5 per cent of the 
total population.5 The Xinka are a distinct Indigenous people from Eastern Guatemala.6 The 
Garifuna are of Carib, Arawak and West African descent and reportedly arrived in Guatemala 
early in the 1800s. 7 But I follow the state and Stavenhagen' s lead in treating them as 
'Indigenous peoples' for the purposes of this discussion. 8 The remainder of the population are 
mestizo ( of Spanish and Indigenous descent) and European. Despite being a numerical minority, 
2 Eduardo Jimenez Mayo, 'The Violence after "La Violencia": The Guatemalan Maya and the United Nations-
Brokered Peace Accords of 1996' (2011) 7(3) Alter Native 207, 2 I 5. 
3 UNDP, Human Development Report 2013 - The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World (2013) 196. 4 Regarding the estimated size of Guatemala's Indigenous peoples population, see HRC, Annual Report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the Activities of Her Office in Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/19/21/Add.l (30 January 2012) [52] ('HCHR Report 
on Guatemala 2012'). Twenty-two different Maya languages are recognised in the decree creating the Academy of 
Mayan Languages, see Ley de la Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala, Government Decree No 65-90 
(Guatemala) art 7. Regarding the total number oflndigenous languages spoken in Guatemala, see Luis Enrique 
Lopez, Reaching the Unreached: Indigenous Intercultural Bilingual Education in Latin America - Background Paper 
Prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010, Reaching the Marginalized, UN Doc 
20 I 0/ED/EF A/MR T/PI/29 (2009) 3 (' Reaching the Unreached'). 
5 Government of the Repub lic of Guatemala, Un idad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca and United Nations, 
Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations, 31 March 1995) ('Agreement on Identity 
and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1995'). Regarding estimates of the population size of the Xinka and Garffuna 
peoples see, eg, Instrumentos lntemacionales de Derechos Humanos, Documento Basico que Forma Parte Integrante 
de los Informes de los Estados Partes: Guatemala, UN Doc HRI/CORE/GTM/2012 (9 October 2012) [14] 
('Guatemala Background Document 2012'). 
6 Roddy Brett, 'Confronting Racism from within the Guatemalan State: The Challenges Faced by the Defender of 
Indigenous Rights of Guatemala's Human Rights Ombudsman's Office' (20 11 ) 39(2) Oxford Development Studies 
205, 224 n l . 
7 CHR, Report by Mr Doudou Diene, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.2 (11 March 2005) [ 40] ('Expert on Racism 
Guatemala 2005'). 
8 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/ Add.2, [ l O]. 
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this latter group is dominant within the state.9 
Guatemala is officially a constitutional republic. Its state structure is based on a civil 
law system, drawn from its Spanish colonisers. It has an executive headed by the President, a 
unicameral Congress elected through a party list proportional representation system and a 
judiciary, of which the Constitutional Court is the highest body. Although formally a 
democracy, Ivan Briscoe identifies the state as in ' a stalled or incomplete process of democratic 
transition' .10 A small number of economic elite exercise de facto power over much of the organs 
of state, sometimes in concert with the international drug cartels that use the country as a transit 
point between Latin America and the United States. 11 Its fragile state institutions are financially 
emaciated creating limited bureaucratic capabilities, 12 a product of the country having one of the 
lowest tax burdens in Latin America and Caribbean. 13 There is widespread impunity for the 
extreme violence that punctuates the state; 14 in 2013 Guatemala ranked 109th most peaceful 
country out of 162 countries, in stark contrast to New Zealand's third place. 15 The military is 
influential. 16 Under the 2012 President-elect Otto Perez-Molina, a former military general, it is 
increasingly so. 17 
Guatemala is a lower middle income country and an ' emerging and developing 
economy', 18 but it is dramatically unequal. Seventy per cent of the country's fertile land is 
9 See, eg, HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/1 9/21 /Add.l, [52]. 
10 Ivan Briscoe, The Proliferation of the "Parallel State" (Fundacion para las Relaciones Intemacionales y el Dialogo 
Exterior, 2008) 13. 
11 Procurador de los Derechos Humanos de la Republica de Guatemala, Contribuci6n de! Procurador de las 
Derechos Humanos de la Republica de Guatemala Examen Peri6dico Universal al Estado de Guatemala Segundo 
Cicio 14° Sesi6n (2012) 
<http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Sessionl4/GT/PDH_UPR_GTM_S-14_20l2_procuraduriaDerecho 
Humano_S.pdf-> 3. See generally Ivan Briscoe and Martin Rodriguez Pellecer, A State Under Seige: Elites, Criminal 
Networks and Institutional Reform in Guatemala (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2010). 12 Kevin Casas-Zamora, The Travails of Development and Democratic Governance in Central America (Brookings 
Institution, 2011) 3. See generally HRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report 
of the United Nations High Commissio.ner for Human Rights on the Activities of Her Office in Guatemala, UN Doc 
A/HRC/16/20/Add.l (26 January 2011) [8] ('HCHR Report on Guatemala 2011 ' ). 
13 Center for Economic and Social Rights and Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales, Rights or Privileges? 
Fiscal Commitment to the Rights to Health, Education and Food in Guatemala: Executive Summa,y (2009) 17. See 
generally HRC, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Accordance with 
Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: Guatemala, UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.6/14/GTM/2 (13 August 2012) [7] (' OHCHR Compilation on Guatemala 2012 '); HCHR Report on 
Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/16/20/Add.l, [12] , [66]; HRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Activities of Her Office in Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/ 13/26/Add.l (3 March 2010) [10] ('HCHR Report on Guatemala 201 O'). 
14 See, eg, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012 (2012) 247-52; Mayo, above n 2,207; Timothy J Smith and 
Thomas A Offit, 'Confronting Violence in Postwar Guatemala: An Introduction' (2010) 15(1) Journal of Latin 
American and Caribbean Anthropology 1, 1-3 ; Megan K Donovan, 'The International Commission Against Impunity 
in Guatemala: Will Accountability Prevail?' (2008) 25(3) Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 
779, 784-85. Special procedures experts are not immune from attack. In August 2013 the Guatemalan office of the 
expert on freedom of opinion was broken into with computers and documents seized, see Chaloka Beyani, 
'Guatemala: UN Expert Alarmed by Break-In of Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression 's Office' (Media 
Statement, 2 August 2013) 
<http: //www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=l3605&LangID=E>. 15 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2013: Measuring the State a/Global Peace (20 13) 5. 16 See, eg, Mayo, above n 2, 211-12. 
17 See, eg, The Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA, Recent Attacks on Land Rights Activists Raise Alarm ( 14 May 2013) <http:/ /www.ghrc-usa.org/our-work/current-cases/recent-attacks-on-land-rights-activists-raise-
alarm/>. 
18 Economy Watch, Emerging Markets <http: //www.economywatch.com/world_economy/emerging-markets/>. 
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controlled by two per cent oflandowners. 19 Ten per cent of the population receives nearly half 
of all the country's income.2° More than fifty per cent of the population lives in poverty, and 
almost one in seven in extreme poverty.21 The country has a GDP per capita approximately half 
of the average for Latin America and the Caribbean,22 and one of the lowest rates of expenditure 
on social policies in the region. 23 The UNDP's Human Development Report 2013 ranks 
Guatemala 133rd out of 187 countries, below Iraq and only one place above Timor-Leste.24 
Since the 1990s Guatemala has positioned itself as a leading advocate of Indigenous 
peoples' rights on the international stage. It has demonstrated keen support for international 
instruments that elaborate international Indigenous rights norms. In contrast to New Zealand, 
Guatemala was a key advocate of including strong rights protections in the UNDRIP and voted 
in favour of its adoption in 2007 .25 In 1996 it ratified the binding JLO Convention 169, which 
New Zealand refuses to ratify; it never ratified ILO Convention 107. Guatemala has also ratified 
the core UN human rights treaties whose provisions elaborate international Indigenous rights 
norms, including the CERD, ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC, CAT and CRPD. 26 Regionally, 
Guatemala is a member of the OAS and is a party to its central human rights instrument, the 
American Convention on Human Rights.27 It has also recognised the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court; the body, along with the Inter-American Commission, responsible for 
overseeing adherence to that Convention.28 In addition, Guatemala has been active in the 
negotiation of the OAS' draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.29 As 
identified in Chapter I, Guatemala has historically cosponsored the resolutions on Indigenous 
rights and activities within the UN's main human rights bodies.30 It has repeatedly taken the 
19 HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/19/21 /Add.l, [66). 
20 Mayo, above n 2, 216. 
21 HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/19/21 /Add.1 [9); Jonathon Menkos, Ignacio Saiz and Maria 
Jose Eva, Rights or Privileges? Fiscal Commitment to the Rights to Health, Education and Food in Guatemala: 
Executive Summa,y (Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies and Center for Economic and Social Rights, 2009) 
7. 
22 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Guatemala <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/gt.html>. 
23 See, eg, HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/19/21/Add . l, [10); OHCHR Compilation on 
Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/14/GTM/2, [58); Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America: Briefing Paper (2010) 33-4. 
24 UNDP, Human Development Report 2013 - The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, above n 3, 
143. 
25 GA, 107'" Plena,y Meeting: Official Records, UN Doc A/6 1/PV.107 (13 September 2007) 19; Megan Davis, 
'Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples' 
(2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 439, 458 n 88; Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc 
A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.3 , appendix [65). 
26 OHCHR Compilation on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/14/GTM/2, 2. 
27 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November I 969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into 
force 18 July 1978); Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights 'Pact of San Jose, 
Costa Rica' (B-32): Signatories and Ratifications <http: //www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights sign .htm>. 
28 lbid. 
-
29 See, eg, Fergus MacKay, A Guide to Indigenous Peoples' Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System 
(IWGIA, 2002) 103, 106, 108-09, 111 , 11 5. 
30 See, eg, Luis Rodriguez-Pinero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples' Rights 
under the Declaration' in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 314, 3 I 5; OHCHR, 'Council Extends 
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international stage to praise the Indigenous-exclusive international mechanisms and to 
encourage other states to respect Indigenous peoples' rights. 31 As a consequence, it has been 
praised for 'its leadership in indigenous peoples' rights.' 32 But the persistence of Indigenous 
rights concerns in Guatemala will surprise no one familiar with its troubled history. 
2 Bleak Historical Record 
Spain asserted colonial authority over Guatemala, and its Maya and Xinka peoples, in 
the 1500s. As in New Zealand, Guatemala's Indigenous peoples actively resisted their 
colonisers. Unlike in New Zealand, there was no treaty with the Maya and Xinka. Instead Spain 
claimed sovereignty over Guatemala by conquest, engaging in explicit policies of extermination 
and extreme labour exploitation. The Spanish colonisers implemented a series of systems from 
the late 1500s, which awarded, initially the Spanish conquistadores or conquerors and later 
others, grants of land that were worked by Guatemala's Indigenous peoples as indentured 
servants through to the early 1800s. When Guatemala gained independence from Spain in 1821 
Mayan and Xinka autonomy was not restored, instead control of the state was placed in the 
hands of an elite descended from the former Spanish colonial rulers. 33 These elite capitalised on 
the racial divisions rife in the country. They embraced the international market system, 
dismantling Mayan highland communal village lands to establish an extensive system of coffee 
plantations that operated into the 1960s using the exploited labour of Indigenous and other 
peasant farmers. 34 Then, in 1954, with United States corporate interests in the country 
threatened by a package of progressive social welfare and land reforms, the United States 
backed a coup that overthrew the elected Government and replaced it with successive repressive 
military dictatorships.35 When dissidents responded with violent resistance in 1960, 
Guatemala's 36 year internal conflict began.36 
Mandates on Slavery, Peaceful Assembly, Health, Arbitrary Detention, Indigenous Peoples and Mercenaries' (Media 
Release, 26 September 2013) 
<http: //www.ohchr.org/EN/N ewsEvents/Pages/DisplayN ews .aspx?NewsID= 13 790&LanglD=E>; doCip, Human 
Rights Council <http://www.docip.org/Human-Rights-Council.64.0.html>. 
31 See, eg, Guatemalan Government, 'lntervenci6n de Guatemala en el Marco de] Sexto Periodo de Sesiones 
Mecanismo de Expertos sabre los Derechos de los Pueblos lndigenas' (Geneva, July 2013) 
<http://www.docip.org/Online-Documentation.32.0.htrnl> 3; HRC, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review, UN Doc A/HRC/17/10 (24 March 2011) [86.107]. 
32 Paraguay cited in HRC, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Guatemala, UN Doc 
A/HRC/22/8 (31 December 2012) [78] ('Guatemala UPR 2012'). 
33 See generally W George Lovell, 'Surviving Conquest: The Maya of Guatemala in Historical Perspective' (1988) 
23(2) Latin American Research Review 25, 28-37. 
34 Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and Domestic Politics in Chile and Guatemala' in 
Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and 
Domestic Change (Cambridge Univers ity Press, 1999) 172, 177; Richard Ashby Wilson, 'Is the Legalization of 
Human Rights Really the Problem? Genocide in the Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission' in Saladin 
Meckled-Garcia and B~ak <;ali (eds), The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human 
Rights and Human Rights Law (Routledge, 2006) 81, 90; Lovell, above n 33, 38-42. 35 Ropp and Sikkink, above n 34, 177-78; Donovan, above n 14, 782. 36 Donovan, above n 14, 782. 
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Guatemala 's internal conflict was not directly in response to the repression of 
Guatemala 's Indigenous peoples. However, after bearing the brunt of the violence many 
Indigenous peoples joined the guerrilla movement.37 The conflict reached its height between 
1981 and 1983 when the military conducted a scorched-earth counterinsurgency campaign in 
Guatemala's Mayan populated highlands. A UN-backed truth commission (headed by a former 
special procedures country mandate-holder) would later describe military massacres of four 
Mayan communities during this period as genocide. 38 Overall, the commission estimated that 
more than 200,000 people were killed or disappeared during the conflict, with over 100,000 
fleeing the country and between 500,000 and a million and a half people displaced. The 
commission attributed 93 per cent of the atrocities committed to the military. Eighty-three per 
cent of the victims of arbitrary execution and forced disappearance identified by the commission 
were Mayan.39 President Molina is himself accused of having supervised acts of genocide 
during the conflict, prompting an allegation letter by the experts on torture and extrajudicial 
executions in 2011. 40 
Moves towards democratic government, peace, and recognition of Indigenous peoples' 
rights occurred during the later years of the conflict. The military, financially starved and 
internally divided, surrendered formal control of the state through a new constitution, agreed in 
1985. The Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala 1985 (Constitution) includes some 
reference to Indigenous peoples, recognising their status as Indigenous peoples, their right to 
their cultural identity, and outlining some general land protections.41 However, in contrast to 
other constitutions in Latin America, the Constitution is silent regarding Indigenous peoples ' 
37 Evelyn Gere and Tim MacNeill, 'Radical Indigenous Subjectivity: Maya Resurgence In Guatemala' (2008) 8(2) The 
International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations 97, 99; Rosemary Thorp, Corinne 
Caumartin and George Gray-Molina, 'Inequality, Ethnicity, Political Mobilisation and Political Violence in Latin 
America: The Cases of Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru' (2006) 25(4) Bulletin of Latin American Research 453 , 455-56 . 38 Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala Memory of Silence: Tz'inil Na'tab'al: Report of the 
Commission fo r Historical Clarification: Conclusions and Recommendations (1999) [1 22] (' Conclusions and 
Recommendations'). The Commission for Historical Clarification (Comisi6n para el Esclarecimiento Hist6rico or 
CEH) was presided over by Christian Tomuschat. The CEH' s full report is available in Spanish only, see Comisi6n 
de Esc larecimiento Hist6rico, Guatemala: Memoria def Silencio: Informe de la Comisi6n para el Esclarecimiento 
Hist6rico (I 999). Another investigation into the conflict was carried out by the Catholic Church: the Recovery of 
Historical Memory (Recuperation de la Memoria Historica or REMHI), see Oficina de Derechos Humanos de! 
Arzobispado de Guatemala, Guatemala: Nunca Mas - Info rme de! Proyecto Interdiocesano Recuperaci6n De La 
Memoria His t6rica (1998). An abridged version is available in English, see Human Rights Office Archdiocese of 
Guatemala, Guatemala, Never Again! REM111, Recove,y of Historical Memory Proj ect: The Official Report of the 
Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of Guatemala ( 1999). 
39 CEH, Conclusions and Recommendations, above n 38, ( l ]-(2], (15], (66]. 
40 HRC, Communications Report of Special Procedures, UN Doc A/HRC/19/44 (23 February 201 2) (' Joint 
Communications Report Februa,y 2012') 62. Molina is not named in the communication but reference is made to 
video foo tage of him and the pseudonym he assumed in the footage. A copy of the information transmitted to the 
expert on torture, which prompted the communication, is available at Rights Action, No More 'Politics & Business As 
Usual' with War Criminals in Guatemala (2011 ) 
<http://www. ri ghtsaction.org/articles/peres molina letter 080611.html>. 
41 Constitution of the Republic ofGuatemakl 1985 (Guate~ala), arts 58, 66-8 and 76. See, eg, Rachel Sieder, 
"Emancipation' or 'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War Guatemala" (2011) 
40 Economy and Society 239, 253; Rachel Sieder, 'The Judiciary and Ind igenous Rights in Guatemala' (2007) 5(2) 
international Journal of Constitutional Law 21 1, 237-38. See generally Roddy Brett, Social Movements, Indigenous 
Politics and Democratisation in Guatemala, 1985-1996 (Brill Academic Publ ishers, 2008). 
190 
rights to self-determination, political participation, legal pluralism and natural resources. 42 The 
most important domestic instrument concerning Indigenous peoples is the 1995 Agreement on 
Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Indigenous Agreement), part of the package ofUN-
mediated Peace Accords signed in December 1996 bringing an end to the conflict. The 
Indigenous Agreement committed the Guatemalan Government to implement constitutional 
reforms to recognise Indigenous peoples and their rights, including to their languages, bilingual 
education, spirituality, cultural heritage sites, laws, authorities and lands.43 The constitutional 
reforms failed at a referendum in 1999, with only 18 per cent of voter participation.44 But the 
Peace Accords were subsequently given effect in ordinary statute instead in 2005.45 Various 
state institutions to advance Indigenous rights were created from the 1990s, including a special 
Indigenous women's defence office (DEMI);46 the defender of the rights of Indigenous peoples' 
unit,47 within the country's NHRI (PDH);48 the Presidential Commission for Coordination on 
Human Rights (COPREDEH);49 and the Presidential Commission against Discrimination and 
Racism towards Indigenous Peoples of Guatemala (CODISRA). 50 However, with resistance 
from the economic elite, a lack of institutional support, and starved of funding, substantive 
implementation of the Peace Accords, in particular of the Indigenous Agreement, has been 
thwarted.51 
3 Indigenous Rights Urgency 
The Indigenous rights situation remains grave. Few of the architects of the worst abuses 
against Indigenous peoples during the conflict have been tried.52 The-autonomy of Indigenous 
42 Gonzalo Aguilar et al, 'South/North Exchange of2009 - The Constitutional Recognition oflndigenous Peoples in 
Latin America' (2010) 2(2) Pace Interryational Law Review Online Companion 44, 99- I 00. 43 Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1995, Preamble, Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V. 
See, eg, Sieder, "Emancipation' or 'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41, 252. 
44 Sieder, 'The Judiciary and Indigenous Rights in Guatemala', above n 41, 218-19. See generally Kay B Warren, 
'Voting Against Indigenous Rights in Guatemala: Lessons from the 1999 Referendum' in Kay B Warren and Jean E 
Jackson (eds), Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the State in Latin America (University of Texas 
Press, 2002) 149. 
45 Ley Marco de los Acuerdos de Paz, Government Decree No 52-2005 (Guatemala). 46 Defensoria de la Mujer Indigena, Government Agreement No 525-99 (Guatemala). 47 Defensoria de los Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas, created in 1998. See generally Brett, 'Confronting Racism 
from within the Guatemalan State: The Challenges Faced by the Defender oflndigenous Rights of Guatemala's 
Human Rights Ombudsman's Office', above n 6,205. 
48 Procurador de los Derechos Humanos, created by Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala 1985 (Guatemala) art 
274. 
49 Comisi6n Presidencial Coordinadora de la Politica del Ejecutivo en Materia de Derechos Humanos, created in 
1992. See generally Guatemala Background Document 2012, UN Doc HRI/CORE/GTM/2012, [164). 5° Comisi6n Presidencial contra la Discriminaci6n y el Racismo contra los Pueblos Indigenas en Guatemala, 
Government Agreement No 390-2002 (Guatemala). 
51 See, eg, UNDP Evaluation Office, Assessment of Development Results, Evaluation of UNDP Contribution: 
Guatemala (United Nations Development Programme, 2009) xii, 48; Brett, 'Confronting Racism from within the 
Guatemalan State: The Challenges Faced by the Defender oflndigenous Rights of Guatemala's Human Rights 
Ombudsman's Office', above n 6, 206-08 . 
52 See, eg, Donovan, above n 14, 780. For comment on some belated positive steps to prosecute key actors see, eg, 
HRC, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report of the United Nations 
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authorities is severely circumscribed and the courts have not revealed a coherent policy for 
recognising Indigenous legal systems. 53 Indigenous peoples are chronically underrepresented in 
Guatemalan political institutions. Following the elections in late 2011 and early 2012 
Indigenous candidates secured only 19 out of the 158 congressional seats, with just three of 
those for Indigenous women. 54 The inequitable distribution of land significantly impacts upon 
Indigenous peoples (particularly Indigenous women), who for the most part lack security of title 
over their territories. 55 Indigenous peoples' territories are threatened by the extractive industries, 
energy development projects and agribusinesses funded by foreign investors, which now form 
the focus of Guatemala's development strategy. 56 Racial discrimination against Indigenous 
peoples is pervasive; in 2012 the HCHR observed that' [t]he situation of indigenous peoples 
epitomizes the structural patterns of racism and discrimination that persist in Guatemala, to a 
degree that could amount to segregation. ' 57 Attacks and threats against Indigenous peoples who 
defend their rights are common, as is the criminalisation of their protests. 58 
Socio-economic statistics that are alarming on a national level are catastrophic when 
disaggregated by ethnicity. More than 70 per cent of Indigenous peoples live in poverty;59 the 
same percentage of Indigenous children suffer from chronic malnutrition;60 the maternal 
mortality rate, already high, is three times higher for Indigenous women than non-Indigenous 
women; 61 and over 47 per cent of Indigenous peoples 15 years old and above are illiterate, 
compared with just under 24 per cent of the non-Indigenous population.62 Indigenous peoples' 
difficulties accessing basic social services are intensified by their location: around 65 per cent of 
the country's Indigenous peoples live in poorly serviced rural areas. 63 As a result, the 
Indigenous rights situation in Guatemala has been the subject of extensive international concern, 
High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Activities of Her Office in Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17 / Add. l (7 
January 2013) [37] ('HCHR Report on Guatemala 2013'). 
53 Sieder, 'The Judiciary and Indigenous Rights in Guatemala', above n 41 , 219-23. 
54 Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Ciudadania Intercultural: Aportes desde la Participaci6n 
Politica de los Pueblos Indigenas de Latinoamerica (2013) 53 . Note that the HCHR identifies that Indigenous 
peoples secured 22 congressional seats. HCHR Report on Guatemala 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17/Add.l [62]. The 
Guatemalan Government has identified the figure as 19 so that is the figure I use. Guatemalan Government 
representative, Connie Taracena Secaira, cited in GA 3rd Committee Press Release 2011, UN Doc GA/SHC/4013. 55 See, eg, UNDP Evaluation Office, above n 51, viii, 31. See generally Michael Holley, 'Recognizing the Rights of 
Indigenous People to their Traditional Lands: A Case Study of an Internally-Displaced Community in Guatemala' 
(1997) 15 Berkeley Journal of International Law 119. 
56 See, eg, Alberto Alonso-Fradej as, 'Land Control-Grabbing in Guatemala: The Political Economy of Contemporary 
Agrarian Change' (2012) 33( 4) Canadian Journal of Development Studies 509; Amanda M Fulmer, Angelina 
Snodgrass Godoy and Philip Neff, 'Indigenous Rights, Resistance, and the Law: Lessons from a Guatemalan Mine' (2008) 50(4) Latin American Politics and Society 91; Sieder, "Emancipation' or 'Regu lation '? Law, Globalization 
and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War Guatemala', above n 41. 
57 HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/19/21/Add.l , [12]. 
58 See, eg, Simona V Yagenova and Rocio Garcia, 'Indigenous People's Struggles Against Transnational Mining 
Companies in Guatemala: The Sipakapa People vs GoldCorp Mining Company' (2009) 23(3) Socialism and 
Democracy 157, 158-59, 161, 165; HCHR Report on Guatemala 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17/Add.l [11], [1 5], [47]-
[53]. 
59 Guatemala Background Document 2012, UN Doc HRI/CORE/GTM/2012, [26] . 
60 Ibid [ 40]. 
61 OHCHR Compilation on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/14/GTM/2, [71]. 
62 Lopez, Reaching the Unreached, above n 4, 6. 
63 Guatemala Background Document 2012, UN Doc HRI/CORE/GTM/2012, [14]. 
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including from the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court,64 the ILO,65 the 
UNDP,66 and the HCHR.;67 with the OHCHR maintaining an office in Guatemala that gives 
'special emphasis' to the rights of Indigenous peoples since 2005 (OHCHR-Guatemala). 68 lt is 
to this crowd of international actors that the special procedures mandate-holders have added 
their voices. 
C Engaging on Maya, Xinka and Garifuna Rights 
I Shaming at the Helm 
In the last three decades the special procedures have devoted sustained attention to the 
human rights situation of Indigenous peoples in Guatemala, flexing each of the mechanism's 
dialogic regulatory tools. The experts have leveraged the regulatory power of shaming through 
numerous country visits and reports, a special country visit and report on a specific case, 
communications, and media releases. These attentions have translated into many hundreds of 
pages of observations, conclusions and recommendations, a number of which criticise the state 
of the dire human rights situation of Maya, Xinka and Garifuna. Altogether, in the course of 
three decades of attention, special procedures experts have issued some 200 recommendations 
to address the situation of Guatemala's Indigenous peoples spanning a spectrum of Indigenous 
rights norms. 69 
(a) Belated Country Consideration 
Copious country reports on Guatemala have been prepared by country and thematic 
mandate-holders, which endeavour to shame the Guatemalan Government by drawing attention 
to core Indigenous rights concerns within the state. From 19 83-1997 Guatemala was the subject 
of successive special procedures country mandates under Mark Colville the Viscount of 
Culross,70 Hector Gros Espiell,71 Christian Tomuschat,72 and Monica Pinto.73 The country 
64 See, eg, Case of the Rio Negro Massacres vs Guatemala (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) 
IACHR Series C No 250, 4 September 2012; Inter-American Commission, Justice and Social Inclusion: The 
Challenges of Democracy in Guatemala, OEA/Ser.LN/II.118 Doc 5 rev 1 (29 December 2003) [210] -[267], [434]. 65 See, eg, ILO, Monitoring Indigenous and Tribal Peoples' Rights Through JLO Conventions: A Compilation of ILO 
Supervisory Bodies' Comments 2009-2010' (2010) 69-75. 
66 See, eg, UNDP Evaluation Office, above n 51 . 
67 See, eg, HRC, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/22/17 (13 December 2012). 
68 Oficina del Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos En Guatemala 
<http: //www.ohchr.org.gt/acerca_oacnudh.asp>. The OHCHR-Guatemala's mandate was extended for a further 3 
years in September 2011, see HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/19/21/Add.l, [l]. 69 This figure is based on separating out individual recommendations even where they are contained in the same 
paragraph. 
70 Mark Colville the Viscount of Culross held the role from 1983 to 1987. The mandate was established by CHR Res 
1982/31 (11 March 1982). Note that the mandate's title shifted from being 'Special Rapporteur ' to 'Special 
Representative' to 'Independent Expert' over the years . See generally Manfred Nowak, 'Country-Oriented Human 
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mandates were only brought to a close following the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996. 74 
The early country mandate-holders paid scant attention to Indigenous peoples in their reports, 
but this improved over time. For example, Viscount Colville offered a small number of 
recommendations of a socio-economic flavour regarding Guatemala' s 'country people' with the 
intimation they were Indigenous at a time when gross human rights violations were being 
committed against Indigenous peoples by the military. 75 In contrast, Pinto devoted significant 
attention to what she expressly identified as Indigenous rights concerns in her reports, including 
regarding Indigenous political participation, non-discrimination, ratification of !LO Convention 
169, healthcare, bilingual education and cultural heritage. 76 
(b) Extensive Thematic Shaming 
Guatemala has also been the subject of extensive country reports by various thematic 
mandate-holders that leverage the technique of shaming by highlighting persisting Indigenous 
rights concerns. As identified in Chapter I, by late 2013 Guatemala had received 21 visits from 
13 different thematic mandates. Two further country missions from thematic special procedures 
were planned for the end of 2013, including from the expert on peaceful assembly, a mandate 
that has not visited Guatemala before. 77 This will bring the figure to 23 visits from 14 different 
thematic mandates. The expert on truth and justice, another mandate that has not previously 
Rights Protection by the UN Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission' (1991) 22 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 39, 62-5 ; Joan Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System/or 
Protecting Rights During States of Emergency (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 133-35 . 
71 Hector Gros Espiell held the role from 1987-1990. He was first appointed under the authority ofCHR Res 1987/53 
(28 May 1987). 
72 Christian Tomuschat held the role from 1990 to 1993. He was first appointed under the authority ofCHR Res 
1990/80 (7 March 1990). 
73 Monica Pinto held the role from 1993 to 1997. She was first appointed under the authority of CHR Res 1993/88 
(10 March 1993). 
74 An advisory services mission was established in 1997 under the authority of CHR Res 1997 /51 (15 April 1997) . In 
1998 the CHR concluded its consideration of the human rights situation in Guatemala, see CHR Res 1998/22 (14 
April 1998) paras 1, 15. 
75 CHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Viscount 
Colville o/Culross Pursuant to Paragraph 9 of Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1983/57 o/8 March 1983, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/1984/30 (8 February 1984) [8.3] recommendation 2; CHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
in Guatemala Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Viscount Colville of Culross, in Accordance with Paragraph 14 of 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1984/53 of 14 March 1984, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/ 19 (8 February 1985) 
[256](g). For criticism of his 1984 report see, eg, Philip Alston, 'The Commission on Human Rights' in Philip Alston 
( ed), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Clarendon Press, 1992) 126, 168. 
76 CHR, Report of the Independent Expert, Mrs Monica Pinto, on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, 
Prepared in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1993/88, UN Doc E/CN.4/ 1994/10 (20 January 1994) [152], 
[170] , [177], [179] , [182]-[l 84]; CHR, Report by the Independent Expert, Mrs Monica Pinto, on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Guatemala, Prepared in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1994/58, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/ 1995/15 (20 December 1994) [l 83], [20 l]; CHR, Report by the Independent Expert, Mrs Monica Pinto, on 
the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1995/51, UN 
Doc E/CN .4/ 1996/ 15 (5 December 1995) [ 13 7], [ 138] ('Pinto Report 1996'); CHR, Report by the Independent 
Expert, Mrs Monica Pinto, on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Submitted in Accordance with 
Commission Resolution 1996/59 and Economic and Social Council Decision 1996/270, UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/90 (22 
January 1997) [99] , [104] , [1 07] -[109]. 
77 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Maina 
Kiai , UN Doc A/HRC/23/39 (24 April 2013) [5] ; HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Juan E Mendez, UN Doc A/HRC/22/53 (I February 20 13) 
[3] . 
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conducted a mission to the country, also intended to visit Guatemala in 2013. But, in a rare 
move by the Guatemalan Government, 'was informed that the Government was unable to 
accommodate a visit this year.' 78 The Guatemalan Government has attempted to portray the 
frequency of thematic special procedures' visits to the country as a reflection of its progressive 
approach to human rights, not its violations of those rights. Before the HRC in 2006 the 
Guatemalan Government representative remarked: 
I would also like to point out that the constant visits by Rapporteurs to Guatemala are not related 
in any way to constant problems or violations of human rights, quite the opposite, they have to 
do with the interest that our country has shown in having appropriate expertise provided to us by 
Rapporteurs and also to provide internal reporting on our work and coming up with 
recommendations to improve our true role as guarantors of human rights. 79 
Guatemala may be unique in attempting to paint sustained international attention to its human 
rights situation as reflective of its respect for human rights. Thematic attention began with the 
Working Group on enforced disappearances in 1987 and spans the themes of Indigenous 
peoples, torture, sale of children, violence against women, racism, extrajudicial executions, 
human rights defenders, migrants, education, food and health. 80 The degree and depth of 
thematic mandate-holders attention to the human rights situation of Guatemala' s Indigenous 
peoples is attributable in large part to the theme of the mandate, as well as the expertise and 
interests of the appointed expert. 
The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has naturally devoted its attention to 
pressing Indigenous rights concerns, in particular relating to land, in its country reports on 
Guatemala. Guatemala is one of few states to have received three country missions from the 
mandate. Stavenhagen visited in 2002, his first country mission in the role. 81 His report on the 
mission is highly critical of the human rights situation of Guatemala's Indigenous peoples, 
identifying the situation as ' extremely difficult' and finding that Indigenous peoples had 'been 
78 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-
Recurrence, Pablo de Greif!, UN Doc A/HRC/24/42 (28 August 2013) [4]. 79 Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human 
Rights Council Second Session: Interactive Dialogue on Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mr 
Jean Ziegler (22 September 2006) United Nations <http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=060922>. 80 Since 1987 country missions have been carried out by the experts on Indigenous peoples in 2002, 2006 and 2010; 
health in 2010; food in 2009 and 2005; the independence of judges in 2009, 2001 and 1999; education in 2008 ; 
migrants in 2008; human rights defenders in 2008 and 2002 ; enforced disappearances in 2006 and 1987; extrajudicial 
executions in 2006; racism in 2004; violence against women in 2004; the sale of children in 1999 and 2012 ; and 
torture in 1989. To access all of the associated country reports since 1998 see OHCHR, Country Visits by Special 
Procedures Mandate Holders Since 1998 A - E <http: //www2.ohchr.org/eng1ish/bodies/chr/special/countryvisitsa-
e.htm>. At least two mandates have produced follow-up reports on Guatemala without conducting a follow-up 
country visit: the mandates on enforced disappearances in 2011 and extrajudicial executions in 2009. HRC, Informe 
del Grupo de Trabajo sabre las Desapariciones Forzadas o lnvoluntarias: Informe de Seguimiento a las 
Recomendaciones Hechas por el Grupo de Trabajo sabre las Misiones a Guatemala y Honduras , UN Doc 
A/HRC/16/48/Add.2 (17 February 2011); HRC. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Follow-up to Country Recommendations - Guatemala, UN Doc 
AIHRC/11/2/Add.7 (4 May 2009) ('Expert on Extrajudicial Executions Guatemala 2009' ). 81 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, [3] . 
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subjected to political exclusion, cultural discrimination and economic marginalization from 
society' .82 Stavenhagen identified land rights as core to Indigenous peoples' concerns in the 
state,83 a point he reiterated when he presented his report to the CHR.84 Stavenhagen's numerous 
and sweeping recommendations to the Guatemalan Government included that the Government 
return land illegally taken during the conflict, establish a land register identifying Indigenous 
communal land and support Indigenous agriculture; fully implement the Peace Accords before 
the end of the then administration; redouble efforts to ensure the full the participation of 
Indigenous peoples in public affairs; ensure Indigenous peoples' access to justice; and extend 
bilingual education throughout the country. 85 In 2006 Stavenhagen returned to Guatemala to 
follow-up implementation of his earlier recommendations.86 He reported some advances in line 
with his recommendations, including increasing awareness among state representatives of the 
need to prioritise Indigenous rights concerns, a public event acknowledging military 
responsibility for a 1982 massacre, establishment of CODISRA, an intention to launch a 
national anti-racism campaign and some developments in the recognition oflanguage and 
bilingual intercultural education.87 But he concluded that ' [d]espite these positive examples, and 
all the efforts deployed, the Special Rapporteur's second visit to Guatemala gave him the 
opportunity to ascertain that the levels of racism and discrimination against indigenous peoples 
are still worryingly high' and he found the position oflndigenous women and children in need 
of urgent attention.88 
Anaya was critical of the Indigenous rights situation in Guatemala following his 2010 
special country mission. Anaya visited Guatemala to investigate the alleged lack of consultation 
with Indigenous peoples over the approval of natural resource extractive projects on or near 
Indigenous territories, both generally and in relation to the Marlin mine. I examine his 
recommendations regarding the Marlin mine in detail in Part E below, but introduce them now. 
Anaya concluded that Guatemala was experiencing 'a highly unstable atmosphere of social 
conflict' as a result of the mine and other projects, 'which is having a serious impact on the 
rights of the indigenous people and threatening the country' s governance and economic 
development.' 89 He expressed 'grave concern at this situation' and called on 'the Government 
and other interested parties, including businesses, to take urgent measures to guarantee the 
rights of the indigenous people concerned. ' 90 His general recommendations to the Guatemalan 
Government concerned provisions for consultation with Indigenous peoples, a review of the 
82 Ibid 2. 
83 Ibid 2. 
84 Press Release CHR 2003, UN Doc HRJCN/1028 . 
85 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, [71]-[82] . Stavenhagen also directed 
recommendations to the international community, Indigenous peoples, civil society, the mass media and the academic 
community: at [83]-[94]. 
86 Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [24]. 
87 Ibid [58]-[63]. 
88 Ibid [64]. 
89 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc N HRC/18/35/Add .3, l . 
90 Ib id 2. 
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legislation governing extractive industries and Indigenous peoples' rights to their lands, 
improvements to environmental laws, mitigation of the negative impacts of extractive projects 
on Indigenous peoples, and protections for Indigenous peoples participating in social protests. 91 
His recommendations regarding the Marlin mine included that the Government comply with 
precautionary measures issued by the Inter-American Commission concerning the mine, which 
notably called on the Government to suspend the mining operations pending a full review of the 
situation by the Commission; conduct independent studies into the health, environmental, social 
and cultural impacts of the mine; obtain the affected Indigenous peoples ' consent to any future 
operations at the mine; create spaces for dialogue in which the affected Indigenous peoples are 
fully informed regarding all aspects of the mining project; investigate the processes surrounding 
the sale of land for the mine; and take decisive steps to reduce social conflict, such as pardoning 
those serving criminal sentences connected to their protests against the mine. 92 
Anaya took several additional steps to draw international attention to, and publically 
shame the Guatemalan Government for, the negative impact of extractive projects on 
Guatemala's Indigenous peoples during 2011. He shared his report through a video conference 
with representatives of Indigenous peoples in Guatemala, the Guatemalan Government and the 
international community. 93 When Anaya presented his report to the HRC he emphasised the 
'urgent ' need 'to carry out an independent evaluation of the social, environmental and health 
impacts of the Marlin mine ' as well as beginning a process of consultation with the affected 
communities' .94 He also referred to the negative impact of mining projects in Guatemala when 
presenting his annual report to the GA, before the EMRIP, and in a speech to an Aboriginal land 
council in Australia. 95 
Other thematic special procedures experts have also devoted attention to persisting 
Indigenous rights concerns in their reports on their country missions. Guatemala's Indigenous 
rights situation is a notable focus of the reports of the experts on racism,96 health,97 food,98 
91 Ibid [78] -[85] . He also addressed recommendations to Indigenous peoples, civil society and the business sector: at [86]-[93]. 
92 Ibid appendix [66] -[74] . 
93 Anaya Communications Report 2011, UN Doc A!HRC/18/35/Add.l, annex V [2]. 94 James Anaya speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special 
Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue (20 September 2011) James Anaya 
<http:/ /unsr .j amesana ya. org/videos/webcast- l 8th-sess i on-of-the-human-rights-council-statement-of-special-
rapporteur-and-interacti ve-dialo gue>. 
95 James Anaya, 'Statement to the United Nations General Assembly' (New York, 17 October 2011) 
<http:/ /unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/statement-of-special-rapporteur-to -un-general-assembly-20 11 >; James 
Anaya, 'Statement to the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (Geneva, 13 July 2011) 
<http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/statement-on-the-rapporteurs-acti vitiesemri p-fourth-session-2011>; James 
Anaya, 'Keynote Speech at the 2011 New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council Conference' (Media Release, 5 
April 2011) <http:/ /unsr .j amesanaya.org/statements/keynote-speech-at-the-2011-new-south-wales-aboriginal-land-
council-conference>. 
96 Expert on Racism Guatemala 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.2 [29]-[49] . 97 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Anand Grover, UN Doc A/HRC/17/25/Add.2 (16 March 2011) [30]-[5 l ], [88](a)-(f), [89] (a)-(f) ('Expert on Health Guatemala 2011'). 
98 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter: Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc 
AIHRC/1 3/33/Add.4 (26 January 2010) [11 ], [21] , [31] , [ 41 ], [ 48], [79] -[8 l ], [86] -[87] ('Expert on Food Guatemala 
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education,99 human rights defenders, 100 and violence against women. 101 Each of the experts' 
reports criticise the human rights position of Guatemala's Indigenous peoples . Their 
recommendations include steps to recognise and protect Indigenous peoples' lands; 102 measures 
to target discrimination and affirmative action programmes; 103 implementation of the 
Indigenous Agreement; 104 improved access to intercultural bilingual education; 105 greater access 
for Indigenous peoples to healthcare; 106 Indigenous involvement in the operation of Mi Familia 
Progresa, a social welfare cash transfer programme; 107 an end to attacks on Indigenous leaders 
and Indigenous rights defenders; 108 a halt to violence against Indigenous women; 109 and better 
funding for the state institutions promoting Indigenous rights. 110 It is noteworthy that the expert 
on food paid material attention to Indigenous peoples' land rights in the mandate's reports on 
Guatemala. 111 The experts on the independence of judges and sale of children also offer 
recommendations to address Indigenous rights issues. 112 The remainder of the experts generally 
make only passing reference to Indigenous peoples. 11 3 However, given the interdependency of 
2010'); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler: Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.l (18 January2006) [4]-[6], [8]-[9], [11], [15]-[20] , [23)-(24], [27]-[28], [30], [37], [39], [42], 
[ 43], [ 49] , [51] , [53]-[55] , [57]-[5 8] ('Expert on Food Guatemala 2006'). 
99 HRC, Informe de! Relator Especial sabre el Derecho a la Educaci6n, Sr Vernor Munoz: Misi6n a Guatemala, UN 
Doc A/HRC/11/8/Add.3 (28 April 2009) [6], [9] , [20], [28]-[31] , [47] , [49]-[63] , [67] , [80] , [81], [84] ('Expert on 
Education Guatemala 2009 '). 
10° CHR, Report by Ms Hina Jilani, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human 
Rights Defenders, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/61: Mission to Guatemala, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/1 04/Add.2 (6 December 2002) [6] , [15], [24] , [27], [32] , [55], [69] ; HRC, Report of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Hina Jilani: Mission to 
Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/1 0/12/Add.3 (16 February 2009) [20], [24] , [25], [34] -[36] ('Expert on Human Rights 
Defenders Guatemala 2009'). 
'
0
' CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Er turk: 
Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3 (10 February 2005) [ 4] , [l l]-[1 2], [ 15]-[20] , [25] , [3 5], [ 43] , 
[67], [72] ('Expert on Violence Against Women Guatemala 2005'). 
102 See, eg, Expert on Food Guatemala 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.l, [58](b), (d), (e), (f); Expert on Food 
Guatemala 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/13/33/Add.4, [87](a). 
103 See, eg, Expert on Racism Guatemala 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.2, [47](c),(e); Expert on Food 
Guatemala 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.l, [58](c)-(e). 
104 See, eg, Expert on Racism Guatemala 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/ 18/Add.2, [47](b),(d) . 105 See, eg, Expert on Education Guatemala 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/11/8/Add.3, [84]( i), (I), (m), (p), (t),(u). 106 See, eg, Expert on Health Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/17/25/Add.2 , [88](a)-(d), (f), [89](a)-(d). 107 See, eg, Expert on Food Guatemala 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/13/33/Add.4, [87](b). 
108 See, eg, Expert on Food Guatemala 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.l, [58](b); Expert on Human Rights 
Defenders Guatemala 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/10/12/ Add .3, [89]-[97]. Note that the expert on human rights defenders 
does not expressly mention Indigenous peoples in her recommendations but elsewhere in the report she identifies the 
prevalence of attacks on Indigenous rights defenders: see, eg, at [25]. 
109 See, eg, Expert on Violence Against Women Guatemala 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3, [72](2), (4), (5) . 110 See, eg, Expert on Racism Guatemala 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/18/Add.2, [47] (h). 111 Expert on Food Guatemala 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.l , [9], [11] , [16] , [23]-[24] , [28], [37], [39], [43], 
[ 49], [51 ], [53] -[54], [58](b ), ( d), ( e), (f); Expert on Food Guatemala 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/ 13/33/Add .4, [3 I], [ 48] , 
[79]-[8 l ], [87](a) . 
11 2 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Leandro Despouy: Mission 
to Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/1 1/41 /Add.3 (1 October 2009) [123]; CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution 2001/39: Report on Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/72/Add.2 (2 1 December 
200 I) [92](d)(iii), [92]( e); CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Mr 
Param Coomaraswamy, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1999/31: Report on Mission to 
Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/61/Add. l (6 January 2000) [169](d)(xii) , [169](h); CHR, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Ms Ofelia Calcetas-Santos: Report 
on the Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4.2000/73/Add .2 (27 January 2000) [l 12]U). 
11 3 HRC, Informe def Grupo de Trabajo sabre las Desapariciones Forzadas o Involuntarias: lnforme de Seguimiento 
a las Recomendaciones Hechas por el Grupo de Trabajo sabre las Misiones a Guatemala y Honduras, UN Doc 
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rights, the general recommendations of all mandate-holders are of at least tangential relevance 
to the rights situation of Guatemala 's Indigenous peoples. 
(c) Frequent Communication of Concerns 
In addition to these country visits and reports, Guatemala has been the subject of a 
considerable quantity of communications from special procedures experts that highlight alleged 
Indigenous rights violations within the state. The total number of communications issued in 
respect of Guatemala is in the high hundreds: between 2004 and 2008 alone Guatemala was the 
subject of 161 communications. 114 A number of these communications have concerned 
Indigenous peoples. For example, by late 2013 Guatemala had been the subject of more than 
twenty reported communications from the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples (jointly 
and alone), making it the fifth highest recipient of communications from that mandate. 115 By 
comparison, recall that New Zealand had been the subject of only two special procedures 
experts ' communications directly concerning Indigenous rights. The communications primarily 
concerned threats and attacks against Indigenous leaders and Indigenous rights defenders. 116 
Accordingly, they have :frequently been sent jointly with the expert on human rights defenders, 
although the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples has joined with other experts too. The 
communications also include concerns regarding the destruction of an archaeological site; 117 
criminalisation and closure of Indigenous community radio stations; 11 8 eviction of Indigenous 
peoples from their homes; 119 and the impact of development projects, such as the Marlin mine, 
A/HRC/16/48/ Add.2 (17 February 2011 ) 23 ; HRC, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disapp earances: Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/4/41 /Add.l (20 February 2007) [9] , [12], [23]; CHR, 
Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Report on a Visit to Guatemala by Two 
Members of the Working Group on Eriforced or Involuntary Disappearances (5-9 October 1987) , UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1988/19/ Add. l (21 December 1987) [1 8]; Expert on Extrajudicial Executions Guatemala 2009, UN Doc 
A/HRC/1 1/2/Add.7, 5 n 3; HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitra,y 
Executions, Philip Alston: Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/4/20/Add.2 (19 February 2007) [2], [ 4] , [28]-[30], 
[3 5] ('Expert on Extrajudicial Executions Guatemala 2007'); HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants, Jorge Bustamante: Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/1 1/7/Add .3 (18 March 2009) [15], 
[104]; CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr Pi Kooijmans, Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 1989/33, UN Doc E/CN.4/1990/17 (18 December 1989) [174]. 
114 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 1, 21. 
11 5 Only Mexico, Colombia, Chile and India have received a greater number of communications from the mandate. 
This is the author's own assessment based on the communications reported in the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples ' communications reports each year. 
116 See, eg, Stavenhagen Communications Report 2004, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.l , [35] -[42]; Stavenhagen 
Communications Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.l, [48]; Stavenhagen Communications Report 2006, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add. l, [42]; Stavenhagen Communications Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.l , 
[209]-[2 12], [21 4]-[217]; Anaya Communications Report 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/1 2/34/Add. l, [1 23]-[132]; Anaya 
Communications Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/1 5/37/Add.l , [187]-[191 ], [1 92]-[197]; Joint Communications 
Report September 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/1 8/51, 67, 144; HRC, Communications Report of Special Procedures, UN 
Doc A/HRC/23/51 (22 May 2013) 94 ('Joint Communications Report May 2013 '). 117 Stavenhagen Communications Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add . l , [193]-[195]. 118 Stavenhagen Communications Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/ Add. l, [ 196]-[ l 97]; Joint Communications 
Report May 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/23/51 , 14. 
11 9 Stavenhagen Communications Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.l , [205]-[207]; Communications Report 
2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/51, 69 . 
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the San Juan Sacatepequez cement factory, and the Chixoy dam. 120 The quality of the experts' 
observations on the communication exchange varies. Stavenhagen's observations on the 
communications were often brief and perfunctory. 121 Anaya's observations offered more 
analysis and more overtly sought to shame the Government for rights concerns. He frequently 
reminded the Government of the need to address the underlying issues, such as the failure to 
consult affected Indigenous peoples on development projects, and the disproportionate use of 
force against Indigenous peoples' legitimate social protests. 122 
(d) Persistent Media Statements 
Special procedures experts have also set out to shame the Guatemalan Government 
through a string of media statements on Indigenous rights concerns in the state. To take a small 
selection of examples from the sizeable collection, country mandate-holder Pinto's alarm at 'the 
marginalization of the indigenous majority' was reported in the media as one of her chief 
concerns following her 1994 country mission.123 In 2002 the following grim warning from 
Stavenhagen was reported in international media: ' [a] ccess to land is the fundamental theme 
affecting the rights of Indian populations ... and if these problems are allowed to continue as they 
have been, with no one working toward solutions, the possibility of social conflicts will 
increase' .124 The expert on education drew attention to 'centuries of discrimination and racism 
against indigenous people' and concerns regarding bilingual intercultural education in his press 
release at the close of his 2008 mission to the country. 125 In 2012 Anaya identified mining in 
Guatemala as an example of 'how projects have progressed without consultation with 
indigenous peoples and much unrest' to Spanish press, reiterating his recommendation to the 
Guatemalan Government that, if contested mining operations cannot be suspended, measures 
should be taken to protect Indigenous peoples' rights and new projects should not be 
120 Anaya Communications Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/ 15/37/Add. l , [185]-[186]; Joint Communications Report 
September 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/51, 125; Anaya Communications Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.l, 
annex V; Joint Communications Report Februa,y 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/19/44, 95; Jo int Communications Report 
February 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/22/67, 11 ; Anaya Communications Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41/Add.4, 
[92]-[95]. 
121 See, eg, Stavenhagen Communications Report 2004, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.l, [35]-[42] ; Stavenhagen 
Communications Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.l, [48]; Stavenhagen Communications Report 2006, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/ Add. I , [ 42]-[ 43]; Stavenhagen Communications Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/ Add. I, [193]-[2 l 7]. 
122 Anaya Communications Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/4 l/ Add.4, [87]-[9 l]; Anaya Communications Report 
2010, UN Doc A/HRC/ 15/37/Add. l , [1 87] -[ 197] ; Anaya Communications Report 2009, UN Doc 
A/HRC/ 12/34/Add.l , [1 23] -[1 32]. 
123 Centro de Reportes Infonnativos sobre Guatemala, 'Monica Pinto Has Harsh Words for Guatemalan Government' 
CERIGUA Weekly Briefs 44 (29 November 1994) 
<http://www.tulane.edu/- libweb/RESTRICTED/CERIGUA/1994 1129.txt>. 
124 
' Guatemala Mayans Still "Wronged" ', BBC News ( online), I 2 September 2002 
<http://news.bbe.co. uk/2/h i/ameri cas/22 5 3 2 73 .stm>. 
125 OHCHR, ' Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education Ends his Visit to Guatemala ' (Press Release, 28 July 
2008) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=8393&LangID=E>. 
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progressed. 126 In the same year, the expert on freedom of opinion (himself Guatemalan) 
revealed his 'deepest concern' regarding 'the prosecution and continuing raids against 
unauthorized indigenous community radio in Guatemala.' 127 
2 Dialogue-building's Support Function 
The special procedures experts have engaged in dialogue-building on Indigenous rights 
with the Guatemalan Government too. As in New Zealand, this tool plays more of a supporting 
function to the expert's leading narrative of shame. But, given the greater interaction between 
the special procedures mechanism and the Guatemalan Government, there are more examples of 
this technique being deployed in Guatemala. The experts' commentaries in their country reports, 
Anaya's special report, the communications, and the media releases act as a witness to the rights 
violations they are concerned with. A member of CODISRA described the special procedures' 
role as important because they focus their work on the 'topics that not everybody is willing to 
talk about' .128 Some of the experts have offered praise to the Guatemalan Government to 
encourage it to continually improve its protection of Indigenous rights. As identified above, in 
his follow-up report Stavenhagen praised the Government for what he considered to be positive 
steps it had taken to implement some of the recommendations in his first report on the state. In 
his special report Anaya identified that, despite the shortcomings he had identified, Guatemala 
had 'demonstrated its international commitment to the promotion and protection of indigenous 
rights', for example, through its role in the development and approval of the UNDRIP. 129 And, 
in her 2012 annual report, the expert on cultural rights commended Guatemala, along with other 
Latin American states, for having 'taken measures to give legal protection to the rights of 
indigenous peoples and local communities to their accumulated scientific knowledge.' 130 The 
experts' country and special reports have endeavoured to improve knowledge within the state 
regarding the content of international Indigenous rights norms and their specific application in 
Guatemala; Anaya's report stands out in this regard. Likewise, the mandate-holders' dialogues 
with Guatemalan state representatives, Indigenous peoples, and other actors during their country 
missions have striven to build rights knowledge. For example, Anaya's special country mission 
included visits to Indigenous peoples' communities, where his public meetings on Indigenous 
rights concerns attracted unprecedented crowds - tens of thousands in some places. 131 
Additionally, Anaya returned to Guatemala in December 2012 to participate in a preparatory 
meeting for the 2014 World Conference on Indigenous Peoples. During the visit he took the 
opportunity to participate in a national forum on Indigenous peoples and natural resources, as 
126 Anaya quoted in Efe Agency, 'Relator de la ONU Aboga por Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas' , Prensa Libre ( on line), 9 April 2012 <http://www.prensalibre.com/economia/Relator-ONU-empresas-promover-derechos-pueblos-
indigenas_ 0 _ 679132237 .html>. 
127 Frank La Rue, 'Radios Allanadas', Prensa Libre (online), 24 May 2012 
<http:/ /www. prensalibre.corn/opinion/Radios-allanadas _ 0 _ 706129402.html>. 
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well as informal meetings with representatives of Indigenous peoples and the private sector, 
building knowledge on Indigenous rights issues regarding development and extractive 
· 132 proJects. 
3 Capacity-building 's Debut 
An effort at Indigenous rights capacity-building has also been made by the mechanism 
in Guatemala, a regulatory tool not leveraged in New Zealand. In 2011 Anaya provided 
technical advisory assistance to the Guatemalan Government on a draft legal instrument 
regulating consultation with Indigenous peoples on matters affecting them, which is explored in 
Part E below. 133 He is the only special procedures mandate-holder to undertake dedicated 
Indigenous rights capacity-building with the state. 
D Projecting Positivity: The Government's Official Response 
Guatemala's official stance towards the special procedures' consideration of its 
Indigenous rights situation has been notably positive, especially compared with New Zealand's 
early response to attentions regarding its own context. As with other countries the subject of a 
special procedures country mandate, Guatemala displayed behaviour that suggested its 
resistance to the existence of a country mandate. 134 But, with few exceptions, the Government 
has maintained an open door for visits by special procedures experts; only one request for a 
country mission remains unanswered (from the expert on foreign debt made in 2008), 135 one 
mission has been postponed since 2006 (by the expert on freedom of opinion), 136 and, as noted 
above, the expert on truth and justice was not able to undertake a visit in 2013. Guatemala was 
one of the earlier states to issue a standing invitation to thematic special procedures to visit the 
128 Interview 11 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011). 
129 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.3, appendix [65] . 130 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed: The Right to Enjoy the 
Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications, UN Doc A/HRC/20/26 (14 May 2012) [64] . 13 1 Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011). Anaya refers to the ' mass attendance at the meetings by the 
authorities and members of indigenous communities' in his preliminary note on the visit. HRC, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya: 
Preliminary Note on the Application of the Principle of Consultation with Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala and the 
Case of the Marlin Mine, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.8 (8 July 2010) [3] ('Anaya Preliminary Note on Guatemala 
2010'). The large number oflndigenous attendees at Anaya's meetings was confirmed by NGOs. See, eg, Brigadas 
lntemacionales De Paz - Proyecto Guatemala, PIM - Paquete de Informaci6n Mensual sabre Guatemala (2010) 
<http://www.pbi-guatemala.org/fi leadmin/user _ fi les/projects/guatemala/files/spanish/PIM _No._ 81.pdf> 2. 132 James Anaya, ' Role of Three UN Mechanisms in World Conference 2014 Discussed at Preparation Meeting in 
Guatemala' (Media Release, 26 December 20 12) <http://unsr.j amesanaya.org/notes/role-of-three-un-mechanisms-in-
world-conference-20 14-d iscussed-at-preparation-meeti ng- i n-guatemala>. 
133 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/ Add.3, [8]-[ 1 O]. 
134 See, eg, Nowak, above n 70, 62-3. 
135 OHCHR Compilation on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/ 14/GTM/2, 5. 
136 HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Ambeyi Ligabo, UN Doc A/HRC/4/27 (2 January 2007) [21]. 
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country- in 2001 -years before New Zealand. 137 High-level state officials have, by and large, 
formally cooperated with the huge number of country visits of thematic and country mandate-
holders. Pockets of criticism of, and non-cooperation with, the mechanism by state 
representatives have occurred but they are the exception to the rule. 138 Guatemala has vocalised 
its approval of the special procedures mechanism. For example, in its pledge in support of its 
candidacy for membership to the HRC in 2006 Guatemala stated that it held the special 
procedures as ' of the utmost importance', cooperated 'fully' and responded 'positively to all 
their requests and urgent appeals' (as the response rate below reveals, this is not the case) , and 
undertook 'to continue cooperating and to guard the effectiveness of the Special Mechanisms in 
the Council ' . 139 In its 2010 pledges and commitments for the same purpose it similarly 
undertook to ' [ s ]upport the strengthening of the human rights special procedures system.' 140 The 
Guatemalan Government has praised the visits and reports of special procedures experts on 
Guatemala, including those that have paid especial attention to Indigenous peoples. 14 1 
Comments to the effect that the Government intends to give serious consideration to 
implementation of the special procedures' recommendations are frequent. 142 It also opposed 
adoption of the Code of Conduct for the special procedures on the grounds that it was 
unnecessary. 143 Further, steps have purportedly been taken towards monitoring fulfilment of the 
special procedures experts' recommendations regarding Indigenous peoples. COPREDEH has 
prepared a database of all of the recommendations on human rights addressed to Guatemala 
since 2008, including from the special procedures, with the stated intention of tracking their 
implementation. 144 
137 OHCHR, Standing Invitations <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/lnvitations .aspx>. 138 Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May2011 ). 
139 Guatemalan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Promesas y Compromisos Voluntarios de Guatemala para 
la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de las Derechos Humanos (l May 2006) 
<http: //www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/guatemala.pdf> 7. 
140 GA, Letter dated 19 March 20 IO from the Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the President of the GA, UN 
Doc A/64/730 (29 March 2010) [30] ('Guatemala Human Rights Pledges 2010 ') . 
14 1 See, eg, Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in the following 
HRC sessions: HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Seventeenth Session: Interactive Dialogue with the Special 
Rapp orteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental 
Health, Mr Anand Grover (l June 2011 ) United Nations 
<http: //www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=l 10601>; HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Thirteenth 
Session: Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mr Olivier De Schutter (5 March 
2010) United Nations <http ://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=l 00305>; HRC, Webcast Human Rights 
Council Second Session: Interactive Dialogue on Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mr Jean 
Ziegler, above n 79 . 
142 See, eg, Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast 
Human Rights Council Thirteenth Session: Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Mr Olivier De Schutter, above n 141. 
143 Meghna Abraham, Building the New Human Rights Council: Outcome and Analysis of the Institution-Building 
Year (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2007) 29 n 90. 
144 HRC, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council 
Resolution 16/21 : Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/1 4/GTM/l (7 August 201 2) [7] ('Guatemala Report to HRC 
2nd UPR 201 2'); OHCHR, Universal Periodic Review Second Cycle - Guatemala. Written Replies to Advance Questions (2012) <http ://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/GTSessionl4 .aspx> 26-8; Guatemala Human 
Rights Pledges 2010, UN Doc A/64/730, [10]. 
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Guatemala has demonstrated pronounced support for the current and former Special 
Rapporteurs on Indigenous peoples' work on Guatemala. As identified in Chapter III, it was 
pivotal in the creation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, and in 
the 2010 amendment of the mandate's title to refer to 'peoples' rather than 'people'. It 
cooperated with both Stavenhagen and Anaya's country missions to the state. 145 It was 
approving of each of Stavenhagen and Anaya's reports on Guatemala. 146 For example, it 
described Stavenhagen's 2002 visit as 'fruitful' and it recognised that it should continue to 
prioritise policies on the issues identified in Stavenhagen's report, including regarding land 
tenure, access to justice, and intercultural bilingual education. 147 When Anaya's report was 
presented to the HRC in 2011 it expressed its thanks for the visit, its 'support for the report', 
and its ' full support for the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous 
peoples and his work'. 148 Before the GA in 2011, the Government welcomed Anaya's 
recommendations on Guatemala and backed his decision to focus on Indigenous rights concerns 
relating to extractive industries in his future reports. 149 The Government cooperated with the 
OHCHR project that ran between 2004 and 2007 advising on, and monitoring the 
implementation of, the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' recommendations regarding 
Guatemala. 150 It fed information concerning the measures it had taken to implement 
Stavenhagen's country recommendations into Stavenhagen's Study on Best Practices. 15 1 The 
Government's response to the mandate's communications is patchier. At times it has not 
responded, 152 and at others it has offered a detailed and substantive response. 153 The Guatemalan 
Government has praised the mandate's work more generally in international fora too, including 
145 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, [2]; Study on Best Practices, UN Doc 
A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [24]; Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3, [4] . 146 See, eg, Guatemalan Government representatives, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado and Luisa Bonilla De Galvao 
De Queiroz, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur 
and Interactive Dialogue, above n 94 . Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, 
speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Fourth Session: Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen (20 March 2007) 
United Nations <http: //www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=070320> . 147 Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in Human Rights Council, 
Webcast Human Rights Council Fourth Session: Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen, above n 146. See also Press Release 
CHR 2003, UN Doc HR/CN/1028 . 
148 Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human 
Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 94. 149 Guatemalan Government representative, Connie Taracena Secaira cited in GA 3rd Committee Press Release 2011, 
UN Doc GA/SHC/4013 . 
150 The project title was OHCHR Promotion and Protection of Human Rights oflndigenous Peoples in Central 
America, with Special Focus on Guatemala and Mexico. See generally Stavenhagen Communications Report 2005, 
UN Doc E/CN .4/2005/88/ Add.I, [91] ; Progress Report on Study on Best Practices, UN Doc E/CN .4/2006/78/ Add.4, 
[ 115]; Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/ Add.4, [21 ]-[26] ; Luis Rodriguez-Pinero Royo, 'Los 
Procedimientos Especiales y Los Derechos Indigenas: El Pape! del Relator Especial' in Mikel Berraondo et al (eds), 
Los Derechos de Los Pueblos Indigenas en el Sistma Internacional de Naciones Unidas (Instituto Promocion Esudios 
Sociales, 2010) 109, 122; Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 2010) . 
151 Progress Report on Study on Best Practices, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.4, [97]. 152 See, eg, Stavenhagen Communications Report 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add .l, [43]. 153 See, eg, Joint Communications Report Februa,y 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/19/44, 95. In the period between 
Guatemala's first and second UPR it replied to just over half of all of the special procedures communications it 
received. OHCHR Compilation on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/1 4/GTM/2, 5. 
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before the PFII, the EMRIP and the HRC. 154 In the latter forum it commented that '[t]his special 
procedure has proved, in its infancy, an innovation and, over time, has become indispensable to 
the human rights system, whether of the United Nations or regionally, for governments, 
academia, civil society and indigenous peoples themselves' .155 Guatemala has even defended 
the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' mandate in the face of attack from other states in 
the CHR. 156 
Like New Zealand, the Guatemalan Government has repeatedly professed its progress 
on the special procedures' Indigenous-focused recommendations in international fora. When 
Stavenhagen presented his 2003 country report to the CHR, the Guatemalan Government 
asserted that it 'had positively dealt with the historical structural problem[s] affecting the 
majority of [the] indigenous people of Guatemala' and claimed progress in 'the recognition of 
the identities and rights of indigenous people', 'legislative matters', and education. 157 During the 
interactive dialogue following the presentation of Anaya's special report, the Guatemalan 
Government outlined the steps it was taking to enable Indigenous peoples to participate in 
decisions affecting them, address poverty, tackle Indigenous peoples' experiences of exclusion, 
and deal with concerns regarding development projects. The representative stated, 'the 
Government of Guatemala continues to make substantive progress aimed at the effective and 
integral exercise of human rights for the entire society' .158 Before the GA in the same year it 
acknowledged domestic issues regarding consultation with Indigenous peoples. But it focused 
on positive developments including efforts to develop a regulation on consultation, the state's 
celebration of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples, the convening of 
meetings that included the participation Indigenous peoples to address climate change, and the 
fact that in the national elections 19 Indigenous peoples had been elected to Congress. 159 A 
similar approach was taken in the dialogue with Anaya during the PFII's 2012 session. 160 Yet, 
this professed progress has not translated into comprehensive implementation of the special 
procedures' recommendations. 
154 See, eg, Connie Taracena Guatemalan Government, ' Intervention: Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Ninth 
Session, Implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples' (New York, 2010) 
<http: //www.docip.org/gsdl/co11ect/cendocdo/index/assoc/HASH6aa6/e938aabb.dir/PF1 0conniel27sp.PDF>; 
Guatemalan Government, 'Intervention: Expert Mechanism on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, Third Session, 
Study on Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making' (Geneva, 12 July 2010) 
<http: //www.docip.org/gsdl/collect/cendocdo/index/assoc/HASHc646/9 5d07963 .dir/EMl 0guatemala0 10 .pdf>; 
Guatemalan Government, 1ntervention: Human Rights Council, Fifteenth Session, Interactive Dialogue with the 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People' (Geneva, 2010) 
<http: //www.docip.org/gsdl/collect/cendocdo/index/assoc/HASHc23c/58e8dl5a.dir/ltem3 IDGuatemala.pdf>. 155 Guatemalan Government, 'Intervention: Human Rights Council, Fifteenth Session, Inte~active Dialogue with the 
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People', above n 154. 156 See, eg, Guatemalan Government representative, Ricardo Alvarado Ortigoza, cited in Press Release CHR 2003, 
UN Doc HR/CN/1028 . 
157 Press Release CHR 2003, UN Doc HR/CN/1028 . 
158 Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human 
R_ights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 94. 1
'
9 Guatemalan Government representative, Connie Taracena Secaira, cited in GA 3rd Committee Press Release 2011, 
UN Doc GA/SHC/4013. 
160 doCip, Update No 104 (2013) (Jan~ary/April) <http: //www.docip.org/A1l-Issues.l21.0 .htm1> 17. 
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E Rooted in Ritualism: The Government 's Actions 
I Deflection through Deficiency 
As with New Zealand, ritualism is the Guatemalan Government's most prevalent 
behavioural response to the special procedures' attentions. Like in New Zealand, in Guatemala 
full implementation of the special procedures' recommendations regarding Indigenous peoples 
is uncommon. The Guatemalan Government is good at conforming to recommendations that 
require the ratification of an international instrument or enactment of domestic legislation. But 
rarely does it follow this action through with implementation. A member of the OHCHR-
Guatemala reflected, 'they ratify a treaty, that's not a problem. The problem is the huge 
gap ... [in] implementation of what they have signed.' 161 For example, Guatemala ratified !LO 
Convention 169 as Pinto recommended; 162 a step that required minimal effort and resources. But 
it has not taken substantive steps to give domestic effect to the Convention's provisions. 163 
Stavenhagen's 2002 visit also reportedly pre-emptively spurred the Government to speed up 
amendment of its Penal Code in order to make discrimination, including on the basis of 
ethnicity, an offence. 164 However, Stavenhagen criticised that legislation for not going far 
enough and enforcement of the Code's provisions as lacking. 165 Guatemala infrequently 
outwardly resists special procedures experts' recommendations regarding Indigenous peoples. 
Below I consider an example of Guatemala's resistance to one of Anaya's recommendation 
regarding the Marlin mine, although for reasons I examine I ultimately characterise the 
Government's response as ritualistic. Instead, following a similar pattern to New Zealand, 
Guatemala favours the incomplete fulfilment of recommendations regarding soft rights, such as 
to an intercultural bilingual education, which help it to deflect scrutiny from its fuller realisation 
of those rights. It also leverages these limited moves to divert attention from its inward 
resistance to hard rights, including regarding the participation of Indigenous peoples in 
decision-making and Indigenous peoples' rights to their lands and territories. Guatemala covers 
up its inward resistance to these hard rights with some outward expressions of commitment. 
161 Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 20 11). 
162 Pinto Report 1994, UN Doc E/CN.4/ 1994/10, [152] , [182]; Pinto Report 1996, UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/15, [13 8]. 
Guatemala ratified !LO Convention 169 in June 1996. ILO, Ratifications fo r Guatemala 
<http ://www.i lo .org/dyn/nonn lex/en/f?p= l 000: 11200:0::NO: 11200:P 11200_ COUNTRY _ID: 102667>. 163 See, eg, Sieder, "Emancipation' or 'Regu lation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples ' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41 , 253 -57 ; HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers, Leandro Despouy: Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/11/41 /Add.3 (1 October 2009) [98]. 164 Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011 ). Stavenhagen identified that the amendment occurred ' [ d]uring the 
Sgecial Rapporteur's visit to the country'. Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add .2, [15] . 1 5 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN .4/2003/90/ Add.2, [ 15]. 
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2 Minor Progress on Education 
(a) Educational Exclusion 
The literature' s best example of Guatemala's commitment to the special procedures ' 
Indigenous-focused recommendations concerns intercultural bilingual education and illuminates 
the Government' s ritualised response. Educational exclusion is a feature of Guatemala' s history, 
not just for Indigenous peoples. Around the time that the first Guatemalan country mandate was 
created, 85 per cent of the population were living in poverty and more than half in extreme 
poverty, none of whom were able to satisfy their basic education needs. 166 The average illiteracy 
rate was over 40 per cent of the population, soaring to nearly 60 per cent amongst rural (and, 
mostly, Indigenous) women. 167 On one estimate, in 1990 almost 60 per cent of Indigenous 
children were not enrolled in schooling. 168 This was attributable in part to a chronic lack of 
schools and teachers: in 1987 the state had well under half of the primary school teachers 
required to support the population. 169 It was also attributable to cultural and language barriers. 
Indigenous languages are widely spoken by Guatemala' s Indigenous peoples making it difficult 
for them to participate in the mainly Spanish-medium and monocultural education system.170 
Some efforts to promote bilingual education had been made at the time of the special 
procedures ' early attentions on Guatemala. Guatemala' s 1985 Constitution provides that ' in 
schools established in regions with a predominantly indigenous population, education shall be 
conducted preferably in bilingual form. ' 171 Further, in the Indigenous Agreement the 
Government committed to ' [p ]romote the use of all indigenous languages in the educational 
system' and ' to protect bilingual and intercultural education and institutions ' .172 To these ends, 
the Government had established a National Bilingual Education Programme in 1984 but it 
enjoyed limited reach: providing bilingual education from early childhood to the fourth grade 
for only around 20 per cent of Indigenous school age children, and operating in only the four 
main Indigenous languages. 173 The Government set up the Guatemala Academy of Mayan 
Languages in 1991 to promote Mayan languages and culture, 174 although the Academy has 
faced mandate, organisational, and personnel problems. 175 The General Directorate of Bilingual 
166 Tomuschat Report 1991, UN Doc E/CN.4/1991/5, [60] . 
167 Ibid [68]. 
168 Ib id [69]. 
169 Ibid [ 68]. 
170 See, eg, Lopez, Reaching the Unreached, above n 4, 4. 
171 Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala 1985 (Guatemala), art 76. 
172 Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1995, Part III, A, 2(b). It also committed to '[r] ecruit and 
train indigenous bilingual teachers': at Part III, G, 2(g). 
173 Programa Nacional de Educaci6n Bilingtie Bicultural , Government Agreement No 1093-84 (Guatemala); 
To muschat Report 1991, UN Doc E/CN.4/1 991/5, [69] ; Interview 11 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011 ). 17
~ Ley de la Academia de Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala, Government Decree No 65-90 (Guatemala). 17
' See, eg, Nora C England, 'Mayan Efforts Towards Language Preservation' in Lenore A Grenoble and Lindsay J 
Whaley (eds), Endangered Languages: Current Issues and Future Prospects (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 99, 
107-09. 
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and Intercultural Education (DIGEBI) was also instituted in 1995 as part of the Ministry of 
Education to advance the bilingual education commitments in the Indigenous Agreement. 176 
However, it has been underfunded. 177 
Recommendations regarding Indigenous language rights and intercultural bilingual 
education have been a popular focus of special procedures experts ' reports on Guatemala. Many 
experts have issued recommendations on the topic, including country mandate-holders 
Tomuschat and Pinto, as well as Stavenhagen and the thematic experts on education and the sale 
of children. 178 It is Stavenhagen' s 2003 recommendations that have been celebrated in the 
literature as an example of the positive influence of the work of special procedures experts ' 
country missions in Guatemala. 179 Stavenhagen was critical of the state of bilingual education in 
his 2003 report. He found that, despite support for intercultural bilingual education in 
Guatemala's Constitution, the Indigenous Agreement, and within the Government, there 
remained insufficient trained bilingual teachers and educational resources, and a curriculum 
unresponsive to the language, needs, values and systems of Indigenous peoples. This resulted in 
particularly negative education statistics in rural and urban Indigenous-dominated areas: half a 
million Indigenous children remained outside of the school system, with more than 40 per cent 
of education services concentrated in Guatemala City, compared with around 7 or 8 per cent 
directed to areas with higher numbers of Indigenous peoples. 180 In response to this situation 
Stavenhagen recommended: 
77. Education should be strengthened as a national priority. Bilingual education should be 
extended to all areas of the country and appropriate bilingual and intercultural teaching materials 
should be prepared; more teacher training colleges should also be established in order to train 
bilingual teachers. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government should draw up a 
realistic timetable, which must be respected, to extend educational services to all the indigenous 
communities, and develop affirmative educational programmes for indigenous adults. 181 
176 La Direcci6n General de Educaci6n Bilingiie Intercultural, Government Agreement No 726-95 (Guatemala) . 177 See, eg, Kay Warren, 'The Dynamic and Multi faceted Character of Pan-Mayanism in Guatemala' in Henry Minde (ed), Indigenous Peoples: Self-Determination, Knoweldge, Identity (Eburon Academic Publ ishers, 2008) 107, 127; 
Interview 11 (Guatemala City, I June 201 I). 
178 Tomuschat Report 1991, UN Doc E/CN .4/199 1/5, [ I 55] ; CHR, Report by the Independent Expert, Mr Christian 
Tomuschat, on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Prepared in Accordance with Paragraph 11 of 
Commission Resolution 1991/51, UN Doc E/CN.4/1992/5 (2 I January I 992) [1 98]; Pinto Report 1994, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/ 1994/ 10, [183]; Pinto Report 1996, UN Doc E/CN.4/ 1996/1 5, [1 38]; CHR, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Ms Ofelia Calcetas-Santos: Report on the 
Mission to Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/73 /Add .2 (27 January 2000) [l 12]U); Stavenhagen Report on 
Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, [77]; Expert on Education Guatemala 2009, UN Doc 
A/HRC/ 11/8/Add.3, [84](i), (I), (m), (p), (t), (u). 
179 Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [63]; Piccone, Catalysts fo r Rights: The Un ique 
Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above n I , append ix E 66 . 
180 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, [52], [54]-[55]. 
181 Ibid [77]. . 
208 
The recommendation itself is not forceful. It recommends extension of intercultural bilingual 
education throughout the country and then suggests that ' drawing up a realistic timetable, which 
must be respected' is sufficient, without providing any guidance on timelines . In addition, it 
recommends 'more ' teacher training colleges should be established and ' appropriate ' teaching 
materials prepared, yet no indication of what this would look like in practical terms is given. 
But we can see its core thrust: as a matter of national priority intercultural bilingual education 
should be extended throughout Guatemala. 
(b) Commitment on Display 
The Guatemalan Government displayed a degree of commitment to Stavenhagen's 
recommendation. When Stavenhagen' s report was presented to the CHR, the Guatemalan 
Government stated that ' [t]he educational system had been reformed through the establishment 
of a commission ' tasked with analysing and debating ' the educational problems of indigenous 
people' .182 Guatemala further ' recognized that it should continue giving priority to public 
policies on .. . access to multicultural and bilingual education ', amongst other areas .183 
Consistent with these encouraging statements, Piccone, in his Brookings Institute study, and 
Stavenhagen, in his report on his 2007 follow-up mission to Guatemala, identify several positive 
steps to implement this recommendation: the Guatemalan Government' s creation in 2003 of the 
Vice-Ministry of Bilingual Intercultural Education; its enactment, in the same year, of the 
National Languages Act 2003, which officially recognises the Mayan, Garifuna and Xinka 
languages and promotes their preservation and use; and, the adoption-in 2004 of a Government 
Order that established the DIGEBI's national policy on bilingualism and interculturalism. 184 
Other subsequent developments include a 2005 Ministerial Agreement, which created a new 
national curriculum for primary education with a focus on bilingual, multilingual and 
intercultural education. 185 These are positive steps . But they have been inadequate to secure 
intercultural bilingual education throughout the country, as Stavenhagen recommended. 
While intercultural bilingual educational initiatives have received legislative and policy 
support in Guatemala they are starved of the institutional and financial resources necessary to 
182 Press Release CHR 2003, UN Doc HR/CN/1 028. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 1, appendix E 66; Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [63). See Ley de Idiomas Nacionales, 
Government Decree 19-2003; Viceministerio de Educaci6n Bilingue e Intercultural, Government Agreement 526-
2003; Generalizaci6n de la Educaci6n Bilingue Multi e Intercultural en el Sistema Educativo Nacional, Government 
Agreement No 22-2004. 
185 Ministerial Agreement 35-2005 . See, eg, CERD Committee, Jnformes Presentados por los Estados Partes de 
Conformidad con el Articulo 9 de la Convenci6, ]2°y 13° Jnformes Peri6dicos que los Estados Partes Debian 
Presentar en 2008: Guatemala, UN Doc CERD/C/GTM/12-13 (17 September 2009) [6 1)-[62] ('Guatemala Report to 
CERD Committee 2009'). See generally Luis Enrique Lopez, 'Cultural Diversity, Multilingualism and Indigenous 
Education in Latin America' in Ofelia Garcia, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Maria E Torres-Guzman (eds), Imagining 
Multilingual Schools: Language in Education and Globalization - Linguistic Diversity and Language Rights (Multi lingual Matters, 2006) 238, 243-46. 
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bring them to fruition. Despite budgetary increases, some Government actors have recognised 
that funding of intercultural bilingual education is deficient and not a governmental priority. 186 
A member of DEMI observed '[w]e indigenous organisations within the Government...don't 
have the budget to do our work properly'. 187 As a result, bilingual education is offered in a small 
number of schools, and only during the first three years of primary school. 188 One Government 
actor estimated that just a third of Indigenous children registered in the system receive a 
bilingual education. 189 There has been limited progress in the training and hiring of bilingual 
teachers: in 2010 only 12 of the 82 teacher training colleges offered bilingual and intercultural 
teacher-training. 190 Teaching materials also lack an intercultural focus. 191 In a 2010 report to the 
UN Human Rights Committee the Guatemalan Government acknowledged that 'one of the 
major difficulties hindering bilingual education in Guatemala' is that 'generally speaking 
national curricula and even bilingual school textbooks continue to take Western culture as the 
reference.' 192 Nor is bilingual education available in all of Guatemala's Indigenous languages. 193 
The quality of education provided is also problematic, with the HCHR noting in 2011 that 
educational quality in Guatemala is of particular concern in 'rural and indigenous schools, 
especially those with bilingual and inter-cultural programmes.' 194 All this is on top of the 
access, institutional, and funding issues that apply across Guatemala's education system more 
generally. 195 Not to mention the absence of a substantive intercultural focus in the general 
186 See, eg, CERD Committee, Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention, Eleventh 
Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 2004: Guatemala, UN Doc CERD/C/469/Add . l (6 May 2005) [76] ('Guatemala Report to CERD Committee 2005'); Mario Ellington Lambe, CODISRA, ' Intervention: Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, Fifth Session, Goal 2 of the Millennium Development Goals' (New York, 19 May 
2005) <http://www.docip.org/gsdl/collect/cendocdo/index/assoc/HASH7 a3 8/abdb6dbe.dir/pfi i4 _ l 02. pdf>; Marco 
Antonio Curuchich, CODISRA, 'Intervention: Expert Mechanism on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, Second 
Session, Study on Lessons Learned and Challenges to Achieve the Implementation of the Right oflndigenous 
Peoples to Education ' (Geneva, 2009) 
<http: //www.docip .org/gsdl/collect/cendocdo/index/assoc/HASHO l 7b/65f389ce.dir/EM09marcoantonio005.pdf>; 
Interview 11 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011); Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 2011). Compare OHCHR, 
Universal Periodic Review Second Cycle - Guatemala: Written Replies to Advance Questions (2012) 
<http: //www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/GTSession 14.aspx> 18-20. 
187 Interview 11 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011). 
188 See, eg, Menkos, Saiz and Jose Eva, above n 21, 16; Lopez, Reaching the Unreached, above n 4, 21; Guatemala 
Report to CERD Committee 2005, UN Doc CERD/C/469/Add.1, [77]. 
189 lnterview 11 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011). 
190 Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant 
- Third Periodic Report: Guatemala, UN Doc CCPR/C/GTM/3 (31 March 2010) [564] ('Guatemala Report to 
Human Rights Committee 2010' ); Interview 11 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011). 
191 Menkos, Saiz and Jose Eva, above n 21, 16; Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 2011). 
192 Guatemala Report to Human Rights Committee 2010, UN Doc CCPR/C/GTM/3, [569]. 
193 Ibid [5 57] ; Lopez, 'Cultural Diversity, Multilingualism and Indigenous Education in Latin America', above n 185, 
243. 
194 HCHR Report on Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/ 16/20/Add.l , [73]. 
195 See, eg, Menkos, Saiz and Jose Eva, above n 21, 15-7; Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011 ). In 20 l 0 the 
CRC Committee expressed concern at issues relating to access to education, see CRC Committee, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Guatemala, UN 
Doc CRC/C/GTM/CO/3-4 (25 October 2010) [80] (' CRC Committee on Guatemala 201 O') . 
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national curriculum. 196 In response, there have been continuing international calls for improved 
bilingual educational services, including from the expert on education in 2009 .197 
(c) Uncertain Influence 
It is not possible to conclusively establish that Stavenhagen, or other special procedures 
experts, played a role in those small positive developments that did occur. Piccone bases his 
assessment of Stavenhagen' s influence on Stavenhagen 's 2007 follow-up report on Guatemala; 
that report does not outline the causal link between the recommendation and the Government ' s 
legislative and policy actions. Further, Stavenhagen' s recommendation did not specify the 
enactment of a law, creation of an office, or adoption of a Government Order so there is no 
textual connection between his recommendation and the moves. Nor was he the only actor 
urging improvements to bilingual education in Guatemala at that time. 198 Bilingual education is 
an area where N GOs have been working hard in Guatemala, often with the support of 
international actors, as Stavenhagen himself points out. 199 But there are a few factors that point 
to his impact too: the small positive developments highlighted above occurred soon after his 
visit; the Guatemalan Government hinted at Stavenhagen' s influence in its response to his 2003 
report; and domestic actors, including a representative of DEMI, see international pressure as 
having an important role in the positive bilingual education gains made. In the representative' s 
words, the ' administration ... created a Vice-Ministry of Bilingual Education so we could keep 
our languages and strengthen DEivll ' s work. However, it only happens when international 
pressure makes an influence ... not by their own initiative. ' 200 The OHCHR' s technical 
cooperation project, which promoted implementation of Stavenhagen ' s recommendations on 
Guatemala, also helped to keep pressure on the Government to act on his recommendations. Its 
activities included disseminating Stavenhagen' s reports , organising meetings to evaluate 
implementation of his recommendations and helping to develop indicators to monitor that 
196 There have been some initiatives to this end, such as Ministry of Education's General Directorate for Quality 
Management in Education's programme 'Education for peace and a full life' . Guatemala Report to HRC 2nd UPR 
2012, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/14/GTM/1, [48]. 
197 See, eg, Expert on Education Guatemala 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/11 /8/Add.3, [84]( i), (1), (m), (p), (t),(u); CERD 
Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Guatemala, UN 
Doc CERD/C/GTM/CO/12-13 (19 May 20 10) [1 5] ('CERD Committee on Guatemala 2010'); CRC Committee on 
Guatemala 2010, UN Doc CRC/C/GTM/CO/3-4, [10 1], [102](a); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDA W Committee), Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women: Guatemala, UN Doc CEDA W/C/GUA/CO/7 (10 February 2009) [28] (' CEDAW 
Committee on Guatemala 2009'). 
198 See, eg, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Guatemala, UN Doc E/C.1 2/1/Add.93 (12 December 2003) [ 45]. 
199 S 1 taven,wgen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/ Add.2, [53]; Stavenhagen Annual Report 2005, UN 
Doc E/CN.4/2005/88, [78]; Lopez, Reaching the Unreached, above n 4, 20. 200 Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 20 11). 
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implementation.201 At best, Stavenhagen played a contributory catalytic role in fostering the 
Government's efforts to advance intercultural bilingual education. 
The problem is that the Guatemalan Government's response to Stavenhagen's 
recommendation regarding intercultural bilingual education has ritualistic overtones. While 
constructive, the efforts have largely been confined to paper only: enacting a law, creating an 
office and adopting a Government Order. The institutional and financial resources required to 
effectively implement these laws and policies are withheld. The Government's approach reveals 
inward resistance even to the implementation of soft Indigenous peoples' rights . It deflects 
attention from this failure by its paper efforts . It further relies on these thin efforts - celebrated 
by Stavenhagen and Piccone - to deflect attention to its resistance to hard rights, including to 
participation in decision-making. 
3 No Consultation Instrument 
(a) Legislative Lacuna 
The Guatemalan Government's response to the special procedures' recommendations 
concerning the hard right to consultation reveals in stark form the depths of its Indigenous rights 
ritualism. Consultation with Indigenous peoples is a vexed issue in Guatemala, especially in 
relation to natural resource exploitation projects on or near Indigenous peoples' traditional 
territories .202 Under the Indigenous Agreement the Government had undertaken to ' [ s ]ecure the 
approval of the indigenous communities prior to the implementation of any project for the 
exploitation of natural resources which might affect the subsistence and way of life of the 
communities. ' 203 But there is broad agreement that this has not occurred.204 In part, this is 
because domestic instruments concerning consultation for Indigenous peoples are piecemeal and 
do not accord with international standards.205 Further, debate continues over whether ILO 
Convention 169 requires incorporation into domestic legislation in order to render it legally 
binding, despite article 46 of Guatemala's Constitution, which establishes '[t]he general 
201 Stavenhagen Communications Report 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/88/ Add. l , [91 ]; Study on Best Practices, UN 
Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [21]-[26]; Preston et al, above n 1, 21; Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 
2010). 
202 See, eg, Sieder, "Emancipation' or 'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples ' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41; Fulmer, Snodgrass Godoy and Neff, above n 56; Amnesty International , Annual Report 
2013: State of the World's Human Rights - Guatemala (20 13) <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/guatemala/report-
2013>. 
203 Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1995, Part IV, F, 6(c). 
204 See, eg, Sieder, "Emancipation ' or 'Regulation '? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples ' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41 , 254- 57; HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/19/21 /Add . l , [59]-[61]. The 
Guatemalan Government has recognised that consultation has not always occurred with Indigenous peoples. See, eg, 
Guatemala Report to CERD Committee 2005, UN Doc CERD/C/469/Add. l , [3 l ]-[32]. 
205 See, eg, Sieder, "Emancipation' or ' Regulation '? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41, 249, 256-57; Fulmer, Snodgrass Godoy and Neff, above n 56, 98- 10 I; ILO, Report of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations: Report III (Part 1 A) (2012). 94 7; 
Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 20 l I) . 
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principle .. . that in the field of human rights treaties and agreements approved and ratified by 
Guatemala have precedence over municipal law. ' 206 ILO Convention 169 contains several 
pertinent provisions concerning Indigenous consultation and participation, including requiring 
that governments 'consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in 
particular through their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to 
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly' .207 Indigenous 
communities have responded to the domestic legislative vacuum by conducting 'community 
consultations', a customary form of Mayan decision-making that is provided for, inter alia, 
under Guatemala's Municipal Code.208 But the Government has ignored these consultations, 
bolstered by a 2007 decision of Guatemala's Constitutional Court that ruled that the community 
consultation process is not legally binding in respect of natural resource projects.209 
The consultation issue has garnered the attention of several special procedures experts. 
Stavenhagen and Anaya, as well as the expert on food, have issued recommendations regarding 
consultation with Indigenous peoples in Guatemala. In 2006 the expert on food recommended 
that Guatemala's mining legislation 'be amended to ensure protection of the rights of 
indigenous people over their natural resources, as provided by ILO Convention No 169', which, 
as identified above, contains provisions regarding Indigenous consultation that the expert 
referenced in his report.210 In 2003 Stavenhagen drew attention to the lack of consultation with 
Indigenous peoples in relation to developments affecting their lands and other matters. 2 11 He 
recommended the adoption of a legal instrument formally regulating the Government's duty to 
consult with Indigenous peoples, with Anaya repeating the recommendation in 2011 and 
specifying that the instrument should accord with international standards.212 Stavenhagen, 
Anaya and other commentators view domestic legislation as necessary to provide certainty in 
the face of widespread misunderstanding about the scope and content of the duty to consult with 
Indigenous peoples, and to counter the view amongst some state actors that the lack of a 
domestic instrument implies the absence of an obligation to consult.213 
206 Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala 1985 (Guatemala) art 46. See generally Sieder, 'The Judiciary and 
Indigenous Rights in Guatemala', above n 41,221. 
207 ]LO Convention 169, art 6(1)(a). 
208 C6digo Municipal, Government Decree 12-2002 (Guatemala), arts 65-6; Ley de Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y 
Rural, Government Agreement No 461-2002 (Guatemala), art 15; Interview 14 (May 2011). See generally Sieder, 
"Emancipation' or 'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War Guatemala', above 
n 41,256; Guatemala Report to CERD Committee 2009, UN Doc CERD/C/GTM/12-13 , [275]-[276]. 209 La Corte de Constitucionalidad de la Republica de Guatemala, Expediente No 1779-2005, 8 May 2007. See 
generally Guatemala Report to CERD Committee 2009, UN Doc CERD/C/GTM/12-13, [278]; Sieder, 
"Emancipation' or 'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War Guatemala', above 
n41,257. 
210 Expert on Food Guatemala 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.l, [23], [28], [58](f). 211 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/ Add.2 , [27], [ 4 7]. 212 Ibid [82]; Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3, [78]. 213 See, eg, Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc AIHRC/18/35/Add.3, 2, [37] ; ILO, above n 205, 947; 
Sieder, "Emancipation' or 'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41, 257. 
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(b) Hollow Commitment and Expert Assistance 
The Guatemalan Government displayed outward commitment to the experts' 
recommendations. Over the years the Guatemalan Government put forward multiple proposals 
for instruments to regulate consultations with Indigenous peoples, none of which were 
enacted.214 Early in 2011, several months after Anaya's special mission to Guatemala, the 
Guatemalan President presented a bill that had the stated purpose of implementing the 
provisions on consultation with Indigenous peoples in ILO Convention 169.215 It is unclear 
whether Anaya played a role in the Government's decision to present a new bill: a host of 
international and domestic actors, including the ILO and Guatemala's Constitutional Court, also 
recommended adoption of a domestic instrument.216 But during the interactive dialogue 
following the presentation of Anaya's report to the HRC the Guatemalan Government implied 
that it was informed by Anaya's views: 
We always would recall what had been set forth by the Special Rapporteur in his report where he 
indicates that, though the consultation is applicable even in the absence of a domestic legislation 
framework, it should also coincide with other bodies and international mechanisms on human 
rights ... [ and] should take place with all haste in order to ensure that these processes have legal 
security and certainty. 217 
And, before the PFII earlier that year, the Guatemalan Government stated that Anaya's 2010 
visit had prompted a national dialogue on the 'pressing need' to consult Indigenous peoples 
regarding development projects in their territories. 218 
Regardless of his influence on the presentation of the new instrument, Anaya had a 
direct influence on the content of the instrument through his capacity-building efforts. At the 
Government's invitation, Anaya provided comments to the Government on initial iterations of 
214 See, eg, ILO, above n 205, 947; Guatemala Report to CERD Committee 2009, UN Doc CERD/C/GTM/12-13, 
[166]-[167] , [278] . See also Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3, [25] . 21 5 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3, [26]. 
2 16 ILO, Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine the Representation Alleging Non-Observance by Guatemala of 
the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No . 169), Made Under Article 24 of the !LO Constitution by 
the Federation of Country and City Workers (FTCC) (4 June 2007) [60](g); La Corte de Constitucionalidad de la 
Republica de Guatemala, Expediente No 1779-2005, 8 May 2007; La Corte de Constitucionalidad de la Republica de 
Guatemala, Expediente No 3878-2007, 21 December 2009. See also, eg, HRC, Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Work of its Office in Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/7 /38/Add.1 
(29 January 2008) [52], [91], [97]; HRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Activities of Her Office in Guatemala in 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/10/31 /Add. l (28 February 2009) [105] (d); HCHR 
Report on Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/16/20/Add. l, [63] ; CERD Committee on Guatemala 2010, UN Doc 
CERD/C/GTM/CO/12-13 , [l l](a)-(c); CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Guatemala, UN Doc CERD/C/GTM/CO/ 11 (15 May 2006) [19]. Anaya 
acknowledges that other actors have recognised the legal vacuum regarding Indigenous peoples' consultation rights 
in Guatemala. Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.3 , [21]. 217 Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human 
Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 94. 218 Guatemalan Government representative, Francisco Cali , cited in Economic and Social Council , 'Global Consensus 
on Indigenous Rights Declaration should be Celebrated, but Strong Effort Needed to Make Principles Alive "On the 
Ground", Permanent Forum Told', (Press Release, UN Doc HR/5057, 19 May 2011). 
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the draft instrument prior to its public release for discussion. 219 In his comments on the 
penultimate draft of the instrument, Anaya described it as 'an important step' towards a 
domestic law regulating consultation. But he also stated that in his view there were ' serious 
limitations and gaps ' in the instrument regarding the content of the state ' s duty to consult with 
Indigenous peoples in accordance with international standards.220 Anaya offered comments and 
recommendations on the draft to bring it into line with international standards. For example, he 
criticised the draft instrument' s statement that Indigenous peoples only have to be consulted on 
those measures that 'directly, exclusively and solely' affect them;22 1 its ' shallow' provisions on 
the consultation process itself;222 and its silence on Indigenous peoples' sharing of the benefits 
of natural resource exploitation projects in their traditional territories. 223 He also emphasised the 
need to open up the instrument for dialogue and consultation with Indigenous peoples.224 Only 
some of Anaya' s proposed amendments were incorporated into the final draft that was released 
for public comment shortly after.225 
Notably, the Government ignored Anaya' s advice to open up the instrument for 
dialogue and consultation with Indigenous peoples. The extent of the Government' s 
' consultation' with Indigenous peoples was to permit comments to be made on the draft by the 
general public within 30 working days of its release, although this period was eventually 
extended for a short time. 226 The notice of consultation and a copy of the draft instrument were 
publicised in Spanish on the Internet,227 excluding a large proportion of Guatemala' s Indigenous 
peoples who do not read Spanish and lack access to the Internet;228 the UNDP estimated that in 
2 19 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/1 8/3 5/Add.3, [8]-[10] ; Anaya Report to GA 2011, UN Doc 
A/66/288, [22]. 
220 Letter from James Anaya to Sr Ricardo Cajas Mejia, Director Ejecutivo Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de 
Guatemala, 1 March 2011 , annex (' Comentarios def Relator Especial sabre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas 
en Relacion con el Borrador Preliminar de Reglamento para el Proceso de Consulta de! Convenio 169 de la OIT 
sabre Pueblos Indigenas y Tribales en Paises Independientes (Guatemala) - 7 de Febrero de 2011 ') 
<http://www.dialogo.gob.gt/nuevo/sites/default/files/anexos _pueblos _indigenas.pdf> [3] ('Letter from Anaya to 
Cajas Mejia 2011 ' ). The annex contained a copy of Anaya's comments to the Guatemalan Government on the third 
draft of the instrument. 
22 1 Ibid annex [15]-[16] . 
222 Ibid annex [25]. 
223 Ibid annex [42]. 
224 Ibid annex [9] , [44]. 
225 Ministerio de Trabajo y Prevision Social, Reglamento para el Proceso de Consulta de! Convenio 169 de la OIT 
Sob re Pueblos Indigenas y Tribal es en Pais es Independientes (23 February 2011) 
<http: //www.politicaspublicas.net/panel/attachments/article/732/2011-guatemala-proyecto-reglamento-consulta.pdf>; 
Letter from Anaya to Cajas Mejia 2011 , above n 220, 2; Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc 
A/HRC/18/35/Add.3 , [10] , [27] . 
226 Human Rights Committee, Replies from the Government of Guatemala to the List of Issues (CCPRICIGTMIQ/3) 
to be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of the Second Periodic Report of Guatemala 
(CCPRICIGTM/3) , UN Doc CCPR/C/GTM/Q/3/Add.1 (29 September 2011) [196]-[197] ; Guatemalan Government 
representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth 
Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 94. 
227 Ministerio de Trabajo y Prevision Social, above n 225 . 
228 Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011). For criticisms of the 'consultation' process see, eg, Irmalicia 
Velasquez Nimatuj , 'Reglamento Consulta Cl69 (III): Es Burlarse de ellos y Violar sus Derechos', El Peri6dico 
( on line), 2011 <http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20110314/opinion/192378/>. 
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2010 only 10.5 per cent of Guatemala's total population used the Internet.229 As a result of the 
Government' s failure to appropriately consult with Indigenous peoples on the instrument, and 
the instrument 's contents, the draft was widely rejected by Indigenous peoples, including 
prompting Indigenous-led highway road blocks and public burnings of the regulations. 230 
Domestic IPOs were vocal in their criticisms of the content of the draft instrument. For 
example, the Western Peoples Council (Consejo de Pueblos de Occidente or CPO), stated that 
the instrument ' diminishes, restricts and distorts the real spirit of the Right to Consultation', 
ignoring the rights affirmed in ILO Convention 169, the UNDRIP and other international 
instruments.23 1 It filed a legal claim before Guatemala's Constitutional Court seeking a halt to 
consultations on the instrurnent.232 
Anaya came under fire from Indigenous peoples for his involvement in the drafting of 
the instrument. In some quarters Anaya's comments in favour of the Government adopting an 
instrument were misconstrued as dictating that the instrument proposed by the President had to 
be approved.233 This view was not helped by the Government putting forward the impression 
that Anaya supported the draft instrument in its publically released form. A representative of the 
PDH commented 'the government says ... James Anaya has provided us with advice, the High 
Commissioner [for Human Rights] also has knowledge and is aware of what we 're doing, the 
OIT [ILO] has presented its opinion on our project and we've incorporated its observations; 
that ' s what the Government says.' 234 Anaya was accused of taking a pro-development stance 
and he was requested by a collective of Guatemalan IPOs to share his comments on the 
instrument, which he did.235 IPOs also criticised Anaya and the ILO for putting pressure on 
Indigenous peoples to respond to the instrument;236 some viewed the community consultations 
as suffici ent avenue for expressing their disapproval of development projects in their 
territories.237 
Anaya took steps to clarify his position. When it became apparent that there was 
misunderstanding amongst Indigenous peoples regarding his stance on the instrument, 
229 UNDP, Human Development Report 2013 - The Rise of the South : Human Progress in a Diverse World, above n 
3, 188. 
230 Interv iew 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011 ); 'Indfgenas Protestan en Quiche Contra Reglamento de Consultas ', 
Prensa Libre (online), 5 April 2011 <http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/reglamento-consultas-protesta-
quiche_O_ 457 1544 15.htrnl>. 
23 1 Consejo de Pueblos de Occidente (CPO), Presentaci6n de! Amparo en Contra de! Reglamento de Consulta - 23 de 
Marzo de 2011 en la Corte de Constitucionalidad (2011 ) 
<http:/ /consej odepueblosdeoccidente. blogspot.com.au/2011 /06/el-consejo-de-pueblos-maya-de-
occ idente.htrn l# !/201 1 /03 /consej o-de-los-pueblos-maya-de.html>. 
232 CPO, Acci6n de Amparo en Contra de! Reglamento de Consulta (2011 ) 
<http:/ /consej odepueb losdeocc i dente.blogspot.com.au/2011 /03/resol ucion-del-amparo-en-contra-
de l .html# !/20 l l /03 /reso I ucion-del-amparo-en-contra-del . html>. 
233 Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 20 11 ). 
234 Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 20 I l ). 
23 5 Ibid; Letter from Anaya to Cajas Mejia 2011, above n 220. 
23 6 See, eg, Velasquez Nimatuj , above n 228 . 
237 See, eg, CPO, Corte de Constitucionalidad Dictamina (14 December 20 11) 
<http ://consej odepueb losdeocc idente. b logs pot. com .au/201 l /12/corte-de-constitucional id ad -
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representatives from Anaya's support team reportedly travelled to Guatemala to clarify his 
views.238 During the interactive dialogue on his 2011 report Anaya was careful to spell out his 
perspective on the Government's draft instrument after the Government representative identified 
in that forum that Guatemala had prepared the draft instrument 'enriched by the contributions of 
the ILO and Anaya' .239 Anaya responded: 
I would like to make reference to the Guatemalan Government's statement that I contributed 
with comments to that effort and that my comments were taken into account in the drafting of 
that regulation. I would simply like to clarify that in my comments I noted that in many respects 
the regulation draft developed by Guatemala fell short of international standards, although at the 
same time I applauded, and continue to applaud, efforts by Guatemala to move forward in this 
regard and urge Guatemala to continue such efforts in full collaboration and cooperation with 
Indigenous peoples. 240 
Despite this, some Indigenous peoples remained unsure of Anaya's intentions in Guatemala, 
with one Mayan woman commenting 'his credibility is questionable. We do not really know if 
his first or primary intention was to say the regulations had to be approved as the Government 
had written them.' 241 It is an example of the vulnerability Merry assodates with those actors 
who perform the role of translators. She argues that translators 'are powerful in that they have 
mastered both of the discourses of the interchange, but they are vulnerable to charges of 
disloyalty or double-dealing.' 242 The Government's act of implying Anaya's support for the 
instrument also backs Piccone's argument that '[i]n intensely polarised situations, opposing 
-
sides will seek to manipulate a rapporteur's visit and report to their own advantage, hindering 
impact. ' 243 The lesson in this for special procedures experts is to be very careful and clear in the 
comments they make in the course of their work and to monitor how those comments are 
presented by other actors, particularly governments. 
At the same time, Anaya's contribution was praised as positive by other domestic actors 
close to the issues. A representative of the OHCHR-Guatemala celebrated Anaya's visit for 
raising the profile of the right to be consulted, which the representative identified as one of 
Guatemala's most pressing issues given its importance to land rights concems.244 The 
238 Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 2011). 
239 Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human 
Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 94. 240 James Anaya, final remarks, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Part II, 
Clustered Interactive Dialogue on Indigenous Peoples, 19th Plenary Meeting (21 September 2011) United Nations 
<http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv /we bcast/2011 /09 /part-ii-clustered-interactive-dialogue-on-indigenous-peoples-
l 9th-plenary-meeting. html>. 
241 Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 2011). 
242 Sally Engle Merry, 'Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle' (2006) 108(1) 
American Anthropologist 38, 40. 
243 Ted Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 206, 216. 
244 Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011). 
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representative identified that Anaya's comments were 'essential' to IPOs' mobilisation of a 
response to the Government on the instrument. For example, his advice was 'really key' in the 
development of the CPO ' s legal claim before the Constitutional Court seeking a halt to 
consultations on the instrument.245 The CPO's writ makes express reference to comments by 
Anaya on the content of the right to consultation.246 
(c) Direct Impact 
This is an example of the special procedures' work having a tangible influence on 
government behaviour. The Guatemalan Government specifically incorporated aspects of 
Anaya' s advice into its draft instrument to regulate consultation with Indigenous peoples. Yet, 
Anaya ' s influence did not translate into Guatemala's actual conformity to the hard right to 
consultation the subject of his recommendation. The draft instrument fell short of international 
standards, contrary to Anaya's recommendation. And, as it transpired, the CPO's claim to halt 
the regulation was successful. Late in 2011 Guatemala's Constitutional Court definitively 
suspended consultation on the instrument on the basis that the draft regulation did not accord 
with ILG Convention 169.247 Anaya 's advice assisted the CPO in achieving its favoured 
domestic ruling. But Anaya may not view the ruling so positively. He encouraged Guatemala's 
Indigenous peoples to objectively consider the draft instrument and to enter into dialogue with 
the Government over any proposed alternatives to the instrument or its content, a reflection of 
his desire for an instrument to be agreed. 248 Thus, Anaya was influential, but not in securing 
adoption of a domestic instrument regulating consultation, as he recommended. Nor was he 
successful in securing the Government's greater conformity to international norms regarding 
Indigenous consultation, the status quo is retained. 
The story is further complicated by the Government's attribution of blame for the 
instrument's failure. Before international fora the Guatemalan Government has acknowledged 
that an instrument regulating consultation with Indigenous peoples is needed. 249 But it has 
attributed its inability to agree an instrument to the actions of Indigenous peoples themselves, 
rather than its own acute failure to give effect to the very right the subject of the regulation: the 
right to be consulted. When Anaya presented his annual report to the GA in 2011 the 
Guatemalan representative is reported as stating: 
245 Ibid. 
246 CPO, Acci6n de Amparo en Contra de! Reglamento de Consulta, above n 232, 12-3 , 19. 
w La Corte de Constitucionalidad de la Republica de Guatemala, Expediente No l 072-2011 , 24 November 2011. See 
generally HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc NHRC/1 9/21/Add . l , [61] . 
248 Letter from Anaya to Cajas Mejia 201 J, above n 220, 2-3. 
249 For example, Guatemala accepted a co ll ection of recommendations directed to it during its second UPR 
concerning the deve lopment of an instrument on consultation with Indigenous peoples. HRC, Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Guatemala - Views on Conclusions and/or Recommendations, Vo luntary 
Commitments and Replies Presented by the State under Review, UN Doc NHRC/22/8/Add. l (23 January 201 3) [4], 
[ 15]. 
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It was clear that there was inadequate participation by indigenous peoples in both designing and 
benefiting from a host of projects, including those by extractive industries. The Government 
wanted to move forward as quickly as possible to regulate the consultations with indigenous 
peoples, with a view towards introducing a sense of certainty regarding such discussions. A 
proposal to that end was put forward to indigenous groups in Guatemala, but some groups had 
opposed that proposal and sought legal remedies to prevent the establishment of such 
regulations. Consequently, all Government efforts to comply with ILO Convention No 169 
through such regulations had been suspended.250 
By attributing the stalling of the draft instrument to political dynamics within Indigenous 
communities the Government shifts perceptions of blame for its non-implementation away from 
itself. This constitutes another form of Indigenous rights ritualism: the Government maintains 
an aura of 'progress' by the release of a draft instrument on consultation but the instrument 
languishes because the Government undermines the right to consultation in the process. In mid-
2012 the Government began drafting yet another instrument to regulate consultation with 
Indigenous peoples in Guatemala, the fate of this instrument remains to be seen.251 
4 Mining despite Opposition 
(a) Operating without Consent 
A final example, intimately tied to the issue of consultation, :further illustrates 
Guatemala's Indigenous rights ritualism. It concerns Indigenous peoples' rights to their lands 
and resources. Indigenous peoples ' land rights are an intractable issue in Guatemala. Like many 
Indigenous peoples of the Americas and elsewhere, Guatemala's Indigenous peoples are 
experiencing extreme pressures on their lands and natural resources from transnational 
companies seeking to undertake large-scale development projects on them. 252 The Marlin mine 
is an emblematic example of how fraught such projects are, although it is only one of many 
such examples in Guatemala.253 
250 Guatemalan Government representative, Connie Taracena Secaira, cited in GA 3rd Committee Press Release 2011, 
UN Doc GA/SHC/4013 . A similar statement was made before the HRC. Guatemalan Government representative, 
Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement 
of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 94. 
251 OHCHR, Universal Periodic Review Second Cycle - Guatemala: Written Replies to Advance Questions (2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/GTSessionl4.aspx> 26; Guatemala UPR 2012, UN Doc 
A/HRC/22/8, [98](a). 
252 See generally Shin Imai, Ladan Mehranvar and Jennifer Sander, 'Breaching Indigenous Law: Canadian Mining in 
Guatemala' (2007) 6 Indigenous Law Journal 101; Leire Urkidi, 'The Defence of Community in the Anti-Mining 
Movement of Guatemala' (2011) 11(4) Journal of Agrarian Change 556; Joris van de Sandt, Mining Conflicts and 
Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala (Cordaid, 2009). 
253 s 1 ee, eg, Fu mer, Snodgrass Godoy and Neff, above n 56, 92. 
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The Marlin mine is an open pit gold and silver mine owned by the Canadian company 
Goldcorp Inc and operating through the subsidiary Montana Exploradora de Guatemala SA. It 
was the first mining project approved in Guatemala under a new 1997 Mining Code.254 It 
operates in San Marcos, in the predominantly Mayan municipalities of Sipakapa and San 
Miguel Ixtahuacan, home to the Sipakepense and Mam peoples. It started commercial 
operations in late 2005 , following the grant of a 25 year operating licence by the Government 
and the injection of US$45 million in loans and equity from the International Finance 
Corporation.255 The mine has generated millions of dollars in levies and taxes for the cash-
starved Guatemalan Government and the company has implemented several social projects. 256 
However, concerns were expressed about the mine from its earliest days . In June 2005 the 
Sipakepense peoples held community consultations over whether the mine should proceed. The 
vast majority of participants voted against the mine, triggering the wave of Indigenous 
community consultations noted above.257 Beyond the affected communities, the mine has 
attracted considerable criticism from other IPOs, human rights and environmental NGOs and 
church groups throughout Guatemala, even some state institutions;258 transnational NGOs, 
including Oxfam;259 scholars;260 and international bodies.26 1 
The main criticism expressed regarding the mine is that the affected Indigenous 
communities were not adequately consulted prior to its commencement. But significant 
concerns have also been raised regarding its negative health, environmental, property and social 
impacts; the lack of sufficient provision for the affected communities to share in the benefits of 
the mine, including through permanent skilled jobs and an appropriate share of royalties; attacks 
and threats against those protesting against the mine and the criminalisation of their protest; its 
conflict with the emphasis in the Mayan 'cosmovision' on harmony with nature; and, the 
questionable manner in which the land for the mine was acquired by the company.262 
254 Sieder, "Emancipation ' or .' Regulation '? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples ' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41,255. 
255 Ibid 255; On Common Ground Consultants Inc, Human Rights Assesment ofGoldcorp's Marlin Mine: 
Commissioned on Behalf of Goldcorp by the Steering Committee for the Human Rights Impact Assessment of the 
Marlin Mine (20 10) append ix A 3. 
256 See, eg, Fulmer, Snodgrass Godoy and Neff, above n 56, 93; ILO, above n 205, 948. 
257 See, eg, Sieder, 'The Judiciary and Ind igenous Rights in Guatemala', above n 41 , 234-36. See generally Yagenova 
and Garcia, above n 58 . 
258 See, eg, Sieder, "Emancipation' or 'Regulation '? Law, Globalization and ind igenous Peoples ' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41,255; Fulmer, Snodgrass Godoy and Neff, abo ve n 56, 94 . The mine has been the subject of 
litigation by the Guatemalan Minister of the Environment and Natural Resources . See, eg, On Common Ground 
Consultants Inc, above n 255 , appendix F 3. 
259 See, eg, Oxfam America, Marlin Mine: Violence and Pollution Lead to Call for Suspension (18 October 2011) 
<http: //www.oxfamamerica.org/articles/marl i_n-mine-vio lence-and-pollution-lead-to-call-for-suspension>; Amnesty 
International, Guatemala: Carmen Mejia (3 January 2013) <http ://www.arnnesty.ca/get-involved/take-action-
now/guatemala-carmen-mej %C3 %ADa>. 
260 See, eg, Imai , Mehranvar and Sander, above n 252; Fulmer, Snodgrass Godoy and Neff, above n 56. 
261 See, eg, ILO, above n 205 , 948-49 ; Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Assessment of a Complaint Submitted to 
CA O in Relation to the Marlin Mining Project in Guatemala (Office of the Compl iance Advisor Ombudsman, 
International finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 7 September 2005) 37-9. 
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The impact of the mine on the Sipakepense and Mam peoples has been the subject of 
several special procedures experts' reports. The mine first attracted concerned comment from 
the expert on food in 2006, with the expert relaying Indigenous peoples ' concerns that they had 
not been adequately consulted over the project and highlighting the violent repression of 
Indigenous peoples' protests against the mine.263 A year later Stavenhagen referred to gold 
mining in San Miguel Ixtahuacan and Sipakapa when commenting on the devastating impact of 
extractive industries on Indigenous peoples in his annual thematic report.264 But it is Anaya who 
has directed the most significant attention to the project. Anaya sent an allegation letter to the 
Guatemalan Government regarding the mine late in 2009 in which he raised concerns regarding 
its alleged social and environmental impacts.265 He eventually conducted a special mission to 
the state in June the following year to investigate the consultation procedures in relation to the 
project. He found that the Marlin mine was not the subject of consultation with the affected 
Indigenous peoples in accordance with international standards.266 In a good example of the 
'close cooperation and coordination with ... regional human rights organizations' that the Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples is requested to exercise in its mandate,267 one of Anaya' s 
resulting recommendations was that the Government comply with the Inter-American 
Commission's 2010 precautionary measures concerning the mine.268 
The Inter-American Commission is one of the principal human rights organs of the 
OAS. On 20 May 2010, less than a month before Anaya' s mission to Guatemala, the Inter-
American Commission had taken the significant step of requesting that the Government comply 
with a suite of precautionary measures regarding the mine. Precautionary measures are issued 
only in the most serious and urgent cases, where life or other fundamental rights are 
threatened.269 Notably, the measures issued by the Inter-American Commission included that the 
Government should suspend the mine's operations within 20 days. 270 The measures were issued 
pending the Inter-American Commission's decision on the merits of a petition brought by 
members of the affected communities, which alleged that the Government had failed to obtain 
their free, prior and informed consent to the mine. Early in June 2010, shortly before Anaya' s 
special mission, the then President Alvaro Colom publically stated that there was 'no basis' for 
above n 252, 110-15, 124; Interview 13 (Telephone Interview, 27 May 2011); Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 
2011); Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011); Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011). 263 Expert on Food Guatemala 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.1, [51]. 264 Stavenhagen Annual Report 2007, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32, [52] . 
265 Anaya Communications Report 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add.l , [185]-[186]. 266 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/ Add.3 , appendix [68]. 267 HRC Res 15/14, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/14, para d. 
268 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3, appendix [66] . 269 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp > art 25(1). See generally Diego Rodriguez-
Pinz6n, 'Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Legal Status and Importance' (2013) 20(2) Human Rights Brief 13. 
270 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Comunidades de! Pueblo Maya (Sipakepense y Mam) de los 
Municipios de Sipacapa y San Miguel Ixtahuacan en el Departamento de San Marcos, Guatemala, MC 260-07 (20 
May 2010) <http: //www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/cautelares.asp>. 
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ordering the suspension of the mine's operations.271 During the visit, and in his preliminary and 
final reports, Anaya urged the Government to suspend the mine on the basis that the Inter-
American Commission's request was a response to reasonable concern regarding the tights of 
Indigenous peoples, particularly in relation to their health and the environment.272 It is Anaya's 
influence regarding suspension of the mine on which I focus here. 
(b) From 'Commitment' to Rejection 
Anaya was influential - fleetingly- in the Government's response to the Inter-
American Commission's request to suspend the mine. Five days after the end of Anaya's visit 
President Colom changed his position. On 23 June 2010 the Government advised the Inter-
American Commission that it would abide by the Inter-American Commission's precautionary 
measures in order 'to comply with its international commitments in the area of human rights', 273 
although the Government also asserted that none of the analyses conducted by the Government 
had identified conclusive evidence of health or environmental concerns arising from the mine's 
activities.274 On the last day of his visit Anaya had given a press conference at which he had 
urged the Government to comply with the measures;275 presumably a sentiment he also 
communicated during his meetings with high-level Government officials, including the 
President, while in Guatemala. A Government announcement regarding compliance with the 
Inter-American Commission's precautionary measures was imminent around the time of 
Anaya's visit. 276 But the turnaround in the Government's position suggests that Anaya's 
recommendation at the press conference, and discussions with Government officials while in the 
country, were influential in the decision. Scholars writing on the mine, following the 
Government's announcement that it would suspend its operations, are silent on Anaya's role in 
the change in position.277 Nor was Anaya or the Inter-American Commission the only actor 
putting pressure on the Government to suspend the mine,278 as the affected communities' 
271 See, eg, President Alvaro Colom quoted in Angels Mas6 and Alberto Ramirez, 'Ecologistas Critican Respaldo a 
Minerfa ', Prensa Libre ( online), 3 June 2010 <http: //www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Ecologistas-critican-respaldo-
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272 
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sustained protests testify.279 However, a representative of the OHCHR-Guatemala credited 
Anaya's visit as instrumental in the Government's announcement to suspend the mine, through 
raising the profile of the right oflndigenous peoples to be consulted and in mobilising IPOs and 
NGOs on the issue.280 Other observers have drawn a connection between Anaya's visit and the 
Government's announcement too.281 
The cause for celebration was short-lived. The Government publically announced that it 
intended to begin the 'administrative process' to suspend the mine, without providing a timeline 
for that process.282 It maintained expectations that the mine would be suspended over the course 
of a year, with the mine in operation all the while. But, eventually, in July 2011 it announced 
that it would not comply with the Inter-American Commission's order to suspend the mine 
because, through its own investigations, it had found that there was no evidence of 
environmental contamination or a probability of any damage if operations at the mine 
continued.283 Concerns have been expressed at the shallow nature of the Government's 
investigations on the mine,284 a product of the state's limited resources and its interest in 
retaining the mine as a revenue source. When Anaya's report on the Marlin mine was presented 
to the HRC a few months later the Guatemalan Government downplayed the issue. It pointed to 
the Constitutional Court's decision that the community consultations regarding the mine were 
not legally binding and asserted, in relation to any potential environmental damage, that its 
Ministries of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as Energy and Mines, were 'carrying 
out constant monit~ring of the situation in Guatemala' .285 
<http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/pressreleases/oxfam-calls-for-suspension-of-guatemala-mine>; Agenzia Fides, 
America/Guatemala - Rigoberta Menchu and the Bishop of San Marcos Call on President Colom to Guarantee 
Security for the People and Respect for the Environment (17 June 2010) 
<http: //www.fides.org/en/news/26899?idnews=26899&lan=eng>; Rights Action, US Members of Congress Letter to 
Guatemalan President Colom Calling/or Suspension of Goldcorp's 'Marlin ' Mine in Guatemala (7 April 2011) 
<http:/ /www.rightsaction.org/articles/Congressional_letter _on_ Marlin_ mine_ 040711.html>; Interview 14 
(Guatemala City, 1 June 2011); Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011); Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 
June 2011). 
279 See, eg, Sieder, "Emancipation' or 'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 41, 255-57; Imai, Mehranvar and Sander, above n 252, 109-15, 124. 280 Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011). 
281 See, eg, Tracy L Barnett, 'Goldcorp's Marlin Mine: "Development for Death'", The Hufjington Post (online), 1 
July 2010 <http:/ /www.huffingtonpost.com/tracy-1-barnett/goldcorps-marlin-mine-dev b 629452.html>. 282 Oscar Ismatul and Geovanni Contreras, 'El Gobierno Cumplira Orden de Cerrar Mi-;:;a\ Prensa Libre (online), 24 
June 2010 <http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/comunitario/Gobierno-cumplira-orden-cerrar-
mina O 286171419.html>. 
283 Min~terio de Energia y Minas Resoluci6n No 0104 (8 July 2011); 'MEM Desiste de Suspender Operaciones en 
Mina Marlin' , La Hora (online), 20 July 2011 
<http://www. lahora. com. gt/index. php/nac ional/ guatemala/ actual idad/3 93 5-mem-desiste-de-suspender-operaci ones-
en-m ina-marlin>. 
284 See, eg, Mining Watch Canada and Center for International Environmental Law, 'Guatemala Defies Human Rights 
Body, Refuses to Suspend Marlin Mine' (Press Release, 4 August 2011) 
<http: //www.miningwatch.ca/news/guatemala-defies-human-rights-body-refuses-suspend-marlin-mine>; Center for 
International Environmental Law and MiningWatch Canada, 'Human Rights Commission's Climbdown a Wake-up 
Call for Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, Not Indicator ofGoldcorp's Performance' (Press Release, 5 
January 2012) <http://www.miningwatch.ca/news/wake-call-human-rights-defenders-americas-not-indicator-
goldcorp-s-performance>. 
285 Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human 
Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 94. 
223 
The Government's resistance to Anaya's recommendation then took an interesting 
form. It not only outwardly resisted suspension of the mine it went a step further and sought to 
reject the basis for Anaya' s recommendation: it petitioned the Inter-American Commission to 
have the precautionary measure regarding suspension of the Marlin mine withdrawn.286 This 
suggests the Guatemalan Government is acutely concerned with its regional and international 
Indigenous rights reputation. In a surprise move, the Inter-American Commission acceded in 
December 2011 , modifying the precautionary measures by removing the request that mining 
operations be suspended.287 NGOs expressed concern over the removal, pointing out that it was 
the second time in less than a year that the Inter-American Commission had succumbed to 
government pressure to modify an order regarding a mining project on Indigenous territories. 288 
Indicative of the Government's push to continue operations at the mine, soon after the Inter-
American Commission modified its measures Goldcorp voluntarily agreed to increase its 
royalty rate to the Guatemalan Government for the mine from one to four per cent of gross 
revenue.
289 Anaya has not publically commented on whether the withdrawal of the order to 
suspend the mine changes his view that operations at the Marlin mine should be suspended. 290 
But Indigenous opposition to the mine remains strong: in mid-2012 in San Miguel Ixtahuacan 
the affected communities conducted a symbolic people's trial against Goldcorp regarding its 
operations in Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico. The Tribunal's judgment included that 
Goldcorp suspend all of its operations in Mesoamerica, including the Marlin mine. 29 1 
The Guatemalan Government's combination of outward commitment and inward 
resistance is ritualistic. Guatemala deflected attention from its resistance to the Inter-American 
Commission's precautionary measure and Anaya's associated recommendation by professing a 
commitment to suspend operations at the mine for a year. When it eventually revealed that it 
would not implement the order it worked hard to remove the basis for the order itself, ultimately 
successfully. While Anaya had an observable influence on the Government's initial 
announcement that it would suspend operations at the Marlin mine, again this influence did not 
translate into Guatemala's actual conformity to the hard land rights norms the subject of the 
286 See, eg, Mining Watch Canada and Center for International Environmental Law, 'Guatemala Defies Human Rights 
Body, Refuses to Suspend Marlin Mine', above n 284 . 
287 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Comunidades de! Pueblo Maya (Sipakepense y Mam) de las 
municipios de Sipacapa y San Miguel Ixtahuacan en el Departamento de San Marcos, Guatemala , MC 260-07 (20 
May 2010, modified 7 December 2011) <http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/cautelares.asp>. 
288 See, eg, Center for International Environmental Law and Mining Watch Canada, 'Human Rights Commission's 
Climbdown a Wake-up Cal l for Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, Not Indicator of Goldcorp's 
Performance ', above n 284; Minority Rights Group International , State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples 2012: Events o/2011 (2012) 109. 
289 Goldcorp Inc, 'New Vo luntary Royalty Agreement to Benefi t Stakeholders ofGoldcorp's Marlin Mine' (Press 
Release, 27 January 2012) <http: //www.go ldcorp.com/Investor-Resources/News/News-Details/2012/New-Voluntary-
Royal ty-Agreement-to-Benefit-Stakeholders-of-Go ldcorps-Marl in-Mine 11 28070/default.aspx>. 
290 However, as identified above, in Apri l 20 12 Anaya stated of mining projects generally in Guatemala, ' [i]n the case 
of Guatemala, my recommendation has been that if you cannot suspend existing projects, take clear measures to 
protect the rights, life and health of indigenous peoples. And no progress at all on new projects.' Anaya quoted in Efe 
Agency, above n 126. 
291 Tribunal Popular Internacional de Salud, Veredicto de Culpabilidad de Goldcorp se Entrega a las Autoridades de 
Guatemala y Canada <http ://tribunaldesalud.org/>. 
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recommendation. The mine continues to operate without the consent of the affected Indigenous 
peoples. 
5 Ritualism as Soft Committing and Hard Resisting 
Indigenous rights ritualism is the Guatemalan Government's prevalent response to the 
special procedures' attentions. Here, even the soft cultural right to an intercultural bilingual 
education struggles to gain recognition. But aspects of this right are recognised, which is worthy 
of praise in a state with a history as harrowing as Guatemala's. As in New Zealand, Guatemala 
uses its limited moves towards implementation of the special procedures experts' 
recommendations regarding the right to an intercultural bilingual education as a cover for its 
failure to more substantively implement both those soft rights recommendations and 
recommendations regarding hard rights. It further deflects attention from its inward resistance to 
hard rights to land and participation in decision-making with outward acceptance of the 
recommendations concerning those rights; at least for periods. The Government's tendency to 
resist recognition of hard Indigenous peoples' rights to land and participation in decision-
making is harder to ignore than in New Zealand. The failing has been recognised to some 
degree by observers of Guatemala's Indigenous rights situation. For example, Charles Hale 
argues of Guatemala's steps to recognise Indigenous peoples' rights that 'neoliberalism's 
cultural project entails pro-active recognition of a minimal package of cultural rights, and an 
equally vigorous rejection of the rest', such as rights to self-determination and land.292 Even if 
Guatemala's Indigenous rights failings are more easily detected than New Zealand's, the 
Guatemalan Government's ritualistic behaviour still carries political perks. 
The advantages of the Guatemalan Government's Indigenous rights ritualism are 
multiple. It does not allow it to avoid international scrutiny, if the number of special procedures 
experts and other international bodies' missions to the country are any indication. Nor does it 
prevent domestic lobbying for rights recognition. But welcoming the multiple visits of special 
procedures experts and others allows Guatemala to assert its status as an open liberal 
democracy.293 Partially implementing some of the recommendations allows it to maintain the 
fa;ade, helping it to hold onto its seat on UN rights bodies such as the HRC, for example. 
Ritualising its Indigenous rights implementation enables the state to avoid outright 
confrontation with the special procedures and other actors regulating those norms, generally 
blunting their criticism. Not since the former expert on extrajudicial executions' biting 2006 
critique that '[t]he question today is less what should be done than whether Guatemala has the 
292 Charles Hale, 'Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics ofldentity in 
Guatemala' (2002) 34 Journal of Latin American Studies 485, 485 . 293 See, eg, Jorge Skinner-Klee, Guatemalan Government representative, ' Intervention: Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, Fifth Session, Human Rights ' (New York, 22 May 2006) 
<http ://www.docip.org/gsdl/collect/cendocdo/index/assoc/HASHeb7 e/62 7 cc9c7 .dir/pfi i5 _ 156.pdf>. 
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will to do so' has Guatemala been vigorously critically dressed down by a special procedures 
mandate-holder.294 Even the HCHR, whose mandate emphasises cooperation with states,295 has 
delivered more critical assessments of the Government ' s commitment to Indigenous peoples' 
rights than the special procedures.296 Ritualism also provides a defence to accusations oflack of 
headway- the Government always has an 'achievement ' up its sleeve to present in its favour. 
These largely ceremonial achievements stunt the potential for substantive rights recognition 
under the guise of rights improvements. With the pretence of rights progress the Government 
continues to access international donor funding and maintain a degree of political power.297 
Moreover, Guatemala ' s Indigenous rights ritualism acts as a domestic pressure valve for 
Indigenous rights concerns: were the depths of its non-conformity to Indigenous peoples' rights 
revealed the Indigenous-majority population could be prompted to mobilise on mass, as has 
occurred in neighbouring countries. 
F Conclusion: Possibilities beyond the Ritual 
The lesson from Guatemala is that being an international advocate of Indigenous 
peoples' rights and the international mechanisms that promote them - including the mandate of 
the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples - does not necessarily translate into domestic 
implementation of special procedures experts' recommendations regarding Indigenous peoples. 
The Government has displayed a degree of commitment to aspects of the special procedures 
experts ' recommendations. This is evident in the Government's act of preparing a draft 
regulation regarding consultation and in some of the steps taken to promote intercultural 
bilingual education across the country, for example. The Government has resisted aspects of the 
experts ' recommendations too, a behaviour apparent in the state' s eventual public revelation 
that it would not suspend operations at the Marlin mine and in its lobbying of the Inter-
American Commission to have the precautionary measure regarding suspension of the Marlin 
mine withdrawn. However, ultimately I characterise these behavioural responses as ritualistic: 
the Government ' s tactic is to publically commit to norms concerning hard rights, only to resist 
those norms in more subtle ways. It further deflects attention from its resistant behaviour 
through a degree of 'paper ' conformity to soft cultural rights. 
294 Expert on Extrajudicial Executions Guatemala 2007, UN Doc A!HRC/4/20/Add.2, [63]. 
295 High Commissioner for the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, GA Res 48/ 141 , UN Doc 
A/RES/48/ 141 (20 December 1993) para 4(g). 
296 See, eg, OHCHR, ' A Cri tical Period in Guatemala's history - avi Pi I lay Press Conference by UN High 
Commissioner fo r Human Rights avi Pi I lay in Guatemala City, Guatemala' (P ress Statement, 15 March 20 12) 
<http://·www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=l l967&LangID=E>; HCHR Report on 
Guatemala 2011, UN Doc AIHRC/16/20/Add.l, [1 0]. 
297 Charlesworth makes asimi lar po int regarding the tangib le rewards Cambodia receives as a product of its rights 
ritualism . Hi lary Charlesworth, 'Ki rby Lecture in International Law - Swimming to Cambodi a: Justice and Ri tual in 
Human Rights After Conflict' (2010) 29 The Australian Year Book of International Law 1, 14. 
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Although, as in New Zealand, ritualism is Guatemala's paramount behavioural response 
to the special procedures' recommendations regarding Indigenous peoples, the special 
procedures have exerted greater influence in this state. Anaya had a direct and observable 
influence on the Guatemalan Government's draft instrument regulating consultation with Maya, 
Xinka and Garfiuna and on the Government's announcement that it would suspend operations at 
the Marlin mine. Stavenhagen at most played a contributory role in expediting the adoption of 
legislative and policy measures regarding intercultural bilingual education for Indigenous 
peoples in the state. However, as in New Zealand, the special procedures' influence on the 
Guatemalan Government's actual conformity to international Indigenous rights norms has been 
slight. None of the examples of Anaya's direct influence translated into Guatemala' s actual 
conformity to the Special Rapporteur's recommendations. Yet, these examples offer some 
insights into the mechanism's potential to influence state behaviour: they underscore the 
importance of the proactive capacity-building work of the special procedures and the catalytic 
force of country missions. The next chapter appraises the factors that explain the special 
procedures' regulatory impact in both Guatemala and New Zealand. It does so with a view to 
understanding whether the special procedures mechanism may be better harnessed to secure 
improved domestic implementation of international Indigenous peoples' rights norms . 
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VII UNRA YELLING THE WEBS: UNPACKING THE 
EXPERTS' INFLUENCE 
A Introduction 
The two case studies tell a story of an international mechanism that regulates state 
behaviour towards Indigenous peoples imperfectly but appreciably. There are instances where 
New Zealand and Guatemala have acted upon the special procedures' recommendations 
regarding Indigenous peoples. However, for the most part, this has not translated into the states' 
conformity to the international Indigenous rights norms the subject of the special procedures ' 
recommendations. Ritualism was the defining behavioural response of both states to the special 
procedures' work. In this chapter I explore the factors that explain the special procedures' 
influence in New Zealand and Guatemala. I undertake a 'webs of influence' analysis to umavel 
the regulatory webs operating in both states. My analysis is based upon my theoretical 
understanding of the mechanics ofregulation, outlined in Chapter II. That understanding draws 
significantly on the theorising of Braithwaite and Drahos and posits that regulation occurs 
through contests of principles between different actors leveraging many mechanisms. In this 
chapter I analyse the key actors, principles and mechanisms that have a bearing on the special 
procedures' impact on state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples in New Zealand and 
Guatemala. I argue that an intricate mosaic of factors affects the experts' influence. Pivotal 
actors are not emolled, the fundamental principles pushed by both governments are not 
countered, and material mechanisms are not worked to their complete capacity. As I undertake 
this analysis I put forward proposals for enhancing the regulatory clout of the experts that are of 
application beyond New Zealand and Guatemala. I argue for improved strategies of actor 
engagement by the special procedures; a more explicit and careful contestation of the principles 
undergirding state reactions to the special procedures' reports and the rights underpinning the 
recommendations they make; and identify ways that several regulatory mechanisms, including 
modelling and capacity-building, can be better exploited. The key actors, principles and 
mechanisms, and associated proposals for improving the special procedures ' impact, are 
analysed in tum. 
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B Actors 
I States ' Lack Political Will 
Multiple key actors have a bearing on the special procedures ' influence on states ' 
behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. States themselves are pivotal. The literature identifies 
states' lack of political will to cooperate with the special procedures and to implement their 
recommendations as a central constraint on their efficacy.1 Lack of institutional or resource 
capacity are additional complicating considerations that frequently crop up. 2 The case studies in 
Chapters V and VI bear out the effect of these constraints. The case studies reveal the slight 
influence the mechanism has had across two markedly different states. As Chapter VI showed, 
Guatemala is a fragile, post-conflict, developing, incompletely transitioned democracy, with a 
low GDP for the region, and organs of state starved of funds and captive to powerful economic 
elite. The state's frailty, particularly the entrenched corruption and impunity, inhibits 
implementation of those special procedures experts (and other actors') recommendations 
regarding Indigenous peoples and their rights that are perceived to run counter to the economic 
elite's interests. But advances in Indigenous rights recognition are not thwarted solely by 
institutional and other barriers beyond the control ofreigning administrations : there is little 
political will to pursue an Indigenous rights or human rights agenda, as the state behaviour 
explored in Chapter VI demonstrated. Thus, in Guatemala it is necessary to manufacture the 
political will to substantively commit to Indigenous peoples' rights. It is also necessary to 
strengthen the institutions of state, by dismantling the elite's underlying power structures, so 
that the state has improved capacity to implement the reforms required. 3 
In New Zealand the dynamic is different. The lack of state action on special procedures 
experts' recommendations cannot be attributed to instability, a lack of available funds or non-
1 See, eg, Ted Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of 
Human Rights Norms' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 206, 206, 210 ; Theodore J Piccone, 
Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights (Brookings Institution Press, 
2012) 91 ; Surya P Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs' (2011) 
33 Human Rights Quarterly 201, 224; Ingrid Nifosi, The UN Special Procedures in the Field of Human Rights (Intersentia, 2005) 148; Tania Baldwin-Pask and Patrizia Scannella, 'The Unfinished Business ofa Special 
Procedures System' in M CherifBassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges for the UN Human Rights 
Machine1y (Intersentia, 2011) 419, 440-45; Jennifer Preston et al, The UN Special Rapporteur: Indigenous Peoples 
Rights: Experiences and Challenges (IWGIA, 2007) 39, 44, 51-54; Jeroen Gutter, Thematic Procedures of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights and International Law: In Search of a Sense of Community (Intersentia, 2006) 
350. 
2 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1, 206,210; Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism ofUN Special 
Rapporteurs', above n 1, 217-18 ; Michael O'Flaherty, 'Future Protection of Human Rights in Post-Conflict Societies: 
The Role of the United Nations' (2003) 3(1) Human Rights Law Review 53 , 69; Miko Lempinen, Challenges Facing 
the System of Special Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Institute for Human Rights, 
Abo Akademi University, 2001) 165-78; Gutter, above n 1, 350; Jennifer Preston et al, above n 1, 44, 53 . 3 Risse and Ropp make the argument of human rights campaigns generally that they ' should be about transforming 
the state, not weakening or even abolishing it.' Thomas Risse and Stephen C Ropp, 'Conclusions' in Thomas Risse, 
Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 234, 277. 
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functioning state institutions. As Chapter V showed, New Zealand is a stable, developed, 
democracy with a high GDP per capita and it is celebrated for having a generally strong human 
rights record. Instead, the inaction can be attributed in a large part to a lack of political will for 
Indigenous rights recognition on the part of successive administrations, as evidenced in the 
chapter on the country; even if the outward response to the special procedures ' 
recommendations improved over time. The impression is that the special procedures' 
recommendations are read in advance of their release in order to help manage New Zealand' s 
domestic and international reputation as a rights respecting state. They are then ignored again 
until such time as international attention is redirected at them, such as during the interactive 
dialogue with the expert, presence before a UN treaty body, or during the UPR. At this point, 
the Government returns to them again to see whether any domestic actions have, coincidentally, 
furthered the recommendations in the reports and so can be profiled publically as steps to 
implement the recommendations. 
The findings are counter-intuitive in a key respect. As many of the recommendations 
require the expenditure of financial and political resources the expectation was that Guatemala, 
as the developing country, would fare worse than New Zealand in implementation. But this did 
not prove to be the case. The mechanism has had more influence in Guatemala than New 
Zealand even though this has not translated into greater substantive rights conformity in that 
state. This lends support to Beth Simmons ' argument that international human rights law has a 
greater potential impact in states where political institutions have been unstable and are in a 
state of transition.4 Perhaps New Zealand was an unusual comparator, given its especially 
stubborn resistance to international oversight of its Indigenous rights situation. But it is not 
alone in this stance.5 New Zealand's initial extreme resistance to negative international 
comment on its Indigenous rights situation, and its later indifference to Anaya's report, indicates 
that in New Zealand domestic actors wield the most clout in the promotion oflndigenous rights 
recognition. In contrast, in Guatemala the Government listens more to international actors 
advocating Indigenous rights recognition: they can make life difficult by lobbying for the 
withdrawal of foreign aid and business investment or for other forms of international ostracism. 
Regardless, Williams identifies that most states, whether from the global North or global South, 
endeavour to avoid the political isolation that can result from international attention to domestic 
4 Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge Universi ty 
Press, 2009) 15-7. See also P iccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to Nati onal Leve l 
Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n I , 2 16. Regard ing Indigenous peoples, Irene Bell ier and Martin 
Preaud identify the paradox that 'where states are dependent on international cooperati on and monitorin g, indi genous 
peoples' can be ' in a somewhat better position to see their rights protected and respected than those li vi ng in the first 
wo rld ', where states contro l deve lopment programmes, lands and resources . Irene Belli er and Martin Preaud , 
'Emerging Issues in Indigenous Rights: Transformative Effects of the Recogni ti on oflndi genous Peoples' (20 I 1) 
16(3) T71e International Journal of Human Rights 4 74, 482 . 
5 See, eg, Phil ippine Governmen t representative, Deni s Yap Lepatan, cited in Press Release CHR 2003, UN Doc 
HR/CN/1028. 
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rights abuses.6 And, ifthere is one positive thing that New Zealand and Guatemala's rights 
ritualism reveals it is that both states are concerned to have a positive international Indigenous 
rights reputation; otherwise they would outwardly resist or disengage from the special 
procedures' work on Indigenous peoples. 
Other states have played a minimal role in promoting implementation of the special 
procedures' recommendations in both countries. Neither New Zealand nor Guatemala is a big 
player on the international stage potentially making them more susceptible to the influence of 
other, more powerful, states. Concerned states could appeal to New Zealand and Guatemala to 
implement the recommendations, backing the appeals with threats to reduce trade or aid or other 
alliances, such as military cooperation. 7 However, relying on such threats to advance Indigenous 
peoples' rights carries its own concerns, including that it is often those whose rights are being 
violated that bear the brunt of the penalty not the state. 8 This is the case where programmes that 
Indigenous peoples are reliant on have aid funding withdrawn, for example. The efficacy of 
trade sanctions and other forms of economic coercion in improving human rights recognition 
has also been called into question.9 Nevertheless scholars, including Simmons, have 
acknowledged that aid could be used by donor countries to incentivise human rights 
conformity. 10 In Guatemala donor states such as Norway, Germany and the Netherlands could 
be pivotal because of the financial resources for Indigenous programmes and projects they 
already provide. 11 But to date they have not prefaced their financial support on the 
implementation of special procedures experts' recommendations. Maj or powers, such as the 
United States and United Kingdom, that have shown an interest in Guatemala or New Zealand's 
Indigenous rights situation could be targeted to place diplomatic pressure on the governments to 
6 Robert A Williams, 'Encounters on the Frontiers oflnternational Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of 
Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World' (1990) Duke Law Journal 660, 669. 
7 Regarding the use of such tactics to secure the realisation of human rights, see, eg, Patrick J Flood, The 
Effectiveness of UN Human Rights Institutions (Praeger Publishers, 1998) 129; Simmons, above n 4, 3 7 4-75; Emilie 
M Hafner-Burton, 'Trading Human Rights : How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression' (2005) 59(3) International Organization 593, 623-24. 
8 For support for this proposition regarding human rights generally see, eg, Simmons, above n 4, 374; Elvira 
Dominguez Redondo, 'The Universal Periodic Review - Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming in Human 
Rights Implementation?' (2012) 4 New Zealand Law Review 673,693. 
9 See, eg, Simmons, above n 4, 374-75; Dursun Peksen, 'Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on 
Human Rights' (2009) 46(1) Journal of Peace Research 59; Cristiane Careniero and Dominique Elden, 'Economic 
Sanctions, Leadership Survival and Human Rights' (2009) 30(3) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Law 969; Elvira Dominguez Redondo, above n 8, 693-94; Risse and Ropp, above n 3, 277-78 . More generally, 
regarding the negative consequences of foreign aid on building the rule of law in developing states, see Katherine 
Erbeznik, 'Money Can't Buy You Law: The Effects of Foreign Aid on the Rule of Law in Developing Countries' (2011) 18(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 873. 
10 Simmons, above n 4, 375. However, Simmons also notes that '[m]ost of the evidence suggests that unless the aid is 
targeted to specific purposes associated with improving rights practices, it has little positive impact.' Piccone 
identifies a potential role for bilateral donors in incentivising the implementation of the special procedures ' 
recommendations specifically and gives some examples of where this has already occurred. Piccone, Catalysts for 
Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 86, 98. 11 For examples of the support these states provide see, eg, HCHR Report on Guatemala 2013, UN Doc 
AIHRC/22/17 /Add.I, [94]; HCHR Report on Guatemala 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/13/26/ Add. I, [75], [77] ; Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, Presentan Libra 'Indicadores para las Pueblos Indigenas' (7 October 20 I 0) 
<http: //www.minex.gob.gt/Noticias/Noticia.aspx?ID=53 l&Busqueda=indigena>. 
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comply with the special procedures experts' recommendations. 12 In respect of Guatemala, the 
five states designated as 'friends' of its peace process could be lobbied to support the state to 
implement its international Indigenous rights obligations; 13 as could its regional neighbours who 
have a direct interest in the state's stability. States with high-level government members who 
are Indigenous, such as Bolivia, or perceived 'global good Samaritans ', 14 such as Sweden, could 
also be encouraged to take a lead in shaming recalcitrant states internationally. Diplomatic 
pressure could be of particular impact where Guatemala or New Zealand seeks membership to 
the HRC or as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; New Zealand is seeking a 
non-permanent seat on the Security-Council for 2015-2016. 15 The home states of transnational 
corporations, such as Canada in the case of Goldcorp, could also be targeted to encourage 
corporate compliance with the special procedures experts' recommendations. 16 But, given the 
associated diplomatic costs, scholars have identified that a general reluctance persists to 
bilaterally advocate the realisation of human rights norms .17 
2 UN Institutional Constraints 
(a) Creating Enforcement Capability 
The heavy institutional constraints, highlighted in Chapter IV, that weigh upon the 
special procedures are relevant factors in understanding their influence. As that chapter 
identified, like other UN human rights mechanisms, the special procedures do not possess the 
power to institutionally enforce their recommendations. There is a lack of institutional follow-
up of actions taken to implement special procedures experts' recommendations by the HRC or 
OHCHR. And the economic and personnel resourcing constraints that mute the impact of the 
special procedures - and the UN human rights system more generally - have been well 
12 For examples of the interest such states have shown in the Indigenous rights situation in New Zealand and 
Guatemala, see, eg, Guatemala UPR 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/22/8, [100.27]; OHCHR, Universal Periodic Review 
Second Cycle - Guatemala: Questions Submitted in Advance, Addendum I (2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/GTSessionl4.aspx> 2; HRC UPR New Zealand, UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/8 [49], [81](32). 
13 The five states are Norway, the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. 
14 The term comes from Ali son Brysk, Global Good Samaritans: Human Rights as Foreign Policy (Oxford 
Un iversity Press, 2009). 
15 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand UN Security Council Candidate 2015-16, New 
Zealand Embassy <http ://www.nzembassy.com/united-nations/news/new-zealand-un-security-council-candidate-
2015-16>. Guatemala assumed a non-permanent seat on the Security-Council for 2012-2013 . 
16 For example, during the EMRIP in 2012 the Canadian Government representative responded to criticisms raised 
regarding Goldcorp's operations at the Marlin mine. Fleur Adcock 'Meeting Notes: Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
oflndigenous Peoples: Fifth Session ' (Ju ly 2012). Notably, in 2012 the CERD Committee recommended that Canada 
' take appropriate legis lative measures to prevent transnational co rporations registered in Canada from carrying out 
activities that negatively impact on the enjoyment of rights of indigenous peoples in territories outside Canada, and 
hold them accountable.' CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: Canada, UN Doc CERD/C/CAN/CO/ 19-20 (9 March 20 12) [14]. 
17 See, eg, Simmons, above n 4, 113-14. For comment on the diplomatic costs associated with threatening economic 
sanctions see, eg, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge Uni vers ity Press, 
2000) 537. 
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documented. Giving international human rights mechanisms enforcement powers is an approach 
advocated by some special procedures experts and Indigenous peoples. 18 But addressing the 
latter two concerns - follow-up and resourcing - dominates existing suggestions in the literature 
for improving the impact of the mechanism. 19 There is merit in each. Making special procedures 
experts' recommendations binding determinations and granting the UN the ability to enforce 
their implementation may improve their implementation rate but raises further issues, including 
the identity of the enforcement body, the nature of the penalty and the mode of enforcement. 
Such a move is unrealistic at present; states are likely to resist mandate-holders making 
enforceable findings. 20 As Chapter II revealed, such a move may also negatively impact the 
implementation of mandate-holders' findings as states find ways to resist coercion. It may 
render states even less likely to grant access to, and cooperate with, mandate-holders in their 
work. Further, it may be opposed by some Indigenous peoples out of concern that the experts do 
not always get their recommendations right, an idea explored further below. 
(b) Institutionalising Follow-up 
There is a stronger case for institutional follow-up of the implementation of special 
procedures experts' recommendations, which can be understood as a form of enforcement. UN 
follow-up of implementation of the special procedures' recommendations was Stavenhagen's 
18 Interview 13 (Telephone Interview, 27 May 2011); Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011); Interview 14 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011); Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011); Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights 
through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 1, 227. See generally Manfred Nowak, 'It's Time for a 
World Court of Human Rights' in M CherifBassiouni and William A Schabas (eds), New Challenges/or the UN 
Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN Treaty Body System and the Human Rights Council Procedures? (Intersentia, 2011) 17. 
19 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1,226; Ted Piccone, Catalysts/or Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent 
Experts on Human Rights (The Brookings Institution, 2010) 40-1; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's 
Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 47-52, 99, 123-26; Lempinen, above n 2, 27-9, 165-180; 
Bertrand G Ramcharan, The Protection Roles of UN Human Rights Special Procedures (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2009) 176; Surya P Subedi, 'The UN Human Rights Mandate in Cambodia: The Challenge of a Country in Transition 
and the Experience of the Special Rapporteur for the Country' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human 
Rights 249, 261-62; Surya P Subedi et al, 'The Role of the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council in the Development and Promotion of International Human Rights Norms' (2011) 15(2) The International 
Journal of Human Rights 155, 160; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 'Being a Special Rapporteur: A Delicate Balancing Act' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 162, 169-70; Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 1, 446-
52, 4 70-78; Allison L Jernow, 'Ad Hoc and Extra-Conventional Means for Human Rights Monitoring' ( 1995-1996) 
28 Journal of International Law and Politics 785, 822; Jennifer Preston et al, above n 1, 45-6; 51, 53-6; Victoria 
Tauli-Corpuz and Erlyn Ruth Alcantara, Engaging the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous People: Opportunities 
and Challenges (Tebtebba Foundation, 2004) 34-5; O'Flaherty, above n 2, 75-6; Sir Nigel S Rodley, 'United Nations 
Action Procedures Against "Disappearances," Summary or Arbitrary Executions, and Torture' (1986) 8 Human 
Rights Quarterly 700, 730; Philip Alston, 'Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the 
New Human Rights Council' (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 185,219; Christophe Golay, Claire 
Mahon and Ioana Cismas, 'The Impact of the UN Special Procedures on the Development and Implementation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (2011) 15(2) International Journal of Human Rights 299, 309; Jared M Genser 
and Margaret K Winterkorn-Meikle, 'The Intersection of Politics and International Law: The United Nations Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention in Theory and in Practice' (2008) 39 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 687, 740-
44, 749-50; Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [88]-[89], [91]-[93], [95], [97], [101] ; CHR, 
Enhancing and Strengthening the Effectiveness of the Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights: 
Report of the Open-Ended Seminar on this Subject Convened Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Decision 
2005/113, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/116 (12 December 2005) [44]-[55] . 
20 See, eg, Nifosi, above n 1, 146. 
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central suggestion for addressing their efficacy. He described the absence of UN follow-up as 
'one of the weakest aspects ' of the mechanism. 21 In support, the literature on responsive 
regulation dictates that as well as agreeing regulatory outcomes agreement is also required on 
how to monitor their achievement. 22 UN actors have taken some ad hoc steps to monitor 
implementation in both states. In both case study states the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples has conducted follow-up missions. In Guatemala multiple other special procedures 
mandate-holders have also carried out follow-up missions looking at rights concerns that 
include violations of Indigenous peoples' rights. The OHCHR has taken several steps to follow-
up implementation of special procedures experts' recommendations regarding Indigenous 
peoples in Guatemala. For example, there was the OHCHR project that had as one of its key 
objectives providing support to Guatemala in implementing Stavenhagen's recommendations on 
the country.23 The OHCHR-Guatemala played a lead role in coordinating a workshop to 
strategise implementation of Anaya' s 2010 report, 24 as well as disseminating special procedures 
experts' reports that examined Indigenous peoples' rights. 25 Domestic institutions have also 
played a role in the two states. As identified in the previous chapter, in Guatemala COPREDEH 
manages a database of special procedures experts' recommendations. But implementation of the 
recommendations in the database is not systematically monitored so the database acts more as a 
repository for the largely forgotten recommendations.26 The NZHRC has expressed an intention 
to coordinate monitoring of implementation of Anaya's recommendations on New Zealand from 
2012, although this is yet to happen.27 Despite these efforts, implementation rates in both states 
have been low. This suggests a greater role for the special procedures' parent body, the HRC, is 
necessary. 
The HRC's potential roles are varied. It could include requiring states to identify 
whether they accept or reject each of the special procedures' country recommendations when 
the report is presented; periodic requests for states, IPOs and civil society to provide updates on 
21 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). 
22 See, eg, John Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation' (2011) 44 University of British 
Columbia Law Review 475,476,496. 
23 See, eg, Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/ Add.4, [2 l]-[22] , [24]-[26] . Note that the special 
procedures' Manual of Operations identifies a role for UN country teams in follow-up. Special Procedures, Manual of 
Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 2008) [104]-[105] , [126] ('Manual of Operations'). 
24 Interview 12 (Telephone Interv iew, 23 June 2011). 
25 See, eg, Oficina de! Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos: Guatemala, 'Relator Especial para los 
Derechos Humanos de los Pueblos Indigenas, Reali za Visita de Seguimiento a Guatemala' (Press Release, 12 May 
2006) 
<http://www.oacnudh.org.gt/documentos/comunicados/2006529153 93 50. Visita%20Stavenhagen, %2 0mayo%202006 
.pdf>; Oficina de] Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos: Guatemala, 'Relator Especial de la ONU Presenta 
Informe Sobre Proyectos de Mineria que Afectan a Pueblos Indigenas en Guatemala' (Press Release, 4 March 20 11 ) 
<http:/ /www.oacnudh .org.gt/documentos/comunicados/Comunicado _ Informe _ Relator _Puebloslndigenas( 4mar 11 ). pd 
f>; Jennifer Preston et al, above n 1, 37. 
26 HCHR Report on Guatemala 201 I, UN Doc A/HRC/ 16/20/Add. l , [l 02] ; Interview 12 (Telephone interview, 23 
June 201 1). 
27 Interv iew 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011); interview 1 (Wellington, 5 May 2011 ); NZHRC commissioner, Ross lyn 
Noonan, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and 
Interactive Dialogue (20 September 20 11 ) James Anaya <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/videos/webcast- l 8th-sess ion-of-
the-human-rights-counci l-statement-of-spec ial-rappo rteur-and-interactive-dialogue>. 
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implementation; independent research on implementation by an arm of the OHCHR, the results 
of which are revealed during HRC sessions; a greater role for special procedures experts in the 
UPR process;28 separate dialogues on each country report;29 and dedicated questioning on 
implementation of recommendations during the interactive and UPR dialogues by the Chair of 
the session. The HRC should take a stance on non-implementation. State cooperation with the 
special procedures and implementation of their recommendations needs to actually be taken into 
account when electing members to the HRC. 3° Consistent failure to implement 
recommendations should be recorded in a resolution of the HRC. James Lebovic and Erik 
Voeten have argued on the basis of statistical data that '[t]he adoption of a UNCHR resolution 
condemning a country's human rights record produced a sizeable reduction in multilateral, and 
especially World Bank, aid' .31 A condemnatory resolution could thus incentivise 
implementation, especially in Guatemala. However, as a state-based body past practice suggests 
that the HRC is likely to be unwilling to comment on states' rights violations except in the most 
extreme or politically charged cases.32 Such institutional follow-up would encourage 
implementation by demonstrating concern at the highest levels of the UN human rights system 
for compliance with special procedures experts' recommendations. The absence of an 
institutional follow-up procedure currently signals the reverse. It should also be made easier for 
Indigenous peoples to participate in the interactive dialogues during which the special 
procedures present their reports to the HRC, presently they must do so under the umbrella of an 
NGO with consultative status with ECOSOC.33 
28 Alston, above n 19, 222; Subedi, 'The UN Human Rights Mandate in Cambodia: The Challenge of a Country in 
Transition and the Experience of the Special Rapporteur for the Country', above n 19, 262; Piccone, Catalysts for 
Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 132-33; HRC, Report of the 
Twentieth Annual Meeting of Special Rapporteurs/Representatives, Independent Experts and Chairpersons of 
Working Groups of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (Vienna, 24-28 June 2013), UN Doc 
A/HRC/24/55 (22 July 2013) [27] ('Report of the Special Procedures ' 20th Meeting') . 29 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 19, 40. 
30 See, eg, ibid 39; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above 
n 1, 127. Subedi goes further suggesting that ' [e]very state wishing to be elected to the Human Rights Council should 
be expected to accept the possible appointment of a country mandate holder for that country if need be.' Subedi, 
'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n 1, 228 . 31 James H Lebovic and Erik Voeten, 'The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid on the 
Punishing of Human Rights Violators' (2009) 46(1) Journal of Peace Research 79, 79. They also found that it ' had 
no effect on the country's aggregate bilateral aid receipts.' 
32 See, eg, Lempinen, above n 1, 105-09; Nifosi, above n 1, 134-35; Menno T Kamminga, 'The Thematic Procedures 
of the UN Commission on Human Rights' (1987) 34 Netherlands International Law Review 299, 317; Pinheiro, 
above n 19, 169-70; Matthew Davies, 'Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United 
Nations' (2010) 35 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 449, 453 ; Katarina Tomasevski , 'Has the Right to Education 
a Future Within the United Nations? A Behind-the-Scenes Account by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Education 1998-2004' (2005) 5(2) Human Rights Law Review 205,213. 33 Improved Indigenous peoples' participation during the interactive dialogue has been facilitated by the expansion of 
the mandate of the Voluntary Fund on Indigenous Populations to support Indigenous peoples' participation in 
sessions of the HRC. HRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc A/HRC/21/23 (25 June 2012) [35]. 
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(c) Increasing Funding 
Increasing the financial support available to the special procedures may improve the 
impact of the mechanism. Anaya has invited the HRC to increase the support provided to the 
Special Rapporteur for Indigenous peoples.34 It could come from other UN agencies, such as 
those that work on Indigenous rights concerns, or outside of the UN.35 Increased funding could 
allow for further follow-up missions by mandate-holders to states, which would assist in 
keeping the rights concerns raised in the reports on the government and public agenda. Few 
mandate-holders have the time or resources to conduct follow-up missions to gauge the extent 
of implementation of their recommendations and none have the capability to carry out sustained 
follow-up. 36 It would allow for more country visits generally. It could improve the quality of the 
reports by allowing for a greater number of research assistants and thus more in-depth research 
on the state. It would allow special procedures mandate-holders to spend a longer period of time 
in the country with the increased domestic media attention that entails. It could allow for 
mandate-holders to action more communications it receives, to conduct more research regarding 
those complaints, and to set up a system for responding to complainants to advise them of any 
action taken regarding the complaint. The structure of the system could be rethought too: 
mandate-holders could become full -time paid employees of the UN. 37 In the context of a global 
economic recession the likelihood of securing increased funding for the mechanism or enabling 
the payment of salaries to mandate-holders is remote. Yet, the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples is one of the mandates that has been particularly successful in securing 
additional private funding for its work, allowing it to conduct follow-up missions in both states 
and to undertake an increased number of state visits generally, suggesting that increased funding 
alone is not the answer. 
These factors - a lack of coercive enforceability, institutional follow-up and funding -
are difficult for non-state actors to address . However, even accounting for these limitations, the 
low influence of the special procedures in New Zealand and Guatemala is in part attributable to 
factors over which the special procedures mandate-holders, Indigenous peoples and Indigenous 
rights advocates have control. 
34 Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc AIHRC/18/35, [89]. 
35 See, eg, Piccone, Catalysts/or Rights: The Un ique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human 
Rights, above n 19, 41 , 43. Piccone argues that the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, who is based in 
New York, should take a lead ro le in securing increased funding for the experts from within the UN system. Piccone, 
Catalysts/or Change: How the UN 's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 133. 
36 See, eg, Piccone, 'The Contri bution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level Implementation of Human 
Rights Norms', above n 1, 217-1 8. 
37 Interview 9 (Telephone In terview, 6 September 2010); Oliver Hoehne, 'Special Procedures and the New Human 
Rights Council - A Need fo r Strategic Pos itioning' (2007) 4(1) Essex Human Rights Review 48, 62 ; Piccone, 
Catalysts/or Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 51. 
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3 Experts ' Incoherent Strategy 
For a start, the influence of the mechanism is hindered by the special procedures ' lack 
of a coherent vision of Indigenous rights conformity and of strategies to implement that vision. 
Determining both is made complex where the special procedures are concerned because the 
mandate-holders function both as independent experts, acting in their personal capacity with 
their own expertise and interests, and as part of the special procedures system. Each expert 
commenting on the human rights situation of Indigenous peoples presumably has a vision of a 
world in which the rights of Indigenous peoples are better respected. But what precisely this 
means is open to interpretation as is the best route for getting there. Hinting at this incoherence, 
were Anaya to offer advice to the next Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, it would be 
' to really think hard about the modalities of the policy and engagement. ' 38 He has also identified 
the 'need to devote greater efforts to ... develop strategies to use the recommendations ... to effect 
change.' 39 
The absence of strategy is evident in both states. It is evident in the high frequency of 
visits made to Guatemala, which are in addition to the multiple country visits undertaken by 
other international mechanisms such as the ILO and Inter-American Commission. It is 
questionable how much impact a mandate-holder will have when it is the third to have 
undertaken a mission to a state in one year.40 The visits themselves can then become ritualised, a 
form of the 'regulatory ritualism' described in Chapter II. It is also discernible in the large 
volume of recommendations that the special procedures produce. It is stark in Guatemala where 
there are approximately 200 recommendations regarding Indigenous peoples. New Zealand has 
received only two visits from special procedures experts and so has not accumulated the same 
size collection of recommendations but the number is still approaching 40. The 
recommendations are often variations on the same theme but working through them and 
understanding their nuances takes time. Nor do these figures include the copious country-
specific recommendations directed at advancing Indigenous rights issued by other international, 
regional and domestic mechanisms. The magnitude of special procedures experts ' 
recommendations regarding Guatemala was a concern of a member of the OHCHR-Guatemala 
' definitely too many recommendations doesn 't help. After a while it's just more 
recommendations: one more, one more. ' 41 Where there is a large pool of recommendations with 
no identifier of priority it is self-defeating. The state may not know where to start with 
38 Interview with James Anaya (Telephone Interview, 24 January 2011 , updated by emai l 5 July 20 13). Beyond the 
Indigenous rights context, Hoehne has argued that the special procedures system should develop ' a mission statement 
and an overall strategy on their desired identity and the steps to achieve it. ' Hoehne, above n 3 7, 64. Regarding the 
need for the experts to be strategic in their country miss ions see Piccone, Catalysts f or Change: How the UN's 
Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 82, 84-6. 
'9 
" Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/31 7, [25] . 
40 See, eg, Baldwin-Pask and Scannella, above n 1, 448; Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 20 11). 41 Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011) . 
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implementation. Nor may other actors know where to begin with monitoring implementation of 
them. It is especially problematic for states, such as Guatemala, with limited resources. It 
enables the 'pick and choose' approach to implementation visible in both states.42 And it 
increases the chance of inconsistency between recommendations.43 
There are several options for tackling this issue. These include creating 'theme-specific 
ad hoc working groups' of mandate-holders (and even others) to address cross-cutting 
Indigenous rights concerns, streamlining visits and recommendations;44 improving coordination 
between the experts and other international and regional institutions concerned with Indigenous 
rights, such as the UN human rights treaty bodies, the ILO and the Inter-American 
Commission;45 special procedures experts moving to offer just five key recommendations, 
identifying them in order of priority for implementation,46 which would help prevent states from 
hiding behind implementation of the softest recommendations; mandate-holders recommending 
the implementation of existing recommendations from special procedures experts or other 
mechanisms, rather than adding more;47 and returning to the provision of centralised thematic 
support for the special procedures dealing with Indigenous rights issues through the OHCHR's 
Indigenous Peoples and Minorities Section, which would assist in rationalising the experts' 
attentions on Indigenous rights concerns.48 
A lack of a coherent plan of action is evident in ill-formulated recommendations that 
make it difficult for Indigenous rights advocates to promote and monitor their implementation. 
A member of the OHCHR-Guatemala remarked, 'you have some recommendations that are so 
general, so ambiguous [such as] "Indigenous peoples need to have their right to health 
respected"' that it is unclear what to do with them. 49 Framing recommendations in broad or 
vague terms exposes them to restrictive interpretation by states, as the New Zealand and 
Guatemalan case studies demonstrate. Similarly, some recommendations simply ask states 'to 
consider taking a course of action ', which is satisfied where consideration is purported to have 
been given to the action ( even where action is required but not taken). Some have called for 
42 See generally Alston, above n 19,221. 
43 For example, whereas Stavenhagen and the HRC's UPR recommended that New Zealand ratify !LO Convention 
169, Anaya did not. Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3 [103] ; HRC UPR New 
Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/ 12/8, [81 ](7). Note that Anaya has recommended that other states ratify !LO Convention 
169, see, eg, HRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya: T71e 
Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Namibia, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41/ Add . I (25 June 2013) [76]. 
44 On the creation of theme specific working groups of special procedures experts generall y see, eg, Hoehne, above n 
3 7, 63 ( emphasis in original) ; Baldwin-Pask and Scannel l a, above n I , 451-52 . 
45 Human rights treaty bodies have occasionally encouraged New Zealand and Guatemala to implement special 
procedures experts ' recommendations, including regarding Indigenous rights concerns. See, eg, CERD Committee on 
New Zealand 2013, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/CO/ 18-20, [7]; CRC Committee on Guatemala 2010, UN Doc 
CRC/C/GTM/CO/3-4, [78]. 
46 Alston , above n 19, 221. 
47 Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 20 11 ). See, eg, Expert on Extrajudicial Executions Guatemala 2007, 
UN Doc A/HRC/4/20/Add .2, [63]. 
48 Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 20 I 0) . 
49 Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011). 
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recommendations that are more practical and specific.50 At the same time, recommendations 
that are too specific may foreclose better alternative routes of achieving the same objective, 
which in-country actors may be better able to design. 51 Further, in their reports on New Zealand 
and Guatemala, mandate-holders have favoured recommendations that focus on the satisfaction 
of what quantitative researchers label 'structural indicators ' and 'process indicators ' rather than 
requiring changes in actual outcomes in Indigenous rights recognition. Structural indicators 
include whether an international instrument has been ratified, a domestic law enacted or a rights 
institution established. Process indicators include whether the state has taken some identifiable 
action to fulfil the relevant right, such as through running human rights training sessions. 52 The 
reliance on structural and process indicators means that New Zealand and Guatemala are in at 
least partial compliance with a number of special procedures experts' recommendations despite 
an absence of notable positive change in Indigenous rights outcomes in either state. 53 To help to 
address this, mandate-holders could recommend a broad outcome and then identify the 
minimum more specific structural and process actions they expect to see. 
Lack of goal-oriented planning is further evident in the special procedures' approach to 
follow-up of implementation of their recommendations. The Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples conducted follow-up missions in each state but did not provide a systematic assessment 
of implementation of each of the mandate's earlier recommendations, choosing instead to 
comment on some positive developments and continuing areas of concern. A methodical 
appraisal setting out what, if any, specific progress has been made and the basis for assessing 
that the recommendation has, or has not, been implemented would make progress clearer. 54 
Beyond the OHCHR-led implementation planning meetings that followed Anaya's 2010 visit in 
Guatemala, there has rarely been a plan of action as to how special procedures experts' reports 
will be used when they are released in either state. 55 Special procedures mandate-holders also 
need to actively challenge the state to show that they are compliant with the experts' 
recommendations. During the interactive dialogues at which the reports are presented, mandate-
holders are primarily reactive, responding to states ' questions about their work, rather than 
proactively questioning states about implementation of their recommendations. As these 
50 See, eg, Alston, above n 19, 221; Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National Level 
Implementation of Human Rights Norms', above n 1,216, 226; Piccone, Catalysts f or Change: How the UN's 
Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 76; Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011). 51 Interview l (Wellington, 5 May 2011 ); NZHRC, 'Commissions Role to Build Discussion and Dialogue' (Media 
Release, 13 April 2006) <http://www.hrc.co.nzJnews-and-issues/maori/commissions-role-to-build-discussion-and-
dialogue/>. 
52 See, eg, Economic and Social Council , Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN 
Doc E/2011 /90 (26 April 2011) [12] . 
53 They reflect what David Kennedy has described as the human rights movement's 'strong attachment ... to the legal 
formalization of rights and the establishment of legal machinery for their implementation' , which has made 'the 
achievement of these forms an end in itself . David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism (Princeton University Press, 2004) 12. 54 Across the two case study states, Alston's follo w-up assessment reflects the closest approximation to such a 
methodical approach, although it did not concern Indigenous peoples ' ri ghts . Expert on Extrajudicial Executions 
<;uatemala 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/11/2/Add.7, appendix. 
)) Interview 9 (Telephone Interview, 6 September 20 10); Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011). 
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dialogues are now webcast, it is a prime opportunity to expose resistant states . The interactive 
dialogue could also provide an opportunity for reflection and adjustment where mandate-holders 
revise and improve recommendations to capture changes and developments. 
4 Non-state Actors' Unenthusiastic Embrace 
(a) Greater Use in Guatemala 
In addition, there has been low take-up of the special procedures ' recommendations by 
the actors best placed to move them forward. The importance of securing the buy-in of actors 
well positioned to leverage the special procedures ' work, particularly local actors, is a thesis 
supported in the existing literature and by the mandate-holders themselves. 56 In the Indigenous 
rights domain these actors include Indigenous peoples and Indigenous rights advocates, human 
rights NGOs, NHRls, 57 epistemic communities of academics and lawyers, business actors and 
the media. Indigenous peoples and Indigenous rights advocates, including NHRis, in New 
Zealand and Guatemala have engaged with the special procedures mechanism: providing 
information to special procedures experts requesting them to take action, such as through the 
communications procedure or calling on them to undertake country missions;58 responding to 
the special procedures ' information gathering questionnaires; 59 meeting with special procedures 
experts during their country missions; 60 and praising their reports .6 1 The issue is leverage of the 
experts' findings and recommendations by a large base of actors . 
The special procedures' findings and recommendations have had more extensive use in 
Guatemala than New Zealand. In Guatemala domestic IPOs have referenced the special 
procedures' work in their domestic legal submissions and in submissions to the international 
56 See, eg, Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 19,3 10; Piccone, Catalysts f or Change: How the UN's Independent 
Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 105, 11 4; Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 
April 201 1 ); Interview 9 (Te lephone Interview, 6 September 2010). 
57 For comment on the important, but uneven, role NHRI 's have played in relation to the special procedures' work 
generall y see Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 
117-21. 
58 Interview 1 (Wellington, 5 May 20 l l ); Interview 3 (Well ington, 3 May 2011 ); Interview 4 (Well ington, 4 May 
20 1 l); Interview 6 (Panama City, 3 June 20 11); Interview 13 (Telephone Interview, 27 May 2011 ); Interview 14 
(Guatemala City, 1 June 20 11 ); Interv iew 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 20 11 ). 
-9 ) See, eg, Letter from CPO to James Anaya, I May 20 11 
<http: //consejodepueblosdeoccidente.b logspot.com.au/20 11 _ 05 _ 0 l _ archive.html# !/201 1/05/respuestas-del-
cuestionario-de-james.html>. 
60 See, eg, Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add .3, [3]-[5]; Anaya Special Report on 
Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3, [6]. 
6 1 See, eg, Moana Jackson, The United Nations on the Foreshore: A Summary of the Report of the Special Rapporteur 
(2006) Converge <http://www.converge.org.nzJpma/mj050406.htm>; Interview 5 (Chri stchurch, 6 May 2011 ); 
Interview 6 (Panama City, 3 June 2011) ; ' UN Report Shouldn 't be Lost in Upheaval', Waatea603am (online), 24 
February 20 11 <http://waatea.blogspot.eom.au/2011 /02/te-puni -koki ri-seeks-quake-ro le.html>; Tracey Castro Whare, 
trustee of Aotearoa Indigenous Ri ghts Trust (under the banner oflncomindios), speaking in HRC, Webcast Human 
Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and In teractive Dialogue, above n 27. 
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system on Indigenous rights concerns.62 Notably, as identified in the previous chapter, Anaya's 
advice on the draft consultation instrument was used to prepare a challenge to that instrument 
before Guatemala's Constitutional Court. 63 The difference in leverage of the reports by 
Guatemala's Indigenous peoples and Maori may be attributable to the fact that in Guatemala 
there are less functioning domestic avenues for exposing the state's rights violations and 
because a far greater number of special procedures experts have reported on their situation, 
providing a rich resource for supporting argument. But, even in Guatemala, IPOs have not made 
a sustained push for implementation of the special procedures' recommendations post-visit or 
harnessed their reports or advice on a large scale. Nor have other actors. Guatemala's PDH, 
although expressing an intention to institutionalise a process for promoting implementation of 
the recommendations, has not done so. 64 And international NGOs, scholars, and the domestic 
media have devoted only modest attention to the special procedures' visits and reports regarding 
Guatemala's Indigenous peoples. 65 
In New Zealand there has been minimal use of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous 
peoples' reports by Maori and even less use of them by other actors. The Special Rapporteur's 
reports have been used most on the international stage, such as by an IPO and other domestic 
human rights NGOs to inform their shadow reports to UN human rights treaty bodies and in 
interventions before the EMRIP. 66 However, as one Maori human rights lawyer identified, it is 
domestic leverage of the reports that is central and more local actors, particularly Maori 
62 See, eg, El Movimiento de Mujeres Indigenas Tz'ununija', Informe Alternativo Sabre la Situaci6n de Mujeres 
Indigenas en Guatemala, Presentado al Consejo de Derechos Humanos de Naciones Unidas, Segundo Examen 
Periodico Universal al Estado de Guatemala (2012) Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights 
<http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session 14/GT/JS 14 _ UPR _ GTM _ S 14_2012 _J ointSubmissionl 4 _ S. 
pdf> 1; Interview 14 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011). 
63 CPO, Acci6n de Amparo en Contra del Reglamento de Consulta (2011) 
<http: / I consej odepueb losdeocci dente. b logs pot.com.au/2011 /03 / reso 1 ucion -del-amparo-en-contra-
del.html#!/2011 /03/resolucion-del -amparo-en-contra-del.html> 12-3, 19; Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 
2011). 
64 Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011). 
65 See, eg, Amnesty International, Guatemala: Lives and Livelihoods at Stake in Mining Conflict (21 June 2012) 
<http: / /www.amnesty.org/ en/news/guatemala-li ves-and-li velihoods-stake-mining-conflict-2012-06-21 >; Rachel 
Sieder, 'The Judiciary and Indigenous Rights in Guatemala' (2007) 5(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 
211,216 n 16; Tara Ward, 'The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples' Participation Rights 
within International Law' (2011) 10(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 54, 81; Efe Agency, 
'Relator de ONU Verificara Dafios Causados por la Mineria en Guatemala' , Terra ( online ), 13 June 2010 
<http://noticias.terra.com/noticias/relator _de_ onu _ verificara _ danos _ causados _por _la_ rnineria _ en _guatemala/act23 7 4 
051 >; Efe Agency, 'El Relator de la ONU sobre el Derecho a la Salud hara una Visita Oficial a Guatemala' , Noticias 
de Guatemala (online), 12 May 2010 <http://noticias.eom.gt/nacionales/20100512-el-relator-de-la-onu-sobre-el-
derecho-a-la-salud-hara-una-visita-oficial-a-guatemala.html>. However, note that in 2005 the expert on violence 
against women stated that she was 'impressed with the media interest in and coverage of my visit.' Expert on 
Violence Against Women Guatemala 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3, [70]. 66 See, eg, Jennifer Preston et al, above n 1, 36, 40; Peace Movement Aotearoa, NGO Information for the 48th session 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (20 12) Converge 
<http: //www.converge.org.nz/pma/CESCR48-PMA.pdf> [ 43] , [ 49]; Aotearoa Indigenous Rights Trust and others, 
Joint submission to the Universal Periodic Review of New Zealand (2009) Converge 
<http ://www.converge.org.nz/pma/towupr09.pdf> [12], [13] , 3 n 6, [35] , 8 n 17, [47]-[49] ; Peace Movement 
Aotearoa, NGO Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2007) Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/pma.pdf> [1 8]-[20] , [38]; 
Interview 6 (Panama City, 3 June 2011). 
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lawyers, need to use the reports. 67 While in opposition the Maori Party referenced 
Stavenhagen's report in Parliament and in media releases on several occasions.68 But this 
practice subsided when the Party entered into its formal relationship with the National Party in 
late 2008.69 The NZHRC has referenced the Special Rapporteur's recommendations in its 
domestic race relations reports, 70 as well as using them 'to drive the issue' of Maori 
representation in local government domestically.71 But a public appraisal of the Government's 
implementation of Anaya's recommendations has not materialised. And a member of the 
NZHRC reflected that it had found the experts' reports 'difficult to mobilise . .. through New 
Zealand.' 72 Neither Anaya nor Stavenhagen's report on New Zealand is cited in reported New 
Zealand case law. Only a handful of academics make minimal reference to the mandate. 73 The 
absence of high profile Maori rights advocates pushing for action on the reports, bar some 
public statements by leading Maori lawyer Moana Jackson regarding Stavenhagen's report, is 
striking. 74 Several factors contribute to the low up-take of the reports by domestic actors in both 
states. 
(b) Fledgling Indigenous Rights Cultures 
There is a fledgling Indigenous rights culture in the two countries. In Guatemala 
Indigenous peoples and their IPOs (and civil society more generally) remain fragmented and 
weakened by the internal conflict and the continuing overt repression of human rights defenders 
67 Interview 6 (Panama City, 3 June 2011). 
68 See, eg, Te Ururoa Flavell , Maori Party MP, 'Local Government Law Reform Bill - Te Ururoa Flavell' (Speech to 
the House of Representatives, Wellington, 4 April 2006) 
<http: //www.waiariki.maori.nz/index.php?pag=nw&id=213&p=local-government-law-reform-bill.html>; Maori 
Party, 'Too Slow Too Furious' (Press Release, 1 June 2006) <http://www.scoop .co.nzJstories/P A0606/S00004.htm>; 
Maori Party, 'Maori Party Welcomes New UN Special Rapporteur' (Press Release, 1 April 2008) 
<http://www. scoop. co .nzJ stories/PAO 8 04/S 00002/maori -party-we I comes-new-un-s pecial-rapporteur .h tm>. 69 The practice did not completely disappear. See, eg, Hone Harawira, Maori Party, 'Treaty Settlements and 
Appropriations - Hone Harawira' (Speech to the House of Representatives, Wellington, 3 August 2010) 
<http: //www. maori party. org/index. ph p ?pag=nw &id= 1196& p=speech-treaty-settl ements-and-appropriati o ns-hone-
hara wira. html>; Interview 2 (Wellington, 5 May 2011). 
70 See, eg, NZHRC, Tui Tui Tuituia: Race Relations in 2012 (2013) 100; NZHRC, Tui Tui Tuituia: Race Relations in 
2011 (2012) 34-7; NZHRC, Tui Tui Tuituia: Race Relations in 2006 15 . 
7 1 Interview 1 (Wellington, 5 May 2011) 
72 Interview 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011). 
73 See, eg, Jacinta Ruru, 'Finding Support for a Changed Property Discourse for Aotearoa New Zealand in the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples' (2011) 15 Lewis & Clark Law Review 951, 973-74; Roderic 
Pitty, 'The Unfinished Business oflndigenous Citizenship in Australia and New Zealand' in Klaus Neumann and 
Gwenda Tavan (eds), Does History Matter? Making and Debating Citizenship, Immigration and Refagee Policy in 
Australia and New Zealand (ANU E Press, 2009) 25, 38-9; Fleur Adcock, 'Indigenous Peoples Rights Under 
International Law: The Year in Review' (2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 296, 296-99; Fleur 
Adcock and Claire Charters, 'Indigenous Peoples' Rights Under International Law: The Year in Review' (2010) 8 
New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 203, 206-07. Non-academic texts have also referred to the experts ' 
reports, see, eg Robert Kirkness, 'A Proud Democratic Tradition?', New Zealand Lawyer (online), 17 August 2007 
<http: //www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nzJ Archives/lssue71 /F4/tabid/422/Default.aspx>; Fleur Adcock, 'Aotearoa (New 
Zealand)' in Ca::cilie Mikkelsen (ed), The Indigenous World 2012 (IWGIA, 2012) 224, 229-30. As noted in Chapter I, 
a journal article based on Chapter V of this dissertation is forthcoming with the New Zealand Yearbook of 
International Law. 
74 See, eg, Jackson, The United Nations on the Foreshore: A Summary of the Report of the Special Rapporteur, above 
n 61. Maori academic Rawiri Taonui urged that attention be given to Anaya's report. Rawiri Taonui cited in 'UN 
Report Shouldn ' t be Lost in Upheaval', above n 61. 
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and social movements. 75 This hinders their ability to push for implementation of the special 
procedures' recommendations on a significant national scale. There are also internal divisions 
within the Indigenous movement, in particular between rural Indigenous communities and the 
' Indigenous elites working the international system' ,76 as well as those Indigenous peoples who 
pursue a primarily class based rather than cultural agenda. 77 Given Indigenous peoples comprise 
a numerical majority within Guatemala their joint mobilisation would offer a real opportunity 
for political influence. On a practical level, the lack of widespread access to community radio 
and the Internet in rural areas, IP Os' significant resourcing constraints, and linguistic and 
cultural differences between Indigenous peoples makes large-scale mobilisation difficult. 78 
Sympathetic institutions, such as the PDH, are also restrained by resourcing issues. 79 In New 
Zealand the same practical issues are not present, but the human rights movement is also in its 
early stages. Maori claims have been high on the public agenda since the 1970s but are usually 
advanced on a hapil or iwi basis rather than on a pan-Maori basis. Further, Maori claims tend to 
centre on the commitments contained in the Treaty rather than human rights instruments. 80 A 
general domestic distrust and apathy towards human rights persists even though Maori have 
been active participants in the international Indigenous peoples ' rights sphere for decades . 81 
(c) Mechanism Little-known 
Further, the special procedures mechanism is not well known beyond UN-savvy IPOs, 
NGOs and select international lawyers. This has been long acknowledged by mandate-holders 
and scholars.82 For the reports to be used actors must first be aware of their contents. There are 
75 See generally Rosemary Thorp, Corinne Caumartin and George Gray-Molina, 'Inequality, Ethnicity, Political 
Mobilisation and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of Bol ivia, Guatemala and Peru' (2006) 25(4) 
Bulletin of Latin American Research 453, 462-65 ; Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norms and 
Domestic Politics in Chile and Guatemala' in Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power 
of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 172, 178, 197-98; 
Sieder, 'The Judiciary and Indigenous Rights in Guatemala', above n 65, 217-18; Rachel Sieder, "Emancipation' or 
'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Post-War Guatemala" (2011) 40 Economy and 
Society 239, 252; Ivan Briscoe and Martin Rodriguez Pellecer, A State Under Seige: Elites, Criminal Networks and 
Institutional Reform in Guatemala (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2010) 30-1; Eduardo Jimenez 
Mayo, 'The Violence after "La Violencia": The Guatemalan Maya and the United Nations-Brokered Peace Accords 
of 1996' (2011) 7(3) AlterNative 207, 207. 
76 Interview 15 (Guatemala City and Antigua, 23 May 20 I 1) . 
77 See, eg, Thorp, Caumartin and Gray-Molina, above n 75, 464; Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011 ). 
See generally Victor Montejo, Maya Intellectual Renaissance: Identity, Representation, and Leadership (University 
of Texas Press, 2005); Edward F Fischer and R McKenna Brown (eds), Maya Cultural Activism in Guatemala (University of Texas Press, 1996); Kay Warren, 'The Dynamic and Multifaceted Character of Pan-Mayanism in 
Guatemala' in Henry Minde (ed), Indigenous Peoples: Self-Determination, Knoweldge, Identity (Eburon Academjc 
Publishers, 2008) 107; Evelyn Gere and Tim MacNeill, 'Radical Indigenous Subjectivity: Maya Resurgence In 
Guatemala' (2008) 8(2) The International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations 97. 78 Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011); Interview 17 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011). 79 Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011 ). 
80 See, eg, Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 (NZ). 
81 See, eg, Fleur Adcock, 'Maori and the Bill of Rights Act: A Case of Missed Opportunities?' (2013) forthcoming 
New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law. Regarding the absence of a human rights culture in New 
Zealand generally see, eg, Sian Elias, 'Limjting Rights under a Human Rights Act: A New Zealand Perspective' (Address to the Australian Bill of Rights Conference, University of Melbourne Law School, 3 October 2008) 8. 82 See, eg, Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2001) 365-66; CHR, Report of the Tenth 
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pockets of high familiarity with the special procedures in the case study states; this is evident in 
the unusually high crowds of 10,000 to 15,000 people that showed out to hear Anaya speak in 
some regions of Guatemala. 83 According to a member of the OHCHR-Guatemala it was the first 
time ' for a long time ' that such mobilisation had been seen by domestic IPOs, 84 a testament to 
the mobilising power of Anaya's visit. Other special procedures experts focusing on Indigenous 
rights concerns in Guatemala that year did not attract the same attention, supporting the 
impression that most Indigenous peoples are even less aware of special procedures mandates 
beyond the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples. 85 The wider public is largely unfamiliar 
with the experts generally. As a result, the perception is that the reports have a relatively low 
readership in both states.86 In Guatemala readership of the reports is constrained by high rates of 
illiteracy amongst Indigenous peoples and physical access to the reports, which are published 
online.87 But sometimes UN country teams, such as the OHCHR-Guatemala, have used their 
own resources to print and distribute summaries of the reports or recordings of them. 88 
Language barriers also prevent the reports from having a greater global readership. 89 For 
example, Anaya' s 2011 report on Guatemala is only available in Spanish,just one of the UN' s 
six official languages. In states such as Guatemala, where international condemnation is one of 
the few avenues available to capture the state' s attention, international readership of the reports 
is particularly important. 
Efforts to improve knowledge regarding the special procedures ' role in realising 
international Indigenous rights norms as well as readership of the reports are needed. Training 
sessions to this end have been held during sessions of the PFII and EMRIP and guidebooks on 
the mechanism have been published.90 But these efforts speak mainly to actors already loosely 
familiar with the international system. Steps to reach wider domestic audiences are needed. User 
fri endly information about the mechanism needs to be shared in different formats beyond the 
OHCHR's website. For example, before the PFII in 2011, the Pacific Caucus recommended that 
the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples 'develop culturally appropriate and accessible 
educational programs about his mandate and protocols for engagement that are easily accessible 
Meeting of Special Rapporteurs/Representatives, Independent Experts and Chairpersons ofWorldng Groups of the 
Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights and of the Advisory Services Programme (Geneva, 23-27 
June 2003), UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/4 (5 August 2003) [20] , [68]; Hoehne, above n 37, 61 ; Anaya Report to GA 2013, 
UN Doc A/68/3 17, [25]. 
83 Interview 12 (Te lephone Interview, 23 June 2011 ); Brigadas Intemacionales De Paz - Proyecto Guatemal a, PIM -
Paquete de Informaci6n Mensual sabre Guatemala (2010) <http://www. pbi-
guatemala.org/fi leadmin/user _ fi les/projects/guatemala/files/spanish/PIM _ No._ 81.pdf> 2. 
84 Interview 12 (Te lephone Interview, 23 June 2011 ). 
85 For example, the expert on health also visi ted Guatemala in 2010 and devoted significant attention to Indigenous 
rights concerns but his visi t did not attract the same attention fro m Indigenous peoples as Anaya. Interv iew 12 
(Te lephone Interview, 23 June 20 11 ). 
86 See, eg, Interv iew 2 (Wellington, 5 May 20 11 ). 
87 See generall y Tau li-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 19, 32. 
88 Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 20 11 ). See, eg, Jenn ifer Preston et al, above n 1, 37. 
89 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interv iew, 19 April 201 1 ). 
90 See, eg, Email fro m Nathali e Gerber McCrae to doCIP mailing list, 15 May 201 3; OHCHR, Working with the 
United Nations Human Rights Programme: A Handbook for Civil Society (2008) chapter VI. 
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to Indigenous peoples from developing and remote regions. ' 91 To help build public 'ownership ' 
of the special procedures' work, and counter the perception that the experts' visits and reports 
are for Indigenous peoples only, mandate-holders could speak at seminars geared at the general 
public during their country missions, as Anaya did once during his New Zealand visit. 92 Further, 
to capitalise on domestic media interest during the visits the experts could present substantive 
findings in their final media statements, which some, such as the Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous peoples, already do. But while these steps may increase awareness of the mechanism 
and readership of the reports it ignores the more fundamental point of whether the receiving 
audience will like what is shared. 
(d) Imaginations Not Captured 
In neither case study state have the special procedures captured the imagination of those 
best placed to take their work forward; Indigenous peoples in particular. If the reports are to 
have impact it is vital that Indigenous peoples use them in their negotiations and lobbying. 93 
Some prominent Indigenous peoples who are highly conversant with the UN human rights 
system and aware of the experts' reports elected not to read them or, having read them, did not 
choose to leverage them. 94 There are variant reasons for this . Some see the mechanism as 
toothless and leveraging the reports as futile 'perhaps there's an embarrassment at an 
international level but it doesn 't matter to us here. ' 95 Others are not moved by the report 's 
findings and recommendations. They do not view their concerns as accurately reflected in the 
reports, including as identified in Chapter V because, comparative to uther Indigenous peoples ' 
situations, the expert perceived their position as less grave; or, as identified in Chapter VI, the 
expert was viewed as taking a pro-development stance. Indigenous women, children, the 
disabled and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Indigenous persons may not identify with 
the reports, which pay little attention to their intersecting concerns. This is a fact recognised by 
some experts: Stavenhagen points out that each of his reports to the CHR, and later the HRC, 
contained a section regarding the rights of Indigenous women and children ' [b Jut I, myself, was 
not very satisfied by the whole thing; that is, I do not think I did a satisfactory job. ' 96 Or they do 
91 Francis Lampard, 'Statement to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues' (New York, 2011) 
<http://www.humanrights.gov .au/sites/ default/fi les/ content/socialjustice/intemational _ docs/2011 /4 _ b _Dialogue_ wit 
h_the_Special_Rapporteur_pACIFIC FINAL.pdf> 5. 
92 Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011); 'Seminar with Professor James Anaya, UN Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights 19 July 2010', Tangatawhenua (online), 13 July 2010 
<http://news.tangatawhenua.com/archives/6 l 59>. 
93 See, eg, Jennifer Preston et al, above n 1, 39-40, 45. 
94 Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 2011); Interview 17 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 20 11); Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011 ); Interview 2 (Wellington, 5 May 2011 ); Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011 ); 
Interview 5 (Christchurch, 6 May 201 1). 
95 Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 2011). 
96 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). Note that the expert on health devoted 
sizeable attention to the health concerns ofindigenous women in his 2011 report on Guatemala, see Expert on Health 
Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/17/25/Add.2. 
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not view the reports as offering any penetrating insights; one Maori academic remarked of 
Anaya's report, 'I didn't pick it up and wave it around, "You must read this! You must read 
this! " I just thought it. .. didn't show any great insight' .97 Still others viewed the experts as failing 
to understand domestic conditions when framing their recommendations, in particular the depth 
of state corruption and capture in Guatemala.98 A few criticised special procedures experts' (and 
other UN mechanisms') reports for their moderate approach towards governments : they 'always 
get along with everybody' ,99 and should 'be a little more frank, a little more drastic with those 
who are in charge of our country'. ' 00 Others see the complicity of the human rights system in 
the watered down recognition of Indigenous peoples' claims and elect not to leverage the 
system as a whole. 101 
On some critiques the mechanism is yet another means by which Indigenous peoples' 
agency and power is removed. In both states some Indigenous peoples favoured articulating 
their own claims to the UN directly rather than relying on the special procedures mechanism. A 
Mayan academic stated 'in our country I would remove the figure of interpreter. We don't need 
these interpreters we Maya, we need spaces to participate.' 102 Similarly, a Maori commentator 
reportedly remarked that Anaya's visit was an insult that suggested Maori could not deal with 
the issues themselves '[i]t reflects that we have the inability to articulate ourselves and deliver 
our own message. We can deliver our own message and we deliver it well'. '03 The low take-up 
of the recommendations intimates that this view has a larger Indigenous base. The Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' mandate is in particular danger of being viewed by states as 
a one stop shop for 'the Indigenous perspective ', saving them the time of engaging with the 
multiple and dispersed authorities and views of the Indigenous peoples within their borders. 
There has been a tendency to rely on the international community to play the central role in 
promoting Indigenous rights consciousness and compliance in Guatemala. '04 An overreliance on 
professional, international, human rights expertise does nothing to develop local expertise or 
97 Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011 ). 
98 Interview 17 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011); Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011 ); Interview I 5 
(Guatemala City and Antigua, 23 May 2011); Interview 14 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011). 99 Interview 14 (Guatemala City, I June 2011). 
100 Interview 17 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 20 I I) . This stance also received support in Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 
31 May 20 11 ); Interview 2 (Wel lington, 5 May 2011). 
101 For example, Jeff Corntassel has argued that the channeling oflndigenous peoples away from grassroots 
mobilisation to gaining an audience before the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, and other international 
mechanisms, marginalises Indigenous peoples and their concerns. JeffCorntassel, 'Partnership in Action? Indigenous 
Political Mobilization and Co-optation during the First UN Indigenous Decade (1995-2004)' (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 137, 140. 
102 Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 201 I). 
103 David Rankin, of the iwi Ngapuhj, quoted in 'UN Expert Reports on NZ Race Relations ', New Zealand Herald 
( online), 21 July 2010 <http: //www.nzherald.co.nzJnzJnews/article.cfm?c _ id= I &objectid= I 0660311 > . 104 For example, Sieder observes that ' [f]ollowing the signi ng of the final peace settlement, international development 
agencies and multilateral banks and donors took a leading role in support ing and implementing the agreements. ' 
Sieder, "Emancipation' or 'Regulation'? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rjghts in Post-War 
Guatemala', above n 75 , 252 . 
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local dialogue on human rights. 105 Thus, especial care needs to be taken there to ensure that 
IPOs and domestic human rights NGOs are buttressed rather than supplanted by the profusion 
of special procedures experts and other international, transnational and regional actors operating 
in the country. 
On other critiques, not all mandate-holders are equally adept at building and sustaining 
the necessary relationships with Indigenous peoples and domestic rights advocates to see the 
reports embraced locally. The centrality of building relationships with domestic stakeholders is 
identified in the literature. ' 06 The importance of Indigenous peoples feeling 'that they were 
listened to' was highlighted by several interviewees as a central dimension of this relationship-
building exercise. 107 It presupposes first that Indigenous peoples are met with. In New Zealand 
Anaya spent a lot oftime with government actors, understood as a tactic by the Maori Party to 
get the buy-in of those actors to his visit, which impeded his exposure to an expanded Maori 
and general public base. 108 This was a source of tension with other Maori rights advocates and 
attracted criticism from Maori on the international stage. For example, before the EMRIP in 
2011, a Maori delegate stated that the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples needed to 
spend more time talking with Indigenous peoples and less time with governments. 109 The need 
for mandate-holders to develop a relationship of ongoing exchange with domestic actors was 
also emphasised by interviewees.''° For the most part the conversation loop with the mandate-
holders ends once the expert leaves the country. The relationship-building should begin before 
the expert arrives in the country and continue after, including enhancing Indigenous peoples ' 
role in the production of the reports. 111 Indigenous peoples need to work at maintaining the 
relationships too. 11 2 
Mass publics also remain unmoved by the special procedures' formal and austere 
reports. The experts' reports on New Zealand and Guatemala follow closely the formal, 
'objective', dispassionate, approach of Geertz's 'Complete Investigator' discussed in Chapter 
IV. Stavenhagen himself has reflected that he 'never felt comfortable' with the formal language 
demanded of the reports. 113 For the mechanism to have impact enlarged social buy-in to the 
105 Hilary Charlesworth, 'Kirby Lecture in International Law - Swimming to Cambodia: Justice and Ritual in Human 
Rights After Conflict' (2010) 29 The Australian Year Book of International Law 1, 11 . Relatedly, Simmons argues 
that ' too often' transnational actors, while crucial to human rights compliance, have been ' presented as the "white 
knights" that make demands for those who are not often credited with the ability to speak, strategize, litigate and 
mobilize for themselves and their society.' Simmons, above n 4, 356. 
106 See, eg, Golay, Mahon and Cismas, above n 19, 310-11 ; Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 19, 36. 107 Interview 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011); Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011); Interview 17 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011 ); Interview 10 (Guatemala City, 27 May 2011 ). 108 Interview 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011). 
109 Anahera Scott cited in Fleur Adcock 'Meeting Notes: Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Fourth Session' (July 2011). A similar comment was made by the interviewee in Interview 6 (Panama City, 3 June 
2011). 
110 Interview 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011); Interview 12 (Telephone Interview, 23 June 2011); Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011). 
111 Interview 3 (Wellington, 3 May 2011); Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011). 11 2 Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 2011). See generally Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 19, 27-9. 113 Interview with Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Skype Interview, 19 April 2011). 
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work of the mechanism is necessary; 114 as one Maori academic reflected, 'we can't do it 
alone ' .115 To resonate with a wider audience the style of the reports should shift to combine the 
current formal narrative with stories or testimonies from Indigenous peoples, even images. This 
would give a more direct voice to the Indigenous peoples the subject of the reports and lift the 
reports' emotional impact. As identified in Chapter IV, Anaya is one expert that has dabbled in 
including direct quotes from Indigenous peoples in some of his country reports; although not on 
either New Zealand or Guatemala. Sharing direct quotes and short testimonies in the reports is 
also one way of revealing divergent Indigenous perspectives on issues, without the expert 
having to take a side. Some innovative moves in this direction have already been taken. A half 
hour documentary in Spanish with English subtitles concerning Anaya's 2011 mission to 
Argentina was released by IWGIA and Ore Media a year after the visit. It included statements 
by Indigenous peoples of their rights concerns from across the state and showed extracts of the 
media presentation Anaya gave at the end of the mission. 116 This is an excellent and emotionally 
affecting way to literally give voice to Indigenous peoples and visually represent their concerns, 
such as showing footage of the environmental contamination perceived as caused by extractive 
projects. In 2013 Anaya described the video as 'a good practice that he considers could be 
developed further to raise awareness of the work of mandate holders.' 117 But thought needs to 
be given to the intended audience of such works, the timing of their release and how they are 
disseminated to reach their audience. 
The above analysis of the key actors relevant to the work of the special procedures in 
New Zealand and Guatemala indicates that the mechanism's slight influence in both states is not 
attributable simply to an absence of political will or institutional constraints, although these are 
important. The approach of sympathetic states, mandate-holders themselves and those best 
positioned to take the recommendations forward - particularly Indigenous peoples - are also 
crucial. I tum now to examine the principles that underlie the rhetorical tussle that goes on 
between these key actors. 
C Principles 
The actors leverage different contesting principles to regulate the Indigenous rights 
regulatory domain. The core principles, on both sides of the contest, are all articulated within a 
liberal frame, reflecting liberalism 's dominance of political discourse and international law. 118 
114 For example, Simmons argues that ' [ o ]ne of the most important resources for a movement 's success has been 
found to be support from actors who are not direct beneficiaries of the movement' s goals.' Simmons, above n 4, 137. 115 Interview 4 (Wellington, 4 May 20 11 ). 
11 6 IWGIA, Visit of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Argentina (201 2) 
<http ://www.iwgia.org/pub lications/search-pubs?publication_id=608>. 
117 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc N68/317, [ 18]. 
118 Martti Koskenniem i, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge 
University Press , 2005) 5. 
248 
Although the actors and their positions are various I discuss the underlying principles with 
reference to two core sets of actors: states (and their allies) and special procedures mandate-
holders ( and their allies). The special procedures' primary arsenal is the growing body of 
international Indigenous peoples' rights norms, which have evolved out of a package of liberal 
human rights law .119 Sometimes the total package of rights is leveraged as a general claim of 
rights subjecthood, while at other times particular rights are advocated. The liberal framing of 
the principles pushed by the mandate-holders both allows them to be heard but also constrains 
the types of claims that can be made: Indigenous peoples' claims largely become translated as 
rights to enjoy and express their culture rather than nationhood. 120 New Zealand and Guatemala 
push back against the mandate-holders using the principles of unitary state sovereignty, with its 
corollaries of territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs; ' equality before the 
law'; and a commitment to national development through economic growth. These are all 
central tenets ofliberal political thought. 121 What is most striking in this contest in Guatemala 
and New Zealand is the almost complete absence of mandate-holders' explicit advocacy of 
Indigenous peoples' right to self-determination. 
1 Indigenous Rights Holders versus State Sovereignty 
(a) Non-radical Contestations of Sovereignty 
The core principle leveraged by special procedures mandate-holders is a 
conceptualisation oflndigenous peoples as rights holders. It is the prescription that Indigenous 
peoples are bearers of Indigenous peoples' rights (which I understand as a subset of human 
rights) that are enforceable against the state. 122 It subsumes and takes for granted the broader 
principle of indigeneity itself, which is the distinctive identity claim made by Indigenous 
peoples by virtue of their status as first peoples. As identified in Chapter I, as a concept 
'indigeneity' suffers from several shortcomings, including its presumption of a homogenous 
Indigenous entity. But it has nevertheless been embraced by many collectives in order to pursue 
11 9 See generally Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, 2 ed, 
2003); Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (Manchester University Press, 2002). 120 See generally Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (Duke 
University Press, 2010) 1-4, 7. Regarding the constraining power of international legal discourse see Koskenniemi, 
above n 118, 12. 
121 See generally Donnelly, above n 119; Koskenniemi, above n 118. 122 Indigenous peoples' rights are commonly conceptualised as an Indigenous specific formulation of human rights, 
see, eg, S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2 ed, 2004) 7. But this is 
debated. For example, Benedict Kingsbury examines the different conceptual approaches that underlie Indigenous 
peoples' rights, see Benedict Kingsbury, 'Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures oflndigenous Peoples' 
Claims in International and Comparative Law' in Philip Alston (ed), Peoples' Rights (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
69. See also Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of 
International Society (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 136-41. 
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their struggles for justice. 123 Pushing Indigenous peoples as rights holders is a logical move 
given that the special procedures are a human rights mechanism. Human rights are the basis for 
mandate-holders ' authority to investigate and report on the situation of Indigenous peoples, with 
international human rights instruments such as the UNDRJP providing the normative framework 
for the mandates. 
Unitary state sovereignty is the core principle pushed by New Zealand and Guatemala 
in response. As identified in Chapter II, it is the prescription that the state is indivisible and 
' should be supreme over any other source of power on matters affecting its citizens or 
territory.' 124 Of course, in practice, no state retains full sovereign power. It is only in rhetoric 
that sovereignty is absolute. 125 The principle manifests itself in several ways, including as a 
resistance to any actions perceived to impact the territorial integrity or political structure of the 
state and more generally as a resistance to outside interference in the domestic affairs of the 
state. The latter stance is more evident in New Zealand than Guatemala. It is apparent in the 
Labour-led Government's assertion that Stavenhagen's recommendations were 'an attempt to 
tell us how to manage our political system' when New Zealand preferred 'to debate and find 
solutions to these issues ourselves. ' 126 It was also present in the National-led Government's 
response to Anaya's visit, when the Prime Minister emphasised that he placed more weight on 
New Zealanders' views on Indigenous rights than the UN's. 127 It is a sentiment that was shared 
by some unexpected non-state actors in New Zealand too, including New Zealand's then Race 
Relations Commissioner who, following release of Stavenhagen' s report, reportedly commented 
that 'while some iwi may seek out international opinion the debate needs to be held at home.' 128 
Yet, Chapter V demonstrates that the New Zealand Government has not outright rejected 
international oversight - it issued the standing invitation to thematic special procedures, it 
formally cooperated with Stavenhagen and Anaya's visits, and outside of the public eye it 
provided detailed almost paragraph by paragraph responses to Stavenhagen and Anaya's 
reports . The Government also publically adopted a more welcoming stance towards Anaya's 
visit and oversight than its stance towards Stavenhagen's, an approach largely attributable to the 
Maori Party's position in Government. 
Part of the reason why the New Zealand Government so vividly rejects international 
interference in its domestic affairs regarding Maori is because it pushes the principle that it is a 
123 See, eg, Fiona McCormack, 'Indigeneity as Process: Maori Claims and Neoliberalism' (201 2) 18(4) Social 
Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture 417, 430. 
124 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17, 25. See general ly Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, above n 
122, 21. 
125 See, eg, Keal , above n 122, 181; Eve Darian-Smith, Laws and Societies in Global Contexts: Contemporary 
Approaches (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 9. 
126 Michae l Cullen, Deputy Prime Mini ster, ' Response to UN Special Rapporteur Report ' (Press Release, 4 April 
2 006) <http://www. beehive.govt. nz/release/response-un-special-rapporteur-report>. 
127 Prime Minister John Key cited in Adam Bennett, 'UN Visitor Checks NZ Race Relations' , New Zealand Herald 
( on line), 20 July 2010 <http ://www. nzherald.co.nz/politics/news/article.cfm?c _ id=280&objectid= l 0659949>. 
128 Joris de Bres, Race Relations Commiss ioner, cited in 'No Consensus Over UN Report ', Television New Zealand 
(online), 5 April 2006 <http ://tvnz.co.nz/content/695498/425825 .html> . See also NZHRC, 'Commissions Role to 
Build Discussion and Dialogue ', above n 5 1. 
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human rights and Indigenous rights leader. As a result it struggles with information - such as 
that set out in the mandate-holders' reports - that conflicts with or may tarnish that self-image. 
This was evident in the Government's response to both mandate-holders' visits . For example, 
when discussing Anaya's visit the Prime Minister stated 'New Zealand actually has a very well 
defined and established set of rules when it comes to dealing with indigenous rights and I think 
we're a leader in that field.' 129 In the Government's formal response to Stavenhagen's report it 
projected the state as an archetype of harmonious ethnic relationships, asserting that 'Maori, like 
all New Zealanders, live in a contemporary democracy that is, by any standards, participatory 
and inclusive ... discrimination is an anathema to New Zealanders.' 130 The view that New 
Zealand is a world leader in human rights and Indigenous rights is widely embraced, 
domestically and internationally. 131 Comparative to other states, New Zealand's positive human 
rights record may be generally well deserved. But it contains many blind spots in its recognition 
oflndigenous peoples' (and others') claims. This self-image renders it that much harder for the 
state to hear criticisms of its behaviour. The myth that New Zealand is a great egalitarian land of 
opportunity for all also serves to place responsibility for those who are struggling back on the 
individuals themselves, stripping claims of their collective dimension and concealing systemic 
issues. Further, the social pervasiveness of this self-image makes it difficult to rally support for 
Indigenous claims from the larger public in New Zealand. 
In contrast, the Guatemalan Government has been less precious about international 
comment on its Indigenous rights situation. As Chapter VI showed, it was one of the earlier 
states to issue a standing invitation to the thematic special procedures, formally cooperated with 
the experts' numerous country visits touching on Indigenous rights, and even actively sought 
out mandate-holders' assistance, in the form of Anaya's advice on the draft consultation 
instrument. Given Guatemala's track record in Indigenous rights protection this may come as a 
surprise - in Guatemala there are ostensibly more rights violations to hide from view. But it 
reflects the fact that Guatemala, after decades of international intervention, has become 
accustomed to international oversight, including by the special procedures. It likely sees the 
potential reputational (being viewed as an open democracy), and other benefits (like donor 
funding and trade agreements), to be gained from opening its doors to review and comment. But 
an outward openness toward international oversight does not translate into action on the 
findings made by those international actors, as Chapter VI showed. It is here that the state's 
resistance to interference in its domestic affairs manifests. In the words of one Mayan academic, 
129 Prime Minister John Key quoted in Bennett, above n 127. 
130 Don Mackay, New Zealand Permanent Representative, 'Human Rights Council: Presentation of Report by Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms oflndigenous Peoples ' (Statement to 
the HRC, Geneva, 19 September 2006) <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MF AT-
speeches/2006/0-19-September-2006.php>. 
131 See, eg, Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy 
Affecting Maori Culture and Identity- Te Taumata Tuarua, Volume J (2011) 98; Carlos Vazquez, the Country 
Rapporteur for New Zealand, closing remarks in CERD Committee, 'Committee on Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination Considers Report ofNew Zealand ' (Media Release, UN Doc CRDl3/010E, 22 February 2013). 
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once the international observers have left ' [ v ]ery often we say, "what does the government care, 
what does the state care, we're autonomous. We couldn't care less what outsiders say."' 132 
Claims that threaten the territorial integrity or political structure of the state meet more 
strident resistance in both countries. Both states ' resistance to such claims is evident in the 
governments' selectivity towards implementation of the special procedures' recommendations 
that concern land and self-government; in the very act of picking and choosing those elements 
of the recommendations they wish to implement the governments are asserting their sovereign 
power. The two governments favour implementation of aspects of recommendations that pose 
less of a challenge to existing state structures (such as aspects of the soft right to an education 
tailored to Indigenous peoples' cultural needs), while those recommendations that may require 
renegotiation of the states' sovereignty (such as aspects oflndigenous peoples' hard rights to 
self-government and to lands and natural resources) are resisted and deflected. In recognising a 
carefully delimited set ofbicultural (New Zealand) and multicultural (Guatemala) rights the 
states exert control over differences 'that challenge the boundaries of the sovereign political 
subject'. 133 And mute Indigenous peoples' demands for more expansive recognition of their 
right to self-determination, such as autonomous Indigenous governments. 134 Biculturalism and 
multiculturalism have facilitated some favourable policies and legislation for Indigenous 
peoples. However, the policies are at root concerned with assimilation rather than the 
recognition of difference as they 'posit one dominant culture under which different subcultures 
must ultimately submit.' 135 Mandate-holders should expressly reject these states' tendency to 
respond selectively to Indigenous peoples' claims and on the assimilationist agenda of their 
cosmetic bicultural and multicultural policies. 
In leveraging the principle of Indigenous peoples as rights holders special procedures 
experts do not radically contest the sovereignty of states. Special procedures experts use 
Indigenous peoples ' rights bearing subjectivity to advocate for transparency in states' actions 
towards Indigenous peoples, asserting that being an international human rights monitoring 
mechanism it should be able to observe, examine and comment on the states' conformity to 
international Indigenous rights norms. 136 It is evident in the fact of the mandate-holders ' country 
132 Interview 18 (Quetzaltenango, 31 May 2011 ). 
133 In the context of discussion on how ' both multiculturali sm and seculari sm are deployed as techniques to govern 
difference' Brenna Bhandar states that ' [d]ifferences that challenge the boundaries of the sovereign political subj ect 
are perceived as a threat to be contained and managed' . Brenna Bhandar, 'The Ties that Bind : Multiculturalism and 
Secularism Reconsidered' (2009) 36(3) Journal of Law and Society 301 , 304 quoted in Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller et 
al, 'Roundtable on Eve Darian-Smith, Religion, Race, Rights: Landmarks in the History of Modern Anglo-American 
Law' (201 1) 19(3) Feminist Legal Studies 265, 28 1. 
134 For criticism of state techniques of accommodation oflndigenous peoples through poli cies of multiculturalism, 
see, eg, James Tully, 'The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples For and Of Freedom' in Duncan lvison, Paul Patton and 
Will Sanders (eds), Political Theo1y and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2000) 36; 
Charles Hale, 'Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics ofldenti ty in Guatemala' (2002) 34 Journal of Latin American Studies 485 . 
135 Eve Darian-Smith in Goldberg-Hiller et al, above n 133, 285 . 
136 As set out in Chapter 11, Braithwaite and Drahos identify transparency as a recurrent principle in the regulatory 
domains they examine. Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17, 25 . In fact, they identify that ' [ o ]fa ll the principles we 
have surveyed, transparency has been the one which has most consistently strengthened in importance': at 507 . 
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visits and communications. In their dialogues and reports the special procedures experts ask 
states to make accommodations for Indigenous peoples in the state. But in the act of that request 
the experts reaffirm the legitimacy of those states' sovereignty. Mandate-holders are also 
constrained by the human rights instruments that frame their mandates, which, at the same time 
as recognising Indigenous peoples as rights-holders, also affirm state sovereignty, such as the 
UNDRIP. In centring the state as the actor both primarily responsible for human rights 
violations and the enforcer of those rights, human rights law reinforces the power of the state. 137 
(b) Avoiding Self-determination 
The special procedures, including the former and current Special Rapporteurs on 
Indigenous peoples, have shied away from explicitly pushing Indigenous peoples' right to self-
determination as a principle in their work on New Zealand and Guatemala. Indigenous peoples ' 
right to self-determination in its stronger forms clashes with state assertions of unilateral and 
undivided sovereignty because it recognises the status of Indigenous peoples as 'peoples ', with 
claims to prior and continuing statehood, self-government and other expressions of autonomy 
over their territories. In its weaker forms the right to self-determination is less threatening. It 
finds expression as Indigenous peoples' rights both to participate in government and to be 
consulted on matters affecting them. 138 
Self-determination claims were raised with the experts in both states. In New Zealand 
the language of self-determination, and its te reo Maori equivalents, was used. 139 For example, 
representatives of the iwi Ngai Tuhoe reportedly discussed Tuhoe aspirations for mana 
rnotuhake or self-determination over their territories with Anaya during his visit. 140 In 
Guatemala it is unclear whether the precise language of self-determination was used during 
discussions with the experts. But expressions of its more autonomous dimensions were evident, 
for example, during Anaya' s visit in assertions that Indigenous peoples could decide, through 
137 See, eg, Mak.au wa Mutua, 'Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse' (1997) 10 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 63, 67. 
138 Regarding the spectrum oflndigenous peoples' claims to 'sovereignty', see, eg, Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, 
'Engaging with lndigeneity: Tino Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa' in Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders (eds), 
Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 89, 93-4. Note that 
Taiaiake Alfred and other Indigenous scholars critique the concept of 'sovereignty' as a political objective for 
Indigenous peoples, see, eg, Taiaiake Alfred, 'From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political 
Discourse' (2001) 3(1) Indigenous Affairs 22, 27-8. See also Steven Wheatley, 'Conceptualizing the Authority of the 
Sovereign State over Indigenous Peoples' (2013) Leiden Journal of International Law l. For comment on the idea of 
'strong' and 'weak' forms of self-determination see Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, 
Culture, Strategy, above n 120, 3; Karen Engle, 'On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights' (20 11) 22(1) The European Journal of International Lm11 141, 
142 n 3. 
139 See, eg, Letter from Peace Movement Aotearoa to Rodolfo Stavenhagen, 23 November 2005 
<http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/sr-pma05 .pdf> 2, 10-1 ; Ruth Berry, 'Maori Denied Rights, UN Man Told' New 
Zealand Herald 21 November 2005 <http://www.nzherald .co.nz/nz/news/article.cfrn?c_id=l&objectid=l03562l2>; 
New Zealand Press Association, 'Tuhoe Assured UN Visitor on Apartheid - Kruger' , New Zealand Herald ( online) , 
30 July 2010 <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c id=l &objectid=l 0662352>. 140 Tamati Kruger, Treaty ofWaitangi settlement negotiator for the iwi Ngai Tuhoe, cited in Berry, above n 139 . 
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their customary decision-making practices, what extractive projects occurred on their traditional 
lands. And, at least since the time of the Indigenous Agreement, there have been demands for 
recognition of Indigenous peoples' rights to manage their internal affairs according to their own 
customs. 141 
Yet, the experts have rarely explicitly referenced the right to self-determination and its 
more autonomous forms in their reports on either country. Stavenhagen's 2006 report on New 
Zealand is the main exception. In that report Stavenhagen pushed the right to self-determination 
in his comments on iwi and hapu governance structures, self-governing social programmes, 
constitutional reform and the UNDRIP. 142 His strongest statement on the right was contained in 
his recommendation for constitutional reform, which was examined in Chapter V. 143 But he was 
silent on self-determination and other of its commonly associated stronger dimensions -
autonomy and self-government - in his comments on his missions to Guatemala. Anaya has 
been more restrained in his references to the right in relation to both states. In respect of New 
Zealand, in his press statement and preliminary note he commented that ' [ t ]he principles of the 
Treaty provide a foundation for Maori self-determination based on a real partnership between 
Maori and the New Zealand State' .144 He also referred to the right in articulating the purpose of 
the UNDRIP.145 However, the language of self-determination disappeared in his final report on 
the mission, beyond a scene-setting remark regarding the meaning of tino rangatiratanga. 146 It 
is telling that Stavenhagen's report on New Zealand found higher support amongst Maori than 
Anaya' s: a report that does not expressly tackle Indigenous self-determination will not capture 
Indigenous imaginations in the same way. Similarly, in his report on Guatemala Anaya simply 
identified that the duty of states to consult with Indigenous peoples on decisions affecting them 
was a manifestation oflndigenous peoples' right to self-determination. 147 Other special 
procedures mandate-holders have demonstrated greater reticence to advocate the principle, 
avoiding referencing the term altogether in their reports on Guatemala. In both states the special 
procedures experts overwhelmingly represent self-determination in their reports by its weaker 
proxies, such as Indigenous participation in government and consultation rights. 
A voiding using the language of self-determination in the country reports may be a 
deliberate tactic to avoid provoking the ire of the governments and keep them at the meeting 
table. Recognition of the right to self-determination may be viewed as too ambitious or 
141 See, eg, Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1995, Part IV, sect E, para 3. 142 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add .3, [1 8], [42], [80] , [84], [94], [102] . 143 As discussed in Chapter V, Stavenhagen called for constitutional reform that regulates the Government-Maori 
relationship 'on the basis of the Treaty of Waitangi and the internationally recognized right of all peoples to self-
determination. ' Ibid [84]. 
144 James Anaya, 'New Zealand: More to be done to Improve Indigenous People's Rights, Says UN Expert ' (P ress 
Statement, 23 July 20 I 0) <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/new-zealand-more-to-be-done-to-improve-
indigenous-peoples-rights-says-un-expert>; Anaya Prelimina,y Note on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/ 15/37/Add .9, [3]. 
145 James Anaya, 'New Zealand: More to be Done to Improve Indigenous People 's Rights, Says UN Expert ', above n 
144; Anaya Prelimina,y Note on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/ 15/37/Add.9, [4] . 146 Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/ 18/35/Add.4, [8]. 147 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.3, [38]. 
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unrealistic. 148 Or it could be that the experts view strong autonomy claims, for example, as 
capable of expression using alternative concepts, such as the right to culture. 149 Both 
Stavenhagen and Anaya expressly emphasise the centrality of self-determination to Indigenous 
peoples' claims in their annual thematic reports and in speeches at workshops and seminars. 150 
Their comfort with the term in this space likely stems from the fact that often specific states are 
not singled out; in the abstract the principle is less confronting. The Special Rapporteurs use the 
language of self-determination more readily in some other country reports too, but regarding 
countries where there is greater domestic ease with the term, such as the United States. 151 
However, the pragmatism argument is more difficult to sustain in respect of Guatemala, where 
the Government was an outward advocate of strongly worded provisions on self-determination 
in the UNDRIP, 152 even if it inwardly resists its realisation. In contrast, New Zealand publically 
voiced concerns regarding the inclusion of an affinnation of self-determination in the 
UNDRIP. 153 
The tendency of the special procedures experts to avoid the language of self-
determination in their reports on New Zealand and Guatemala is problematic. While the 
UNDRIP limits the recognition of Indigenous self-determination to its internal dimensions 
( except where the legal justifications for secession are made out) it does not preclude models at 
the stronger end of the spectrum that fall short of secession, such as models that provide for the 
exercise of significant internal autonomy over a defined territory within the state. 154 In both 
New Zealand and Guatemala Indigenous peoples' understandings of self-determination 
represent the full spectrum of its conceptualisations, although calls for external models of self-
determination are not strong in either country. 155 Given the numericah:najority of Indigenous 
148 As set out in Chapter IV, the Manual of Operations calls for the experts' recommendations to be 'attainable' and 
' realistic', see Manual of Operations, above n 23, [98]. Engle identifies that it is ' [ c]laims centered on the protection 
of culture' that 'have tended to gamer success before international and regional legal bodies '. Engle, T71e Elusive 
Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy, above n 120, 4. 149 Engle points out that 'relatively strong redistributive claims' are capable of being made by Indigenous peoples 
'under the right to culture', in the context of an overall argument critiquing 'the cultural rights rubric for often 
displacing or deferring issues of structural distributional inequalities'. Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous 
Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy, above n 120, 3. 
1 ·o 
' See, eg, Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [73]-[77]; Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc 
A/HRC/21 /47, 1, [29]-[33] ; Anaya Annual Report 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35, [80], [82]; Anaya Annual Report 
2009, UN Doc A/HRC/12/34, [41] ; Anaya Annual Report 2008, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9 [74] ; Stavenhagen Annual 
Report 2003, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90, [12], [73]; StavenhagenAnnual Report 2002, UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/97, [38], [86]-[91] ; James Anaya, 'International Development Cooperation Must Advance Indigenous Self-Determination' (Media Release, 30 March 2011) <http: //unsr.jamesanaya.org/notes/intemational-development-cooperation-must-
advance-indigenous-self-determination>. 
151 See, eg, Anaya Report on US 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/21/47/Add. l , [27], [30], [52], [59] , [63], [71], [79], [82]; 
Anaya Report on Sapmi Region 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.2 (6 June 2011 ) [12] , [23] , [32]-[45], [72], [74]-[?8]; Stavenhagen Report on Bolivia 2009, UN Doc A/HRC/11 /11 , [16], [83] . 
1'
2 Megan Davis, 'Indigenous Struggles in Standard-Setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples' (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 439,458 n 88. 153 See, eg, New Zealand Government representative, Rosemary Banks, quoted in Engle, 'On Fragile Architecture: 
1:he UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights', above n 138, 146 n 14. 1
~: UNDRIP arts 3, 46(1); GA, 107th Plena,y Meeting: Official Records UN Doc A/61/PV.107 (13 September 2007). 
b, Regarding New Zealand see, eg, Sheryl Lightfoot, 'Emerging International Indigenous Rights Norms and 'Over-
Compliance' in New Zealand and Canada' (2010) 62(1) Political Science 84, 98-9; Maaka and Fleras, above n 138, 
99-100; Charles M Hawksley and Richard Howson, 'Tino Rangatiratanga and Mana Motuhake: Nation State and Self 
Determination in Aotearoa New Zealand' (2011) 7(3) AlterNative: A Journal a/Indigenous Peoples 246, 250-51 , 
255 
peoples in Guatemala existing democratic institutions provide an avenue for strong Indigenous 
political expression. But this ignores concerns over the Hispanic structure of those political 
institutions and the differences between and within different Indigenous and Mayan collectives 
that make pan-Indigenous or even pan-Maya action difficult. And yet the special procedures 
have shied away from advocating stronger models. Where special procedures experts exclude 
stronger forms of Indigenous self-determination from their dialogues with states and their 
country reports they are pushing those dimensions to the fringes, weakening and radicalising 
them. While their compromise interpretations may improve the position of Indigenous peoples 
in the short-term in the longer term it may make it more difficult for Indigenous peoples to 
successfully bring more expansive claims against the state. 156 In this way we see how the work 
of the special procedures both supports and constrains Indigenous peoples' claims. Part of the 
experts' hesitancy in advocating stronger forms of self-determination may be attributable to the 
diversity of opinions amongst Indigenous peoples regarding what self-determination means for 
them in practice. But this only underscores how problematic it is for mandate-holders to give 
voice to such a small selection of understandings of the concept. For frank dialogue on 
Indigenous peoples' claims to occur, self-determination needs to return to the forefront of 
discussion as an explicit counter to the Government's principle of unitary sovereignty. 157 
Pushback is likely from some quarters. 158 But the special procedures' low influence to date 
indicates that they have little to lose by invoking the strong language of self-determination. As 
the case studies reveal, states will not necessarily even implement recommendations reflecting 
its weaker dimensions. 
2 The Equality Contest: Rights versus Privileges 
A contest of equalities plays out vividly in the principle of Indigenous privilege, the 
second core principle leveraged by the states. It is the prescription that where Indigenous 
253-55. Regarding Guatemala, see, eg, Demetrio Cojti Cuxil, 'The Politics of Mayan Revindication' in Edward F 
Fischer and R McKenna Brown (eds), Maya Cultural Activism in Guatemala (University of Texas Press, 2001) 19, 
27-43; Montejo, above n 77, 174; Gere and MacNeill , above n 77, 99-100, 102; Santiago Bastos, 'La (Ausencia de) 
Demanda Auton6mica en Guatemala' in Miguel Gonzalez, Araceli Burguete Cal y Mayor and Pablo Ortiz-T (eds), La 
Autonomia a Debate Autogobierno Indigena y Estado Plurinacional en America Latina (FLACSO, Sede Ecuador et 
al, 2010) 317. 
156 Merry, describing the work of Myra Marx Ferree, argues ' that resonant discourses are less radical than 
nonresonant ones, and that some movement leaders may choose the nonresonant approach to induce greater social 
change in the long run ' . Myra Marx Ferree, 'Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of 
the United States and Germany' (2003) 109(2) American Journal of Sociology 304,305 cited in Sally Engle Merry, 
'Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle' (2006) 108(1) American Anthropologist 38, 
41. 
157 Scholars from Koskenniemi to Ivison have underscored the need for genuine dialogue (or ' multilogue ') to resol ve 
normative problems. Koskenniemi , above n 118, 544-45; Duncan Ivison, Postcolonial Liberalism (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 163. 
158 For example, from those who see claims based on a human right to culture as capable of generating the same 
outcomes that claims based on self-determination can and those who see self-determination as having 'already failed 
as a strategy.' For comment see, eg, Kirsty Gover, 'Review Essay: The Elusive Promise oflndigenous Development: 
Rights, Cu lture, Strategy by Karen Engle' (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 5. 
256 
peoples enjoy differential recognition based on their identity they are receiving an inappropriate 
privilege rather than enjoying a human right. The concept of equality is leveraged by states in its 
formal sense to argue against 'special' recognition afforded Indigenous peoples and it is 
advanced by Indigenous peoples to argue for equal recognition of their difference. In New 
Zealand the former leader of both the National and ACT parties, Don Brash, has been a 
particular advocate of the principle of Indigenous privilege. 159 The support he secured as leader 
of the Opposition with his 'one law for all New Zealanders' stance in the mid-2000s prompted 
the Government of the time to review all policies and laws that made specific provision for 
Maori. 160 This rhetoric was at fever pitch at the time of Stavenhagen's visit. It is evident in an 
internal draft of the Government' s formal response to Stavenhagen's report before the HRC: 
The arrangements in place for Maori take into account historical inequalities, and, where 
appropriate, encourage self-management. Consistent with our obligations under CERD, they are, 
of course, discretionary. And, the CERD also makes it clear that special measures should be 
temporary and should not lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups. 
The Special Rapporteur seems to be suggesting, however, that special measures should exist in 
perpetuity. Any notion of perpetual dependency is not one that is shared by Maori, or by the 
New Zealand government. 161 
The Government conveyed similar comments to Stavenhagen when responding privately to his 
draft report. 162 Its public response to the report was more toned down, although the Government 
advised that '[i]n our view, a delicate balance can and must be struck between measures that 
may be put in place specifically for indigenous peoples and the imperative to avoid creating 
different classes of citizenship.' 163 The language of differential citizenship recurs in 
Government statements on Indigenous peoples' rights. 164 But the principle of Indigenous 
privilege has not been expressly advocated by the Government in response to Anaya's report; 
although the notion resurfaced with a vengeance in the rhetoric of the ACT Party, one of the 
National-led Government's coalition partners, following Anaya's visit. 165 Both New Zealand' s 
159 See, eg, Don Brash, leader of the National Party, 'Nationhood' (Address to the Orewa Rotary Club, Orewa, 27 
January 2004) <http://www.scoop.co.nzJstories/P A0401 /S00220.htm>. See generally Pitty, above n 73, 36-9; Claire 
Charters, 'Do Maori Rights Discriminate Against Non-Maori?' (2009) 40 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 649 . 
160 Trevor Mallard, Coordinating Minister Race Relations, 'Terms of Reference: Review of Targeted Programmes ' (Media Release, 25 March 2004) <http://www.beehive.govt.nz1node/19258>. 161 Internal briefing to New Zealand ' s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'New Zealand's Response to the Report 
of the UN Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Issues' , 24 February 2006, obtained under OJA request from MFAT, 5. 162 Internal briefing to New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Special Rapporteur' s Draft Report on 
the Situation of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms oflndigenous Peoples in New Zealand ', 31 January 
2006, obtained under OJA request from MFAT, 5. 
163 Mackay, above n 130. 
164 See, eg, New Zealand Government representative, Rosemary Banks, cited in GA, 107'h Plenary Meeting: Official 
Records, UN Doc A/6 1/PV.107 (13 September 2007) 14. 165 See, eg, ACT Party, Fed Up with Pandering to Maori Radicals? (Advertisement, 11 July 2011) 
<http: //www.act.org.nzJfiles/MaoriRadicals.pdt>. 
257 
Court of Appeal and the Waitangi Tribunal have identified the lingering public presence of the 
. . l . h 166 pnnc1p e m t e country. 
The Indigenous privileges rhetoric is apparent in Guatemala too. According to a PDH 
representative, amongst ' the conservatives' the prevailing sentiment is that Indigenous peoples 
are being afforded privileges (such as through proposed laws that seek to protect Indigenous 
peoples ' sacred sites) that will ' divide the country '. 167 A similar rhetoric was behind the failure 
to get the constitutional reforms giving effect to the Indigenous Agreement up in 1999. 168 But 
the principle has not played out in dialogue surrounding the special procedures experts' reports 
in the same way. 
In New Zealand the special procedures have countered this principle by emphasising the 
rights basis for measures targeted at Indigenous peoples. Stavenhagen criticised the view that 
Maori have special privileges in several places in his 2005 report. For example, he commented: 
[S]ome New Zealanders appear to approve of the view of "One law for all" (that is, no more 
special laws on Maori rights, understood as meaning Government should stop the alleged 
"pampering" of Maori). The political media have taken up these arguments and have reflected 
the view of those who would like to see an end to the alleged "privileges" accorded by the 
Government to Maori. The Special Rapporteur was asked several times whether he agreed that 
Maori had received special privileges. He answered that he had not been presented with any 
evidence to that effect, but that, on the contrary, he had received plenty of evidence concerning 
the historical and institutional discrimination suffered by the Maori people, evidence that he is 
concerned with in the present report. 169 
He identified the role of some politicians in pushing the idea too. 170 The privileges rhetoric was 
not a focus of Anaya's report, although he noted complaints regarding ' the lack of political will 
to implement what are perceived as "special measures" for Maori people.' 171 But in the press 
statement he gave on the last day of his 2010 visit, and in his preliminary note, he referenced the 
debate commenting that the UNDRIP 'far from affirming rights that place indigenous peoples in 
a privileged position, aims at repairing the ongoing consequences of the historical denial of the 
166 See, eg, Takamore v Clarke [2011] NZCA 587 (CA), 658-59; Waitangi Tribunal , 'Time to Move beyond 
Grievance in Treaty Relationship, Tribunal Says' (Media Release, 2 July 201 1) <http://www.waitangi-
tribunal.govt.nz1news/media/wai262 .asp>. The Government's equation oflndigenous rights with privileges or specia l 
measures also prompted concerned comment from the CERD Committee in 2007. CERD Committee 2007, UN Doc 
CERD/C/NZL/CO/1 7, [ 15]. 
167 Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 201 !) . 
168 Sieder, 'The Judiciary and Indigenous Rights in Guatemala', above n 65, 219; Kay B Warren, 'Voting Against 
Indigenous Rights in Guatemala: Lessons from the 1999 Referendum' in Kay B Warren and Jean E Jackson (eds), 
Indigenous Movements, Self-Representation, and the State in Latin America (Un iversity of Texas Press, 2002) 149, 
172-74. 
169 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3 , [54]. See also [27], [79]. 170 Stavenhagen Report on New Zealand, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, [27] . 171 Anaya Follow-up Report on Nev.i Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4, [21]. 
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right to self-determination and other basic human rights. ' 172 
In respect of Guatemala, the privileges debate is not tackled in any of the special 
procedures experts' country reports. But critical comment on the absence of equality for 
Indigenous peoples is made. For example, Stavenhagen observes that 'far from being full and 
equal partners with the rest of the population, indigenous people have been subjected to political 
exclusion, cultural discrimination and economic marginalization from society', 173 and that the 
country ' remains a profoundly unequal and divided society. ' 174 Experts including those on 
food, 175 health, 176 and violence against women 177 have also underscored the inequality 
experienced by Indigenous peoples in Guatemala repeatedly in their country reports. 
The persistence of the Indigenous privilege principle, especially in New Zealand, 
suggests that the mandate-holders need to devote greater attention to explaining the rights basis 
for recognition afforded Indigenous peoples in their general and special country reports. 178 
Alternatively, at least in New Zealand where the rights counter has been more prominent, it 
suggests that the counter is ineffective and a new response should be found. The rights versus 
privileges debate could be put to bed by moving away from using rights language and instead 
focusing on individual and group capabilities. For example, Duncan Ivison has suggested that it 
may be 'more helpful to talk about the capabilities we want individuals or groups to have - as 
opposed to the rights they apparently already possess - and then of the mechanisms and 
institutions required for their effective exercise.' 179 Karen Engle has also suggested that 
Indigenous claims are better expressed outside of a human rights framework. 180 But as a human 
rights mechanism the special procedures are confined to the language ofrights. 181 Moreover, 
rights discourse is the principal language of emancipation globally, making articulations outside 
of its frame more difficult to be heard. 182 
172 James Anaya, 'New Zealand: More to be Done to Improve Indigenous People 's Rights, Says UN Expert', above n 
144; Anaya Preliminary Note on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/15/37/Add .9, [4]. l T 
, Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003 /90/Add.2, 2. 
174 Ibid [70]. 
1r 
, Expert on Food Guatemala 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44/Add.l, 2, [15]-[16] , [54] , [5 8](b) . 176 Expert on Health Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/17/25/Add.2, 1-2, [6]-[7], [30] , [36]-[37] , [39]-[41] , [43], [ 51]. 
177 Expert on Vio lence Against Women Guatemala 2005, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3, 2, [4] , [5] , [11] , [21] , [67]. 178 I note that Anaya devoted especial attention to debunking the view that the UNDRJP affords Indigenous peoples 
privileges in his final report to the GA in 20 13 . Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [68] -[72]. 179 Ivison, above n 157, 164. 
180 Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy, above n 120, 1-2, 7-8, 14, 73, 
98-9, 102, 133. 
181 Merry observes that ' translators are restricted by the discursive fields within which they work. ' Merry, above n 
156, 48. 
182 David Kennedy points out that ' [a]s a dominant and fashionable vocabulary for thinking about emancipation, 
human rights crowds out other ways of understanding harm and recompense.' Kennedy, above n 53, 9. See also 
Wendy Brown, "The Most We Can Hope For. .. ': Human Rights and the Politics ofFatalism' (2004) 103(2 -3) South 
Atlantic Quarterly 451 , 461-62. 
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3 National Economic Development versus Indigenous Rights 
The third principle of national economic development is leveraged by both states. It is the 
prescription that economic growth is the priority of the state and the key to national progress. In 
New Zealand the principle is an implicit driving force in governmental policy. 183 For example, a 
cynical view would see both sets of foreshore and seabed legislation as spurred by a desire to 
' resolve' Maori property rights in the foreshore and seabed in order to facilitate offshore natural 
resource extraction ventures. 184 In its response to Anaya's 2012 communication, the 
Government also emphasised the need to 'achieve better results for Maori, which will benefit 
New Zealand as a whole', which has a development undertone. 185 But as a developed country 
the principle is not at the forefront in the Indigenous rights domain in same way as it is in 
Guatemala, a developing country. The Guatemalan Government has not explicitly advocated 
this principle in response to special procedures experts' reports. In its interactive dialogues with 
special procedures experts and reports to UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies its language 
regarding development is carefully chosen, emphasising social and cultural development 
alongside economic development, and highlighting the important role of Indigenous peoples in 
its achievement. 186 But there are indicators of the Government's more general prioritisation of 
economic development, especially the extractive industries, 187 as its stance towards those 
opposing the Marlin mine reveals. Guatemala's Constitution even declares the exploitation of 
minerals a public necessity. 188 And the Government itself identifies that it has 'a big interest in 
developing the sector.' 189 This is problematic because Indigenous peoples' assertions of their 
right to oppose extractive projects on or near their territories are then framed as opposition to 
national development and progress. In the words of one Mayan interviewee, 'as we object to 
mining activity it 's been projected that our objection is against development.' 190 
The special procedures have countered with the need for economic development to 
occur consistently with Indigenous peoples' rights. Several special procedures experts have 
expressed concern at the negative impact of development projects on Indigenous peoples in 
183 See, eg, McCormack, above n 123, 421. 
184 Interview 5 (Christchurch, 6 May 2011). 
185 Letter from Brian Wilson to James Anaya, 6 November 2012, 2 avai lable in Joint Communications Report 
February 2013, UN Doc A!HRC/22/67, 78. 
186 See, eg, Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast 
Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and interactive Dialogue, above n 27 ; 
Guatemala Report to CERD Committee 2009, UN Doc CERD/C/GTM/12-13 , [281], [294]. 187 See generally Sieder, "Emancipation' or ' Regulation ' ? Law, Globalization and Indigenous Peoples' Rights in 
Post-War Guatemala', above n 75 , 254 . 
188 Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala 1985 (Guatemala), art 125. 
189 Gobierno de Guatemala Ministerio de Economica and Invest in Guatemala, Mining (20 13) 4. 190 Interview 14 (Guatemala City, 1 June 2011 ). See also HCHR Report on Guatemala 2012, UN Doc 
A!HRC/1 9/21 /Add.l , [55]. Regarding the prevalence of this rhetoric generally see, eg, Rhiannon Morgan, 
Transforming Law and institution: Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights (Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2011) 158. 
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Guatemala, Anaya most extensively. 191 He attempted to paint a picture of how development 
could occur consistent with Indigenous rights, highlighting the importance of consultation with 
Indigenous peoples regarding the projects, for example. But he also called on Indigenous 
peoples to enter into dialogue with the Government with a view to reaching agreement on 
projects that respect their internationally recognised rights, contribute to their economic and 
social development, and enable their full participation in decision-making affecting their 
lives. 192 As identified in the previous chapter, some Indigenous peoples criticised the perceived 
pro-development sentiment in Anaya's injunction. The tension reveals something of the limits 
of human rights discourse as a tool for resisting dominant models of development as economic 
growth: the two are intertwined; the GA has described them as 'interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing' .193 As a result, the human rights project has been criticised for legitimating 
neoliberal development models that maintain Western hegemony. 194 
Related to Guatemala's claims of the need to prioritise national economic development 
is the Government's claim that its developing status renders it incapable of implementing 
measures recommended by the special procedures. I term it the principle of 'lack of capacity'. 
The Guatemalan state plays on the idea that it is doing the best it can within its limited means. It 
has repeated its commitment, and will, to implement the international Indigenous standards 
articulated by the special procedures before the UN. 195 But it expressly or impliedly cites, inter 
alia, lack of funds, technical expertise, sufficient assistance and knowledge of solutions for its 
inability to give them full effect. For example, during the interactive dialogue with the expert on 
food in 2010 the Guatemalan delegate asserted that the situation of under-nourishment (which 
particularly impacts Indigenous peoples) was a priority for the Government's attention adding 
the proviso, 'although we do have limitations we have implemented measures to the best of our 
abilities' .196 Statements in a similar vein have been made following the state's two UPRs. 197 
191 See, eg, Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc AIHRC/18/35/Add.3; Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, 
UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, [27]; Expert on Food Guatemala 2006, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/44/Add. l, [43], [51], 
[58]G); Expert on Health Guatemala 2011, UN Doc AIHRC/17/25/Add.2, [39]. 192 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc AIHRC/18/35/ Add.3, [77]-[87]. 193 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1 , UN Doc AIRES/60/1 (16 September 2005) (135]. 194 For example, according to Wendy Brown, rights discourse ' converges neatly with the requisites of liberal 
imperialism and global free trade, and legitimates both as well.' Brown, above n 182, 461. See generally Sundhya 
Pahuja, 'Rights as Regulation: The Integration of Development and Human Rights' in Bronwen Morgan (ed), The 
Intersection of Rights and Regulation: New Directions in Sociolegal Scholarship (Ash gate Publishing, 2007) 167; 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law From Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World 
Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 163-232; Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A Political & Cultural 
Critique (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 
195 See, eg, Guatemalan Government representatives, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado and Luisa Bonilla De Galvao 
De Queiroz, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur 
and Interactive Dialogue, above n 27; Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, 
speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Fourth Session: Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, Mr Rodolfo Stavenhagen (20 March 2007) 
United Nations <http: //www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=070320>. 196 Guatemalan Government representative, Carlos Ramiro Martinez Alvarado, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human 
Rights Council Thirteenth Session: Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mr 
Olivier De Schutter (5 March 2010) United Nations <http ://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=100305>. 197 See, eg, HRC, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Eighth Session, UN Doc AIHRC/8/52 (1 September 
2008) [685]; Guatemala UPR 2012, UN Doc AIHRC/22/8, [6]. 
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Constraining expectations of its human rights capacity allows the Government to present itself 
as both needy and progressing, which assists it to deflect criticism for its failures in rights 
implementation and allows it to continue to secure donor funding and assistance from states and 
international organisations. 
At times this principle has been countered by mandate-holders ' affirmations that it is 
within the state's abilities to institute reforms to enable it to better comply with international 
Indigenous rights norms, it simply lacks the political will to do so. For example, both 
Stavenhagen and the expert on racism have identified that the Indigenous Agreement remains 
unimplemented due to a lack of political will, 198 with Stavenhagen stating that 'Guatemala has 
the capacity ... to implement an effective human rights policy.' 199 The strongest statement of the 
Government ' s ability to address its own human rights situation has come from the expert on 
extrajudicial executions. In 2007 he observed that 'Guatemala is not a failed State' nor 
' especially poor' ,200 and that 'Guatemalans are not ignorant of the problems confronting their 
country and are aware of the policies that could be pursued to ameliorate those problems.' 20 1 
Rather, he concluded that the widespread nature of the human rights violations he witnessed 
were the product of' a distinct lack of political will' . 202 To an extent the Guatemalan 
Government is justified in bringing attention to its reduced capacity to address Indigenous rights 
issues within its borders, given the economic elite ' s stranglehold on power noted above and in 
Chapter VI. But this does not absolve the state ' s responsibility to tackle that stranglehold in 
order to meet its Indigenous rights, and other human rights, obligations. 
In New Zealand, instead of a focus on incapacity as an excusing principle, the 
Government emphasises what it perceives as the comparatively impressive steps it has taken to 
address Indigenous claims to excuse it from criticism. As noted above, the Government pushes 
the idea that it is already a world leader in Indigenous rights recognition comparative to other 
states with the implication that it should be immune from criticism in that domain. Mandate-
holders have demonstrated that while New Zealand has taken some important steps in 
Indigenous rights recognition significant concerns remain. 203 But the strength ofthis self-image 
prevents the New Zealand Government from taking seriously criticisms of its Indigenous rights 
record. Instead it blames the mandate-holder for getting it wrong, as it did with Stavenhagen, or 
fixates on the praise and glosses over the criticism (where it responds at all) as it did with 
Anaya. 
198 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, (62]; Expert on Racism Guatemala 2005, 
UN Doc E/CN .4/2005/18/ Add.2, (3 7] . The expert on racism acknowledged that resourcing issues played a role too. 199 Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, [68]. Anaya concluded that the reforms he 
identified required the Government to show greater initiative but he also called on other stakeholders, includ ing 
Indigenous peoples, to make greater efforts to engage in dialogue with the Government. Anaya Special Report on 
Guatemala, UN Doc NHRC/18/35/Add.3, [77]. 
200 Expert on Extrajudicial Executions Guatemala 200 7, UN Doc A/HRC/4/20/Add.2, 2. 20 1 Ibid [63]. 
202 Ibid 2. 
203 See, eg, Anaya Follow-up Report on New Zealand, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.4 , [66]-[85]; Stavenhagen Report 
on New Zealand, UN Doc EiC .4/2006/78/Add.3, [51], [59], [67], [77] -[82]. 
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4 Tackling Principles: A Role for Continuous Improvement 
More traction may be gained where the principles underlying the states' responses to 
these Indigenous rights norms are explicitly tackled. This is because principles 'set the direction 
of regulatory change' by unifying thinking. 204 As identified in Chapter II, this feature makes 
principles the most important component of the regulatory webs. At present the principles 
pushed by the states are being inadequately contested and dominating the Indigenous rights 
domains in both states. Special procedures experts need to get inventive and develop principles 
to set a new direction for regulatory change. Theoretically, the possible principles are 
constrained only by the experts' imaginations. 
Continuous improvement is one principle that may be useful as a novel counter by 
mandate-holders where state actors view themselves either as incapacitated (Guatemala) or as 
world leaders (New Zealand) in Indigenous rights recognition. As identified in Chapter II, 
continuous improvement is a management philosophy capturing the notion of an ongoing effort 
to improve or ratchet-up standards.205 And its focus on a learning culture rather than a culture of 
blame has been singled out by Charlesworth as potentially useful in fostering improved human 
rights protection, including in the work of the special procedures.206 Dominguez Redondo and 
Rodriguez-Pinero have also made a connection between the general failure of the human rights 
project to elicit compliance and its naming and shaming approach, although neither discuss the 
principle of continuous improvement specifically. Dominguez Redondo explains that 'those in 
charge of human rights mechanisms, scholars and practitioners tend to neglect the potential 
value of cooperative approaches to human rights implementation and focus instead on the 
confrontational approaches' .207 And Rodriguez-Pinero observes 'that the effectiveness of "name 
and shame" techniques has long been superseded by crude facts', 208 underlining 'the importance 
of empowering rights-holders, ofreinforcing duty-bearers' capacities, and of the role of 
technical cooperation' in heralding a more sophisticated approach to rights implementation.209 
The idea of special procedures experts putting a greater focus on the cooperative aspect of their 
work has received support from mandate-holders and states too.21° For example, in his final 
204 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17, 522. 
205 Ibid 25, 35, 615-16. 
206 Charlesworth, above n 105, 15. 
207 Dominguez Redondo, above n 8, 683. Note that Dominguez Redondo's focus is narrow. She is concerned with the 
role of the 'cooperative' mechanism of the UPR in creating international legal obligations. 208 Luis Rodriguez-Pinero, "'Where Appropriate": Monitoring/Implementing oflndigenous Peoples' Rights under the 
Declaration' in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA, 2009) 314, 329. 209 Ibid 330. 
210 See, eg, Report of the Special Procedures' 14th Meeting, UN Doc A/HRC/7/29, [33] ; Report of the Special 
Procedures' 18h Meeting, UN Doc A/HRC/18/41, [34]; Juan Jose Gomez Camacho, Permanent Representative of 
Mexico to the UN (Geneva), and Sihasak Phuangketkeow, President of the HRC, cited in Improving Implementation 
and Follow-up: Treaty Bodies, Special Procedures, Universal Periodic Review - Report of Proceedings (Open 
Society Justice Initiative, Global Observatory on Human Rights - UPR Watch and Foreign Policy at Brookings, 
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report to the GA in 2013 Anaya remarked that he hoped 'that future work of the mandate will be 
able to focus more on moving beyond reacting to denouncements of alleged human rights 
violations, to helping to assist indigenous peoples and States to develop concrete proposals and 
programmes of action for advancing the rights of indigenous peoples. ' 211 
The principle of continuous improvement aligns with the diplomatic dimension of the 
special procedures' mandate. It is also relationship enhancing, which is important given that the 
special procedures are dependent on the cooperation of states, as well as Indigenous peoples and 
others, in their work. Chapters IV to VI revealed that the principle of continuous improvement 
is already engaged to a very small degree in mandate-holders' work. For example, mandate-
holders typically begin their country and special reports by highlighting positive steps the state 
has taken towards respect for Indigenous rights and then go on to outline core Indigenous rights 
concerns that persist. But the principle has been under-engaged in New Zealand and Guatemala. 
Embracing the principle of continuous improvement would mean flipping the focus of special 
procedures experts' reports. The starting point would be to understand what the state is good at 
and then to build commitment outwards through shared projects.212 Rather than shaming, 
cooperation is the hallmark of this approach. Under this approach New Zealand's self-image as 
an Indigenous rights leader could even be exploited to the advantage of the experts. The state's 
interest in maintaining that self-image could be harnessed as a tool for persuading New Zealand 
to become 'an innovator to lead the pack' in continuous improvement.213 This could harbour 
benefits, both for New Zealand's Indigenous rights conformity and potentially that of other 
states, who are compelled to 'catch up with the leader'.214 
Care must be taken to ensure that embrace of this principle is not counter-productive, 
however. Chapter II identified Charlesworth's caution of the 'need to guard against the process 
of continuous improvement itself becoming ritualised. ' 215 A commitment to continuous 
improvement should not prevent the special procedures from being critical where necessary. If 
pushed too far the principle may contribute to the state's inability to see the true extent ofrights 
violations within the country and its liability for them. In addition, the special procedures' 
experts will also need to take care not to alienate Indigenous peoples - the greatest potential 
advocates of the reports - who expect mandate-holders to communicate the gravity of their 
human rights situation forcefully to govemrnents.216 A 'delicate balance' is demanded between 
2010) 11, 27; Dell Higgie, New Zealand Government representative, speaking in HRC, Webcast Human Rights 
Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 27. 211 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [5]. 
212 See, eg, Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation' , above n 22, 501. 213 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17,615. 
214 Ibid . 
2 15 Charlesworth, above n I 05, 15 . See generally John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai and Valerie Braithwaite, Regulating 
Aged Care (Edward Elgar, 2007), 207-8. 
216 For example, Tauli-Corpuz and Alcantara identify the importance of experts not offending the states that host 
them but praise Stavenhagen for having been 'uncompromising in pointing out the realities in a country' . Tauli-
Corpuz and Alcantara, above n 19, 32. 
264 
the criticism ofrights violations and the encouragement ofrights promotion.217 
D Mechanisms 
I The States' Tools 
To push these principles, states and mandate-holders largely engage webs of dialogue 
and persuasion, dialogue being the primary regulatory mechanism available to the experts. But 
this does not put the actors on an equal footing. As identified in Chapter II, states' use of 
dialogic mechanisms carries more weight than mandate-holders' use of them because lurking 
behind the state's dialogue is always the spectre of enforcement through coercion and other 
means. Modelling, which is a dialogic mechanism, is the primary tool engaged by both states. 
Models of New Zealand as an Indigenous rights leader and egalitarian land of opportunity for 
all were promoted domestically and internationally in response to both Stavenhagen and 
Anaya's visits and reports, particularly following Stavenhagen's report.218 It used the models to 
dismiss and gloss over the special procedures' criticisms of its Indigenous rights situation. In 
contrast, Guatemala modelled itself as a state committed to Indigenous rights but thwarted by 
domestic conditions and in need of international assistance to realise those commitments. It 
used this model to explain its minimal progress. 
In both states the threat and use of military coercion, economic coercion and systems of 
reward - all tools of the powerful - are present although they have not been leveraged in 
response to the mandate-holders' work. Military and economic coercion are dominant motifs in 
states' struggles to contain Indigenous peoples' claims. Military coercion is most stark in 
Guatemala. It is evident in the violent repression of protests over development projects on or 
near Indigenous territories, the criminalisation of Indigenous peoples involved in protests, and 
the imposition of states of siege over Indigenous territories where development projects are 
opposed.219 Even where force is not used, the threat of force remains high given the state's 
2 17 Charlesworth, above n 105, 16. See also Piccone, 'The Contribution of the UN's Special Procedures to National 
Level Implementation ofHuman Rights Norms', above n 1, 216; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's 
Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 76, 128; Flood, above n 7, 113; Joanna Naples-Mitchell, 
'Perspectives of UN Special Rapporteurs on their Role: Inherent Tensions and Unique Contributions to Human 
Rights' (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 232, 241. 
2 18 See, eg, Prime Minister John Key quoted in Bennett, above n 127; Cullen, above n 126; Parekura Horomia, 
Minister of Maori Affairs, 'NZ Government to Host United Nations Special Rapporteur ' (Media Release, 15 
November 2005) <http://www.beehive.govt.nzJrelease/nz-govemment-host-united-nations-special-rapporteur>; Dell 
Higgie, New Zealand Government representative, speaking in. HRC, Webcast Human Rights Council Eighteenth 
Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 27 ; Mackay, above n 130. 219 See, eg, Shin Imai, Ladan Mehranvar and Jennifer Sander, 'Breaching Indigenous Law: Canadian Mining in 
Guatemala' (2007) 6 Indigenous Law Journal 101, 110-15, 124; Amanda M Fulmer, Angelina Snodgrass Godoy and 
Philip Neff, 'Indigenous Rights, Resistance, and the Law: Lessons from a Guatemalan Mine' (2008) 50(4) Latin 
American Politics and Society 91, 91-2, 114; Sieder, 'The Judiciary and Indigenous Rights in Guatemala', above n 65, 
216-17; Gobiemo de Guatemala, 'Gobiemo Levanta estado de Sitio y Declara el de Prevenci6n en Cuatro 
Municipios' (Government Notice, 9 May 2013) <http://www.guatemala.gob.gt/index.php/20 l l -08-04-l 8-06-
26/item/3725-gobiemo-levanta-estado-de-sitio-y-declara-el-de-prevenci%C3%B3n-en-cuatro-municipios>. 
265 
brutal use of violence against Indigenous peoples during the internal conflict. The threat and use 
of military coercion against Maori is present in New Zealand too. It is evident in the heavy-
handed police tactics during Operation 8, for example.220 In Guatemala economic coercion is 
apparent through the withholding of basic state services to Indigenous communities; as Chapter 
VI showed public investment in Guatemala is inequitable predominantly targeting urban areas 
with lower populations of Indigenous peoples. It means that business interests seeking to 
execute development projects on Indigenous lands can ' reward' Indigenous peoples by 
providing improved community infrastructure (such as health centres, schools and roads) , which 
are the responsibility of the state.221 In New Zealand, for those Maori collectives who cooperate 
with the Government, there is, for example, the promise of recognition as a mandated iwi 
organisation that can receive historical Treaty settlement redress and other forms of Government 
cooperation and support. 
2 The Experts' Mechanisms 
(a) Shaming Dominates 
As identified in Chapters IV to VI, like with most of the UN human rights machinery, 
shaming is the primary regulatory mechanism engaged by the special procedures mandate-
holders, including in New Zealand and Guatemala. For shaming to be an effective persuasive 
tool the state must care about its Indigenous rights reputation. Where states predominantly 
engage in Indigenous rights ritualism, as New Zealand and Guatemala do, it indicates that the 
states care about whether they appear to be complying with at least some Indigenous rights 
norms. This concern may be explained in varying ways. As Chapter IV pointed out, states may 
covet a reputation as an Indigenous rights respecter to secure continued investment and donor 
funding, maintain domestic stability, or to enjoy status as a good global actor. This care for 
appearances provides a foothold for mandate-holders: by naming states' behaviour as 
Indigenous rights ritualism the mandate-holders can help to deconstruct the false image of the 
state as respecting the relevant right and reveal the true areas in which the state is, and is not, 
committed. This information can then be leveraged by Indigenous rights advocates in their 
interactions with state actors, the media and others. Shaming has not been leveraged to its full 
capacity in either state. For example, neither state has been pulled up by the special procedures 
experts on its tactic of avoiding recognition of hard Indigenous peoples ' rights .222 But, where it 
220 See, eg, Moana Jackson, 'Preface' in Danny Keenan (ed), Terror in Our Midst? Searching/or Terror in Aotearoa 
New Zealand (Huia Publishers, 2008) 1, 1-2. 
22 1 See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 , [24]. 222 Stavenhagen, in his Study on Best Practices, identified the general tendency amongst states to implement 
recommendations regarding social policy and development and avoid implementing recommendations regarding 
constitutional reform and land. Study on Best Practices, UN Doc A/HRC/4/32/Add.4, [83]. 
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has been leveraged, shaming has not proved very effective as the primary tool in the special 
procedures' tool belt.This has been the case even in Guatemala, despite the fact that Downs and 
Jones argue that reputational consequences for rights violations appear to be higher for 
developing states.223 In part this is attributable to the way the experts have approached the 
technique of shaming. Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite identify that strong regulators ' do 
mobilize shame, but in a reintegrative way' , rather than in a stigmatising way, when norms are 
not met.224 It is a stretch to characterise the technique as being used in a reintegrative way in 
both states. 
(b) Modelling not Prominent 
There are a host of other regulatory mechanisms that have not been widely engaged by 
the special procedures, which could also be useful. Modelling is one such mechanism. 
Modelling has been underutilised by the special procedures experts in both states. Yet, 
Braithwaite and Drahos identify it as 'the most consistently important mechanism of 
globalization' .225 As Chapter II established, it is especially useful for actors with little resources. 
This is -because whether a model is effective depends more on the power of the model than of 
the resources and capacities of the actor promoting it;226 although Braithwaite and Drahos' 
findings still suggest that powerful actors will generally prevail over less powerful actors.227 
Special procedures experts do engage the mechanism of modelling to a small degree. In a sense, 
every recommendation issued by the mandate-holders can be understood as a model: each is a 
conception of action to be taken. But Braithwaite and Drahos point to -Oran Young and Gail 
Osherenko's finding regarding international environmental regimes that 'models must be 
simple.' 228 Braithwaite and Drahos add that those models that have impact 'are uncomplicated 
formulae that advocates and journalists can encapsulate for political and public consumption. ' 229 
Recommendations vary in form but rarely do they meet these criteria such that they spur the 
mass action envisaged by those authors. In fact, the case studies do not reveal any successful 
examples of the mandate-holders exploiting the micro-macro theory of the processes of 
globalisation put forward by Braithwaite and Drahos in which modelling is central, which is 
outlined in Chapter II. 
Models can also be understood as transferable examples of behaviour from other 
countries. This taps into the responsive approach to regulation's idea that regulatory culture 
223 George W Downs and Michael A Jones, 'Reputation, Compliance, and International Law' (2002) 31 Journal of 
Legal Studies S95, Sl 13-S114. 
224 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 215, 302. 
225 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17, 34. 
226 Ibid 595. 
227 See, eg, ibid 475, 551. 
228 Ibid 291 referring to Oran R Young and Gail Osherenko (eds), Polar Politics: Creating International 
Environmental Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1993). 
229 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17, 291. 
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should be conceived 'not as a rulebook but as a storybook' through which 'instructive stories' 
are shared.230 Subedi observes that some of the special procedures experts' country visits 'may 
constitute a learning process of best practice in operation in countries with a better record of the 
human rights situation. These may then be passed on to other countries.' 231 Special procedures 
experts have sometimes promoted models of successful rights recognition from other countries 
in the case study states. For example, in his 2011 report on Guatemala the expert on health 
described effective interventions by women's groups in rural Nepal to address perinatal 
problems, which 'could readily be adapted to the most remote villages in Guatemala' .232 But 
references like this are infrequent. Given that mandate-holders are exposed to positive measures 
taken by states and other actors to respect Indigenous rights across the globe, it is surprising that 
these examples are not drawn on more. The practice is largely restricted to occasional 
statements in the experts ' thematic reports. 233 
Guatemala could learn both from (apparent) world leaders in the protection of 
Indigenous rights, such as Norway, and from similarly placed countries, such as Nepal, who are 
also struggling to address serious Indigenous rights challenges. Admittedly, contextual 
considerations mean that few models will be wholly transferable. Speaking of human rights 
generally, Ife cautions that care must be taken to avoid making over-simplifications and 
assuming 'some commonality across different communities, which does not reflect the reality of 
practice. ' 234 But the models may still provide inspiration. Special procedures experts could also 
draw on positive models from similarly placed states in Latin America, such as Bolivia, 
Venezuela and Mexico.235 For example, Simmons advocates comparisons ofrights practices 
'within cultures and within development levels' as a way of helping to 'undercut the perception 
that rights are a game of the West against the rest. ' 236 Both Bolivia and Mexico have received a 
country mission from the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples and so are known to the 
mandate. Models of how Guatemala could use its meagre public resources more equitably and 
efficiently would be particularly useful. Guatemala is an especially good candidate for models 
from other countries as it has demonstrated a desire to learn from other states how they are 
tackling Indigenous rights challenges. Guatemalan representatives met with state representatives 
of Nepal, Norway and Peru during 2010 and 2011 to discuss strategies for implementation of 
ILO Convention 169, Indigenous rights challenges, and drafting a law regarding Indigenous 
230 Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lectu re: The Essence of Responsive Regulation', above n 22, 520. Braithwaite relies on 
Clifford Shearing and Richard Ericson in making this point. Clifford D Shearing and Richard V Ericson, 'Culture as 
Figurative Action' (1991) 42( 4) The British Journal of Sociology 481, 489. See also Braithwaite, Makkai and 
Braithwaite, above n 215, 299. 
23 1 Subedi , 'Protection ofHuman Rights through the Mechanism ofUN Special Rapporteurs', above n I , 223 . 232 Expert on Health Guatemala 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/ 17/25/Add.2 , [59] . 
2'3 
J See, eg, Anaya Annual Report 2012, UN Doc A/HRC/2 1/47, [1 3]. 
23 4 Jim Ife, Human Rights From Below: Achieving Rights Through Community Development (Cambridge University 
Press, 20 I 0) 2 11. 
235 Two Guatemalan interviewees identified these three states as potential sources of inspiration for Indigenous rights 
recognition. Interview 15 (Guatemala City and Antigua, 23 May 20 11 ); Interview 16 (Guatemala City, 26 May 
201 1). 
236 Simmons, above n 4,377 (emphasis in original). 
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peoples' right to be consulted, respectively. 237 Other states, including the Philippines, have 
expressed a desire to learn from ' Guatemala' s vast experience in international cooperation on 
human rights issues ' too,238 underscoring the fact that in some respects Guatemala itself may 
provide positive rights lessons for other countries. 
Neither Stavenhagen nor Anaya drew on overseas models for Indigenous rights 
protection in their reports on New Zealand. In contrast to Guatemala, in New Zealand there is 
less interest in what is happening overseas in the recognition of Indigenous claims, a reflection 
of New Zealand's self-image as a world leader in Indigenous rights protection. But New 
Zealand has acted quickly when it has perceived itself to be lagging behind those states on 
which it does model itself more generally, such as Australia, the United States and Canada. For 
example, as identified in Chapter V, New Zealand 's move to endorse the UNDRIP seems to 
have been motivated at least in part by a desire not to be left behind when Australia and Canada 
expressed support for it. 
A key advantage of the mechanism of modelling is that it can be used to harness the 
identitive power of mass publics, which could be of particular use in New Zealand. Recall, as 
set out in Chapter II, that Braithwaite and Drahos argue that actors can use modelling to draw 
out ' contradictions in the identities propagated by dominant models ' that confer privilege on 
dominant groups. 239 Mandate-holders themselves do not necessarily have to develop the models 
that invert hegemonic status systems. There are several potential roles for special procedures 
experts in the modelling process that Braithwaite and Drahos describe, which I identify in 
Chapter II. In brief, they can operate as model missionaries to popularise oppositional models; 
model mercenaries to tum the toeholds created by model missionaries-into footholds; or model 
mongers to experimentally float different oppositional models. 24° For example, the special 
procedures experts could harness the mechanism to draw out contradictions between the human 
rights situation of Maori and New Zealand's dominant national identity that values equality of 
opportunity. Projections of this self-image abound on the international stage, including in New 
Zealand's response to the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples' reports, where references 
237 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, 'Comunicado 06 1-2010: Funcionarios de Nepal Visitan 
Guatemala para Conocer Experiencias Relacionadas con el Avance de! Convenio 169 de la OIT' (Government 
Notice, 19 March 2010) <http ://www.minex.gob.gt/Noticias/Noticia.aspx?ID=2l6&Busqueda=indfgena>; Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores de Guatemala, 'Comunicado 152-2010: Realizan Seminario para Intercambiar Experiencias 
de los Pueblos Indigenas de Noruega y Guatemala' (Government Notice, 16 June 2010) 
<http://www.minex.gob .gt/Noticias/Noticia.aspx?ID=28l&Busqueda=indigena>; Guatemala UPR 2012, UN Doc 
A/HRC/22/8, [98](a) . 
238 HRC, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Guatemala, UN Doc A/HRC/8/38 (29 May 
2008) [66]. In a meeting in Nepal in 2007, Stavenhagen reportedly identified Guatemala as 'one example that can be 
studied carefully' in efforts to address issues facing Nepal. NGO-Federation of Nepalese Indigenous National ities, 
Interaction Meeting with Special Rapporteur: Record of Meeting (2007) 5-6. 239 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17,579. See also Kimberle \Villiams Crenshaw, 'Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law' (1988) 101(7) Harvard Lav,1 Review 1331, 1367. 
240 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17, 579-80. 
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to 'equal treatment', ' fairness ' and ' equality' recur. 241 The media and Internet have an important 
function in encapsulating models for public consumption. But this is hampered in both states by 
the prevalence of discriminatory stereotypes of Indigenous peoples in the mainstream media 
d . G 1 b . 24? an , m uatema a, y access issues. -
(c) Capacity-building Underexploited 
The mechanism of capacity-building has also been underexploited by mandate-holders. 
Anaya' s advice on Guatemala's draft consultation instrument is the only example of a special 
procedures expert providing technical advisory assistance regarding Indigenous rights in either 
state. Capacity-building could be further leveraged by the special procedures experts, especially 
in Guatemala where more of an emphasis on developing the expertise oflocal actors and 
building the capacity of local institutions to address Indigenous rights challenges is needed. This 
would assist in addressing concerns that Indigenous agency is negatively affected by deferring 
to outside international experts, including mandate-holders . Capacity-building has an 
empowering educative dimension, which is positive. It is also relationship enhancing (like a 
focus on continuous improvement), helping to build trust between the collaborating actors. 243 
And it is proactive rather than simply reactive, developing capacity to avoid further rights 
violations rather than only responding to immediate violations. 
As identified above, mandate-holders and states have recognised the value of embracing 
a focus on cooperative capacity-building for the realisation of human rights . Subedi cites the 
argument of some developing states that the move to a more constructive approach, which 
focuses on 'guiding and offering concrete advice towards improving a situation' rather than 
naming and shaming, would help to dispel 'the perception of "us" versus "them'" .244 And 
Pinheiro quotes the words of former HCHR, Sergio Vieira de Mello, in reflecting on his own 
work as a mandate-holder: ' [i]t is not enough to blame. It is also necessary to help governments 
24 1 See, eg, Mackay, above n 130; Dell Higgie, New Zealand Government representative speaking in HRC, Webcas t 
Human Rights Council Eighteenth Session: Statement of Special Rapporteur and Interactive Dialogue, above n 27. 
For further examples beyond the state' s response to the special procedures see, eg, New Zealand Report to CERD 
Committee 2012, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/18-20, [3] ; NZHRC, A Fair Go for All? <http ://www.hrc .co.nz/key-
projects/a-fair-go-for-all>. See generally David Hackett Fischer, Fairness and Freedom: A Histo,y of Two Open 
Societies: New Zealand and the United States (Oxford Uni vers ity Press, 2012) 6-9. 
242 See generally Raymond Nairn et al, 'Media, Racism and Public Health Psychology' (2006) 11 Journal of Health 
Psychology 183; Ajb'ee Jimenez, 'Representaci6n de las Luchas Mayas en los Medios de Comunicaci6n escrita en 
Guatemala' in Roddy Brett and Marta Casaus Arzu (eds), Racism and Ethnic Discrimination in Guatemala: 
Historical Tendencies and Actual Debates (Institute of Lati n American Studies, Stockholm University, 20 10) 77. 243 Capacity-building has been successfu ll y engaged by other human ri ghts actors, such as the OHCHR' s country 
offices, ' to build trust and relationships' with state actors wi th whom relationships can otherwise be strained . 
Chri stian Salazar Volkmann, 'Eval uating the Impact of Human Rights Work: The Office of the United Nations High 
Commiss ioner for Human Rights and the Reduction ofExtrajudicial Executions in Colombia' (20 12) 4(3) Journal of 
Human Rights Practice 396, 427, 429, 446. Admittedly in a markedly different regulatory context, and as identified 
in Chapter II, Heimer and Gazley have also argued that more cooperative interactions between regulators and 
regu latees provide an opportunity fo r transcending rituali sm. Carol A Heimer and J Lynn Gazley, 'Perfo rming 
Regulation: Transcending Regulatory Rituali sm in HIV Clinics' (2012) 46(4) Law & Society Review 853, 853. 24
.i Subedi, 'Protection of Human Rights through the Mechanism of UN Special Rapporteurs', above n l , 228. 
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or regimes to emerge from their own mistakes or their own contradictions. ' 245 Notably, a shift to 
focus on capacity-building is supported by Anaya in the Indigenous rights domain. In 2013, 
when reflecting on the lessons he had learned during his two terms in the role, he stated that 
'[t]he promotion of good practices and providing technical assistance are key areas in which the 
Special Rapporteur has seen his work have a positive effect, with many of his recommendations 
being taken up in legal and policy reforms made at the international and national levels. ' 246 
Going forward, he called for additional attention to be devoted to furnishing capacity-building 
assistance directly to Indigenous peoples (not just states) to support them in their own initiatives 
to realise their rights,247 a welcome suggestion. 
A capacity-building approach also carries attendant risks. States may cite cooperation 
with special procedures experts as evidence of their proactive efforts on human rights even 
where those efforts are lacking, reluctant or ritualistic, as Guatemala did. Time and resources, 
both of which are precious given their limited supply, are then expended on states that lack a 
genuine commitment to the project. There is also the dilemma whether the experts should 
cooperate with states that are known to commit grave Indigenous rights violations.248 But states 
with posit_ive track records of cooperation with the experts can be favoured for technical 
assistance.249 And reintegrative shaming theory suggests that a strategy-of principled 
engagement with states, which dictates 'respectful engagement with the state and its people 
while firmly disapproving' of the rights violation, will yield more influence than stigmatising 
the state and treating it as a pariah.250 
( d) Low Adjustment and Coordination 
Examples of the experts employing the mechanisms of reciprocal adjustment and non-
reciprocal coordination regarding Indigenous peoples' rights are scarce. Non-reciprocal 
coordination is evident in a recommendation by Anaya that Goldcorp's Guatemalan subsidiary 
consider withdrawing its complaints against Indigenous protesters pending before the courts 
(not a move obviously in the company's interests) in order to generate trust with Indigenous 
communities ( easing tensions and facilitating dialogue with the communities, which may 
ultimately allow smoother business operations).251 It is a dialogic tool more suited to a meeting 
room than a UN report and so there are likely more examples of this technique than apparent 
245 Sergio Vieira de Mello in Jean-Claude Buhrer and Claude B Levenson, Sergio Vieira de Mello, un Espoir 
Foudroye (Mille et une nuits, 2004) 84-5 quoted in Pinheiro, above n 19, 167. 246 Anaya Report to GA 20 I 3, UN Doc A/68/317, [ 16]. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Volkmann notes this tension in the context of the OHCHR's work on extrajudicial executions in Colombia. 
Salazar Volkmann, above n 243,447. 
249 Piccone, Catalysts for Rights: The Unique Contribution of the UN's Independent Experts on Human Rights, above 
n 19, 39; Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN's Independent Experts Promote Human Rights, above n 1, 99-
100. 
250 John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth and Aderito Soares, Networked Governance of Freedom and Tyranny: 
Peace in Timor-Leste (ANU EPress, 2012) 32. 
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from the reports. Both mechanisms require reciprocity: an exchange with others for mutual 
benefit. Thus, they depend on a willing other party (for example, the state or business actors) 
with which to exchange. Special procedures experts could try and facilitate Indigenous peoples' 
engagement in strategies of reciprocal adjustment with governments. But the special procedures 
need to be careful that concessions are not made in the form of 'adjustments' regarding 
Indigenous peoples' rights without a clear mandate from the affected Indigenous peoples. 
(e) Faint Webs of Reward and Coercion 
Webs ofreward and coercion - which operate through the mechanisms of economic 
coercion, military coercion, and reward - are only capable of being woven by the special 
procedures experts when they enrol the power of other actors who possess these capabilities ( or 
who are good at enrolling others who do) . Mechanisms of reward and coercion have not been 
well harnessed by the experts in either case study state. The special procedures have at times 
directed recommendations to the UN system in their country reports on Guatemala, but not New 
Zealand.252 However, they have not formally requested the HRC or CHR to take specific action 
to address Indigenous rights violations. Special procedures experts could push for the removal 
of states from sitting on the HRC or the issue of a HRC recommendation condemning a state's 
actions where they are in serious breach of their Indigenous rights obligations. Lebovic and 
Voeten's research, noted above, identifies the impact a CHR resolution condemning a state's 
human rights record can have on the multilateral aid a state receives.253 Infrequently have 
mandate-holders sought to enrol the power of actors with significant resources and authority, 
such as multilateral finance institutions, sympathetic states ( or minority factions within states) 
and companies;254 Anaya's overtures to Goldcorp's Guatemalan subsidiary being the central 
exception.255 In support, in 2013 Anaya observed that 'more engagement with business 
enterprises is needed' on the part of the mandate and he expressed the hope 'that greater 
emphasis will be placed on this in the future. ' 256 As identified above, multilateral lending 
institutions and foreign donors could be targeted to financially incentivise Guatemala's 
compliance with the special procedures' recommendations. Special procedures experts could 
target sympathetic shareholders in corporations such as Goldcorp to help exert pressure within 
25 1 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc NHRC/ 18/35/Add.3, [74] . 
252 See, eg, Stavenhagen Report on Guatemala, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90/Add.2, [83]-[87]. 
253 Lebovic and Voeten, above n 31, 79. 
254 For comment on the absence of this approach by the UN genera ll y regarding human rights see Flood, above n 7, 
130. 
255 Anaya Special Report on Guatemala, UN Doc NHRC/18/35/Add.3, [66], [74]; Interview 12 (Te lephone 
Interview, 23 June 201 1). 
256 Anaya Report to GA 2013, UN Doc A/68/317, [34]. 
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the organisations for respect for Indigenous rights. 257 Military coercion is not a tool available to, 
or used, by the special procedures acting alone. But special procedures experts could 
foreseeably play a role in bringing grave Indigenous rights violations to the attention of the UN 
Security Council, which has the power to authorise the use of force; 258 although using force, 
especially to advance a human rights agenda, is problematic.259 The special procedures are well 
placed to emol these actors given their time spent at the UN headquarters in Geneva and New 
York, sites at which the heads of many powerful actors come together. 260 
3 Dual Regulatory Pyramids 
I gather these strands together to conceive of mandate-holders' regulatory powers as 
two linked and complementary regulatory pyramids: one strengths-based and another focused 
on enforcement. The idea of regulatory pyramids was introduced in Chapter II. The strengths-
based pyramid is designed to expand strengths to take regulatory domains up through ceilings 
and is backed by rewards.261 It preferences active rather than passive responsibility 'challenging 
actors to take resp~msibility for making things right into the future' rather than 'holding actors 
responsible for wrongs they have done in the past. ' 262 This is a markedly different 
conceptualisation from current rhetoric around Indigenous rights, which tends to be grievance 
based. My strengths-based pyramid for the special procedures starts at its base with education 
and persuasion regarding strengths; it focuses on identifying what the state is good at, assisting 
states to 'find their own motivation to improve' .263 Under this pyramid, states are praised where 
they demonstrate commitment, in order to nurture their motivation to continuously improve.264 
Praise has a role only where human rights performance is reliably shown to have improved, 
however.265 Thus, attention must be paid to ritualistic behaviour where, as in the case studies, 
steps are taken to deflect attention from a failure to implement Indigenous rights norms. The 
pyramid then moves to providing 'prizes' , perhaps in the form of a public award from the chair 
257 The Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala, an NGO, has taken steps in this direction. See, eg, 
Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala, Mobilizing for Goldcorp's 2012 Meeting of Shareholders (20 
June 2012) <http: //nisgua.blogspot.com.au/2012/06/mobilizing-for-goldcorps-2012-meeting.html>. 258 For an argument that the UN Security Council should play a greater role in the protection of human rights see 
Claire Breen, 'Revitalising the United Nations Human Rights Special Procedures Mechanisms as a Means of 
Achieving and Maintaining International Peace and Security' (2008) 12 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
177. 
259 See, eg, Simmons, above n 4, 373-74. 
260 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 17, 560. 
261 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 215,318,330. 
262 Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation', above n 22, 510. Braithwaite draws on 
Mark Bovens in making this distinction. Mark Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship 
in Complex Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 263 The quoted text is from Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation', above n 22, 476. 
Braithwaite speaks ofregulators generally, not the special procedures. I share Braithwaite's view that to do this 
regulators (that is, the special procedures) need to become adept ' at what the counselling literature conceives as 
Rogerian reflective listening: listening that reflects back commitment to achieve outcomes grounded in motivations 
chosen by the speaker': at 499-500. 
264 Ibid 476. 
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of the special procedures ' Coordination Committee or the President of the HRC, where 
Indigenous rights recognition is greatest. It provides capacity-building in the form of offers of 
assistance where Indigenous rights performance is poor and need is greatest, privileging states 
or other actors that have demonstrated a genuine commitment to the realisation of Indigenous 
peoples ' rights. These prizes and assistance are enhanced as the pyramid is climbed. The experts 
will celebrate the innovation of actors whose strengths are expanding by publicising it in their 
reports, before the HRC, and in the media, as well as supporting the extension of these strengths 
with further prizes and grants of capacity-building assistance. Mandate-holders can enrol the 
power of others, including IPOs, NGOs, the UN, other states and businesses, to reward states 
for improvements, rendering it 'a pyramid of progressively more expanded networking of 
capacity-building. ' 266 For example, at the peak of the pyramid the HRC could issue a resolution 
praising states for good Indigenous rights performance.267 IPOs and NGOs could also 
acknowledge positive steps in media campaigns and donor states could inject further funding 
into states showing continuous improvement in Indigenous rights recognition. 268 Yet, some 
states will abuse mandate-holders ' offers of cooperation, which is why the strengths-based 
pyramid needs to be backed up by enforcement capability.269 
The enforcement pyramid is designed to use networked escalation (from deterrent to 
incapacitative sanctions) to identify and solve problems. The enforcement pyramid's strategy is 
one of principled engagement.270 It begins with soft and weak dialogic webs of regulation at its 
base, such as the persuasive techniques of disapproval and shaming. The formal and informal 
meetings between mandate-holders and key state actors in Geneva, New York and domestically 
are good places for respectful pressure to be applied, alongside offers of assistance. 271 Where a 
state is failing to implement recommendations made by a mandate-holder or to respond 
substantively to a communication, the mandate-holder could first contact the state's permanent 
mission in Geneva or high-level state officials in the relevant country to privately express 
concern at the failure. As Chapter II identified, presuming that dialogic forms of social control 
will be tried first lends legitimacy to the more coercive forms of control when they are engaged 
and improves the likelihood of compliance. Mandate-holders should signal, but not threaten, the 
266 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 215 , 315, 317. 
267 Human Rights Watch has suggested that decisions of the HRC ' could include positive measures des igned to 
reinforce and encourage good practices, as well as criticisms'. Human Rights Watch, Curing the Selectivity 
Syndrome: The 2011 Review of the Human Rights Council (20 10) 11 . 
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human rights campaigns. See, eg, Amnesty International Australia, Success Stories 
<http ://www.amnesty.org.au/success/> . In support, at their twentieth meeting the experts 'suggested that positive 
examples of the impact of specia l procedures should be brought to the attention of member States and donors. ' Report 
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sanctions to which they can escalate.272 Although special procedures mandate-holders do not 
have coercive powers, they can temper this handicap by progressively enrolling the capabilities 
of others as they move up the pyramid. 273 The steps continuing up the pyramid could include: 
sending an official letter to the relevant head of state to express concern (further up the pyramid 
the President of the HRC could also do so); conducting a country visit or repeat country visit; 
issuing a press release and meeting with local media to draw attention to the lack of 
implementation; naming non-cooperating states in mandate-holders' reports; shaming the state 
during the interactive dialogue before the HRC or in presenting its report to the GA; relevant 
mandate-holders grouping together to consider the rights issue and publicising their 
observations; holding a special session of the HRC on the issue; requesting the HRC to issue a 
resolution condemning the rights violation; calling on donor states and multilateral finance 
organisations not to provide aid or finance to the country in question; appealing to sympathetic 
states to impose economic sanctions on the violating state; and, in particularly grave 
circumstances, asking the UN Security Council to intervene in the violations. Where efforts at 
'reform and repair' are shown then the expert can de-escalate down the pyramid or,274 when the 
problem is solved, 'switch off' .275 Recall too Braithwaite's observation that '[t]he paradox of 
responsive regulation is that by having a capability to escalate to tough -enforcement, most 
regulation can be about collaborative capacity building.' 276 If the experts have the ability to 
move up to sanctions at the top of the pyramid, and this is known to states, the need to engage 
these tougher sanctions should be small. 
Context is crucial when engaging the dual regulatory pyramids. Mandate-holders must 
remain attentive to the particular contextual factors of each state and rights challenge they 
consider and be flexible in the sanction or reward engaged, or even in applying the pyramid at 
all.277 Circumstances may justify circumventing the order of the pyramid or that a different 
regulatory pyramid is used. Mandate-holders should also not be afraid to use praise and shame 
simultaneously. Braithwaite argues that '[w]hen an organization has been so irresponsible that a 
regulator is punishing it at the peak of its regulatory pyramid for a particular form of conduct, 
there-is no inconsistency in lauding the same organization by moving it to the top of the 
pyramid of supports on some other issue. ' 278 In fact, he argues that praise in one domain can 
build the actor's confidence to address concerns in another domain. 279 Braithwaite 
acknowledges regulators' concerns about sending the public mixed messages about how an 
272 Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation', above n 22, 476. For comment on the 
reasons why threats should exist in the background rather than the foreground see: at 489. 273 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 215, 315; Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Soares, above n 250, 38. 274 Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation', above n 22, 483-84. 275 Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, above n 215, 322. 
276 Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation', above n 22, 475 . 277 Ibid 490, 492-93 . Regarding the special procedures specifically, Flood has argued that ' [h]ow we]) a rapporteur 
tailors strategy and tactics to the specific features of the target state will help significantly in determining how 
successful he or she will be in achieving the goals set forth in the mandate.' Flood, above n 7, 112. 278 Braithwaite, 'Fasken Lecture: The Essence of Responsive Regulation', above n 22, 504. 279 Ibid. 
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actor should be viewed but cautions that ' we should not want the public to stigmatize or 
essentialize a whole organization, or worse, a whole country (such as Iraq), because one part of 
it has done something terrible. ' 280 He argues that the best way to transcend this is to assist 
responsible actors within the organisation to get an upper hand.28 1 This is a pertinent caution in 
the regulatory domain of Indigenous rights where states, such as New Zealand and Guatemala, 
demonstrate behaviour that is both deserving of praise and shame. The focus must be on 
supporting and cultivating Indigenous rights allies within the organs of government. 
E Conclusion: Engage Actors, Contest Principles, Exploit Mechanisms 
A knotty collection of elements elucidate the minimal impact of the special procedures 
on New Zealand and Guatemala ' s behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. The analysis reveals 
several of the decisive factors , including both states ' lack of political will; the institutional 
constraints acting on the mechanism; the special procedures' lack of a coherent vision and 
strategy; the special procedures ' failure to capture the imagination of the actors best placed to 
take their work forward; the uncontested nature of the state's ruling principles of unitary state 
sovereignty, formal equality and national economic development; and, the suite of under-
utilised regulatory mechanisms available to mandate-holders, especially modelling and 
capacity-building. If the special procedures are to have a greater impact on state behaviour 
towards Indigenous peoples these factors must be addressed. Indigenous peoples and other 
advocates of Indigenous rights must be inspired to leverage the reports, the special procedures 
experts must expressly and rigorously counter the principles pushed by states, and all regulatory 
mechanisms must be used. An option presented here is for special procedures mandate-holders 
to engage dual regulatory pyramids, one focused on building strengths and the other on 
enforcement, in order to promote compliance. The dual pyramids neatly illustrate the need for 
the special procedures experts to balance robust criticism of state behaviour in violation of 
Indigenous peoples' rights with empowering praise for efforts to realise them. For many 
lawyers, governed by the myopia of seeing punishment as the response to rights violations, this 
approach will require a leap of faith. Braithwaite argues that ' [r]esponsive regulation for 
continuous improvement in human rights performance is not the way that human rights lawyers 
tend to think. It is a paradigm shift worthy of their consideration, however. ' 282 I agree. As 
someone steeped in the same disciplinary biases, I do not advocate it lightly. I do not seek to 
downplay the gravity of the many Indigenous rights violations that occur on a daily basis or to 
deny the role, explicit and tacit, that states often play in the commission of those wrongs. 
Rather, out of fideli ty to the goal of advancing the realisation of international Indigenous 
280 Ibid . 
281 Ibid . 
282 Brai thwai te, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation , above n 265 , 20 1. 
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peoples' rights norms, I am concerned with identifying approaches that actually work and there 
are indications that a dual enforcement and strengths-based approach could. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
This research set out to understand the role that the international human rights system 
could play in tack.ling the gap between states' commitment to international Indigenous rights 
norms and their domestic implementation of them. To do so it examined how the special 
procedures, a unique and under-researched mechanism within the UN human rights system, 
regulate state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. It found that the special procedures 
regulate state behaviour towards Indigenous peoples unevenly but observably. There are 
instances where states have acted upon the special procedures' recommendations. Yet, in most 
instances this has not translated into the states' conformity to the international Indigenous rights 
norms the subject of the special procedures' recommendations. This is because states deflect 
deep scrutiny of their Indigenous rights records by predominantly engaging in ritualism: 
outwardly agreeing with the special procedures' recommendations , while inwardly developing 
techniques to avoid them. It also determined that the full influential potential of the mechanism 
is untapped; identifying strategies for improving the special procedures' regulatory impact and, 
accordingly, enhancing its role in narrowing the Indigenous rights commitment-implementation 
divide. 
The fact that the special procedures regulate state behaviour at all will challenge 
rationalist theorists. As Chapter III revealed, this independent human rights mechanism enjoys a 
broad mandate to advance the realisation of international Indigenous rights norms, in particular 
through the work of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples, but also through the 50 
additional thematic and country-focused mandates. However, Chapter IV showed that the core 
tools at the mechanism's disposal to carry out this task are dialogic. The experts have no 
mandated power to coerce state cooperation with their work or state implementation of their 
recommendations. As a result, the experts principally deploy shaming techniques, especially 
through their country and special reports, communications and the media. In addition, they seek 
to build dialogue around Indigenous rights norms through the techniques of witnessing, praise 
and knowledge-building. Some, like Anaya, also undertake capacity-building work, supporting 
states to conform to Indigenous rights norms through their technical advisory assistance. They 
conduct this massive task with inadequate UN support: without a salary, with limited funds and 
with varying levels and quality of OHCHR personnel assistance; although a few mandates have 
astutely emolled assistance from beyond the UN. 
Nor do the experts' recommendations appeal to rationalists' understandings of states' 
self-interest. The experts ask states to relinquish some of their power rather than increasing it, 
including seeking recognition ofindigenous peoples' right to self-determination (albeit 
primarily through its less challenging proxies of self-government and the right to participate in 
278 
decision-making), to their lands and resources, and to an education tailored to their cultural 
needs, including one that is in their language. Yet, some states act on these recommendations. 
Chapters V and VI demonstrated the influence the special procedures have had on the 
New Zealand and Guatemalan governments' behaviour towards Indigenous peoples. These two 
vastly different states both expressed partial commitment to the special procedures' 
recommendations concerning Indigenous peoples' soft cultural right to education. Outward 
displays of commitment were also made regarding aspects of the special procedures' 
recommendations regarding the hard rights to self-determination and to land. What is more, the 
case studies showed that, in some cases, the states were influenced in their actions by the 
experts. 
In New Zealand the role of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous peoples in bringing 
about the moves in line with the mandate's country recommendations was faint but identifiable. 
The experts bolstered domestic lobbying efforts for Maori constitutional recognition and 
protection of Maori rights over the foreshore and seabed and, to a lesser extent, for improved 
Maori educational outcomes and access to an education in te reo Maori. Moreover, the New 
Zealand Government claimed to have taken on board Anaya's recommendations in refining the 
replacement foreshore and seabed legislation. 
In Guatemala the special procedures' influence was more pronounced. Anaya had a 
direct influence on the Guatemalan Government's draft instrument regulating consultation with 
Maya, Xinka, and Garifuna through his capacity-building work and, following his special 
country mission, on the Government's announcement that it would suspend operations at the 
Marlin mine. Although the literature has celebrated Stavenhagen's influence on the 
Government's adoption of legislative and policy measures regarding an intercultural bilingual 
education for the state's Indigenous peoples, he at most played a contributory role in these 
developments. 
The fact that the special procedures' influence is more evident in Guatemala than in 
New Zealand will surprise those who expected a developed liberal democracy to be more 
responsive to international human rights regulation than a post-conflict developing state in 
democratic transition. But it reflects the differing contexts of the two states: in New Zealand 
domestic actors, especially the Maori Party, wield more influence over the government, whereas 
in Guatemala international actors do. It also reflects the different regulatory mechanisms 
deployed in the two states. In Guatemala Anaya engaged in capacity-building and embraced a 
more cooperative working style, which seemingly fostered Guatemala's rights commitments. 
However, a deeper reading of New Zealand and Guatemala's public exhibitions of commitment 
to the special procedures experts' recommendations, including Anaya's, revealed that they were 
often ritualised. 
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In both New Zealand and Guatemala, ritualism was the governments' dominant 
response to the special procedures ' efforts to advance the realisation of international Indigenous 
rights norms. The pervasiveness of this behavioural response paints a bleaker picture of the 
special procedures ' regulatory impact. It lends support to Charlesworth's argument that 
ritualism is rife in the field of human rights .1 New Zealand disguised its inward resistance to the 
special procedures experts ' recommendations regarding hard rights to constitutional protection 
and land with a degree of outward acceptance of those recommendations. It leveraged its partial 
commitment to the experts ' recommendations concerning the soft cultural right of Maori to an 
education tailored to their cultural needs, including one in te reo Maori, to deflect attention both 
from its fuller implementation of those soft rights and its resistance to the hard rights. The same 
pattern of behaviour was discernible in Guatemala in relation to the Government's resistance to 
the hard rights to Indigenous peoples' participation in decision-making and land, and its limited 
commitment to Indigenous peoples ' soft right to a bilingual intercultural education. It indicates 
that these states ' anxieties regarding Indigenous peoples' hard rights to self-determination ( even 
its weak proxies) and to their lands and resources persist, despite their endorsement of the 
UNDRJP. While these two states are less resistant to soft cultural rights, the case studies 
demonstrated that even here their level of commitment is unsteady. 
States can successfully maintain the fac;:ade of Indigenous rights commitment, even in 
this hyper information age, given the lack of institutionalised follow-up of implementation of 
the special procedures experts ' recommendations. In the longer term states may be caught out 
where it becomes apparent that the rights issue remains unaddressed. Yet, ritualism buys states 
time. At the point at which the shallow nature of the Indigenous rights commitment is revealed, 
a future government administration will likely have to deal with it. Worse, the ritualised 
commitment may keep the continuing violation permanently hidden from the view of all but 
those who bear its brunt, erecting thick communication barriers between Indigenous peoples and 
their potential allies. 
States ' Indigenous rights ritualism gives us something to work with, however. The fact 
that both New Zealand and Guatemala engage in Indigenous rights ritualism reveals both states ' 
concern to have favourable international Indigenous rights reputations. In the act of pretending 
to comply with the international Indigenous rights norms that underpin the special procedures 
experts' recommendations, there may actually be some compliance by the states: constructivist 
approaches to state conformity to international norms posit that states may become so enmeshed 
in their own rights rhetoric that it leads to improved rights conformity over time; although the 
time horizons for such change may be lengthy.2 The states ' rights ritualism also signals that the 
1 Hilary Charlesworth , 'Kirby Lecture in International Law - Swi mming to Cambodia: Justice and Ri tual in Human 
Rights After Conflict' (20 I 0) 29 The Australian Year Book of International Law I, 12. 
2 See, eg, Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Socializati on ofintemational Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices : Introduction' in Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999) I, 17, 27; Ryan Goodman 
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states view the special procedures as an authority that has some legitimacy; otherwise they 
would outwardly reject the mechanism and its work. 
The discernible, albeit far from perfect, regulatory impact of the special procedures in 
New Zealand and Guatemala is important. It shows that comparatively weak actors like the 
special procedures can influence powerful actors, such as states. It offers some empirical 
backing to the existing literature's largely anecdotal reflections on the special procedures' 
ability to influence states ' human rights behaviour. In doing so it suggests that this instrument of 
the international human rights system retains some of the emancipatory promise of human 
rights, even if the claims that can be made using it are constrained by the mechanism's liberal 
foundations: the master' s tools can contribute to dismantling the master ' s house.3 But other 
devices are needed too 
In understanding the special procedures as a mechanism with influential power it is 
necessary to remain alive to the possible negative consequences of the experts' exercise of that 
power. David Kennedy has termed such consequences the 'dark sides of virtue' .4 As Chapter V 
to VII showed, these can include the experts' positions on rights concerns undercutting 
Indigenous peoples' more challenging claims, such as to stronger forms of self-determination; 
some Indigenous peoples ' voices being excluded; and the misuse and misrepresentation of the 
experts' findings by states and others. Much will depend on the individual mandate-holders, 
given the significant autonomy they enjoy, as to whether the mechanism is an instrument of 
progress in advancing the realisation of Indigenous peoples ' rights. 
While the special procedures' impact in the two states studied here is slight, the 
mechanism has great potential. Chapter II argued that the special procedures have the ability to 
weave webs of influence that conduce state conformity to the international Indigenous rights 
norms they push. Understanding regulation as a product of 'webs of influence' - actors pushing 
contesting principles using different regulatory mechanisms - opens up a host of regulatory 
strategies to the special procedures. Special procedures experts can weave dialogic webs, which 
are often more influential and common than the webs of reward and coercion open to powerful 
actors like states. They can be proactive in micro-macro processes of globalisation as individual 
entrepreneurs, enrolling organisational power and promoting models that highlight 
contradictions in majoritarian identities. They can leverage the principle of continuous 
improvement to build on states ' latent strengths. In other contexts, seemingly powerless actors 
and Derek Jinks, 'Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law' (2008) 19(4) The European 
Journal of International Law 725 , 738-41. Even Anaya observes that in in being ' [m]otivated to appear in 
compliance with their international obligations when under the scrutiny of international bodies, states are more likely 
to actually be in compliance.' S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2 
ed, 2004) 219 (emphasis in original) . 
3 Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider (The Crossing Press Feminist Series, 1984) 112. 4 David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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have mobilised such dialogic networks to significant effect. 5 
Multiplex forces constrain the realisation of the mechanism's full influential capabilities 
in the two case study states. These were examined in Chapter VII, where the threads of the webs 
of influence operating in the Indigenous rights domains in New Zealand and Guatemala were 
unravelled. The analysis enabled a move away from the standard assessment that it is the 
unenforceability of the experts ' recommendations, resource issues and a lack of will on the part 
of states that thwarts the special procedures' influence. These factors matter. But they do not 
capture the whole narrative where Indigenous peoples' rights are concerned. Beyond states and 
institutional actors, other salient actors were not wholly enrolled. The special procedures 
themselves did not display a cohesive vision on Indigenous rights conformity and on ways to 
implement that objective. Further, in the two case study states there was a low take-up of the 
special procedures experts ' recommendations by the actors that are best placed to give them life. 
In part this was because of the weak rights cultures in both states and the lack of knowledge 
regarding the mechanism. But it was also because the experts had failed to capture ( or, in some 
cases, sustain) the imagination of pivotal stakeholders, especially Indigenous peoples. In 
addition, the core principles of unitary state sovereignty, formal equality and national economic 
development leveraged by the states were not sufficiently challenged. Nor were all available 
mechanisms applied with their full might, especially modelling and capacity-building. 
Informed by an understanding of these factors, the research offers insights into how the 
special procedures ' efficacy in realising international Indigenous rights norms could be 
enhanced, insights that can inform practical strategies to help close the Indigenous rights 
implementation gap. To elevate the special procedures ' influence there is a need for the experts 
to refine their plans of action for actor engagement; more frankly and attentively assail the 
principles at the base of states' behavioural responses to their recommendations and the rights 
they promote; and to take advantage of all available regulatory mechanisms. I draw these ideas 
together to propose that the special procedures experts engage dual regulatory pyramids, one 
designed to expand strengths and backed by rewards, and the other focused on enforcement in 
order to ' solve a problem' .6 While no one mechanism is the panacea to the human rights 
situation of Indigenous peoples, by engaging these strategies the special procedures can be a 
compelling tool in the armoury for change. 
The analysis advocates viewing the international human rights system as a potentially 
powerful source of influence regarding Indigenous peoples ' rights; the dialogic 'webs of 
influence ' that human rights actors weave can impact state behaviour. But it also exposes one of 
the tactics states engage in to deflect attention from their resistance to international Indigenous 
rights norms: rituali sm. The depth of the gap between the international commitment to 
5 See, eg, John Braithwaite, Hilary Charlesworth and Aderito Soares, Networked Governance of Freedom and 
Tyranny: Peace in Timor-Leste (ANU EPress, 2012) . 
6 John Braithwaite, Toni Makkai and Valeri e Braithwa ite, Regulating Aged Care (Edward Elgar, 2007) 320, 322. 
282 
Indigenous rights norms and their domestic implementation suggests that ritualism is practised 
by states beyond New Zealand and Guatemala and that it is also engaged in response to 
international human rights mechanisms other than the special procedures. Indigenous rights 
ritualism is an unexplored concept in scholarship concerning the implementation of 
international norms. This research suggests that it is a concept deserving of attention, including 
in states lauded as world leaders in the recognition oflndigenous peoples' rights, such as New 
Zealand. 
Notably, the research supports a shift in the international human rights system's 
predominant focus on shaming states for behaviour that does not conform to international 
Indigenous rights norms to models that simultaneously focus on encouraging and supporting 
states to continuously improve their observance oflndigenous rights. It is not so much that 
dialogue-building and capacity-building have had an arresting impact on state conformity to 
international Indigenous rights norms in the two case study states: these techniques did not 
feature prominently in the approach of the experts in either state, Anaya's efforts in Guatemala 
being the primary exception. Rather, the research shows that the reigning technique of shaming 
states has had a notable lack of impact. The special procedures are well placed to take a leading 
role in this shift in approach, given that dialogue-building and capacity-building are already a 
component of their working repertoire. Shame still has an important role to play where states 
prove unwilling to improve their Indigenous rights behaviour. But, crucially, so too do strengths 
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